THE BABI CONCEPT OF HOLY WAR

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The religious movement known as Babism appeared in mid-nineteenth-century Iran following the promulgation of charismatic claims by a young merchant, Sayyid 'Ali Muḥammad Shīrāzī, in 1844. In its earliest phase (to 1848), Babism grew rapidly among the Shi'a populations of Iran and Iraq as an expression of extreme Islamic pietism animated by urgent expectation of the return of the Hidden Imam in his messianic persona as the Imam Mahdi, Sayyid 'Ali Muḥammad being his agent or 'gate' (bāb) on earth. In its brief second phase (1848–49), the movement achieved a tremendous charismatic breakthrough when a gathering of Bābīs announced the abrogation of the Islamic legal code while the Bāb (by now in prison in the north west of Iran) proclaimed himself the promised Mahdi in person. A third phase followed, initiated by the Bāb's rapid assumption of the role of an independent prophet or divine 'manifestation' directly empowered by God to open a new religious dispensation after Islam, to reveal new scriptures and to ordain a new legal system. Between 1848 and 1850, some four or five thousand Bābīs died in fierce clashes with state troops, while the Bāb himself was executed by firing squad in July 1850.¹

The following article seeks to clarify the background to the Bābī-state clashes in the form of a discussion of the theory of holy war as presented in early Bābī writings and to analyse these conflicts themselves within the context of that theory. It is hoped that this analysis will also provide a basis for a later discussion of the dynamics of the transformation which took place from the 1860s from Babism to Bahā'īsm.

Although some form of holy war has been recognized at various times and in different places in most religions, it is a concept most typically associated with Islam, a religion in which it has played a central role and where it has developed what is probably its most distinctive form as well as its most elaborate theological justification. It is not surprising, therefore, that holy war or jihād came to be a major feature of Babism, particularly in its early 'Islamic' phase, and that a response to the problems raised by jihād in the contemporary
period, as well as to the complications engendered by Babi militancy, became a dominant element in the early development of the doctrines of the derivative Bahá'í movement. Until now, however, the role of *jihād* in Bābī theory and practice has been largely ignored by scholars, and no serious attempt has as yet been made to define or analyse its relationship to the Islamic concept of religious warfare.

It has, for example, been common to speak of ‘Bābī uprisings’, or ‘Bābī-inspired revolt’ and ‘rebellion’, of a Bābī ‘rebellion against the state’, and of ‘Bābī insurrection’. Later Bahá'í writers have, on the other hand, consistently characterized the military activities of the Bábís as defensive measures taken in response to religious persecution and have rejected all suggestions of rebellion or, indeed, of militancy. Thus, one writer states that ‘when they (the Bábís) defended themselves, as they did in a few places where a large number of Bábís had congregated, their enemies misrepresented them as rebelling’, and speaks of ‘prolonged Bābī resistance to the attacks of vastly superior forces’ and the ‘heroic defence’ of the Bábís. Each of the struggles in Mazandarān, Nayriz and Zanjān is generally described as an ‘upheaval’, ‘conflagration’, or ‘commotion’, and the participants in them as ‘the victims of an intense and systematic persecution on the part of both civil and ecclesiastical authorities’, as ‘martyrs’, and as ‘the scattered disciples of a persecuted community’. Emphasis is laid on the ‘categorical repudiation, on the part of the Bábís, of any intention of interfering with the civil jurisdiction of the realm, or of undermining the legitimate authority of its sovereign’, and on the denial by the Bābī leadership that they had sought to ‘direct any offensive’ against their opponents. Both these views—‘rebellion’ on the one hand and ‘self-defence’ and ‘persecution’ on the other—obscure the more fundamental issue of the nature, status, and function of *jihād* within the Bābī movement, as derived from Islam, from the writings of the Báb, and from the expressed attitudes of the Bābī leadership in those localities where trouble broke out. A careful consideration of the doctrine of holy war is a vital factor in the study of the Báb-Bahá’í movement, for a number of reasons. Firstly, it provides us with an important focus for the consideration of the Báb’s attitude and the attitudes of his followers to Islam and to the Qājār state. Secondly, it enables us to carry out a reappraisal of the political and ethical issues involved in the struggles of Shaykh  Ṭabarṣī, Nayriz and Zanjān, as well as in other outbreaks of violence on a smaller scale between Bábís and Muslim civilians or military forces. Thirdly, it leads us directly to one of the most central questions around which the development of Bahá’ism out of Babism revolves, and clarifies for us what is perhaps the most distinctive feature of early Bahá’í doctrine.
THE ISLAMIC CONCEPT OF JIHĀD
From the beginning, jihād has played a vital role in the expansion and consolidation of Islam and in the structuring of its world view. M.M. Bravmann has convincingly demonstrated the close connections between the concepts of islam (submission, surrender) and those of holy war (jihād), war in general (harb) and fighting (qitāl) in the earliest period. More perhaps than the other major teachings of Islam, jihād bears a deep relationship to its image and function as a universal religion to which, in the end, all men must submit, and whose legal and political system must ultimately embrace the planet. Muḥammad is the last of the prophets and, as such, commissioned by God with a message, not for one people or race, but for all mankind: ‘We have not sent you save as a bringer of universal tidings and a warner unto men’. Muḥammad’s function as a bringer of tidings and a warner (primarily concerning the Day of Judgment) included the obligation to proclaim the message given him by God and to summon men to God and to submission to Him (al-islām). Although the duty of inviting men to Islam fell primarily on the shoulders of the Prophet (particularly in the early period when access to him was always feasible), and although the ultimate work of guidance was left in the hands of God, there gradually developed in both theory and practice an obligation for the believers to assist God and His apostle in the universal daʿwā, the summons to Islam. The nature of this daʿwā was necessarily closely linked to the actual circumstances in which the Prophet and his followers found themselves and to the character of the response which it evoked.

During the Meccan period (about 610–622 A.D.), Muhammad and his companions found themselves in a position of extreme weakness vis-à-vis the possible or actual physical sanctions of the society in which they lived. Summoning to Islam was to be carried out wisely and in a spirit of loving persuasion: ‘ Summon to the path of your Lord with wisdom and goodly counsel; dispute with them in the most suitable manner’. The punishment of unbelievers lay outside the sphere of action of the small Islamic community; it would be taken care of in due course by God—in the meantime, men were to be warned of the imminence of such punishment and invited to salvation through embracing the true faith.

The first sign of a marked change in policy coincided with the accession of some real strength to the Islamic community by the conversion of large numbers in the city of Medina between the summer of 621 and June 622. In this latter month, a party of seventy-five Medinan Muslims came to Mecca, met Muḥammad by night, and pledged themselves to accept him as their prophet, to avoid the commission of sins, and to fight on behalf of God and His messenger. This ‘Second Pledge of al-Aqaba’ came to be known as ‘the Pledge
of War'. According to some Muslim authorities, it was not long after this that the first revelation concerning fighting was given to Muhammad, in a passage which now constitutes verses 30 to 40 of the eighth chapter of the Qur'an: 'Say to those that have disbelieved in God that if they should cease (from persecuting the believers), that which has gone before shall be forgiven them; but should they begin once more, then the example of those who went before them has already been given. Wherefore, fight them until persecution shall be no more and religion shall belong in its entirety to God. But if they should cease, God beholds all that they do'.

In Medina, Muhammad's role changed gradually from that of prophet pure and simple to that of divinely-inspired legislator and de facto leader of a city state comprising Meccan and Medinan Muslims, pagan Arabs of Medina, and three allied Jewish tribes. In 623, having sufficiently consolidated his position in Medina, Muhammad initiated the practice of sending out expeditions against Meccan caravans. These raids soon began to acquire something of the character of a holy war: the Quranic injunctions to take part in them emphasized the virtue of striving (jihad) in the way of God and were eventually addressed to the community of believers as a whole, rather than specifically to the Meccan emigrants originally involved in this activity. The term for thus striving on behalf of God and His prophet against the unbelievers came, before long, to be the technical term for the holy war waged by Islam against the world of infidelity. 'The change from the razzia (expedition) to the jihad', writes Montgomery Watt, 'may seem to be no more than a change of name, the giving of an aura of religion to what was essentially the same activity. Yet this was not so. There was a change in the activity which came to be of the utmost importance as time went on. A razzia was the action of a tribe against another tribe . . . Jihad, however, was the action of a religious community against non-members of the community, and the community was expanding. If the members of the pagan tribes raided by the Muslims professed Islam, they at once became exempt from further Muslim raids. Consequently, as the Islamic community grew, the raiding propensities of the Muslims had to be directed ever further outwards.'

The open outbreak of hostilities between the fledgling Islamic state and the city of Mecca and the subsequent escalation of the conflict in the battles of Badr (624) and Uhud (625), leading to the Siege of the Trench in 627 and culminating in the final capitulation of the Meccans in January 630, must all be studied in the standard histories. There is, similarly, no room here to enter in any detail into the discussion as to the dating of those passages of the Qur'an which elaborate the rationale and method of the holy war.

In general, there would appear to have been a gradual movement from injunctions to fight on a defensive basis to more explicitly aggressive ordinances in the later years of the Prophet's life. The early period seems to
have been characterized by a certain distinction between the military role of *jihād* on the one hand and religious conversion by peaceful means on the other: ‘there is no compulsion in religion’. Nevertheless, even if it was recognized that conscience could not be compelled by force (at least in days when the techniques of brain-washing had not been thought of), Islam was a system in which church and state, religion and politics formed a unity. To spread the faith, it was necessary to spread the Pax Islamica within which the law and polity of Islam might hold sway. To engage in *jihād* was a religious act of the greatest piety in a world divided in almost Manichaean fashion between God and the devil, belief and unbelief: ‘Those who believe do battle for the cause of God, while the unbelievers wage war on behalf of idols’. Following the capture of Mecca, an unremitting war against all idolaters was enjoined on the Muslim community: ‘When the sacred months are past, slay the idolaters wherever you may come upon them, and seize them, and lay siege to them, and prepare ambushes for them; but if they are converted and perform the obligatory prayer and pay the alms-tax, then leave their way open’. Jews and Christians, who had previously been looked on with some favour, were regarded now as, for the most part, unbelievers (*kuffār*) and enemies of Islam, and war against them was prescribed, until they would pay a submission tax or impost known as *jizya*. Islam was to be the universal religion, before which all others were to give way: ‘He (God) it is Who has sent His messenger with guidance and with the true religion, that He may make it supreme over all religions, even though the unbelievers may be averse to it’; ‘fight then until mischief is at an end and all religion may belong to God’. As is well known, *jihād* played a fundamental role in the physical expansion of Islam after the death of the Prophet in 632. The doctrine of the abrogation of earlier Quranic texts by later ones meant that, in practice, *jihād* was waged in accordance with those scriptural injunctions which reflected an intransigent, uncompromising attitude towards pagans and ‘people of the Book’ (Jews, Christians and, later, Zoroastrians). The former were normally given a simple choice between conversion and death; the latter were given three choices: they could submit to the authority of the Islamic state, pay the poll-tax and land-tax, and be treated as protected but definitely inferior subjects of the Islamic state (whose only true citizens were Muslims); they could fight but, if defeated, might be enslaved and their property be taken as booty, four-fifths of it belonging to the Muslim army; or they could embrace Islam and become full citizens.

Over the centuries, *jihād* has remained a duty binding on the community of believers, rather than an individual duty. In theory, this duty cannot be relaxed until the faith of Islam holds universal sway or ‘until the Day of Resurrection’. Traditionally, the world is divided into two sections: the *dār al-ḥarb* (realm of war) and *dār al-islām* (realm of Islam), and it is the function...
of *jihad* to transform the former into the latter; theoretically, therefore, a state of perpetual war exists between the Islamic world and the rest of mankind, although it has not always proved possible in practice to maintain this position in an active sense, particularly in the modern period. Nevertheless, any war between a Muslim and a non-Muslim state, whether offensive or, as has occurred more frequently in recent centuries, defensive, has the status of *jihad*, and those who die while waging such a war are accounted martyrs. In principle, war between Muslim states is prohibited; where it does occur, however, it is referred to as ‘war’, ‘fighting’ or ‘conflict’, but never as *jihad*. In general, this principle also applies in the case of conflict between an army of an orthodox Islamic state and the members of a heretical group, within or without the state, although on more than one occasion *jihad* has been invoked as a means of sanctioning a struggle against sectaries and rebels, defined as ‘people of rebellion’ (*ahl al-baghy*).

The Twelver Shi‘ī doctrine of *jihad* is, for the most part, identical with the Sunnī theory, but the peculiar conditions under which Shi‘īsm developed created a number of differences, some of which are of considerable importance. The Shi‘ī theory presents two features of particular interest, namely: the identity of the individual empowered to lead the faithful in the prosecution of such a struggle, and that of the enemies against whom it may be waged. With respect to the first of these, Shi‘ī theory limits the leadership of the holy war to one of the twelve Imāms or to his lieutenant designate. In practice, only the Imāms Ālī and Ḥusayn ever led an army into battle, and the failure of the latter’s rising against the Ummayad state resulted in the adoption of a quietist position by his successors. *Jihad* came to be regarded as being held in abeyance until the moment arrived for its revival—that is, on the return of the twelfth Imām as the divinely-guided Mahdi who would conquer the world for Islam. Since the hidden Imām did not delegate his authority directly to anyone except the four ‘gates’ (*abwāb*, sing. *bāb*) who followed him during his ‘lesser occultation’, *jihad* could no longer be declared, since for anyone to do so would be for him to usurp the prerogative of the Imām of the age. In practice, however, this theory required modification in cases where the survival of a Shi‘ī state might depend on its ability to launch a legitimate holy war against its enemies. Abū Ja‘far al-Tūsī argued that *jihad* of a defensive nature might be waged in the absence of the Imām, a view that had a powerful influence on later theorists. Certain jurists of the Šī‘ī period stated that the believers could be summoned to *jihad* by the Imām or by a person appointed by him to do so, in a context implying that the duty of issuing such a summons rested with the *ulamā*, the religious scholars, as representatives of the Imam.

In the Šafavī period, the establishment of a powerful, centralized Shi‘ī state capable of waging both offensive and defensive warfare, was combined with the claim by the monarchs of the dynasty to be descended from the Imāms and
to possess the authority needed to assume many of their prerogatives, including that of leading *jihād*. The situation changed somewhat under the Qājārs in the nineteenth century; in this case, the ruling dynasty was considered illegitimate by much of the religious establishment, while the latter waxed considerably in their influence, particularly during the first part of the nineteenth century.Individual *ʿulamā* such as Shaykh Jaʿfar al-Nayafī, Mullā Muhammad Bāqir Ḥujjat al-İslām Shāftī, and Shaykh Muḥammad Ḥasan al-Nayafī possessed personal power to a degree unmatched by even the greatest of their Šafāvī predecessors. The newly-powerful *mujtāhids* and, in particular, those of them who could lay claim to the function of *marjāʿiyyat* (acting as a model and authority for the behaviour of others), came to be regarded as the de facto representatives of the Imām. Coinciding with this novel situation came the threat of Russian aggression on the northern borders of Iran, leading directly to the outbreak of the Russo-Persian wars of 1804–13 and 1826–28. In 1809, five years after the start of the first of these wars, Mīrzā Buzurg Farāhānī Qā’īm Maqām, the vazir of crown prince ĖAbbās Mīrzā, either on his own initiative or on the instructions of Fath Ėlī Shāh, obtained decrees from several of the leading *ʿulamā* at the Šīʿī shrines in Iraq, declaring the war against Russia to be a *jihād*. These decrees were collected by Mīrzā Buzurg in a volume entitled *Riṣāla-yi jihādiyya*, which was one of the first books ever printed in Iran. In 1826, Russian atrocities committed against the Muslim population of the Caucasus stirred the religious authorities in Iraq and Iran, led by Āqā Sayyid Muḥammad Isfahānī, to declare a second *jihād*. Reluctant to declare war on Russia, Fath Ėlī Shāh was, in the end, forced to do so by religious pressure from the *ʿulamā*, which included the issuing of a decree to the effect that opposition to *jihād* was a sign of unbelief. In 1836, an attempt was made to preach holy war against the Sunni Afghans and Turkomans; in 1843, following the sack of Karbala by Najib Pāshā, a similar attempt was made to wage a Šīʿī *jihād* against the Ottomans; and in 1856/57 a more intensive effort was made by the state itself to launch a full-scale *jihād* against the British, who had declared war on Iran after the sack of Herat in 1856. Among those impelled by the British attack on Iran to advocate the launching of a holy war was Ḥājj Mullā Muḥammad Karīm Khān Kirmānī, the leader of the Shaykhī sect in Kirmān, who wrote a lengthy treatise entitled *Riṣāla-yi Naṣīriyya*, in which he outlined the nature of *jihād* and its varieties and called on Naṣīr al-Dīn Shāh and the people of Iran to defend the faith of Iran against the incursions of the unbelievers.

*Jihād* has also been invoked on occasion during the present century. In 1912, for example, following the Italian invasion of Libya, some of the Iranian *ʿulamā* of Iraq called, somewhat quixotically, for a holy war against the invaders, as much to stir up feelings against the British and Russians then occupying parts of Iran as to offer real support to the people of Libya. In 1914, during the
British occupation of Iraq, the Shiʾi ʿulamā there declared *jiḥād* in reinforcement of a call to holy war made by the Shaykh al-Islām of the Ottoman Empire,46 and their opposition to non-Muslim rule continued during the period of the British mandate in Iraq.

The second distinguishing feature of the Shiʾi view of *jiḥād* is the problem of identifying those who may be regarded as legitimate enemies in a religious war. Both Sunnis and Shiʾis are agreed that *jiḥād* may be waged against polytheists, apostates, scripturaries (Jews, Christians and Zoroastrians), and dissenters. But, whereas Sunni theory defined the latter as those who rebelled against the legitimate religious or secular ruler and regarded it necessary to fight only when the state was actually threatened by such elements, Shiʾi doctrine applied the term without discrimination to all those who opposed the twelve Imāms—in other words, to all non-Twelver Muslims. The duty to fight against these dissenters was not dependent on any specific threatening circumstances, but remained a constant element of doctrine. '... while the Imāmis concurred in the need to fight the infidels, they regarded as an essential step the conversion of all Muslims into true believers (i.e. Imāmī Shiʾis).'47 This belief is closely related to the distinction drawn in Shiʾism between *islām* (which is professed by all Muslims) and *īmān* (true faith, professed only by the Shiʾa).48 In this way, the world is divided for the Shiʾa, not between infidelity and Islam, but into three areas: the realms of faith, Islam and unbelief.49 So important is the idea of *jiḥād* against dissenters for Shiʾ thinkers that references to it in their writings ‘probably outnumber references to other kinds of *jiḥād*’.50 The wars between the Imām ʿAlī and his enemies are regarded by Shiʾ theorists as *jiḥād*, as is the subsequent rising of his son Husayn against the Umayyad caliphate. Justification has, therefore, always existed within Shiʾi doctrine, not only for war against non-Shiʾ Muslims of another state, but for any rising against a state which is deemed to have usurped the rights of the Imām and his people. A novel development of this attitude has occurred in the last two centuries under the ostensibly Shiʾ rule of the Qājār and Pahlavi dynasties in Iran. In the course of the agitation which led to the granting of a constitution in 1906, the Qājārs were sometimes compared to or even identified with the hated Umayyads,51 while the struggle for a constitution was decreed as being ‘like a Holy War under the command of the Hidden Imām’.52 The recent Iranian revolution against the Pahlavi regime serves as the most telling example of the power of the *jiḥād* concept as a factor in political opposition within a Shiʾi state, nor is it insignificant that the opposition to the revolutionary authorities continues to style its members mujāhidin, ‘fighters in the holy war’.

We may, then, identify in Shiʾi theory several factors which, as will be seen, are relevant to the formulation of the Bābī *jiḥād* doctrine. There is, firstly, the traditional view that *jiḥād* is illegitimate during the period of the Imām’s
concealment and that, conversely, the waging of a universal holy war to purify the earth from unbelief and ‘to fill the earth with justice after it has been filled with injustice’ was one of the central acts to be performed by the Mahdi in his parousia. Side by side with this, there is the apparently contradictory nineteenth century experience of the issue of decrees for the waging of jihad against Christian enemies and a growing tendency to legitimize internal revolutionary struggles by classing them as jihad. There is, secondly, the notion of a tripartite division of the world into the realms of faith, Islam and unbelief coupled with the duty of jihad not only to bring the world of infidelity within the realm of Islam, but to transform the world of rebellious, ‘covenant-breaking’ Islam into that of true faith through allegiance to the Imam and his representatives.

**THE DOCTRINE OF JIHAD IN THE BĀBĪ WRITINGS**

The writings of the Bāb, with which we shall concern ourselves here, may conveniently be divided into two periods: from 1843 to 1848, during the time of the Bāb’s claim to be the ‘gate’ (bāb) and ‘remembrance’ (dhikr) of the Hidden Imam, and his insistence on the observance of Islamic law and practice in preparation for the parousia of the ‘Lord of the Age’, the Imām as Mahdī and universal saviour; from 1848 to 1850, the period of the Bāb’s claims to be the Hidden Imām in person and an independent prophet, his instruction to abrogate the Islamic legal code, and his elaboration of a Bābī code to replace it. The first period, in which the jihad element figures largely in written doctrine, coincided with the early development of Babism as a schismatic movement within the Shaykhi school of Shi‘ism and was characterized by extreme pietism and orthodoxy, numerical weakness, and mild persecution in one or two isolated instances; the second period, in which jihad plays a less significant role, corresponds to the open abandonment of Islam (notably at the enclave of some eighty Bābis at Badasht in July 1848) by large numbers of the Bāb’s followers, considerable numerical strength in some areas, and outbreaks of large-scale struggles between Bābi fanatics and Muslim troops and civilians leading to the execution of the Bāb (July 1850), a Bābī attempt on the life of Nāṣir al-Dīn Shāh (August 1852), and the subsequent repression of the movement within Iran.

The first reasonably systematic elaboration of Islamic law by the Bāb in an extant work occurs in his early ‘commentary’ on the twelfth chapter of the Qurʾān, known as the Qayyūm al-asma‘. This work was, apparently, commenced on the evening of the Bāb’s announcement of his first claims (May 22, 1844), and, according to some sources, was completed within forty days of that date, although the present writer would maintain, on the basis of internal evidence, that it may have been completed in the course of the Bāb’s pilgrimage to Mecca in the winter of 1844–45. This work contains fuller references to jihad than any other of the Bāb’s writings; these are, for the most
part, concentrated in the later section of the work, but several earlier allusions to the subject occur in passing. A study of the *Qayyūm al-asmā'* provides us, then, with a clear picture of the Bāb’s attitude to *jihād* at this early stage of his career.

The gate and representative of the Imām, the Bāb was also, in a sense, the Imām himself ‘in the worlds of command and creation’, and, as such, was entrusted with a mission on behalf of the Imām to all mankind. He himself constantly addresses ‘the peoples of the earth’ and ‘the peoples of East and West’, and calls on his followers to ‘spread the cause to all lands’. Towards the very beginning of the book, he summons ‘the concourse of kings’ to take his verses to the Turks and Indians and to lands beyond in the East and West. God Himself had assured him of sovereignty over all lands and the peoples in them, had written down ‘the dominion of the earth’ for him, and, indeed, already ruled the world through him. The Bāb, clearly, did not conceive of his message as limited to Iran or to the Shi‘ī or even the Muslim world, but envisioned a universal role for himself complementary to that of Muḥammad and the Imāms. Since the laws of Muḥammad and the decrees of the Imāms were to remain binding ‘until the Day of Resurrection’, there was no question but that *jihād* was to be the principal means of bringing men to the true faith.

The first explicit reference to *jihād* occurs about a quarter of the way through the book, when the Bāb speaks of those who have ‘repented and turned to God, followed the Remembrance (i.e. the Bāb) and the Book, and aided the most great Remembrance of God in *jihād*. This passage is followed several lines later by what is significantly, the first reference to the notion that ‘the victory of God and His days are, in the Mother Book, near at hand’. Messianic expectation and exhortation to *jihād* were clearly linked for the Bāb in the role of the Imām as the victorious leader of the holy war of the last days. On the one hand, it is clear that aiding God (*naṣr*—a term widely used in the Qur‘ān to mean fighting in the path of God) was seen by the Bāb as a means of anticipating the Day of Judgment and of helping to hasten its advent—of ‘immanentizing the eschaton’ as it has been facetiously expressed in a recent novel. He speaks of ‘the man who has submitted himself to God and who aids our cause and anticipates the dominion of God in the Remembrance of God, the Exalted, through and by God, the Almighty, as drawing near’. Elsewhere, he calls on ‘the peoples of the East and the West’ to ‘issue forth from your lands in order to come to the assistance of God through the truth, for, truly, God’s victory is, in the Mother Book, near at hand’. More explicitly, the Bāb links the waging of holy war with the necessary preparations for the advent of the promised Imām: ‘O armies of God!’, he writes, ‘when you wage war with the infidels (*al-mushrikīn*), do not fear their numbers... Slay those who have joined partners with God and leave not a single one of the un-
believers (al-kāfirīn) alive upon the earth, so that the earth and all that are upon it may be purified for the Remnant of God, the Expected One’. 69

On the other hand, the Bāb anticipated jihād as one of the events prophesied in the traditions relating to the appearance of the Mahdī. 70 In a relatively early passage of the Qayyūm al-asma’, the Imāms prophesy that they will wage war on behalf of the Bāb: ‘We shall, God willing, descend upon the Day of the Remembrance, upon crimson thrones, and shall slay you, by the permission of God, with our swords, in truth—just as you have disbelieved and turned aside from our mighty word (i.e. the Bāb)’. 71 The Qayyūm al-asma’ itself was ‘revealed’, it states in one passage, ‘in order that men might believe and assist him (the Bāb) on the day of slaughter’. 72 The Bāb himself was, it seems, awaiting permission from the Imām to ‘rise up in the cause’ when the time came. 73

The regulations governing the conduct of jihād are set out in a number of places in the Qayyūm al-asma’, principally in sūras 96 to 101. For the most part these consist, like a great many passages of the book (notably those dealing with legislation), of verbatim or near-verbatim reproductions of existing Quranic passages or echoes of such passages, with only occasionally novel features introduced by the Bāb himself. It is obviously outside the scope of this paper to illustrate all of the Quranic parallels, but we shall attempt to outline the main features of the Bāb’s directions concerning jihād, with brief references in the notes to what seem to be the Quranic originals, where appropriate.

Sura 96 opens with the words: ‘O believers! God has written down for you warfare (al-qītāl) in the path of this mighty Remembrance’. 74 If the believers should encounter a party of the unbelievers, they should make their hearts firm for meeting God in the hereafter and for its benefits. 75 The Bāb himself is told by the Imām to spur the believers on in fighting, 76 and he accordingly addresses them, telling them not to fear to be slain. 77 There is to be no fighting in the four sacred months (i.e. Shawwāl, Dhū ’l-Qa‘da, Dhū ’l-Ḥijja, and Muḥarram), 78 and it is expressly forbidden to slay the unbelievers in the month of Muharram or in the house of the Ka‘ba. 79 The peoples of East and West are to issue forth from their countries in order to assist God, Whose victory is stated to be near at hand. 80 Those who fight for God are superior to those who sit at home, 81 and those who die as martyrs will receive their due reward. 82 The unbelievers have made no compact with the followers (shī‘a) of the Imām and are not to be permitted entry to the sacred territory (around Mecca). 83 The believers are to pray, give alms and fight with the unbelievers, 84 and are enjoined to ‘conquer the countries and their people for the pure faith of God’, while being forbidden to accept a submission-tax from the unbelievers. 85 The armies of God are not to fear in battle nor are they to leave a single unbeliever alive, in order to purify the earth for the coming of the Imām. 86 Weak men, boys, women, the sick, the blind and the deaf are all
exempted from fighting in the jihad. The infidels are to be slain anywhere except in the Ḥarām Mosque (of Mecca). The believers are called on to purify their clothing for the day of war and are to issue forth when the trumpet sounds. They are, specifically, told to purify the ‘holy land’ (i.e. Karbalā) from foulness, and are instructed to ‘purchase arms for yourselves for the day of gathering together’. Angels will be sent to aid them in battle, and they are assured that God, not they, shall slay the unbelievers.

Two major questions occur at this point in our discussion: against whom did the Báb envisage waging holy war? And who was to lead the jihad? It is clear from the Qayyum al-asma‘ that, as in orthodox Shi‘ism, war could be waged against several distinct categories of people, although these groups are not at all times defined precisely—the Qayyum al-asma‘ is not, after all, a work of jurisprudence. In general, the terms kuffār and mushrikūn, which occur throughout the passages on jihad, may certainly be taken to have their obvious meanings of ‘unbelievers’ or ‘polytheists’; strictly speaking, a kāfir is one who denies the favours or even the existence of God, a mushrik one who ‘joins partners’ with Him. Taken in this sense, these terms would apply, as they normally do in Islam, to pagans, Buddhists, Hindus and any others not accounted ‘people of the book’. These latter, whom the Báb seems to limit to Jews and Christians, are certainly condemned in the Qayyum al-asma‘, but it is not until a later date, as we shall see, that the Báb makes clear his intentions with regard to them. On the basis of this later attitude, however, we may assume that they were regarded in the early period as automatically subject to the declaration of jihad, particularly in the absence of any specific command abrogating the Islamic injunction to that effect. It is clear from several references, however, that the Báb by no means restricted the terms kāfir and mushrik to atheists or polytheists, but applied them to Muslims, whether Sunni or Shi‘i, who held what he regarded as heretical doctrines or, more particularly, who refused to recognize him. In one place, he refers to the ‘polytheists’ (al-mushrikūn) from among the people of the Qur‘ān. He himself is the ‘pure faith’ and those who wish to accept Islam must do so by embracing his cause, while the deeds of those who disbelieve in Islam will not be accepted by God. This same idea occurs in an earlier work of the Báb’s, his commentary on the second sūra of the Qur‘ān (Sūrat al-baqara), where he states that ‘not every Muslim is a believer (mu‘min)’, and speaks of the tripartite division of the world into the realms of faith, Islam and unbelief.

Leadership of the jihad appears to rest with the Báb himself or with a king who fights on his behalf. The believers are to ‘assist the mighty Remembrance of God in the jihad. As indicated above, the Báb was awaiting permission from the Imām to ‘rise up in the cause’. In the course of the directions on the
waging of *jihād*, men are called on to ‘gather together about the mighty Word, around the Remembrance’;¹⁰¹ and the Bāb is instructed by the Imām to ‘urge the believers to fight in your presence’.¹⁰² As I have noted elsewhere,¹⁰³ news reached the early followers of the Bāb in the Karbalā region of Iraq that, on leaving for Mecca in September 1844, he had promised to reveal his cause in the holy city, after which he would enter Karbalā and fulfil the prophecies. In various letters, he summoned his disciples to gather together in Karbalā in order to aid the Mahdi when he would appear,¹⁰⁴ and, accordingly, large numbers of Bābis headed for Karbalā—where there was already a heightened sense of messianic expectation and considerable tension—to await the Bāb’s arrival. Many, very possibly in accordance with the Bāb’s instructions in the *Qayyūm al-asma‘* (which was being distributed in the region) to ‘purchase arms for the day of gathering together’, bought weapons with which to wage the anticipated last *jihād*. In the event, the Bāb was unable or unwilling to go to Karbalā; many of his followers there dispersed, some to await a later summons to *jihād*, others to abandon the Bāb as an imposter.

On almost the first page of the *Qayyūm al-asma‘*, the Imām calls on the reigning monarch of Iran, Muḥammad Shāh (to whom he refers as ‘king of the Muslims’) to come to the aid of the Bāb, warns him not to oppose him, asks him to purify Karbalā of those who have rejected the previous book ‘on the day when the Remembrance shall come suddenly’, and urges him to ‘submit to the Remembrance and his cause and to conquer the countries of the earth for the truth, by God’s permission’.¹⁰⁵ When the Bāb’s first disciple, Mullā Huṣayn Bushrū‘ī, travelled to Tehran on the Bāb’s behalf in 1844, he attempted to deliver a copy of the *Qayyūm al-asma‘* and other works of the Bāb to Muhammad Shāh. Also in his possession was a letter from the Bāb to the king: Ḥadd al-Salṭana, a state official, writes that this letter contained a passage stating ‘if you pledge allegiance to me and regard obedience to me as obligatory, then shall I make your sovereignty great and bring the foreign powers under your command’.¹⁰⁶ In a further letter, written to Muḥammad Shāh from Būshīhr in 1845, the Bāb writes that ‘God, your Lord, has willed that the Turks (al-Rūm) and most of the peoples of the earth should believe in the verses; aid, then, the faith of God, that you may be of those who are triumphant on the Day of Resurrection’.¹⁰⁷ The Bāb continued to write letters to the Shāh, but later examples of these, written from prison in Ādharbāyjān, indicate that the king’s consistent rejection of the Bāb and his instructions to have him imprisoned had dashed any hopes the latter might have entertained that he would adopt the role of royal warrior on behalf of the Bābi cause. Nevertheless, as we shall see shortly, the Bāb’s later views on *jihād* centred very much on the hope that a Bābi monarch would arise to carry out the task of converting mankind to his religion.

The Bāb’s views about military assistance for the *jihād* from the state seem to
have been somewhat ambiguous, however. When in Isfahān, for example, he is said to have turned down an offer of military aid or the arrangement of a marriage with one of the Shāh’s daughters or sisters—an offer made by the governor of the city, Manūchihr Khān Muẓtam ad-Dawla, with whom he had entered into close and cordial relations. On the other hand, it is recorded that, when on his way to prison in ādharbāyjān, he sent one of his followers to Zanjan to enlist the support of Sulaymān Khān Ašhār Sāhib-i Ikhtiyār, one of the country’s leading military men and an admirer of the late Sayyid Kāzim Rashtī (the second head of the Shaykhi school out of which Babism had emerged), to one of whose daughters his son was married. The request was turned down and Sulaymān Khān, who later became a follower of Ḥājj Muḥammad Karīm Khān Kirmānī, the then head of the Shaykhi school and the Bāb’s chief rival, soon played a major role in the defeat of the Bābī defendants at the shrine of Shaykh Ṭabarsī.

The Bāb next attempted a fairly systematic discussion of the regulations concerning jihād in his Risāla furūʾ al-ʿAdliyya, written in late 1261/1845 or 1262/1846, while he was living in Shirāz after his return from the pilgrimage to Mecca. The sixth chapter of this work is devoted entirely to jihād; brief as it is, it provides several details as to the early Bābī doctrine of jihād which do not appear in the Qayyūm al-ʿasrāʿ. At the beginning—and most significantly—he states that jihād is one of the branches (furūʾ) of religion and that it resembles formal prayer. This is important in that it indicates that the Bāb explicitly raised jihād to the rank of a sixth pillar of the faith. He then refers to the idea that, when God sent Muḥammad, it was with five swords, and that three of these would not be returned to their scabbards until war came to an end. This would not happen until the sun rose from the west. The first of these swords was drawn against the pagan Arabs, who were given a choice between death and conversion. The second sword was that drawn against the Jews and Christians; the Bāb quotes a Qur’anic verse (9:29) in this connection: ‘fight those who do not believe in God nor in the Last Day, who do not make unlawful what God and His Prophet have made unlawful and who do not practice the true religion, yet are of those to whom the Book has been given—until they pay the tribute out of hand and are brought low’. He then states that the Imām or his representatives have the authority to accept this tribute from the rich but not the poor, the stupid or the insane. The third sword is that drawn against the peoples of the earth; the Bāb again quotes a Qur’anic verse (47:4): ‘(when you meet the unbelievers) smite their necks until, when you have made a great slaughter among them, make fast the bonds; then either act with liberality afterwards or take a ransom (until the war comes to an end)’. These too have a choice only between conversion and death.

The Bāb then goes on to say that, after these three swords, there is that drawn against the ‘people of dissent’. This position is supported, like the
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others, by a Quranic verse (49:9) 'If two groups among the believers fall to fighting one another, make peace between them; but if one should act unjustly [from the same root as the term here translated 'dissenter'] against the other, then fight the unjust one until it returns to the cause of God'. Alī and the Imāms fought according to the decree in this verse and the hidden Imām shall slay the dissenters on the strength of it when he appears.114 Jihād is not permitted to anyone except the Imām, unless he gives permission.115 The fifth sword is sheathed for the purpose of punishment, as indicated in the Quranic verse (5:45): 'We wrote down for them in it (the Torah): “a life for a life, an eye for an eye, a nose for a nose, an ear for an ear, a tooth for a tooth, and retaliation for wounds”'—but whoever remits it as alms shall have it as an expiation. They who do not judge according to what God has sent down are unbelievers'.116 The decree on this matter rests with the Imam. Whoever denies these swords is an unbeliever; the decrees concerning them show that the ordinance of jihād is binding on whoever believes in God and His verses.117

Up to 1264/1848, 'Bābī' doctrine was essentially that of orthodox Shi'ism, with differences only in some subsidiary matters and then only to a limited degree. From 1848, however, following the Bāb’s assumption of the office of Qā‘īm (i.e. the Mahdī) and his announcement of the inauguration of the Resurrection, the entire system of Islamic revealed law had to be dismantled and a new Bābī structure erected in its place. As far as jihād is concerned, the proclamation of Resurrection and the substitution of a new code of laws for those of the Qur’ān and traditions meant a sharp change in practice together with various doctrinal changes which remained theoretical. We shall discuss the practical consequences of the announcement that the Qā‘īm had appeared in the next section of this article; let us continue for the moment with our survey of the doctrinal basis for jihād in the Bābī writings. The main laws of Babism following the break with Islam are contained in the Persian Bayān (Bayān-i-Fārsī), the much shorter, telescoped Arabic Bayān (al-Bayān al-'Arabī), both written during the Bāb’s imprisonment in Mākū between 1847 and 1848, and the Haykal al-dīn, an extremely late work which effectively represents the Bāb’s final thoughts on these matters. Since neither of the latter two works adds anything particularly remarkable on this subject, however, we shall refer the reader in the footnotes to passages in them paralleling those of the Persian Bayān.

In keeping with the discursive, allusive, even rambling style of this work, no particular section of the Persian Bayān is exclusively devoted to jihād, nor is there, indeed, any specific injunction to wage jihād, in terms comparable to those found in the Qur’ān or the Qayyūm al-asma‘. Nevertheless, several passages exist which rest on the assumption that jihād may be waged, while others command it in a form very different to that of the Quranic injunctions. The later Bābī doctrine of jihād rests largely on a passage in section 5 chapter 5, in
which it states that ‘the possessors of power (i.e. kings) must not wait for something to descend from heaven in order to bring all that are on earth into the faith of God, but it should be as all entered the faith in Islam, by reason of what was shown forth at the command of the Prophet of God; in every dispensation this must be shown forth in this way’. Had the kings of Islam acted on the commandments of the Qur'an, the whole earth would have been converted. It is made a duty for every king who believes in the Bayân not to allow any unbeliever to live in his country, with the exception of traders, who bring benefits. This duty is also incumbent on all men. Elsewhere, the Báb asks how a king can drink water while there still remains on earth one person who is an unbeliever? Permission is given to conquer other countries in order to bring men into the faith, although, if possible, other means should be used to convert people, such as giving them the goods of the world. It is, nevertheless, made clear that the prohibition on killing which is laid down in the Bayân applies only to the murder of believers. In every dispensation, it is said, no-one has the right to anything, not even his own life, if he does not believe, and the same applies in the Bábí dispensation. As a result, the property of unbelievers may be taken by the Bábís and only returned to them if they convert. This decree is only to be carried out by the kings. Detailed instructions are given concerning the distribution of property taken from unbelievers, as follows: whatever is unique belongs to the Báb, while he lives; on his death, it is to be kept by traders ‘until the rising of the sun’ (the appearance of the messianic figure whose advent at a distant date the Báb alluded to); one fifth of the total value of other goods must be given to the Letters of the Living (i.e. the body of the Báb’s chief disciples, originally eighteen in number) to spend on the believers; the remainder goes to the general of the victorious army and to those who have assisted him, each according to his station and needs; if there is any left, it is to be spent on the holy shrines, or else all the believers are to be given a share, this latter course being preferable unless a given shrine has not yet been erected, in which case its construction has priority. One important regulation must also be noted here, if only because it forms the basis for later Bahá’í legislation with somewhat wider implications: believers are forbidden to have arms or armour except in time of need or holy war (mujáhada), unless, of course, they are engaged in their manufacture.

Jihâd, it would seem, could be waged against any group who did not believe in the Bayân; the questions of unbelief, Islam, faith, dissidence, and so forth no longer apply here since the entire non-Bábí world is now the ‘realm of unbelief’. In the Haykal al-din, the Bábí monarch of the future is exhorted ‘not to leave upon the earth, if possible, anyone save the Bábís’. While in the Dalâ'il-i sab'a, written in Mákû, the Báb states with regard to the Jews and Christians that ‘unless a powerful king shall cause them to enter the faith of
God, there shall be no way for their salvation’. The Shi‘i population of Iran was now regarded as subject to the decree of holy war: in the Persian and Arabic Bayan, the Bāb explicitly states that God as forbidden non-Bābīs to live in the five central provinces of Iran (Fars, Iraq, Šahr-i Qādīm, Khurāsān and Mazandaran), since it was from these areas that the faith spread to other lands. Obviously, the Shi‘i inhabitants of these regions would either have to be expelled by force from their homes or converted.

The regulations in the Bayan and elsewhere are part of a generally harsh policy on the part of the Bāb towards all that did not belong to the true faith. Thus, for example, the shrines and holy places of previous religions must be demolished, including the Shi‘i shrines in Kūfa and elsewhere; all books except those written on the Bābī religion are to be destroyed; the believers are to sever all relations with those not of the people of the Bayan, in order to avoid contamination; they are not to sit in their company, and they are not to marry them.

We see, then, that the Bāb had, by the end of his short life, moved beyond even the harshest Islamic measures against unbelievers. A Bābī jihad was to be an ongoing process, each Bābī monarch striving to eliminate all traces of infidelity from his dominions and, ultimately, from the earth in order to establish a totalitarian Bābī state. Such a monarch was, above all, to be a holy warrior fighting for the victory of his faith and awaiting the opportunity to wage jihad on behalf of ‘him whom God shall make manifest’, the future Bābī Messiah. The role of the king here is significant in view of the Bāb’s earlier disappointment with Muhammad Shāh; clearly, he still looked forward to gaining military support from such a source. God, it was anticipated, would ‘send’ one or more kings to fight on behalf of the Bābī cause.

THE JIHĀD ELEMENT IN THE BĀBĪ-STATE STRUGGLES AFTER 1848

Despite the exhortations to jihad in the Qayyum al-asma’ and the abortive attempt to initiate what may have been intended as an armed rising in Karbalā in 1845, it soon became clear to both the Bāb and the Bābī leadership in the provinces that the movement was numerically and, ultimately, from the arrest of the former, psychologically weak. Between 1844 and 1848, there were no incidents of serious persecution directed against the Bābīs which might, of themselves, have sparked off a conflict, nor did any Bābīs initiate direct action—although, as we shall see, tension between them and non-believers was slowly building up and many of the faithful were actively preparing themselves both mentally and physically for an imminent struggle. In the meantime, the Bāb instructed his followers to confront their opponents in mubahala, a form of trial by faith in which two parties would call down the wrath of God on each other. This practice was not uncommon in Shi‘ism and had been used by the Shaykhi leader Sayyid Kāẓim Rashtī as, in his view,
the only valid means of putting claims to the truth to the test. The Islamic practice was ratified early in *Qayyūm al-asma*’, where the Imām instructs the Bāb to challenge the unbelievers to *mubahala* if things should become difficult for him. The earliest recorded instance of a challenge issued on the directions of the Bāb took place when his emissary, Mullā ʿAlī Baṣṭāmī, arrived in Iraq in the autumn of 1844. According to one source, Mullā ʿAlī had been instructed by the Bāb to summon a meeting of the religious leaders in Karbalā and to issue such a challenge to them. While in Mecca on pilgrimage, the Bāb himself issued a *mubahala* challenge to two leading Shaykhi scholars from Karbalā who were also on pilgrimage at that time. In 1262/1846 in Iṣfahān, the Bāb challenged the religious leaders of the city to present themselves for *mubahala* on the day of ʿArafa (9 Dhū ‘l-Hijja/28 November), although they did not, in fact, respond. It seems probable that, when he wrote to the clergy of Qazvīn during his stay at the nearby village of Siyāh-dīhān in 1847, calling on them to meet with him, he had in mind the possibility of engaging in *mubahala* with them. This may also have been his purpose in requesting Muḥammad Shāh in 1264/1848 to summon the clergy of the country to meet with him so that he might ‘confound’ them.

The Bāb encouraged his followers to adopt the same course of action as a means of seeking non-violent confrontation with a numerically and psychologically more powerful opposition. He himself refers to a *mubahala* challenge issued on his behalf, probably sometime in 1845, by Mullā Muḥammad Mahdī Khūʿī to Mullā ʿAbd al-ʿAlī Harātī, an early apostate from Babism. In 1846, following instructions from the Bāb, Qurrat al-ʿAyn (one of his leading disciples, a woman noted for her intransigence and irascibility) called a meeting of the religious scholars and leading divines of Karbalā in order to challenge them either to produce verses like those of the Bāb or to engage in *mubahala*; although the meeting never took place, she remained eager for such a direct confrontation and, in 1847, while in Baghdād, wrote a letter to the Shiʿī clergy there, in which she said ‘if you are not satisfied with these conclusive proofs, I challenge you to *mubahala*’. Again, in Kirmānshāh in the same year, she issued a challenge to the ʿulamā of the city to meet with her for *mubahala*—‘and let the curse of God fall on those who speak falsely’.

Although *mubahala* functioned in theory as a means of avoiding unnecessary physical conflict in situations of religious disagreement, relying for its effectiveness on psychological and social pressure, it did not always succeed in its aim. Relations between Shaykhis and other Shiʿis had, for a period of about twenty years, been extremely tense and occasional violence had broken out when feelings ran high. Now, the introduction of a new and even more apparently heretical element into the situation added fuel to the fire. The Bābis themselves pulled few punches in their letters and sermons and, in some
cases even threatened physical violence against those who would not accept their message. Thus, for example, Mullâ Muḥammad Ḥāli Qazvînî, one of the Bâb’s original hierarchy of ‘Letters of the Living’ and a brother-in-law of the fiery Qurrat al-Ḥâlî, wrote to his aged father that, if he did not accept the Bâb’s message, he would break his neck ‘like a dog’.150

The preaching of Babism sometimes led to physical assaults being made on individual Bâbî propagandists, either spontaneously by their audience or on the instructions of the civil or religious authorities. Thus, Mullâ Ḥâli Bāstâmî, the Bâb’s legate to Iraq, was handled roughly by the followers of the outstanding scholar Shaykh Muḥammad Ḥasan al-Najafî,151 arrested by the civil authorities in Karbalâ, imprisoned and tried in Baghdad, and finally sent to Istanbul, where he was sentenced to labour in the docks.152 Mullâ Muḥammad Ṣâdiq Khurâsânî, Mullâ Muḥammad Ḥâli Bârfurûshî and Mullâ Ḥâli Akbar Ardîstânî caused an uproar in one of the mosques of Shîrâz in 1845, were arrested on the instigation of some of the local clergy, punished and expelled from the city by the governor.153 In 1847, Mullâ Ibrâhîm Mahallâtî was badly beaten by the pupils of the leading cleric of Hamadân, on the latter’s instructions.154 In the same year, Mullâ Jâlîl Urûmî, a ‘Letter of the Living’ who had been teaching Babism secretly for some years in Qazvin, was taken by a mob to the house of Mullâ Muḥammad Taqî Baraghânî, where he was bastinadoed.155 In 1846 in Karbalâ, Qurrat al-Ḥâlî was arrested and her house looted by a mob acting on the orders of the governor, in order to prevent an outbreak of more serious trouble by reason of her open expression of what were regarded as unusually extreme views.156 In Kirmanshâh, despite the favourable attitude of the governor, she and her followers were attacked, beaten and expelled from the town by a force independently organized by the local military commander, who appears to have been bribed to act by relatives of Qurrat al-Ḥâlî from Qazvin.157 During the mubâhala period, therefore, outbreaks of limited violence between Bâbîs and non-Bâbîs began to grow in frequency and seriousness—although no-one actually died before 1847—while the numbers involved on both sides steadily increased. Whereas early violence tended to be ‘legal’ violence directed by the civil authorities against potentially seditious elements, the later trend is towards mob violence, controlled to some extent by the religious leadership and, less often, the civil authorities.

In the meantime, numbers of Bâbîs in various regions were engaged in making preparations for the jihad that must inevitably come. We know that many early Bâbîs possessed and carried arms. The Arab and Iranian Bâbîs who escorted Qurrat al-Ḥâlî from Baḥdâd to Iran in 1847 were armed,158 and those who stayed with her in Qazvin appear to have remained so. While the Bâb was staying at the village of Siyâh-dihan, en route to prison in Mâkû in Ādharbâyjân, Mullâ Muḥammad Ḥâli Zanjânî Ḥujjat sent an armed force of
Bábís from Zanján in the hope of effecting his rescue; this force was joined by others from Qazvín and Tehran.¹⁵⁹ In Mashhad in 1848, when a group of seventy-two Bábís set out to rescue a young co-religionist who had been imprisoned by the chief constable of the city, they all carried arms in readiness for a clash with anyone who might seek to oppose them (which would, clearly, have included the forces of law and order).¹⁶⁰ Most significantly, in Qazvín Āqā Muḥammad Hādī Farhādī, a member of a wealthy family of Bábí merchants, constructed sword-making apparatus in the basement of his home, where he made weapons for himself and his fellow-believers for the purpose of engaging in a holy war in the company of the Báb.¹⁶¹

Not surprisingly, perhaps, it was in Qazvín that the increasing tension finally erupted into serious violence. The leading figure of the religious establishment in the city, Mulla Muḥammad Taqī Baraghānī, an uncle of Qurrat al-ʿAyn and the man responsible for initiating the excommunication of Shaykh Aḥmad al-ʿAḥsāʿī (the founder of the Shaykhī school), identified himself quite early as an opponent of the Bábís and preached against them in his mosque. The Bábí community of Qazvín continued to grow, however, and numbered among its members both clergy and influential merchants. The arrival of Qurrat al-ʿAyn and several companions from Iraq in the autumn of 1847 brought matters to a head. About this time, Āqā Muḥammad ʿSadīq, a Bábí merchant, was beaten in the bazaar, arrested, and bastinadoed on the orders of the governor.¹⁶² Baraghānī had a Bábí cleric, Mulla ʿAbd al-Ḥusayn Rūdbārī, arrested, interrogated, and bastinadoed¹⁶³ and, as we have mentioned above, was responsible for the arrest and bastinado of the leading Bábí of the city, Mulla Jalīl Urūmī. The arrest of Mullā Jalīl was regarded as a serious act of provocation on the part of Baraghānī; Āqā Muḥammad Hādī Farhādī (to whom we have referred as engaged in the manufacture of swords), his brother Āqā Muḥammad Jawād and a group of Bábí extremists attacked the house in which Mullā Jalīl was being held and rescued him after a brief struggle.¹⁶⁴ It was probably not long after this, on 15 Dhū ʿl-Qaʿda 1263/25 October 1847, that a group of perhaps three Bábís, including Āqā Muḥammad Hādī Farhādī, surprised Baraghānī while praying alone in his mosque at dawn, fell on him, and stabbed him repeatedly with daggers; he died two days later.¹⁶⁵ Large numbers of Bábís in Qazvín were arrested, homes were broken into and looted, and several individuals were eventually put to death in retribution for what was held to be a general Bábī plot. Rightly or wrongly, many Iranian Muslims must now have begun to fear that the Bábís were planning to use force to attain their objectives, objectives that were still far from clear to the majority of the populace.

Meanwhile, in the shrine centre of Mashhad, an important Bábí community had grown up under the tutelage of two of the Báb’s leading agents, Mulla Muḥammad Ḥusayn Bushūrī and Mulla Muḥammad ʿAlī Bārfūrūshī Quddūs. Gatherings of large number of Bábís at a house in the main street of
the city excited the uneasiness of the many clerics of the region, who made complaints to Ḥamza Mīrzā, a new governor who had arrived in Mashhad in October 1847. The civil authorities were concerned at the possibility of trouble; the region was still unsettled because of the rebellion of Mīrzā Ḥasan Khān Sālār on behalf of his father, the former governor of the city, while the physical condition of Muhammad Shāh was giving much cause for concern regarding the general stability of the Qājār state. Two apparently unconnected incidents increased the agitation of the local population with regard to the Bābīs. In the first of these, a servant of Mullā Ḥusayn Bushrūʾī, named Ḥasan, was arrested by the civil authorities for some reason which remains unknown; a group of armed Bābīs attacked and killed the guards escorting him, thereby securing his release. The second incident occurred shortly after this, while Bushrūʾī was staying as a ‘guest’ of the governor in his camp outside the city. A young Bābī named Mūḥammad Baqir Qaʾīnī, the owner of the Bābī house there, obtained permission from Mullā Mūḥammad Ḥusayn to intervene, on condition that they should not strike until struck by the enemy—hardly a severe restriction since they could count on resistance once they began their rescue attempt. A party of seventy-two Bābīs set off with swords bared after the youth and, in the course of effecting his rescue, engaged in several clashes with his captors.

We shall see again how a determination to take the law into their own hands led the Bābīs of Zanjan and Nayriz into direct conflict with the local authorities and populace.

In order to avoid further trouble, Ḥamza Mīrzā ordered Bushrūʾī to leave Mashhad and, on 19 Shaʿbān 1264/21 July 1848, he set out with a large body of fellow Bābīs, ostensibly heading for the Shīʿī shrines in Iraq. Travelling towards Māzandarān, this party, swelled somewhat in numbers by new arrivals along the route, reached Bārfurūsh on 12 Shawwāl/12 September and there clashed seriously with local inhabitants trying to prevent their entry to the town. Penetrating more deeply into the forest region of Māzandarān province, they reached the shrine of Shaykh AbūʾAli al-Faḍl Ṭabarṣī on 22 Shawwāl/24 September. Here they constructed a fortress of sorts and were joined gradually by other Bābīs from various parts of the country, including Mullā Mūḥammad ʿAlī Quddūs. The continued presence of what was by now a band of almost five hundred armed men created considerable anxiety in the minds of the people of the surrounding region and, before long, the newly-crowned Nāṣir al-Dīn Shāh sent the first of several detachments of state troops to confront the Bābīs at Shaykh Ṭabarṣī. The details of the ensuing struggle, which continued to May 1849, are well known and have been described in numerous accounts, to which the reader is referred.

Leaving aside the many historical questions raised by this whole incident—
or, more correctly, this series of incidents—let us try to examine as far as possible the motives and objectives of the Bābī defenders of Shaykh Ṭabarsi. Our best sources for this are Sayyid Muḥammad Ḥusayn Zavārāʾī’s Waqāyīʿ-i mīniyya and Luṭf Ālī Mīrza Shīrāzī’s history of the struggle—both unpublished eye-witness accounts. Before turning to these, however, it will be in order to consider first some general points which have a bearing on the outlook of most of the Bābīs at the shrine. We shall find that some of these are also relevant to the question of the motivation of the Bābī insurgents at Zanjān and Nayrīz, whom we shall discuss a little later.

In the first months of 1848, towards the end of his confinement in Mākū, the Bāb wrote an important letter to Mulla Shaykh Ālī Turshīzī Āẓīm, in which he proclaimed himself to be the Qāʾīm and announced the abrogation of the laws of Islam. On the Bāb’s instructions, Āẓīm copied and circulated this letter, and it would seem that news of the inception of the Resurrection spread rapidly among the Bābīs of Iran. At an enclave held at the village of Badasht in Māzandarān in July 1848, several Bābī leaders, including the controversial and iconoclastic Qurrat al-ʿĀyn, openly announced the advent of the Resurrection to some eighty of their followers. Among those who played an active role at this gathering was Mulla Muḥammad Ālī Bārfurūshī, who was later to take effective control of the fort at Shaykh Ṭabarsi. It is, I think, unnecessary to labour the point that the advent of the Qāʾīm had long been regarded as the signal for the final jihiḍ against the hosts of unbelief and that the Bāb’s followers had been daily expecting such apocalyptic upheavals for some four years.

An unforeseen problem existed, however, in the fact that the Bāb was still in prison and, therefore, unable to lead the jihiḍ in person, as was proper. The Bābīs gathered at Badasht had, in fact, as one of their aims the possibility of formulating plans for the release of their chief from Chihriq, where he was now held; Āvārā maintains that they decided to send out messengers to summon the Bāb’s followers to go to Chihriq as pilgrims—once there, it was proposed that they should try to exert pressure on Muḥammad Shāh to free the Bāb, failing which they intended to take the latter from his confinement by force. It has been plausibly suggested by A.L.M. Nicolas that, when Mulla Ḥusayn Bushrūʿī and his force left Mashhad about this time, it was with the aim of heading ultimately for Ādarbāyjān, in the hope of effecting the Bāb’s rescue.

It is vital to bear in mind, however, that the Bāb’s particular role was far from clear to his followers and that Babism in this period was far from being a doctrinally homogeneous movement. Bābī leaders such as Qurrat al-ʿĀyn, Bushrūʿī, Quḍḍūs, Ḥūjjat Zanjānī, and others were accorded considerable respect and veneration and were regarded by many as incarnations of the Imāms or other sacred figures of Shiʿī hagiography. It is significant to note in
the present context that Bushrū’ī is referred to consistently by Zavārā’ī as ‘the Qā’īm of Khurāsān’ and Mullā Muḥammad ʿAlī Quddūs as ‘the Qā’īm of Jīlān’.

The latter in particular seems to have been widely regarded as holding the station of Qā’īm: Bushrū’ī is reported as saying in a sermon that Quddūs was ‘the one whose advent you have awaited for one thousand two hundred and sixty years’, while the latter is stated to have advanced this claim in his own behalf or even, according to the Bahā’ī patriarch ʿAbbās Effendi, to have claimed to be God in his (no longer extant) commentary on the letter ʿād of the divine name al-Ṣamad, written mostly in Shaykh Tabarsi.

As Qā’īm, whether in a universal or restricted sense, it was held to be legitimate for these two men to lead their followers in jihād. That this was not merely Zavārā’ī’s personal view is indicated by several references in Lutf ʿAlī Mīrzā’s history. The latter notes, for example, that some of the Bābīs at Shaykh Tabarsi regarded Quddūs as the point towards which prayers were to be directed and turned to him when they performed their devotions; on the night of the ʿĪd al-Qurbān, Mullā Ḥusayn Bushrū’ī and others performed ritual circumambulation around the house of Quddūs, a practice which they continued on other nights. The Kīāb-i nuqṭat al-kāf, written in the early 1850’s, similarly speaks of Quddūs and Bushrū’ī in terms such as these: the former is stated to have claimed to be the return of Muḥammad or of Jesus, and is referred to as the ‘promised Qā’īm’, whose gate was the Bāb. The latter is consistently spoken of as ‘the Prince of Martyrs’, identifying him with the Imām ʿĪsā, is said to have been given the rank of ʾibā in 1848 by the Bāb, and is described as the ‘bearer of Yemeni pillar’ and the ‘fourth support’, the first a term from Shiʿī apocalypse, the second a Shaykhi designation for the representative of the Imām on earth. Bushrū’ī’s messianic role was considerably enhanced by his carrying of a black banner on his journey from Khurāsān, a gesture whose significance would hardly have been missed by anyone even vaguely familiar with Shiʿī prophetic traditions. Even the enemies of the Bābīs were given eschatological roles to play, most notably Saʿīd al-ʿUlamāʾ, the leading cleric of Bāfrūrūsh and the man responsible for the execution of Quddūs there at the end of the Shaykh Tabarsi siege, who is described as the ‘bearded woman’ who, it was prophesied, would kill the Qā’īm.

It is impossible to tell what may have been in Bushrū’ī’s mind as he left Mashhad. In all likelihood, he aimed at meeting his associate Mullā Muḥammad ʿAlī and others at Badasht, but the meeting there had been broken up and dispersed by local residents by the time the contingent from Mashhad reached nearby Shāhrūd. As has been suggested above, they may have continued into Māzandarān with the intention either of reaching Tehran in the hope of forcing the Shāh to release the Bāb or of going on via Gilān to Chihriq in order to effect an immediate rescue. Bushrū’ī seems to have been
eager to conceal the identity and plans of his group. On several occasions, he gave strict instructions to his followers to refer to him as Āqā Sayyid Āli Makkī, a resident of Karbalā, and to say that they were all headed for the shrines in Iraq, with various pretexts to explain their choice of such an unlikely route.\(^{188}\)

Whatever their immediate aims, it is clear that the Bābīs under the leadership of Bushruʿī harboured general hopes of spreading Babism, by preaching if possible, by force if necessary. In the course of a sermon on the Adhā festival (10 Dhū ʿl-Ḥijja/8 November), Bushruʿī stated that his aim in leaving Mashhad had been to exalt ‘the word of God’ and to seek martyrdom.\(^{189}\) Some time later, a more militant tone can be observed in his reply to the new governor of Māzandarān, Mahdī Qulī Mīrzā, who had enquired as to the motives of the Bābīs. They had come from Mashhad, said Bushruʿī, with the aim of spreading the truth, in whatever way might prove possible, whether by overcoming falsehood (apparently in argument) or by means of the sword or by suffering martyrdom.\(^{190}\) In this same reply, he refused to leave Māzandarān as requested by the prince, stating that ‘until the cause of God is manifested, we shall not depart from this province; we shall make manifest God’s cause by means of the sword’ and that ‘we few companions who are here shall not disperse until we have overcome all (of you) or have ourselves been slain’.\(^{191}\) Lutf Āli Mīrzā goes on to describe how, in his communications with the prince, Bushruʿī referred to Nāṣir al-Dīn Shāh as a ‘puppy’, made threats of terror and sent harsh messages.\(^{192}\)

The twin themes of martyrdom and jihād alternate throughout the Shyakh Ṭabarṣī struggle. Shortly after their arrival at the shrine, Bushruʿī addressed his followers, comparing their intention to reveal the truth through martyrdom with events in the time of the Imām Ḥusayn (martyred in 680).\(^{193}\) According to Zavāraʿī, Quddūs stated that his followers were the army of Ḥusayn and the enemy the army of Kūfā\(^ {194}\) (a reference to the debacle of Karbalā when Ḥusayn and a small band of followers were massacred almost to a man by imperial troops loyal to the Caliph Yazīd, against whom the Imām was rebelling). This same theme recurs in most later accounts.\(^{195}\) Evocation of the Karbalā motif provided an excellent focus for a drive towards charismatic martyrdom and jihād against the Qājār state, identified with the Umayyad dynasty against which Ḥusayn had rebelled.\(^{196}\) The death of Muḥammad Shāh in September 1848 was regarded by the Bābīs as a cause for rejoicing: ‘praise be to God, the foul tree has gone to hell’,\(^ {197}\) but, while Nāṣir al-Dīn remained on the throne, true government could not be established. According to the author of the Nuqtat al-kāf, Quddūs wrote to Prince Mahdī Qulī Mīrzā, stating that ‘Nāṣir al-Dīn Shāh is a false king and his helpers shall be punished in the fires of God; we are the true sovereign, who seek for the good-pleasure of God’.\(^ {198}\)
Our sources contain numerous explicit references to the struggles of the Bábís with both local residents and state troops as jihād. Refused entry to Bārfurūş by the inhabitants of the town, the Bábís ‘began to wage jihād’ and succeeded in killing over one hundred and fifty of the enemy.199 Throughout Zavārā’i’s account, the Bábís are described as being ‘engaged in jihād’,200 while Bushrū’i orders them to ‘fight the holy war’.201 The purpose of this jihād is to ‘empty the earth of corruption’,202 while the enemy troops are variously described as ‘unbelievers’, ‘hypocrites’, and ‘polytheists’203 or as ‘the forces of Satan’ and the ‘army of satans’.204 Although Luṭf-‘Alî Mīrzā uses the term jihād very little, he ascribes to Bushrū’i an interesting speech in which he states that ‘now two matters are determined: one is jihād, the other defence. Whoever turns aside is an unbeliever’.205 ‘Whoever turns his back on jihād, he goes on,’ is an unbeliever, according to the decrees of all religions’, and he promises that there shall be ‘either victory or martyrdom’.206 According to the same source, when asked by Mahdi Qulí Mīrzā why the Bábís were building a fort and why they ate the food of others (i.e. food taken from the people of the vicinity), Bushrū’i replied that the spoils of jihād were religiously lawful to the believers.207

It seems clear, then, that the Bábís at Shaykh Tabarsi harboured a variety of interrelated aims. The hopelessness of their numerical position and the existing role of martyrdom as a major element in Shi‘i piety led them to emphasize a desire to die as martyrs in a defensive jihād for the purpose of upholding the true faith; at the same time, offensive jihād against a government which had shown itself to be the enemy of the truth by its treatment of the Báb was a duty, and it was clearly regarded as an obligation on the part of the defenders of Shaykh Tabarsi to send as many as possible of the enemy ‘to hell’. If the figures given in most accounts are accurate, there is no doubt that here, as elsewhere, the Bábís proved a formidable fighting force and succeeded in despatching considerably larger numbers of the enemy than they themselves lost, often showing great brutality not only to the hostile solider but to civilians in the region as well.

There were two further major outbreaks of violence between Bábís and Muslims in Iran after the suppression of the Shaykh Tabarsi rising in May 1849. The number of Bábís in the country was growing rapidly; in February 1849, Prince Dolgorukov, the Russian Minister in Tehran, wrote to his Minister for Foreign Affairs: ‘... no matter how serious this question (the military rebellion in Khurāsān) may be, it has not preoccupied society to the same extent ever since the sectaries of the Bab have apparently had the tendency to grow in all parts of the Kingdom. The Amīr (the new Prime Minister, Amīr-i Kabīr) confessed to me that their number can be already put at 100,000; that they have already appeared in southern provinces; that they are to be found in large numbers in Tehran itself; and that, finally, their
presence in Ādharbāyjān is beginning to worry him very much'. This figure of 100,000, is, curiously, the same as that given by the Bāb himself in the Dalā'il-i sab'ā as having been converted during the first four years of his career. In Dolgorukov’s report of February 1849, he referred to rumours that the numbers of Bābis in Zanjan to the west of the capital had reached 800 and that ‘by their presence, they threaten to disrupt the public order’. By March 1850, Dolgorukov reported that the number of Bābis there was now 2000, and noted that ‘the harmful doctrines of these dangerous sectaries find a response among the masses and do not cease to worry the government’. According to āb al-Aḥad Zanjānī, the number of Bābis in Zanjān rose to 3000 before trouble broke out. Leadership of the sect there was in the hands of Mullā Muḥammad ālī Zanjānī, a religious firebrand who had already fallen foul of the secular authorities well before his conversion to Babism. Following his adoption of the new faith, his position was investigated by the authorities at Tehran, but he seems to have been able to persuade them of his loyalty to Islam and to the state and was allowed to return to Zanjān. It soon became apparent that his role as the Bāb’s representative in the city threatened the existing religious and civil authorities. Shortly after his return, he assumed the functions of Imām-Jum‘a (the leader of the main Friday prayers), a position normally conferred by the ruling sovereign; the incumbent naturally protested, but was told that his right to the office ‘has been superseded by the authority with which the Qā‘im Himself has invested me. I have been commanded by Him to assume that function publicly, and I cannot allow any person to trespass upon that right. If attacked, I will take steps to defend myself and to protect the lives of my companions’. This behaviour led to further protests on the part of the local clergy, and Zanjānī was taken to Tehran and held there under house arrest for about one year. While in Tehran, in reply to queries from one of his followers in Zanjān, he ‘enumerated a series of observances, some of which constituted a definite departure from the established traditions of Islam’, maintaining that these were based on instructions of the Bāb. In the autumn of 1848, however, he contrived to make his escape from the capital following the death of Muḥammad Shāh.

Back in Zanjān, it was clear that he aimed at the institution of radical changes in the city. According to āb al-Aḥad Zanjānī, the poor sat on the right side of the pulpit in his mosque and the rich on the left, while he consistently addressed himself to the poor. He was as impatient as ever of the existing religious and secular powers. Following an incident in which two Bābis stabbed a Muslim in the course of an altercation, one Bābi, named āb al-ālī, was arrested and imprisoned on the orders of Amīr Aslan Khān, the governor. After a month, Zanjānī wrote to the governor demanding the release of this man, but was curtly refused on the grounds that this amounted to
 interference in the affairs of the local administration. A second demand was also refused, whereupon Zanjānī’s agent forcibly freed the Bābī prisoner, releasing at the same time other criminals held in the local gaol and threatening to kill anyone who tried to intervene. The whole episode received the approval of Zanjānī. Following this incident, a decree for the death of Zanjānī and his followers was written by the local religious leaders and sent to the capital for ratification by Nāṣīr al-Dīn Shāh. On 16 May 1850, fighting broke out between a mob organized by the clergy and a small force of Bābīs, in the course of which one of the latter was killed. At some point, the clergy declared *jihād* against the Bābīs—on which Ābd al-Aḥad Zanjānī remarks that ‘had this religious war been against such as denied their faith, and law, and scripture, there had been no harm; but this war was against those who cried like themselves: “There is no god but God, Muḥammad is the Apostle of God, Āli is the Friend of God!”’

It certainly appears that, even before his conversion to Babism, Zanjānī had exhibited a strongly puritanical streak and had applied Islamic law rigorously; in one instance, he closed a brothel used for temporary marriage (which is legal under Shiʿī law), married off most of the women in it, and sent others into service. Now, he seems to have continued to take a strong line on the application of the religious law, rigorously prohibiting the sale and manufacture of wine in the region. ‘... under his jurisdiction,’ writes Ābd al-Aḥad, ‘Zanjān was purified in every way which you can conceive from unnatural crimes and fornications, and such things as are forbidden by Religion and Law’, while his followers were consistent in their observance of prayer and fasting, and would not ‘tolerate any misdeed which infringed the Law’. It is, therefore, difficult to assess how far Zanjānī and his followers thought of themselves as Bābīs and how far as Muslims. According to Nicolas, Zanjānī even forbade his followers to take part in the struggle at Shaykh Ṭabarsi, and it may well be that he regarded those who had abrogated the Islamic legal code as infidels. Quite obviously, our interpretation of the nature and intent of the struggle at Zanjān depends very much on finding clear answers to the questions raised here.

Following the first outbreak of trouble mentioned above, the governor of Zanjān ordered the city divided into two opposing camps, an act which made questions of allegiance particularly sharp. An armed struggle now began which lasted until January 1851, in the course of which the Muslim population of Zanjān was reinforced by troops from the region and, later, from the central government. Various accounts indicate that Zanjānī refused to declare *jihād* against the enemy, although he clearly regarded them as unbelievers and held *jihād* as such to be possible.

This seems to me to be an over-simplification. If the Bābīs were not fighting some kind of *jihād*, then their action could not be justified or rendered legal in
any way and would be regarded simply as rebellion. Now, this was certainly how the defence of the Bábís was looked on by their adversaries, but Zanjáni and his followers clearly did not see their own behaviour as insurrection, if only because they did not regard the secular government as legal. If the opposition clergy had declared *jihād* against them, then this was further evidence of the infidelity of the former and the rightness of the Bábí cause. The evidence suggests that Zanjáni did not declare an offensive but a defensive *jihād*. Thus, according to *Abd al-Áhad, he asked the Muslim clergy: ‘... during all this period of strife, what day hath there been, or what night, wherein I have commanded a religious war, save only that I was constantly considering how we might ward off your assaults from our wives and children, for we have no choice but to defend ourselves?’

In the absence of strictly contemporary documentation, it remains difficult to assess the motives and aims of the Bábís at Zanján; in general, there appear to be several factors involved, not all of them easily compatible. We can see the role played here, as at Shaykh Tabarsí, by religious fanaticism and a characteristically Shií fascination with martyrdom. On the other hand, the speed with which conversion to Babism appears to have occurred in Zanján, and the numbers involved, suggest that other, social and economic factors were at work and that few of the combatants had a clear idea of the teachings of the Báb or of the distinctness of Babism from Islam by 1850. Mullá Muḥammad ʿAlí himself seems to have retained his Muslim identity and to have been impelled as much by puritan and egalitarian motives as abstract spiritual convictions centred in the person of the Báb. Unlike the Bábí leaders at Badasht and Shaykh Tabarsí, he had never been a Shaykhi and may have been less receptive to the metaphysical elements of the Báb’s teaching. There is evidence, however, that he may have subscribed to the belief that the Báb was the Qā’ím and that the Day of Resurrection had appeared. The use of the watchword ‘O Lord of the Age’ by the Bábís suggests that messianic enthusiasm may have figured largely in the struggle, which, in its turn, implies that many may have regarded themselves as involved in the final *jihād* against the forces of Antichrist.

The Yazd and Nayríz upheavals of 1850, led by Sayyid Yahyá Dárábí Vaḥid, although on a much smaller scale than that of Zanján, exhibit many features similar to it. Dárábí was a highly popular religious leader who had the allegiance of large numbers in both towns. He himself seems to have been preparing for a holy war and is known to have tested the swords manufactured by Aqá Muhammad Hádi Farhádí in Qazvín. On his arrival at Nayríz, in opposition to the orders of the local governor, Zayn al-ʿAbidín Khán, he made his way to the principal mosque of the city, accompanied by some nine hundred heavily armed supporters, many with swords drawn, and ascended the pulpit in order to preach to a congregation of about one thousand five
hundred.\textsuperscript{234} There is good reason to believe that very few of Darabi's followers knew much of the teachings of the Bāb,\textsuperscript{235} and it seems likely that social and political motives dominated the struggle. In Yazd, for example, there had been serious civil disturbance in the town prior to Darabi's arrival, and at least one of those who lent him his support was a known agitator.\textsuperscript{236} In Nayriz also, the people had already been rebelling against the governor at the time of Darabi's appearance in the town.\textsuperscript{237} Like Zanjani, the latter seems to have been regarded as an independent authority over against the existing civil powers. In one instance, Ḥāji Sayyid Ismā'īl, the Shaykh al-Islām of Bavānāt, ordered the arrest of a certain Mullā Bāqir, an ambassador en route from the governor of Nayriz to Prince Firūz Mīrza in Shirāz; the unfortunate man was brought before Darabi by the village chief of Rastāq and put to death.\textsuperscript{238} Darabi similarly appointed his own officers and functionaries at the fort of Khaja in which he and his followers took refuge.\textsuperscript{239} According to Zarandi, Darabi disclaimed any intention of waging \textit{jihād}.\textsuperscript{240} As in the case of Zanjani, if we mean by this offensive \textit{jihād}, then it may be correct; but the spirit of the defence put up against the royalist forces strongly suggests that the struggle was seen as defensive \textit{jihād}.

In conclusion, then, we may note that in no instance do the Bābis seem to have declared offensive \textit{jihād} along the lines suggested in the \textit{Qayyūm al-asma'}, probably because it was regarded as wrong to declare a holy war unless there was a reasonable chance of success—a condition clearly lacking in the case of the Bābis. But their refusal to recognize existing ecclesiastical and secular authority, their carrying of arms in situations of considerable political instability, and their generally aggressive manner resulted in clashes between them and the civilian population which quickly escalated into full-scale struggles. Once battle was joined, religious motifs of martyrdom, defensive \textit{jihād} and 'perfecting the proof' (i.e. demonstrating the truth of the cause in the eyes of men) took precedence over social, economic and other features. In the case of Shaykh Ṭabarsi, religious motives seem to have predominated from the beginning, whereas in the cases of Zanjān, Yazd and Nayriz, existing urban tensions played a central role which at times obscures the religious elements of these struggles. From the point of view of both local and national government, the Bābis were manifestly insurrectionaries bent on subverting the existing religious and social order. The role of \textit{jihād} in these struggles is, then, obscured by a multiplicity of motives and by the inability of the Bābis to transform merely local upheavals into a more widely-based revolutionary struggle against the forces of unbelief. The Bābi ideal \textit{jihād}, as represented in the works of the Bāb, and the reality, as seen at Shaykh Tabarsi, Nayriz and Zanjān, were certainly not commensurate, and failure, once it came, was complete and permanent.
NOTES

1 Much has been written on Babism, much of it unreliable. An up-to-date account of the background and history to 1848 may be found in my ‘From Shaykhism to Babism: a study in charismatic renewal in Shi‘ī Islam’ (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Cambridge, 1979; University Microfilms 81-70,043). For more general surveys, see Alessandro Bausani ‘Bāb’ and ‘Babism’ in the Encyclopaedia of Islam (2nd. ed.) and my articles ‘Bab’ and ‘Babism’ in the Encyclopaedia Iranica (forthcoming). A recent valuable addition to the literature on the subject is Moojan Momen (ed.) The Babi and Baha’i Religions, 1844–1944: Some Contemporary Western Accounts, Oxford, 1981. A comprehensive bibliography by the present author will appear in the forthcoming Bibliographical Guide to Iran.


3 Peter Avery Modern Iran, London 1965, pp. 54, 58.


6 Ibid., p. 196.


8 Shoghi Effendi God Passes By, p. 42.

9 Ibid.


11 Shoghi Effendi God Passes By, p. 38.

12 Ibid., p. 37.

13 Ibid., p. 43.

14 Zarandi Dawn-Breakers, p. 396.


17 Qur’ān 33:40.

18 Ibid., 34:28.


22 Ibid., 16:125. The next verse, which refers to reprisals equivalent to the degree of injury, was revealed later in Medina.


24 Qur’ān 8:38–9.


26 Qur’ān 2:256.

27 Ibid., 4:76.

28 Ibid., 9:5.

29 See ibid., 5:17, 72, 81–2.


32 Ibid., 8:39.
Some schools recognize a third division known as dār al-ṣulḥ, territory in tributary relationship to Islam.


Kohlberg “Shi‘i Doctrine of jihād,” p. 80.

Ibid., p. 81.

Thus Algar Religion and State, p. 79.


For passages from an abridged version, see Kohlberg “Shi‘i Doctrine of jihād” p. 82.

Algar Religion and State, pp. 87–89.


Ibid., pp. 154–5.


Abdul-Hadi Hairī Shi‘ism and Constitutionalism in Iran, Leiden 1977, p. 121.

Ibid., p. 124.

Kohlberg “Shi‘i Doctrine of jihād,” p. 69.


Thus al-Shaykh al-Muḥīd Avā‘īl al-maqālāt, pp. 70–71, cited Kohlberg “Shi‘i Doctrine of jihād” p. 69.

Kohlberg “Shi‘i Doctrine of jihād,” p. 70.

Algar Religion and State, p. 252.

Shaykh ʿAbd Allāh Māzandarānī, quoted Hairī Shi‘ism and Constitutionalism, p. 99.

Zarandī Dawn-breakers, p. 61.


Qāyūm al-asmā’ Cambridge University Library, Browne Or. Ms. F.11, f. 76b; cf. ff.89a, 142b.

Ibid., ff. 26a, 46b.

Ibid., f.3a, etc.

Ibid., f.49b, etc.

Ibid., f.41a; cf. f.68b.

Ibid., f.3a.

Qayyīm al-asma' f. 55a.

Qayyīm al-asma' f. 89a; cf. Qur'ān 2:216. It is specifically the hidden Imām who thus associates these three ordinances; in this way, jihad appears to be formally elevated to the position of a pillar of the faith (see later discussion of Risāla-yi furū' al-Adliyya).

Qayyīm al-asma' f. 84b.

Qayyīm al-asma' f. 98b.

Qayyīm al-asma' f. 123a.

Qayyīm al-asma' f. 158a.

Qayyīm al-asma' f. 169a, 170b; cf. Qur'ān 4:84.

Qayyīm al-asma' f. 169b.

Qayyīm al-asma' f. 169b.

Qayyīm al-asma' f. 170b; cf. Qur'ān 9:28. These four months were originally held sacred by the pagan Arabs, by whom fighting in them had been prohibited.

Qayyīm al-asma' f. 170b; cf. Qur'ān 9:5. These four months were originally held sacred by the pagan Arabs, by whom fighting in them had been prohibited.

Qayyīm al-asma' f. 170b; cf. Qur'ān 9:5. These four months were originally held sacred by the pagan Arabs, by whom fighting in them had been prohibited.

Qayyīm al-asma' f. 170b; cf. Qur'ān 9:5. These four months were originally held sacred by the pagan Arabs, by whom fighting in them had been prohibited.

Qayyīm al-asma' f. 170b; cf. Qur'ān 9:28. These four months were originally held sacred by the pagan Arabs, by whom fighting in them had been prohibited.

Qayyīm al-asma' f. 170b; cf. Qur'ān 9:28. These four months were originally held sacred by the pagan Arabs, by whom fighting in them had been prohibited.

Qayyīm al-asma' f. 170b; cf. Qur'ān 9:28. These four months were originally held sacred by the pagan Arabs, by whom fighting in them had been prohibited.

Qayyīm al-asma' f. 170b; cf. Qur'ān 9:28. These four months were originally held sacred by the pagan Arabs, by whom fighting in them had been prohibited.

Qayyīm al-asma' f. 170b; cf. Qur'ān 9:28. These four months were originally held sacred by the pagan Arabs, by whom fighting in them had been prohibited.
102 Ibid., f. 179a.
103 ‘From Shaykhism to Babism’, p. 190.
104 Mazandarānī Zuhūr al-ḥaqq, p. 235.
105 Qayyūm al-asmā’, f. 2b.
109 Mazandarānī Zuhūr al-ḥaqq, p. 75.
111 Ibid.
112 Ibid., p. 115.
113 Ibid.
114 Ibid.
115 Ibid.
116 Ibid., p. 116; the last word here, ‘unbelievers’ (kāfirūn) differs from the original text, which reads ‘evildoers’ (zālimūn).
117 Ibid. In the preceding chapter, devoted to khums (a one-fifth levy imposed on booty, treasure, mines, pearl-fishing, trading profits, land belonging to protected peoples, and things combining what is legally allowable with what is forbidden), the Bāb adopts an orthodox Islamic position. Three points stand out here insofar as this regulation concerns jihād: firstly khums must be levied on property taken by the Muslims from unbelievers by the sword. Secondly, it is a duty to take the property of enemies of the Imāms—that is, ‘dissenters’—and to pay khums on this property. Thirdly, the khums which is levied on booty taken in war belongs to the Imām and consists of spoils and land. (Risāla furūʿ al-ʾAdliyya, pp. 110–13). For summaries of the orthodox Shiʿī position on khums, see Shaykh Abū ʿl-Qāsim al-Ḥillī Al-mukhtaşar al-nāfiʿ (Tehran, 1387/1967–8) pp. 87–88; Muḥammad al Ḥusayn Al Kāshīf Al-Ghiṭā Aṣl al-Shīʿa wa usūlūhā, 9th. ed., Najaf, 1381/1962, pp. 112–3.
118 Bayān-i Fārsī (n.p., n.d.) 5:5, p. 158.
119 Ibid.
121 Ibid.
123 Ibid., p. 120.
126 Ibid., 5:6, pp. 159–60.
128 Haykal al-dīn, p. 15.
131 Bayān-i Fārsī 4:12, pp. 135–6.
132 Ibid., 6:6, pp. 198–9. Cf. the burning of all books but the Bible by the Anabaptists of Münster under the leadership of John Matthyss in 1534.
133 Ibid., 5:14, p. 174.
The concept of *mubahala* in Islam reverts to the Quranic verse 3:61, supposed to relate to a challenge issued by Muḥammad to a Christian delegation from Najrān. For the significance of *mubahala* in Shi'ism, see Henry Corbin *En Islam iranien* 4 vols., Paris 1971–2, vol. 3, pp. 210–3.

**135** Ibid., 8:15, p. 298.

**136** Ibid., 4:5, p. 119.

**137** Ibid., 7:16, p. 262.

**138** The concept of *mubahala* in Islam reverts to the Quranic verse 3:61, supposed to relate to a challenge issued by Muḥammad to a Christian delegation from Najrān. For the significance of *mubahala* in Shi'ism, see Henry Corbin *En Islam iranien* 4 vols., Paris 1971–2, vol. 3, pp. 210–3.


**140** Qayyīm *al-asma‘*, ff. 6b–7a.


**144** Samandar *Tārīkh*, pp. 97–8.


**146** Letter quoted Māzandarānī *Zuhūr al-haqq*, p. 274.

**147** Samandar *Tārīkh* p. 347; letter of Qurrat al-ʿAyn printed in Māzandarānī *Zuhūr al-haqq*, p. 352.


**149** Al-Baghdādī *Risāla*, p. 113.


**151** Zarandī *Dawn-breakers*, pp. 90–91.

**152** Balyuzī *The Bāb* chapter 4; Momen *Bābī and Bahā‘ī Religions*, pp. 83–90.

**153** Zarandī *Dawn-breakers*, pp. 144–8.

**154** Al-Baghdādī *Risāla*, p. 117.

**155** Samandar *Tārīkh*, p. 352.


**158** ʿAbbās Effendi *Tadhkira*, p. 299.

**159** Zarandī *Dawn-breakers*, pp. 235–6.

**160** Sayyīd Muḥammad Ḥusayn Zavārī *Waqāyī‘i mīniyya* Cambridge University Library, Brown Or. Ms. F. 28 item 1, p. 7.

**161** Māzandarānī *Zuhūr al-haqq*, p. 374.

**162** Samandar *Tārīkh*, pp. 64–66, 334–5.

**163** Ibid., pp. 191–3, 352; Māzandarānī *Zuhūr al-haqq*, p. 383.

**164** Samandar *Tārīkh*, pp. 191–3, 352.

For varying accounts of this incident, see Zarandī *Dawn-breakers*, pp. 276–8, who seeks to attribute the murder to a single Shaykḥī; Samandar *Tārīkh* p. 356; Mīrzā
Muḥammad ibn Sulaymān Tanakabūn Ḍiṣaṣ al-ʿulamā (Tehran, Intishārāt-ī ʿIlmiyya-yi Islāmiyya, n.d.) p. 57. Muʿīn al-Saltāna Tabrīzī gives the names of the assassins as Sayyid Husayn Qazvīnī, Mīrzā Ṣâliḥ Shīrāzī, and Mīrzā Hādī Farhādī, but states that Sayyid Husayn was a Shaykhī (Tārīkh-i Muʿīn al-Saltāna Tehran Bahāʾī Archives, Ms. 19, pp. 242–5)—the distinction between ‘Shaykhī’ and ‘Bābī’, was not always, if at all, clear at this period. The date of Muḥammad Taqī’s murder is given only in an anonymous account of it appended to a rare early edition of his Majālis al-mutajaṣīn (n.p., 1280/1863–64), a copy of which is in the possession of the present author.

167 Zavārāʾi Waqāyiʾ, pp. 6–8. It is not impossible that this incident and that described by Zarandī are, in fact, one and the same; but the difference in names and the contradictory statements as to the whereabouts of Bushrūʾī make it difficult to assert this categorically.

169 Shoghi Effendi God Passes By, p. 31.
170 Al-kawākib al-durrīyya, p. 129.
171 Zavārāʾi Waqāyiʾ, pp. 1, 3, and passim.
172 Ibid., p. 54.
173 Ibid., p. 70.
175 Ibid., p. 254.
176 Ibid., p. 71.
177 Ibid., p. 189.
178 Makāṭib-i ʿAbd al-Bahā vol. 2, Cairo 1320/1921, p. 254; cf. p. 252.
195 See Nuqät al-káf, p. 204; Zarandi Dawn-breakers, pp. 326, 344.
196 See Browne Târîkh-i-Jadîd Appendix II, p. 337.
198 Nuqät al-káf, p. 166.
199 Waqâyin, pp. 28–9.
200 Ibid., pp. 29, 44, 52; cf. idem Majlis-i shahâdat, pp. 102, 103.
201 Waqâyin, p. 32; cf. idem Majlis-i shahâdat, p. 94.
202 Majlis-i shahâdat, p. 102.
203 Ibid., p. 101; idem Waqâyin, pp. 29, 58.
204 Waqâyin, p. 38.
207 Ibid., p. 86
209 Dalâ’il-i saḥcîa, p. 64.
210 Dossier no. 177, Tehran, 1849; World Order 1:1 p. 19.
211 Ibid., p. 21.
213 Zarandi Dawn-breakers, pp. 529–30; Lisân al-Mulk indicates that he introduced several innovations in religious practice into the city: Nâsikh al-tawârîkh vol. 3 p. 287.
214 Zarandi Dawn-breakers, pp. 531–32.
215 Ibid., p. 533.
216 Ibid., p. 539.
218 Ibid., p. 779.
220 Ibid., p. 783.
221 Zarandi Dawn-breakers, pp. 542–3.
225 Ibid.
226 Seyyêd Ali Mohammed, p. 338.
227 Zarandi Dawn-breakers, p. 543.
231 Zarandi Dawn-breakers, p. 567.
232 For full accounts of these struggles, see: Zarandi Dawn-breakers, pp. 465–99; Muḥâammad Shafî Rawḫânî Nayrizî Lama’ât al-anwâr, vol. 1, Tehran 130

235 Zarandi Dawn-breakers, pp. 477, 482.
236 See Moojan Momen 'Some Problems Connected with the Yazd Episode of 1850', a paper read to the 3rd. Bahai Studies Seminar, University of Lancaster 1977.
238 Zarandi Dawn-breakers, pp. 484-5.
239 Ibid., p. 483.
240 Ibid., p. 469.

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