

The Soviet Socialist Republic of Iran, 1920–1921

Birth of the Trauma

Cosroe Chaqueri



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In memoriam

To the unknown "bizarre young maiden" who, standing on the deck of a ship at the Caspian, told a Frenchman that although she could not be a soldier among her "brothers," she would fight for the revolution by enrolling in Kuchek Khan's Jangali army.

To D. Ross, in gratitude

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Abbott reported in 1840 and 1844 that Iranian merchants vainly demanded that the shah prohibit the import of foreign goods.⁸

Despite vigorous protests, Iran's commerce was soon dominated by traders from England and Russia, or by merchants under their protection. A British envoy reported from Tabriz in 1851, "Great discontent prevails in the Bazaars of Tabreez in consequence of the duties on goods imported by Persians having been increased; the mode of levying them is also greatly and very justly complained of."⁹ Temporary solutions, such as taking Russian citizenship or buying agricultural lands, proved inadequate for Iranian merchants.

The Babi revolt of 1848-1851, basically a revolt of merchants in religious guise, was crushed in blood.¹⁰ But it was followed by a triumphant rebellion that brought the cancellation of a concession given to a British firm that monopolized domestic and foreign trade in Iranian tobacco.¹¹ By midcentury, the country's economy had undergone tremendous changes: agricultural land was increasingly falling into the hands of rich merchants or government bureaucrats who now geared production to foreign markets; the peasantry was increasingly exploited; and impoverished peasants and artisans, deprived of their livelihood, sought their subsistence elsewhere, mostly by emigrating.

The British consul in Gilan, the rich Caspian province, reported in 1865:

In many districts of Gilan, the peasantry are heavily in debt to their landlords who exact an usurious rate of interest, from 24 to 40 per cent being the lowest figure upon such loans. Money thus lent is frequently lost. A succession of bad crops plunges the labourer into difficulties; he is unable to pay and, when reduced to great straits, deserts the village to elude the pursuit of his creditors.¹²

The situation for traditional industries was no better. Under unequal competition imposed by foreign producers, Iranian artisans were abandoning their trades, as testified by foreign observers such as the German physician Polack, the British envoy Abbott, and Curzon.¹³

Increased exploitation, financial ruin, inflation, and of course natural calamities forced Iran's rural and urban producers to emigrate. This process was accelerated by the rapid capitalist development in industry, mines, and agriculture in the Caucasus and Central Asia that absorbed displaced workers. Emigration was an integral part of Iran's *specific development*, in contrast to what occurred in other colonies or semi-colonies. Iran, with a population of 8-10 million persons between 1900

and 1905, exported 200,000-500,000 working men to the Caucasus and Central Asia annually, where they earned miserable wages.¹⁴ This was the equivalent of 20 to 50 percent of the male population in the northern regions between the ages of twenty and forty. Within this vast emigration to the Caucasus, Iran's workers' movement was born, giving rise to successive forms of political organization—from social democracy to communism.

While Iran's peasants and artisans continued to emigrate, other groups, such as the clerics, discontented merchants, and their allies pressured the royal court and the government for reform. Finally, in the summer of 1906, the deepening economic crisis and the psychological effects of Russia's defeat by the newly emerging Asiatic power, Japan, and its 1905 revolution made possible the temporary defeat of Iran's autocratic state. The ailing, dying shah gave in to popular demands and promised to create a national consultative assembly, the Majles. A month later, he accepted a proposal for a parliament, which was inaugurated on October 7, 1906.¹⁵ The Fundamental Laws of the Nation were submitted to the shah for his signature only five days before his death. One of the parliament's first acts was to recognize the sanctity of private property.¹⁶

The successor to the throne soon revealed his animosity to constitutional government. Between his accession in January 1907 and June 1908, a fierce struggle raged between the new shah, who did everything in his power to dismantle the new parliament, and the constitutionalists. On June 23, 1908, the shah carried out a coup d'état: his Cossack Brigade, led by the Russian colonel Liakhov, bombarded the Majles and massacred whatever important deputies they could put their hands on. This coup occurred against the background of a secret agreement made between the British and Russians in 1907 that divided Iran into two zones of influence.¹⁷ Iranians recognized that their recently acquired democratic institutions had been destroyed as a result of this secret understanding.

Except for the province of Azerbaijan, which did not submit to the new absolute power and soon rose in arms, the whole of Iran was silenced by brutal force. The Azerbaijani revolt was led by Sattar Khan, a popular figure not unlike Zapata in Mexico. The center of the revolt was the city-provincial council (*anjoman*) in Tabriz, which acted as the informal consultative body around Sattar. Iranian social democrats, scattered in Tabriz, Istanbul, and the Caucasus, and helped by their Caucasian comrades, brought enough support to Sattar that he could tilt the balance

some Turkestanian Communists²³ received the Jangali delegation aboard the battleship *Korsk*.²⁴ The Jangalis reached an agreement with the Bolsheviks, the salient points of which are as follows:

1. Communist principles regarding property rights would not be applied, and communist propaganda would be proscribed in Gilan;
2. A provisional revolutionary republican regime would be established;
3. The people would determine the nature of the regime through a constituent assembly after the seizure of Teheran;
4. The Soviets would not interfere in the affairs of the revolutionary government, which would alone be in charge;
5. No Soviet troops should enter Iran beyond the existing 2,000 without authorization by the revolutionary regime;
6. Expenses of the troops stationed in Iran would be covered by the revolutionary regime;
7. Any arms and munitions requested by the revolutionary regime would be delivered against payment;
8. Iranian merchandise confiscated at Baku would be handed over to the revolutionary regime;
9. All Russian commercial enterprises in Iran would be handed over to the republican regime.²⁵

No doubt, this agreement was reached so easily because of previous contacts assuring the Jangali leader of the Bolsheviks' sincerity; he was also presumably aware of Bravin's and Kolomiitsev's views regarding Iran's lack of preparedness for communism.

Evidently, an unannounced part of the agreement was the formation of a tripartite Revolutionary Committee, or Revkom,²⁶ comprised of the following individuals: Kuchek Khan, Ehsan, Mozaffarzâdeh, and Mo'in or-Ro'aya, from the Jangali side; Kamrân Aqâyev for the Iranian Communist party; Kozhanov, commander of Soviet (Azerbaijan) forces remaining in Iran, and Vassili Garkaltselli, a former tsarist-Georgian officer turned Bolshevik, with the Persian alias "Shapour," on behalf of the Bolsheviks; and finally the Volga-German Gauck, alias "Houshang."²⁷ It is noteworthy that during these negotiations, Kuchek Khan promised to give "assistance to the local [Iranian Communist] party organizations."²⁸

As the British left Gilan and Raskolnikov and his seamen departed for Baku, the Jangalis undertook preparations for the "commencement

of the revolution" in Iran. Jangali leaders moved to Resht in a procession accompanied by a military band and red flags.²⁹

A "Soviet Socialist" Republic Is Born

Showers of flowers and enthusiastically received by the city's inhabitants shouting, "Long live Kuchek Khan! Long live Anzali!"³⁰ the Jangali leader immediately organized a public demonstration for June 5 at Sabzeh Maydân (the Green Square), where he and Ehsan made revolutionary speeches. Ehsan repeated more or less what he had said at the Foumen gathering: "With Russian Bolsheviks, whose army [is] composed of workers and peasants . . . we will march on Teheran hand in hand against our enemies . . . and we will be the victors." According to Yaghikian, however, in addition to evoking the glory of Iran's ancient times, the memory of the constitutionalists, Nâser ed-Din Shah's assassin's "good deed," and the bravery of Iranian gendarmerie officers in World War I, Ehsan also rekindled the memory of the pre-Islamic Mazdaki uprising, known in Iran for its "communist" principles. This last allusion helped his enemies to stir people against him as a "Mazdaki or Baha'i."³¹

Kuchek, in a brief address, saluted the population for their enthusiastic support and announced the beginning of the Iranian revolution.³² He reportedly said:

A dazzling light has been lit in Russia, but that at the beginning we were so blinded by its rays that we even turned away from it. But now we have understood all the greatness of this radiant light. If this burning lamp should be extinguished in Russia, the Iranian people will not have the means to rekindle it. All the efforts of the Iranian people should therefore be directed at an alliance with Soviet Russia. As a token of close alliance with Russian Bolsheviks, I embrace the representatives of Soviet Russia.³³

He finished his address by wishing both Lenin and Trotsky long lives.³⁴

Another important speaker at this meeting was Kozhanov, commander of the Soviet forces left behind with the Jangalis by Admiral Raskolnikov. In Yaghikian's account, Kozhanov declared that the Soviet Army, which was composed of peasants and workers and was "ready to cooperate with the revolutionaries of Iran and other nations of the East, will make the necessary sacrifices in order to expel the English from Iran, Mesopotamia, and India. The toiling masses of the East must gather around the leader of the Asian revolution, Comrade Kuchek Khan, in order to annihilate the English, the shah, capitalists, landlords, and des-

endowment (*vaqf*) holding; some private ownership also existed. This form eventually became dominant after the 1906–1909 revolution. For a discussion of the Asiatic mode of production, see *The Ethnological Notebooks of Karl Marx*, ed. L. Krader (Assen, 1972); A. Sultanzade, *ERPAI (Iran's Economic Development and English Imperialism)* (Moscow, 1930), translated in his *Ecrits Economiques*, ed. C. Chaqueri (Florence, 1980); and F. Tökei, *Essays on the Asiatic Mode of Production* (Budapest, 1979).

7. On the expansion of Russia's commercial position in Iran, see D. Krahmer, *Russland in Asien*, vol. 6, *Die Beziehungen Russlands zu Persien zu Persien* (Leipzig, 1903); and G. I. Ter'-Gukasov, *Politicheskie i Ekonomicheskie Interesy Rossii v' Persii* (Petrograd, 1916).

8. See C. Issawi, *The Economic History of Iran, 1800–1914* (Chicago, 1971), pp. 112–258.

9. *Ibid.*, pp. 80–81.

10. For the Babi revolt, see E. G. Browne, *Materials for the Study of Babi Religion* (Cambridge, 1918), and *A Traveller's Narrative* (Cambridge, 1891); J. A. de Gobineau, *Les Religions et Philosophies dans l'Asie Centrale* (Paris, 1865); M. Bayat, *Mysticism and Dissent, Socio-religious Thought in Qajar Iran* (Syracuse, 1982); M. Momen, "The Social Basis of Babi Upheavals in Iran, 1848–53," *International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* 15 (1983): 159–83.

11. For two original accounts of the Tobacco Protest, see the following works: Ann K. S. Lambton, "The Tobacco Règie, a prelude to revolution," *Studia Islamica* 22–23 (1965, 1966), rpt. in *Qajar Persia* (London, 1987); and F. Adamiyat, *Shouresh bar Emtiâz-i Rezhi* (Teheran, 1360/1981).

12. Issawi, *The Economic History of Iran*, p. 209; the deterioration of the peasants' lot, in consequence of the land tenure and the gradual generalization of private ownership is described by Sultanzade in *Iran's Economic Development*; and also by A. Tchilinkirian, "Die Persische Revolution, ihre Ursachen, ihr Charakter und ihre Kampfmethoden," *Die Neue Zeit* 28 (May 20, 1910).

13. See Issawi, *The Economic History of Iran*, pp. 267–69; and George N. Curzon, *Persia and the Persian Question* (London, 1966), 2:41–42; and J. E. Polack, *Persien und Seine Bewohner* (Leipzig, 1865).

14. See C. Chaqueri, *La Social-Démocratie en Iran (Florence, 1978)*, and *Social Democracy in the Persian Constitutional Revolution, 1905–1911*, forthcoming.

15. For a history of the constitutional revolution, see E. G. Browne, *The Persian Revolution of 1905–1909* (London, 1910; rpt. 1966).

16. Article V, Supplements to the Fundamental Laws.

17. On the Anglo-Russian agreement of 1907, see Browne, *The Persian Revolution*, chap. 6; R. P. Churchill, *Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907* (Cedar Rapids, Iowa, 1939); and R. W. Cottam, *Nationalism in Iran* (Pittsburgh, 1979), pp. 164–75.

18. For a detailed study of the role of Iranian Social-Democrats, see Chaqueri, *Social Democracy in the Persian Constitutional Revolution, 1905–1911*, and "The Role and Impact of Armenian Intellectuals in Iranian Politics, 1905–1909," *Armenian Review* 2, 4 (1988).

19. Apparently instituted during the reign of the Safavids, *haidari versus ne'mati* existed in most Iranian cities and was abolished during the reign of the first Pahlavi king. It may have been devised to serve rechannel pent-up energy and anger away from the state and toward the population itself.

20. H. L. Rabino, "Les Provinces Caspiennes de la Perse," *RMM* 32 (1916–1917): 479–80.

21. *Ibid.*; see also Rabino, "Tanzimât Hasaneh," *RMM* 26 (1914): 135–36, which relates how the landed clergy in Gilan resisted the administrative reforms of Mirza M. H. Moshir od-Doleh, the first Sepahsâlâr; the clergy incited "the ignorant people" against them because they were also intended to check the abuse of state revenues.

22. Rabino, "Les Provinces Caspiennes," p. 482.

23. *Ibid.*

24. *Ibid.*, p. 483.

25. In September 1904, another wave of cholera hit Resht but was rapidly brought under control, which kept fatalities to a minimum. *Ibid.*, p. 485.

26. *Ibid.*

27. E. Fakhra'i, *Gilan dar Jonbesh-i Mashroutiyyat (Gilan)* (Teheran, 1973), chap. 3.

28. Issawi, *The Economic History of Iran*, p. 231. See also A. Seyf, "The Plague of 1877 and the Economy of Gilan," *Iran, Journal of British Institute of Persian Studies* 27 (1989): 81–86.

29. See Browne, *The Persian Revolution*; A. Taddayyon, *Naqsh-i Gilan dar Nahzat-i Mashroutiyyat-i Iran* (Teheran, 1974); *Gilan*; H. L. Rabino, *Mashrouteh-yi Gilan* (Resht, 1973); A. Kasravi, *Târikh-i Mashrouteh-yi Iran* (Teheran, 1967); M. Malekzâdeh, *Târikh-i Mashrouteh-yi Iran* (Teheran, 1979), vols. 5, 7. These volumes are often inexact as to their facts and more often ideologically biased.

30. *Gilan*, chap. 16; see also Taddayyon, *Naqsh-i Gilan*, pp. 324–27. Among the important newspapers mentioned by Fakhra'i and by E. G. Browne, *The Press and Poetry of Modern Persia* (Los Angeles, 1983), is *Mojahed*, which seems to have published no more than five issues. See *Historical Documents: The Workers', Social Democratic, and Communist Movement in Iran*, 23 vols., ed. C. Chaqueri (Florence and Teheran, 1969–1993), 6:11–15, for the first issue.

31. Taddayyon, *Naqsh-i Gilan*, pp. 234–36; *Gilan*, chap. 7.

32. The Persian equivalent of "Soviet" (*shorâ*) at this time meant constitutional government; it had been spontaneously adopted from the first Russian revolution.

33. *Gilan*, pp. 95–97; and Malekzâdeh, *Târikh-i Mashrouteh-yi Iran*, vol. 5, chap. 8. After the revolutionaries' victory in 1909, Haji Khomâmi retracted and supported the constitution. However, not taken seriously, he was shot by the revolutionaries.

34. Rabino, *Mashrouteh*, pp. 8–10.

35. According to *Habl ol-Matin*, June 3, 1907, Anzali's "National Anjoman" had twenty-one members in 1907, but "several members withdrew, declaring that they could not agree to sit next to "ordinary" people exercising professions [such as carpentry and masonry] which they considered vile." Others thought this "aristocratic attitude" unpatriotic, one which "hurts our national sentiment

65. See official declaration of the Jangalis, quoted in *Jangali*, p. 89. While Dunsterville, *The Adventures of Dunsterforce*, p. 78, writes that the two Britons fled to Anzali “due to the leniency accorded them,” Yaghikian (an old Armenian social democrat and a naturalized Canadian citizen living in Anzali who was in touch with the British consulate in Resht) told the British minister at Teheran that he had been instrumental in their release (Marling letter, October 14, 1918, FO 248/1212). Dunsterville’s version is partly corroborated by the Presbyterian missionary Murray who wrote that the two Britons escaped through a “clever ruse” and took refuge in a Russian ship at Anzali (October 30, 1919, USNA 891.00/1071). Nikitin, writing in 1941 after reading Dunsterville’s book, states that the two Britons escaped on a ruse organized by him and Stokes, with the help of Armenian Red Cross workers (Nikitin, *Irani keh Man Shenâkhteh Am*, p. 306; “Souvenirs,” pp. 222–23).

Maclaren had a strange fate. It was reported that he had shot and killed Colonel Barttelot, the British military attaché at Teheran, over a “family” issue. Trying to take his own life, he shot himself in the leg and was hospitalized; he was sent to England for trial (Caldwell report, October 15, 1918, USNA 891.00/1092).

66. Donohoe, *With the Persian Expedition*, pp. 204–05.

67. Fakhra’i (*Sardar*, p. 135) reports 100 Jangali dead, 50 wounded, and an unknown number of prisoners; there are no official figures (*Jangali*, pp. 79–80). Murray put the number of Jangali dead, wounded, and captives at only 50 (Murray letter, October 30, 1919, USNA 891.00/1071).

68. The Jangalis blamed Gholâm-Hosein Ebtehâj (brother of Abol-Hasan Ebtehâj, the powerful banker under the Pahlavis) for giving intelligence to the British for bombing Jangali positions. The Ebtehâj family believed that the Jangalis killed their father, but he died at the hands of one of his peasants because of an insulting comment about the Shi’a Hidden Imam. According to Fakhra’i (*Sardar*, pp. 102, 140), though arrested and tried by the Jangalis as a spy, Ebtehâj was released under pressure from Ehsan and Reza Afshâr, two important Jangali leaders and Ebtehâj’s Baha’i co-religionists. Cf. A.-H. Ebtehâj, “Memoirs,” ed. H. Ladjevardi, file 39 [1], p. 1; and *Planning and Power in Iran, Ebtehaj and Economic Development under the Shah*, ed. F. Bostock and G. Jones (London, 1989), pp. 17–20, where, in addition to giving a different version of the father’s death, it is admitted that both worked as “interpreters” for the British occupying forces with “princely” salaries.

69. For descriptions of battles and bombardments, see: Clutterbuck telegrams to Dunsterville beginning June 12, 1918, and Dunsterforce report from Baku, September 1, 1918, both in WO 95/5043; Report of Operations at Resht commencing July 20, 1918; and Mesopotamia Dunster Troops file for April–September 1918, both in WO 95/5044; Dunsterforce report to the British military attaché, August 1, 1918, FO 248/1212; Sabouri, *Negâhi az Daroun*, pp. 66–81; and *Jangali*, pp. 76–105. The French military attaché, Captain Ducrocq, reporting on operations against the Jangalis, confirmed the superior force used by the British supported by military aircraft (May 8, 1919, Archives du MAEF, Asie, Série E, Perse, 1919–1929, doss. 5, pp. 36–40). Nikitin confirms that Resht was bombed by the British (*Irani keh Man Shenâkhteh Am*, p. 310; “Souvenirs,” pp.

225–26); also Reza Khâjavi, “Memoirs,” unpublished MS, p. 32. The Jangali claim that the British bombed a hospital (*Jangali*, p. 91) is corroborated by J. D. Frame (report, July 20, 1918, USNA 891.00/1047). Five patients died and three were wounded.

70. C. Sykes, *Wassmuss, “The German Lawrence,”* p. 177.

71. In his report to Dunsterville, Clutterbuck advised against bombing Resht. For a Jangali account of British atrocities, see S. Kuchekpour, *Nahzat-i Jangal va Oza’-i Farhangi va Ejtema’-yi Gilan va Qazvin* (Resht, 1990), pp. 11–13.

72. Maclaren letter, June 29, 1918, FO 248/1212; he must have referred to incidents such as Russian troops breaking into a female public bath, as reported in some Persian sources; see A. H. Mas’oud-Ansâri, *Zendegi-yi Man*, p. 250, as quoted in *Ayandeh* 13, nos. 8–10, p. 652, n. 2.

73. *Jangali*, pp. 77–81.

74. *Ibid.*, pp. 83–84.

75. *Ibid.*, pp. 86–89, 96–100.

76. Interestingly, the British at this time wished only to talk to Kuchek Khan and ignored Haji Ahmad Kasma’i, who, according to Kuchekpour (*Nahzat-i Jangal*, p. 15) was terribly irritated!

77. The British version also imposes this condition on the British forces.

78. The British version differs slightly, adding the free right of passage for the forces of the central government.

79. The “treaty” was signed by Colonel Mathews (commander of British forces), Meyer (British political officer), Dr. Abol-Qâsem Khan Farbud, and Reza Afshâr (chief of Jangali finances). For the full text of the accord see: *Jangali*, pp. 109–10; *Sardar*, p. 155; and *Jangal*, no. 2, 1918. For the British version, see Cox telegram, July 14, 1919, FO 248/1243 and 1203. Kuchekpour and his editor (*Nahzat-i Jangal*, pp. 15, 159) mistakenly state that Dunsterville took part in the negotiations. (Dunsterville confessed that he never met the Jangali leader.)

80. See for instance *Sardar*, pp. 155–57.

81. During these negotiations the British reportedly told Kuchek Khan that, since he was a patriot and a democrat, they could help him overthrow the corrupt dynasty and install him as Iran’s new ruler. He rejected the idea, affirming that his intention was to free Iran of all foreign influence, including theirs (Kuchekpour, *Nahzat-i Jangal*, pp. 15–16).

82. For Vosouq’s biographical notice, see Appendix.

83. For negotiations between General Thompson and Musavatist ministers, see Kazemzadeh, *The Struggle for Transcaucasia*, pp. 163–69. British gains in the richest part of the Caucasus were best reflected by H. Allen, chairman of the Bibi Eibat Oil Co. (Baku), who welcomed British occupation of the Baku oil fields as a “golden opportunity,” “a second India or a second Egypt” for the British Empire (*Financial News*, December 24, 1918, quoted in L. Fischer, *Oil Imperialism* [New York, 1928], p. 31).

84. Declaration of the Azerbaijani delegation in Paris, quoted in Kazemzadeh, *The Struggle for Transcaucasia*, pp. 220–30.

85. *Sardar*, p. 138.

15. Ehsan, "Memoirs," pt. 3 (*RMI* p. 720); Yaghikian, *Showravi va Jonbesh-i Jangal*, p. 481; Sepehr, *Iran dar Jang-i Bozorg*, p. 391.

16. See Yaghikian's account in *Hist. Doc.*, 13:169-70; see also Yaghikian, *Showravi va Jonbesh-i Jangal*, pp. 42-43, 480-81; *Sardar*, p. 241; M. Sadr, *Khâterât-i Sadr ol-Ashraf* (Teheran, 1985), pp. 248-49; Sabouri, *Negâhi az Daroun*, p. 154; Reza Khâjavi, "Memoirs," unpublished MS, p. 55.

17. *Hist. Doc.*, 13:170.

18. Ehsan, "Memoirs," pt. 3 (*RMI*, p. 720).

19. "The inhabitants of Resht prepared for Kuchek Khan's arrival an indescribable and enthusiastic welcome" (*Setâreh-yi Sorkh*, nos. 3-4 [1929]: 7-9; German trans. in *RMI*, p. 767).

20. *Ra'd*, June 1, 1920.

21. It is unclear whether Reissner meant by *Kopf* a physical or political head (pp. 167-68).

22. Reissner wrote that the commander of the Soviet fleet stood on deck saying: "I await the visit of their National Hero—Kuchek Khan" (ibid., p. 166).

23. Here, too, the accounts differ as to the members of the Soviet delegation; see Kheifets, *Sovetskaia Rossiia i Sopredel'nye Strany*, p. 242; *Sardar*, p. 233; Mirza Isma'il Khan Jangali, *Qiyâm-i Jangal, Yâd-dâsh-tâ-yi Mirzâ Esmâ'il Jangali* [Memoirs] (*Jangali*), ed. E. Râ'in (Teheran, 1978), p. 138; *Hist. Doc.*, 13:190.

24. Sabouri (*Negâhi az Daroun*, p. 151) states that aboard the battleship Kuchek Khan "spoke on the [wireless] with Lenin in Moscow and reached the agreement with him"! This is surely no more than the sort of myth Persians are so capable of inventing.

25. *Sardar* (p. 244) and *Jangali* (p. 138) give identical texts of the agreement, while Yaghikian is silent on its details. The same conditions are recorded by Yaghikian in *Setâreh-yi Iran* (*Hist. Doc.*, 13:183-84). Sabouri, while confirming in essence the above conditions, adds: it was also agreed that, after routing the British in Iran, Bolshevik forces would depart from the southern Iranian port of Boushehr for India, and if necessary, 500 Jangalis would accompany them! No other source even alludes to such a clause (*Negâhi az Daroun*, p. 151).

26. The Revkom is probably the same as the Iranian Red Revolution Committee (IRRC); see below.

27. *Sardar*, p. 251; Yaghikian, *Showravi va Jonbesh-i Jangal*, pp. 66-67, claims that this committee was formed under pressure on the eve of the departure of Ordzhonikidze and Raskolnikov. A declaration of the Revkom, of July 4, 1920, excludes Kamrân Agâyev's name from its membership; see *Hist. Doc.*, 13:125-26. A British Intelligence report gave a different composition: four Russians, Kozhanov, Abukov, Gauck, and another Russian; three Jangalis, including Kuchek Khan. See Edmonds memorandum, June 27, 1920, FO 248/1310).

28. S. L. Agaev and V. N. Plastun, "Voprosy Kommunisticheskogo i Nacional'no-osvobodil'nogo dvizhenia v Irane v 20-kh Godakh" ("The Communist and National Liberation Movement in Iran in 1920"), in *Komintern i Vostok, Kritika Kritiki* (Moscow, 1978), ed. R. A. Ulianovskii; trans. as *The Comintern and the East, A Critique of the Critique* (Moscow, 1981); hereafter the English translation will be quoted, except for parts of the Russian text deleted from the English edition.

29. Sabouri, *Negâhi az Daroun*, pp. 155-56.

30. Ehsan, "Memoirs," pt. 3 (*RMI*, p. 723).

31. Yaghikian, *Showravi va Jonbesh-i Jangal*, pp. 61-62. Being of a Baha'i family, Ehsan was an easy target for fanatic Islamic opponents of the Jangali Movement.

32. Ibid.; Fakhra'i (*Sardar*, p. 245) puts the meeting at a place five kilometers from Resht and on June 3; this does not make sense, since the documents of the official announcement bear the date of June 5, 1920.

33. Kheifets, *Sovetskaia Rossiia i Sopredel'nye Strany*, p. 243; see also *Rosta's* dispatch dated June 13, 1920, FO 371/4917.

34. Yaghikian, *Showravi va Jonbesh-i Jangal*, p. 63.

35. Ibid., pp. 58-59; Sabouri, *Negâhi az Daroun*, p. 156.

36. Yaghikian, *Showravi va Jonbesh-i Jangal*, p. 59.

37. Kuchek Khan, "Cry of the Oppressed Nation of Iran Voiced by the Fa-da'is of Jangal," in ibid., pp. 78-86; *Jangali*, pp. 141-47; *Sardar*, pp. 246-50.

38. In a telegram to Lenin, Raskolnikov informed him of the content of Kuchek's public speech and his attitude toward Soviet Russia; see M. I. Trush, *Vneshnepoliticheskaja Deiatel'nost V.I. Lenina, 1917-1920* (Moscow, 1963), p. 245.

39. Many Western (and Soviet) sources have referred to this republic as the "Gilan Republic" and accused Kuchek Khan of separatism. This is a gross falsification. On the contrary, every piece of evidence emphasizes that all the Jangalis did was done in the name of Iran. See *Revue du Monde Musulman* 42 (1922): 89; G. Lenczowski, *Russia and the West in Iran, 1918-1948* (Ithaca, 1949), p. 57. M. R. Pahlavi, *Mission for My Country* (London, 1960), pp. 113-14; and one of his official historians (E. Safa'i, *Zamineh-ha-yi Koudeta-yi 1229* (Teheran, 1974), p. 219) refers to it as the "Soviet Republic of Gilan."

40. The manifesto was signed by Iran's Red Revolution Committee (not "League" as the two above references give it); see the original manifesto in *Seddâ-yi Teheran*, rpt. in *Hist. Doc.*, 13:110-11; see also Kheifets, *Sovetskaia Rossiia i Sopredel'nye Strany* p. 243. The term *jam'iyat* (league) is, however, used in one of the edicts signed by Kuchek Khan reprinted in facsimile in *Sardar*, p. 263.

41. Unlike most Western scholars, Fakhra'i (*Sardar*, pp. 251-52) and Yaghikian (*Showravi va Jonbesh-i Jangal*, p. 92) state that this Ja'far was not Pishevari (Mir Ja'far Javâdzâdeh), a top leader of the ICP, but rather Ja'far Mohseni, of Iran's Foreign Ministry. This may be true, for communist sources have never acknowledged the participation of Pishevari in the first SSRI government; Raskolnikov in his interview (*Soviet Russia*, October 23, 1920, p. 395) stresses that the closest figure in Kuchek's government to the ICP was Ehsan.

42. For the background of the members of this government, see Yaghikian, *Showravi va Jonbesh-i Jangal*, pp. 91-94.

43. *Hist. Doc.*, 13:120-21; *Sardar*, pp. 251-53. A series of other appointments were made by the IRRC at various government offices, the most important aspect of which was that several Russian Bolsheviks were given advisory positions at key posts: Tronin (alias Fereydoun) at the "political office," Kert at the Military Tribunal, and Kukov at the Security Office (Yaghikian, *Showravi va Jonbesh-i Jangal*, pp. 94-95).