

Modern Iran

Roots and Results of Revolution

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by personal ambition, launched a revolt in south-central Iran. He was defeated, and as a result he fled, along with many of his followers, to India, where there were many adherents of his branch of Isma'ili Shi'ism. The followers of the hereditary Agha Khans, based from the 1840s until today in India, believe them to be the descendants of the first imams, via the Egypt-centered Fatimid dynasty, followed by the Nizaris (Assassins). Hence they are considered living imams, the imams of the Seveners line never having disappeared like the Twelfth Imam of the Twelvers. Unknown to most, a small and often semisecret community of Seveners has continued to exist in Iran after the 1840s exile.⁵

Far more important for Iran from the mid-nineteenth century on was the messianic movement known as the Babis, an altered offshoot of which later spread both within and outside Iran as Baha'ism. The founder of Babism, Sayyed Ali Mohammad, later called the Bab ("gate" to the Twelfth Imam), was born in 1819 into a family of merchants in the southwestern city of Shiraz. Early choosing a religious vocation, he went to study with the most learned of the Shi'i ulama in the shrine cities of Najaf and Karbala in Ottoman Iraq. Here he became a follower of a movement within Shi'ism named the Shaikhi movement after its founder Shaikh Ahmad Ahsa'i (1754-1826). Shaikhi ideas included elements both more philosophical and more mystical than those of most orthodox Shi'is, but their most important special feature was a new "fourth pillar," which suggested that there is always a man in the world capable of interpreting the will of the hidden imam (and perhaps of communicating with him). After returning to Shiraz, in 1844 Sayyed Ali Mohammad proclaimed himself this door (Bab) to the hidden imam. Later, as his claims were rejected by most ulama and they began to treat him as a heretic, he sometimes announced he was the imam himself, returning as was predicted to institute perfection on earth. In Shiraz and later in Isfahan he preached against the corruption and venality of the ulama, and when civil authorities turned against him he attacked them also for their sins. The Bab had started with a small but devoted following, and this quickly grew; many at first came from the Shaikhi community, which had expanded in Iran since the late eighteenth century. On the other hand less radical Shaikhis now began, and continued, to insist that the "Bab" spoken of by Shaikh Ahmad Ahsa'i would not manifest himself openly, and that the concept was spiritual, rather than referring to an identifiable man.

It seems probable that the Babi movement, which developed into open socioreligious messianic revolt, can in part be understood as one of

several mass religiopolitical messianic movements that appeared under the initial impact of the industrialized West in the third world. This impact tends to make third-world countries subject to new trade fluctuations, to undermine handicrafts, restructure agriculture to the detriment of some, and have other disruptive effects, at the same time as Western examples in law, religion, and custom may suggest new ideas on how to meet new problems. Among such messianic movements occurring after the early impact of the industrialized West are the Taiping Rebellion in China, the Ahmadiya and other groups in India and Pakistan, the Mahdist movement of the Sudan, and a variety of Christian and semi-Christian movements in Africa and Latin America. The new ideological content of most of these, as of the Babi movement, supports the idea that they are not simply "traditional" messianic revolts, but are in addition linked to new conditions brought by the Western presence.⁶

Once he lost hope of becoming the leader of a reformed Islam, the Bab not only denounced both secular and religious authorities, but announced a new scripture, the *Bayan*, which contained laws superseding many in the Quran. In his scripture and preachings the Bab spoke out for greater social justice, and his partially modern, perhaps "bourgeois," content is seen in such points as a high valuation of productive work, a denunciation of begging (not blameworthy in Islam, especially as it provides an occasion to give alms), a call for mild and humanitarian treatment of children and others, and the end to the prohibition of taking interest. He also called, if not exactly in modern economic terms, for guarantees for personal property, freedom of trade and profits, and the reduction of arbitrary taxes. He called notably for a higher position for women, who were to be educated and not to be beaten, and for limits on polygamy. The already educated but formerly secluded Babi poet and preacher, Qorrat al-Ain, was reported to have preached unveiled; most Babi women did not dare go that far at this early time.

Whether he claimed to be the gate to the Twelfth Imam or whether, as he sometimes later said, he was both a prophet and the imam himself returned to institute a reign of perfect justice throughout the world, the Bab aroused messianic sentiments among his followers. The differences of his scripture from the Quran he explained by a theory containing a progressive evolutionism rare in premodern thought. Muslims believe that there were prophets before Mohammad but that each brought an essentially identical revelation, from which some followers deviated and needed to be brought back to the true path by a new prophet. Moham-

mad, however, was the last of the prophets (even though Shi'is often seem to revere Ali and Hosain more, their messages are not considered to differ from Mohammad's). The Bab, however, said that each prophet brings a new message in accord with the growing maturity of humanity, and that each new message supersedes the last one. Hence the *Bayan* does not just interpret, but supersedes the Quran, while including the essence of its message. Past prophets are respected and their laws were needed during their own prophetic cycle, but those laws that are superseded are no longer valid. This doctrine was regarded with horror by pious Muslims and was seen as a dangerous heretical breakoff from Islam.

Political events now impinged on the Babi movement. Mohammad Shah died in 1848 and British and Russian protection served to assure the throne to the crown prince, the teen-aged Naser ad-Din, who was to reign for forty-eight years (1848-96). In Muslim countries interregna are often periods for disorder and revolt, as when there is no new king ruling from the capital many consider that no legal ruler exists. As crown princes took some weeks to travel from Tabriz to Tehran, interregna could be dangerous times for rulers and propitious ones for their opponents. The Babis tried to take advantage of this period to begin revolts, and they succeeded in establishing enclaves, first in a village in the Caspian province of Mazanderan and later in some cities. The Babi revolts were not well coordinated nationally, however, owing in part to lack of modern transportation and communication, and the government was able between 1848 and 1851 to suppress them cruelly, massacring many who had been offered safe conduct in return for surrender. The Bab himself was arrested even before the revolts began, and his civil and ulama opponents evidently decided that messianic feelings about him, considered a main factor in the revolts, could be dampened by his execution. Hence, he was taken to Tabriz, interrogated by the ulama about his religious beliefs, and sentenced to death by firing squad, in 1850. The first round of bullets sent up a cloud of smoke, which remarkably cleared to reveal no body, though the Bab was then found and executed, the first volley having merely cut his ropes.

After the suppression of the Babi revolts, during which one Babi enclave adopted a semicomunist doctrine, and the repression that followed, a small and desperate group of Babis tried to kill the shah in 1852. After this there were terrible tortures and executions of Babis, including the woman preacher-poet Qorrat al-Ain. The Babis who survived now

had either to keep their beliefs hidden or to emigrate, concentrating first in Ottoman Baghdad. The successor as leader of the Babis, apparently chosen by the Bab, was called Sobh-e Azal. He was soon challenged by his more dynamic half-brother, Baha'ollah, who succeeded in attracting the great majority of the community. As part of the Bab's progressive theory of prophets, he had predicted that the future would bring a new prophet, "He whom God shall manifest," whose new scripture would supersede his own. In 1863 Baha'ollah declared himself to be this new prophet, and in his writings introduced a cosmopolitan, pacifist, liberal doctrine that largely replaced the Iranian radical messianism of the Bab.

The Baha'is proselytized outside Iran, but are also almost surely the largest non-Muslim religious minority in Iran, while the followers of the Sobh-e Azal, the Azalis, probably now number only a few thousand, nearly all Iranian. Neither group is officially counted as a religion either in Iran or in other Muslim countries. By Muslim law conversion is permitted to Islam or between non-Muslim religions but not *from* Islam, which is apostasy. Nonrecognition of the Baha'i religion is therefore not new and does not distinguish Iran from other Muslim countries; more significant is the question of how Baha'is and other minorities are treated in practice, which has shown some variation.

After 1863, the Azalis retained a strong radical and rebellious component, as well as a hatred for the Qajars that was stronger than their dislike of the Shi'i ulama, and so a number of Azalis were found among the precursors of, and participants in, the Constitutional Revolution of 1905-11. The pacifist Baha'is, on the other hand, eschewed direct political activity, although some of their acts had political implications, and declared their neutrality in the 1905-11 Revolution (which sometimes objectively meant support to the shahs). Many Baha'is received modern educations, and, like other minorities with Westernized educations and sometimes employment, were often suspected of representing Western interests, which added anti-Western feeling to the religious prejudices against them. As with other minorities, most Baha'is probably did nothing to draw hostility, but the acts or positions of only a few among a minority often suffice to add to hostile ideas about a whole religious minority. Besides having modern educations, Baha'is are often professionals or businessmen, and all this has made them frequent scapegoats.

The chief minister brought with him by Naser ad-Din Shah from Tabriz, Mirza Taqi Khan *Amir Kabir*, was heavily involved in the suppression of the Babis from 1848 to 1850. An extremely able man of

humble birth in the royal household, Amir Kabir was the first person after Abbas Mirza to attempt modernization from above. As did most Iranian governmental and other reformers in Qajar times, Amir Kabir followed in part the example of the Ottoman Empire, to which he had traveled, although he was also impressed by what he had seen in Russia. He was primarily concerned, like reformers in other Asian countries, with military reform, beginning his attempt to reorganize the army on Western lines by strengthening the European-style education and training of troops. In order to strengthen the impoverished central treasury, he reduced the number of sinecures and took back many dubious tuyuls, replacing them with small pensions. He founded the first official gazette and the first higher school, the *Dar al-Fonun* in Tehran, which included both technical-scientific and military instruction. It was mainly taught by European teachers with the aid of local translators. For years this was the only modern higher school in Iran, as Naser ad-Din came to fear the upsetting effects of modern education and to discourage both its diffusion in Iran and travel abroad for study. (The effects of these and other policies by this long-lived ruler have scarcely been assessed. In general, Iran would have been better off if "modernization" could have been more gradual and indigenous before 1925 instead of being so much imposed from the top in a brief fifty-year period thereafter.) Under the *Dar al-Fonun's* auspices various Western books were first translated into Persian, the first Persian textbooks were published, and some government officials received their education.

The efforts of Amir Kabir to start modern industries were less successful. Although some factories were begun under his auspices, lack of governmental interest or preparation for factories, treaty preclusion of protective tariffs, and the lack of a prepared labor force, transport, and so forth aborted these enterprises. A few of his schemes for agriculture required less infrastructure and succeeded better.

Some courtiers, landlords, and ulama were threatened by Amir Kabir's reforms, which included measures that hit their economic and judicial powers. They might tolerate him until he achieved success against the Babi menace with his improved military, but once this threat was over many of them worked to get rid of him, aided by the queen mother and also by the imperious tone that Amir Kabir used with Naser ad-Din, perhaps not realizing that the boy had now grown up. A strong defamatory campaign to discredit Amir Kabir finally convinced the young shah that his chief minister was hungry for total power, so the shah dismissed

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Protest and Revolution: 1890–1914

The economic and political dislocations brought by the Western impact included the undermining of most Iranian handicrafts, the transformation of carpet weavers into laborers working for a pittance, the fall in prices of Iranian exports as compared to European imports, and a disastrous drop in the international price of silver, the basis of Iran's currency. These developments, along with the difficulty of being a trader independent of Europeans and the impossibility of setting up protected factories, led to growing economic discontents and resentment against European rivals. Even though some rural and urban groups benefited from trade with the West, they often had other grievances. Increasing Western political control of Iran was resented, and the numerous Iranian merchants and workers who traveled to India, Russian Transcaucasia, and Turkey could witness reforms and hear liberal or radical ideas suggesting ways that governments could change and could undertake self-strengthening policies of a kind that might better Iran's condition and free it from foreign control.

In the 1880s and after there were also a number of officials who advocated reform. Among ministers the most important was Amin ad-Dauleh, who held a variety of positions, chiefly minister of posts, and was generally considered a sincere reformer who disliked the corruption and foreign dominance he saw around him. Less forceful or powerful than men like Amir Kabir or Mirza Hosain Khan (with whom he had not got along), he could have only a small influence in the face of the power held by the long-standing chief minister, Amin as-Soltan. Mirza Malkom Khan, 1833–1908, a Western-educated Armenian Iranian expelled from Iran for forming a society modeled on Freemasonry, later became Iran's

minister to Great Britain from 1873 to 1889, and concentrated his reform activities on promoting a modified Persian script and on writing reformist essays with very limited circulation.

In 1889 Naser ad-Din Shah took his third trip to Europe, which was heavily promoted by the British minister in Iran, Sir Henry Drummond Wolff, who hoped to further British financial interest in Iran, and largely succeeded. Among the concessions signed by the shah was one for a lottery in Iran promoted in part by Malkom Khan. After returning to Iran, the shah faced strong opposition to the lottery concession, coming partly from the religious element who noted that gambling was forbidden by the Quran. The shah canceled the concession and so informed Malkom Khan, who hastened to sell what he controlled of the concession for a good price before its cancellation became known. This and other actions resulted in Malkom's dismissal from his posts and the removal of all his titles. The somewhat tarnished but influential reformer now decided to undermine, or perhaps to blackmail, Iran's rulers by producing an oppositional and reformist newspaper, *Qanun* (Law), printed in London and smuggled into Iran. Preaching the virtues of a fixed legal system and the evils of arbitrary and corrupt government, *Qanun* concentrated its attacks on Amin as-Soltan. It was widely read among Iran's elite during its existence, until the death of Naser ad-Din Shah.¹ The only other free newspaper at this time, the older *Akhtar* put out by Iranians in Istanbul, was milder in its reformism, and hence less often forbidden entry into Iran. Within Iran there were only official journals. (The one freer paper launched with the encouragement of Mirza Hosain Khan in 1876, the bilingual *La Patrie*, lasted for only one issue, in which its French editor called for open and fearless criticism.)

Before 1890 most educated Westernizing reformists had been rather hostile to the ulama—as were reformist officials like Amir Kabir, Mirza Hosain Khan, Amin ad-Dauleh, and the Babi and Baha'i reformers. On the other hand, some ulama increasingly emerged as effective opponents of the alarming trend toward the sale of Iran's resources to foreigners. Moreover, the ulama's virtual inviolability and their ties to the guilds could make even secular reformers recognize them as useful allies in a struggle against foreign control. From 1890 through 1912 there was some reconciliation between secularists and ulama opposed to the regime's policies.

One architect of this historically unusual alliance between religious and radical elements was the internationally traveled Muslim reformer

and pan-Islamist, Sayyed Jamal ad-Din "al-Afghani" (1839-97). Although he claimed Afghan birth and upbringing, probably in order to have more influence in the Sunni world than he could have had as an Iranian of Shi'i birth and education, Afghani was in fact born in Iran and had a Shi'i education in Iran and in the Shi'i shrine cities of Iraq. Educated in the rationalist philosophical tradition of Avicenna and later Iranian philosophers, who were far more taught in Iran than in the Sunni Near East, Afghani was also influenced by the philosophically oriented Shaikhi school of Shi'ism. In about 1857-58 he traveled to India, where he seems to have developed a lifelong hatred of British imperialism. After activities in Afghanistan and Istanbul and an influential stay in Egypt from 1871 to 1879, he continued his modernist and anti-imperialist writing, first in India and then in Paris, where he edited the anti-British and pan-Islamic Arabic newspaper, *al-'Urwa al-Wuthqa*.²

After activities in London, Afghani returned to the south Persian port city of Bushehr, whence he had left decades before for India. He apparently intended only to pick up books sent to him there from Egypt and to go to Russia to continue anti-British activities. The Iranian minister of press, E'temad as-Saltaneh, who had read *al-'Urwa al-Wuthqa*, talked the shah into inviting Afghani to Tehran. There he soon offended the shah, probably by violent anti-British proposals, but gathered a group of Iranian disciples. He apparently spoke to them of the need for uniting religious and nonreligious opposition to foreign encroachments. Forced by the shah to leave Iran in 1887, he spent two years in Russia and then rejoined the shah during the latter's third trip to Europe and received an invitation back to Iran. He first went to Russia, believing he had a mission from Amin as-Soltan to calm Russian hostility over concessions to the British, but in Iran Amin as-Soltan denied such a mission and refused to see him. In the summer of 1890 Afghani heard that the shah was planning to exile him and forestalled this by taking sanctuary in a shrine south of Tehran. He continued to gather disciples, to whom he explained such means of organized opposition as the secret society and the secretly posted and distributed leaflet. His contacts in Iran included his Tehran host, Amin az-Zarb, the wealthiest Persian merchant and master of the mint; Amin ad-Dauleh; some members of the ulama, notably the saintly, ascetic, and progressive Shaikh Hadi Najmabadi; and various reformers and ordinary people, like his devoted servant, Mirza Reza Kermani.

northern and central Iran, including Tehran and Isfahan, in the Russian sphere; southeast Iran in the British sphere; and an area in between (ironically including the area where oil was first found in 1908) in the neutral zone. The Iranians were neither consulted on the agreement nor informed of the terms when it was signed.

After an unsuccessful attempt on his life, the shah achieved, following one failed coup, a successful coup d'état with the help of the Russian-led Cossack Brigade in June 1908. The majles was closed and many popular nationalist leaders, especially those of more advanced views, were arrested and executed. The radical preachers Jamal ad-Din Esfahani (caught while trying to flee), Malek al-Motakallemin and the editor of *Sur-e Esrafil*, Mirza Jahangir Khan (the last two had Azali Babi ties), were among those killed. Taqizadeh along with some others found refuge in the British Legation, whence he went abroad for a time.

While the rest of the country bowed to royal control, the city of Tabriz which, exceptionally, had formed an armed and drilled popular guard, held out against royal forces. The leaders of this popular resistance were brave men of humble origin. One of them, Sattar Khan, had defied the royal order to put up white flags as a sign of surrender to the approaching royal forces, and had instead gone around with his men tearing down white flags, thus initiating the Tabriz resistance. With the help of his coleader, Baqer Khan, Sattar Kahn and their men held out for months against an effective siege by royalist troops. When food supplies became critical the Russians sent troops into Tabriz ostensibly to protect Europeans, but effectively they took over. Many of the popular forces, known alternatively as *Mojahedin* or *Feda'iyān*, both implying self-sacrificing fighters for the faith, left for the nearby Caspian province of Gilan, where they were joined by a local revolutionary armed force, and together they began a march on Tehran. Meanwhile the Bakhtiari tribe, which had grudges against the Qajars and had some leaders who were genuinely liberal and others who wanted to control the central government themselves, helped liberate Isfahan from royalist forces and began moving northward toward Tehran. The Bakhtiaris and the northern revolutionaries converged on Tehran in July 1909. The shah took refuge with the Russians and his minor son Ahmad was made shah with the moderate Oxford-educated Naser al-Molk as regent.

The second majles was elected under a new electoral law calling for a single class of voters, and was marked by differences between what were now considered parties—the Moderates, led by Behbehani, who was

Before 1960, most recognized Iranian intellectuals with a following outside traditional religious circles were to a high degree Westernizers. The desire for rationalized law, rule, and economics was expressed both in the emigré newspapers published before the Constitutional Revolution of 1905-11 and the great majority of papers published in Iran during that revolution, of which *Sur-e Esrafil* with its brilliant prose satire by the writer Dehkhoda and *Iran-e Nau* led by the outstanding socialist Caucasian Rasulzadeh may be singled out. In addition to news, these numerous newspapers were full of new poetry and satires that spoke out against corrupt and hypocritical officials and ulama, and also took as a main theme criticism of the veiling, seclusion, and enforced ignorance of women. Before and during the revolution longer prose forms with themes similarly critical of Iranian mores and looking, at least implicitly, to Western models for improvement, played a role in enlightening Iranians. These, like the newspapers, were often read aloud and discussed to groups. The most famous such early twentieth-century work was Zain al-Abidin Maraghe'i's *Travelbook of Ibrahim Beg*, exposing a myriad of Iranian evils. There were also the improved translation of James Morier's *Hajji Baba of Esfahan* by Mirza Habib Esfahani, which was more savage and political about Iran's faults than the original, and the works by men of Iranian origin living in Russian Transcaucasia, notably Akhundzadeh and Talebzadeh.⁶ The victory of Japan in the Russo-Japanese War aroused interest in Japan's secret of rapid self-strengthening, which many saw in the fact that Japan had a constitution and Russia did not; hence there was a spate of writings on Japan, some of which stressed for the first time the virtues of constitutions.

As to the ulama in the constitutional revolution, there were varying degrees of support for a constitution and of awareness of its implications. Among the popular preachers there were a number in the tradition of Afghani—men brought up with a religious education and filling, more than Afghani, religious functions, notably preaching, but who were not themselves believers in any usual sense. These included most notably two preacher friends from Isfahan—Malek al-Motakallemin and Sayyed Jamal ad-Din Esfahani, the former the father of the historian of the constitutional revolution, Mehdi Malekzadeh, and the latter the father of Iran's first great modern short-story writer, Mohammad Ali Jamalzadeh. Malek al-Motakallemin was long an Azali Babi, although by the time he became a preacher in the revolution he appears to have lost even this belief, while Sayyed Jamal ad-Din Esfahani was described by his son as a

freethinker.⁷ They both recognized the appeal of Islam to the masses and bazaaris, however. Before the Revolution they helped, with the participation of Isfahan businessmen, to set up and publicize an "Islamic company" that would boycott foreign cloth and goods and promote local products. In Tehran, the two became major preachers of the revolutionary and constitutional cause, explaining it in familiar Muslim terms emphasizing such Islamic concepts, particularly central in Shi'ism, as Justice and Oppression. Mohammad Ali Shah considered them among the most dangerous of his enemies and had them both killed in 1908, as he did the editor of *Sur-e Esrafil*, Mirza Jahangir Khan, also of Babi background.⁸

Among the more powerful ulama there was a variety of views, but the most prominent ulama of Iraq and many prominent ones in Iran remained proconstitutional throughout the revolution, although there were defections as the social revolutionary and even "anti-Islamic" potential of the constitution became clearer. The two main ulama constitutional leaders within Iran were very different types: Sayyed Mohammad Tabataba'i, who appears to have had genuinely liberal proclivities and considerable contact with other liberals, believed that a constitution would be the best way to limit the power of uncontrolled autocrats who were selling Iran to the Western powers. The more wily and powerful Sayyed Abdollah Behbehani had a long record of pro-British activity; he had been almost alone in refusing to back the anti-British tobacco movement, had taken personal presents and money from the British to organize movements against the Russians, and had helped arrange the use of the British Legation for the bast of 1906. To a degree his early participation in the revolution may be seen as part of his pro-British policy with an aim of advancing himself as he weakened the Qajars. He also wished to keep the constitutional movement conservative, while not openly turning against it. The third main leader of the Tehran ulama, Shaikh Fazlollah Nuri, did turn against the movement once it became clear that the constitution was not going to reinstate the sharia, but bring in many Western-style institutions and laws. The constitution and its form reflected more the ideas of Westernizing secularists, backed financially especially by merchants, than the ulama, although, as noted, provisions were inserted to protect ulama power. However, in 1909, a defense of the constitution was written by a younger mujtahid, Na'ini, that was endorsed by leading Iraqi ulama.⁹ It does not appear to have been very influential when it was written, however; its real fame and importance

dence on the West and the spread of Western ways. Although Western goods are widely sold in the bazaars, the growth of supermarkets, department stores, large banks, and goods like machine-made carpeting that compete with Persian rugs added to Western control of Iran's economy and reduced the role of the bazaar. Governmental favoring of non-bazaar trade and industry and various plans of "modernization" or dispersal of the bazaar, of which two have been discussed, were partly designed to weaken the bazaar's politico-economic cohesion and were seen as a threat. Among those who live much in the old way in the traditional economy, Western mores are often viewed with horror, and the "traditionalist" bazaar attitude along with the close family, financial, and cultural ties of the bazaar with the ulama, help explain the bazaar-ulama alliance that has been responsible for so much revolutionary activity in Iran since 1891. Religious taxes and gifts to the ulama for religious, educational, charitable, and political purposes come from bazaaris, account for a high percentage of ulama influence, and help cement the political ties between bazaar and mosque. In addition, bazaaris often held weekly "religious" meetings in homes, which provided an ideal network for discussing political problems and tactics. The extent and propinquity of small, open bazaar shops make the bazaar an easy area for rapid communication and organization.

Some in the modern economy who had recently moved from the bazaar were also attracted particularly by Shariati's blend of Islam with modern ideas. Despite the modernization of Iran, the bazaar remained a focal point of major political opposition movements from 1891 through 1979. This was partly due to the ease of organizing craft and religious circles that in time of crisis took on an increasingly political aspect. In addition, bazaaris have been closely tied to the ulama who, as noted, have given ideological leadership to many important oppositional movements. Most bazaaris are free of ties to the government, which might have made them hesitate (as did many in the modern middle class, often in governmental or quasi-governmental jobs) to join a really revolutionary movement. Although one tends to think of bazaaris as a group in decline, this is probably true only in a relative sense; the new middle class with Westernized educations and positions may have grown faster than they, but with the massive immigration from the countryside there was more need than ever before for petty retailers, bazaar wholesalers, and bazaar moneylenders and bankers, so that their numbers are considerable and have grown along with cities. According to Robert Graham, citing reli-

able estimates: "Despite the modernisation of the economy, the Bazaar still controls over two-thirds of domestic wholesale trade and accounts for at least 30 per cent of all imports . . . At the same time through its control of the carpet trade and other export items like nuts and dried fruits, the Bazaar has access to foreign exchange which has not been channelled through the official system. . . . One unofficial estimate puts Bazaari lending in 1976 at 15 per cent of private sector credit."⁹

Over the years the Pahlavis tried to reduce bazaar power by building new streets, shops, schools, and institutions away from it; by imposing grid patterns on bazaar streets, by controlling distribution, and by campaigns against "profiteers," chiefly bazaaris rather than the really rich, and by restricting cheap credit to bazaaris. Although a major shift in economic power to the modern sector occurred, bazaaris were neither cowed nor reduced in numbers.

One incident in the new militant bazaar-ulama alliance was a fight to keep Iran's most ubiquitous private bank, the Bank Saderat, considered by some to be the bazaaris' friend, from falling under the control of a Baha'i, Yazdani, who had acquired a 26 percent share in it. Working with ulama, bazaar merchants organized a campaign of withdrawals from the bank and Yazdani was forced to sell out. Bazaaris also helped to support families of victims of 1978's struggles, and provided financial support for the antiregime strikes that began in May 1978 among university students and teachers and in the fall spread to the workers and civil servants.

Another group important in the victory of the revolution was the subproletariat, often recent immigrants to town. These people lived in slums and shantytowns with few amenities; often left their families behind in the village; and suffered increasingly from the growing shortage of unskilled construction and other jobs from 1976 onward, combined with a rise in prices. Uprooted literally and culturally, and closer physically and culturally to the bazaar than to the modernized parts of town, they easily believed that drastic action should be taken to see that the oil billions they knew were streaming into Iran did something for them.

The key role of such rootless young males was first seen in the important Tabriz riot of February 1978, which began in commemoration of those killed in Qom in January but soon turned into a strong protest against the shah. The Azerbaijani police reportedly refused to act, and outside troops were called in, and began to shoot. A riot developed, led by youths, who attacked the banks, the headquarters of the shah's

The NF had a third of the ministers in the provisional government. After the revolution, younger, more left-leaning members dissatisfied with the NF, led by Hedayatollah Matin-Daftari, Mosaddeq's grandson, created the National Democratic Front (NDF) in March 1979, with a leftist program and a stress on human rights. The emigration of hundreds of thousands of largely modern middle-class Iranians reduced the NF and NDF constituencies.

The Muslim non-Khomeinist left included the armed and disciplined Mojahedin-e Khalq (MK). Decimated by executions under the shah, they grew rapidly during and after the revolution, and in 1979 organized large rallies in the major cities. They, like the Marxist Feda'iyān-e Khalq, were partly responsible for the revolution's victory. The MK called for rule by peasants and workers, the nationalization of industries, an end to ties with the West, and close relations with the third world and Eastern Europe. They had a radical interpretation of Islam.⁶ The secular left ranged from Stalinists to Maoists and Trotskyists. The largest were the Soviet-oriented Tudeh and the Feda'iyān-e Khalq, while the Maoist Peykar came from the secular wing of the MK. Secular left programs were similar to that of the MK minus Islam. Their parties were largely composed of high school and university students, with some intellectuals and workers. Khomeini refused to meet with leftist parties and excluded them from government.

There was no unity among leftist groups. The Feda'iyān at first tried to work both with the Khomeini forces and with the Tudeh, which led to splits, the most important being into Majority (pro-Tudeh) and Minority groups in 1980. Leftists followed contradictory strategies, with the Feda'iyān Majority and the Tudeh backing Khomeini, while others supported the moderates, and many criticized both. The left had contributed importantly to the revolution but often used terms most Iranians did not understand, lacked a good analysis of Iran, and were sometimes blinded by anti-imperialist rhetoric. The influence of Soviet policy on the Tudeh and Feda'iyān Majority was a deterrent to their developing appropriate programs for Iran. Also, the left had no significant source of economic support, unlike the clerics, who were heavily supported by bazaaris and old and new foundations.⁷

The Khomeinists centered in the Islamic Republic Party (IRP), created with Khomeini's approval in February 1979. Ayatollah Mohammad Beheshti was its main figure; he had a Ph.D. in religious studies from Tehran University, spoke English and German, and had been sent by the

shah's government to head the Islamic Center in Hamburg in the seventies. The IRP was created to increase clerical and Khomeinist power to support Islamic government and comprised various Islamic groups. The IRP included opposing interests of merchants and the lower classes, but Khomeini's popularity and the desire for strength against the opposition kept it viable as long as opposition groups were allowed to exist and could be seen as a threat to Khomeinist power. It had ties to armed paralegal forces like the Revolutionary Guard (Pasdaran), created by Khomeini in May 1979, and the violent groups called *hezbollah*. These groups disrupted demonstrations and attacked dissidents. Khomeini appointed IRP-endorsed ulama as Friday prayer leaders in nearly all cities and as his representatives in government bodies. The IRP got support from the traditional middle class and from the often-migrant poor. A conservative religious group in the first period who did not support Khomeini's idea of rule by the jurist, *velayat-e faqih*, was the *hojjatiyeh* society, which began before 1978 as an anti-Baha'i group. Khomeinists severely criticized it in 1983, after which the term virtually disappeared.⁸ Another term current in the early period was *maktabi*, adopted by Khomeinists to contrast with the *hojjatiyeh* and other non-Khomeinists.

Khomeini was popular because of his uncompromising attitude to the shah, his anti-imperialist and populist rhetoric, his simple lifestyle and language, and his religious status. Although he made Bazargan prime minister, he chose many key administrative personnel from clerics and others in his camp. He then kept mostly divorced from direct administration, except to intervene pro or con when other bodies had acted, and hence shielded himself from much criticism for bad policies.

Both nationalists and ulama respected Bazargan. When he took over, government authority was almost nonexistent, and some ethnic groups (Kurds, Turkomans) and leftists were in revolt. Thousands of trained persons had fled, oil production was low, strikes continued, major industries were shut down, and unemployment and inflation were high. The government had to restore order and supervise a referendum, an election, and a constituent assembly. Despite accomplishing these tasks, the provisional government soon had far less power than the Khomeinists and their organizations.

Regional autonomist movements in non-Persian-speaking areas were important in these early years, with some risings among the Turkomans and armed struggles by the Kurds, backed by the National Democratic Party and some of the leftist parties, from 1979 through 1981. Some