Bibliography 2: #BIB31353

Key	BIB31353
Reference type	Book
Title	Strategies of the Muslim Brotherhood Movements
Author	Altmann, Israel
Year	2007
Date	May 1, 2007
Publisher	IDC Herzliya ; PIPS Institute for Policy and Strategy
Place published	Herzliya, Israel
Issue	7.
Abstract	To be sure, there is no Ikhwani strategy common to all the branches and thinkers affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) movement. What characterizes the MB is its adherence to the final objectives and rigid commitment to a core of principles related to them, combined with pragmatism and flexibility as far as the strategy and tactics of achieving those objectives are concerned. There are no clear time tables to reach the goals, and gradual, methodical progress takes priority. The Muslim Brethren share an interpretation of history and of the crisis of Islam; a holistic view of Islam as religion and state which are inseparable; a vision of bringing Islam back to its rightful place; and a number of principles regarding how to make that vision a reality, namely: Resistance to foreign occupation, and liberation of Muslim countries from all types of foreign domination; creation of the Islamist state which will implement the Shari’ah; unification of the Muslims; and spreading Islam, a universal religion, all over the world. The MB has followed three different strategies to reach power and set up the Islamic state: Missionary work (da’wah), participatory politics, and armed revolt. That created divergences between one MB national branch and the other, and between competing trends or different generations inside branches. In many cases MB organizations and thinkers changed their strategies, sometimes radically, along their careers, according to changing personal or environmental circumstances, but without loosing sight of the final goals. The emergence of Muslim communities in the West generated strategies designed to use them in the Ikhwani project. The combination of rigidity over the final goals and flexibility on strategies and tactics is compatible with a movement which seeks to be an inclusive mass movement rather then an exclusive, elitist vanguard organization, and looks at itself not as one more social-political force among others but as the real Muslim Community. It has allowed the MB, which has viewed itself since its inception as a global movement with a universal message, to grow up as a global movement with over 50 national branches. Those branches are affiliated with the International Organization of the MB which functions as a fundraising and coordination body. Policies of the national branches occasionally contradict each other, and reflect local realities and constraints. Some of the national branches go under names other than the MB, sometimes in order to bypass legislation making it illegal to form parties which are connected to a foreign entity. Still, the national branches act in many respects as parts of one movement and regard the International Organization and its Guidance Bureau as a coordinator and arbiter. The existence of considerable ambiguities, or “grey zones”, in the MB’s positions on key issues (such as Islamic law, jihad, political pluralism, civil and political rights, women rights and religious minorities) is intentional: Strategic and tactical flexibility is a “strategy” whereby the end justifies the means, and the means include confusing the message. The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, the origin of the global MB movement, has passed through three distinctive historical phases, each with its own typical strategies. The first phase, from the MB’s foundation in 1928 to the 1952 Revolution, was dominated by the classical MB strategy formulated by the movement’s founder, Hassan al-Banna, namely the educational or missionary - da’wah- strategy: The Islamization of society and the creation of an Islamic state as a gradual, multi-stage, “bottom-up” process. The rise of a militant trend in the movement toward the end of this period and the rivalry with the new military regime led to the second phase- dissolution of the MB in 1954 and its harsh suppression by 'Abd al-Nasir, organizational paralysis and the emergence of the takfiri trends inspired by Sayyid Qutb. The third phase is that of the “Second Republic”, under Presidents Sadat and Mubarak: Rejecting the isolationist and violent strategies of the takfiris, the MB opted for reform and gradual Islamization “bottom up” through both da’wah and using more than ever before the democratic tools made available to them. The opening of the political process in Egypt since the 1970’s produced an ideological adjustment to the new democratic game - the “new Ikhwanism”. Like the classic MB, the “new Ikhwan” strive for the creation of an Islamic state which will apply the Shari’ah. But while the classic MB strategy to reach that goal calls mainly for missionary and educational work, da’wah, although politics are not rejected, the “new Ikhwan” focus on using the tools of democratic politics as the main strategy to reach power and establish that state. This change was accompanied by a shift from the classical pan-Islamic orientation of the MB to focusing on the particular territorial state. Yet “new Ikhwanism” has not replaced the old one- it cohabitates with it, adding to the ideological confusion. The main force for change in the direction of “new Ikhwanism” have been in the last two decades members of the “second generation” of MB activists, former leaders of the Islamist student groups in the 1970’s, who joined the MB, rose through the ranks as trade union leaders, and engineered the Movement’s entry into the political arena. Yet much power in the MB still rests with the “old guard” leaders, who adhere to the classic MB world view and are less open to change in general, and to the increasing politicization of the MB in particular. Like its Egyptian counterpart, the Syrian MB went through a violent phase. From its foundation in 1945 to the Ba’ath takeover in 1963 it was a reformist social and political movement which sought to bring about the application of the Shari’ah through da’wah and political work within the existing political system, and participated in elections, parliaments and governments. But after 1963 it became a revolutionary organization seeking to overturn the Ba’ath regime and set up an Islamic state through armed struggle, which culminated in its total defeat by 1982. Strictly outlawed ever since, and with its leadership in exile, the Syrian MB has reinvented itself as a non-violent Sunni reform movement, claiming to lead the Syrian opposition to the Asad regime and to bring about the establishment of a democratic Muslim state in Syria through democratic means. Since its creation in 1945, the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood, and since 1992 its political arm, the Islamic Action Front (IAF) have pursued two distinctive, though related, agendas. One has been the advancement of the general objectives of the Muslim Brotherhood movement- Islamization of society; creation of the Islamic state which will apply the Shari’ah; jihad to liberate occupied Muslim lands; and unification of the Muslim Nation. The other agenda has been the Palestinian cause, a dominant national concern in Jordan much more than in any other Arab Country The Jordanian MB was set up with the Monarchy’s blessing, and for its first three decades pursued a symbiotic alliance with the Jordanian state, which enabled it to construct the immense network of charitable institutions, services and enterprises used by it to spread its da’wah and build its political power. That alliance ended in the 1980’s, when Islamism inherited Arab Socialism and Nationalism as the main ideological challenge to the monarchy, and due to the growing domination of the Palestinian element, demographically and ideologically, in the MB. It gave place to an uneasy coexistence which has gradually developed to an open political conflict and systematic efforts on the regime’s part to contain and reduce the MB’s power and influence. The MB’s radicalization and overzealous pushing of its Palestinian agenda raise the question to what extent it still is a Jordanian movement. Hamas was the first MB organization to reach power through parliamentary elections. After the failure of the Islamists in Sudan and Algeria, the fortunes of this new experiment of an Islamist movement in power are of crucial importance for Islamism everywhere. Hamas' case is unique, though. Firstly, its election victory was achieved not only under foreign occupation, but to a large extent because of it and thanks to the particular political setup of the Palestinian Authority. Secondly, unlike its sister organizations in Egypt, Jordan and other Arab States, Hamas is at the same time a da’wah movement, seeking to Islamize the Palestinian society through education and social work and bring about the creation of an Islamic state, and a resistance movement. These two identities could coexist well until Hamas moved to electoral politics, and the contradiction between being simultaneously a government, responsible for the wellbeing of its population, and an armed resistance movement, has brought it into a strategic dead end, at least thus far. Finally, Hamas' decision-making is heavily encumbered by additional factors which do not characterize its sister organization in other Arab countries: Its leadership is split between the external one, based in Syria, and the local one (which in turn is split again between the Gaza Strip and the West Bank), each with its distinctive perspectives and strategic outlook. And the centrality of the Palestinian cause for MB organizations everywhere, and their expectations from Hamas, are a clear constraint on its room of maneuver. From its foundation in 1946 and until 1987, the Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood movement held that the military struggle against Israel, advocated and practiced by other Palestinian groups, was second priority. The first one was Islamization of society: Israel’s existence, in the movement’s view, was a symptom of the weakness of the Muslim world resulting from its abandonment of Islam. Only once Islam is revived, and a unified Islamic state created, will it be possible to defeat Israel. The decision to create The Islamic Resistance Movement (Harakat al-Muqawamah al-Islamiyyah - Hamas) in late December 1987 was actually forced upon the movement by the outbreak of the first Intifada. Historically, Islamist movements pursued three main strategies to reach power: Missionary work (da’wah), working through the political process (siyasah) and military takeover (inqilab). No MB organization today advocates taking power by force in order to Islamize society using the state’s power apparatuses, but the military does figure in some thinking. The national branches are either one organization combining da’wah with political work, like in Egypt, or a political organization formally separate from the charitable-missionary da’wah organization, like in Jordan. The Egyptian MB combined the political with the da’wah tools in its plan to reach power through political means. That plan called indeed for the penetration of the police and the military in order to neutralize their opposition to the MB’s ascension to power, and in order to ensure their support for the movement once it is in power. But the plan did not envisage using the police or the military to seize power. The Syrian MB for its part says that, as its own historical experience indicates, jihad should be conducted only against external enemies, not at home, and promises to bring about the collapse of the present regime by peaceful protest and civil disobedience; it does not rule out, however, the possibility that the army will seize power for a transition period. Going down the political road, and seeking to take advantage of democratic, electoral processes, MB organizations have to define the nature of the Islamic state they envision. Most Ikhwani organizations and thinkers adhere in one variation or another to the classical doctrine as defined by al-Banna: The goal is to set up an Islamic political order, or a state, in which the Shari’ah will rule as the implementation of Allah’s rule, which is the only legitimate one. Implementation of the Shari’ah is the raison d’etre of that state, and is more important than the form it takes- caliphate or another. The source of legitimacy of that state is its being the rule of Allah; the Qura`n - its constitution; and the ruler draws his authority from the pledge of allegiance (bay’ah) he receives from ahl al-'aqd wal-hall who are elected by the people, and from the consultation (shura) he practices with them. The ruler must be Muslim and male. The “new Ikhwani” narrative is in a way an effort to repackage that creed to make it more compatible with current notions of democracy. It argues that the goal is not a religious state or a religious government, but a civil state (madaniyah), with an Islamic source of authority (marja’iyyah), where the basis of membership will be citizenship (muwatanah), not religion, and all will be equal in their rights and duties. An alternative version is a civil state with “an Islamic cultural background” (khalfiyyah thaqafiyyah Islamiyyah). Those formulations do not alter the fact that all the MB organizations and thinkers adhere to the creed that the Islamic state is set up in fulfillment of Divine will, and its raison d’etre is to implement the Divine Law, that implementation being the application of Divine rule on earth. While the community, or the people, is the source of the authority of the ruler, through the institutions of bay’ah and of shura, the source of sovereignty and legitimacy of the state is Allah. Such a state cannot be but a religious state. No MB organization or thinker has accepted the separation of state from religion and abandoned the core principle that Islam is both din and dawlah. The MB traditionally shunned forming political partnerships and alliances and joining political fronts or coalitions. The new Ikhwan, with their emphasis on politics, do make overtures to other political forces but do not form long-range, strong alliances. That attitude reflects the secretive nature of the movement and its fears of being penetrated or that the negotiating involved in political coalition building could erode the core principles and undermine the da’wah. The Syrian MB has been adapting in recent years and formed the National Salvation Front with former Vice President Khaddam, formerly the nemesis of the organization, and several other groups. One of the arguments for encouraging the participation of Islamist movements in democratic politics and electoral processes has been the moderating effect: The assumption that once those movements join the system and get closer to political power, they will adapt their ideologies to the new circumstances and to new obligations towards their electoral constituencies. Recent developments have refuted that assumption. Hamas' winning of elections and becoming the government did little to moderate its principles, and it has not metamorphosed from a violent resistance and opposition movement to a pragmatic ruling political party. The electoral achievements of the Egyptian MB seem to have imbued its leadership with a new sense of empowerment and to have only reinforced its willingness to challenge the regime. That sense, that Islamists are on their way to power, comes also from the Jordanian MB following the election gains of Hamas and the Egyptian MB.
Notes	Bahá'ís in Egypt: p. 17.
Language	English
Keywords	MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD; EGYPT; APOSTASY; PERSECUTION
Number of pages	59
File attachments	internal-pdf://0558487854/Altman - Strategies of the Muslim Brotherhood.pdf

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