Commentaries

BAHÁ'Í STUDIES REVIEW, Volume 6, 1996
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COMMENTARIES

Commentary on Sen McGlinn's "Towards the Enlightened Society," The Bahá'í Studies Review 4.1 (1994): 76-82.
Commentators: Roshan Danesh and Gordon Dicks
The fundamental point raised by Sen McGlinn in his essay "Towards the Enlightened Society"—that Enlightenment values of individuality were a positive development—is more than reasonable. Indeed, this conclusion is explicitly supported in Bahá'í writings: "Freedom of thought, freedom of expression, freedom of action are among the freedoms which have received the ardent attention of social thinkers across the centuries... A true reading of the teachings of Bahá'u'lláh leaves no doubt as to the high importance of these freedoms to constructive social progress."⁽¹⁾ However, both the Writings⁽²⁾ and observation of society suggest that any endorsement of individualism needs further exploration. Self-centred individualism is surely at the root of many of the most serious issues we face: weakened families and a sense of aimlessness amongst youth; environmental abuse; extreme and in many cases increasing disparities of wealth; a cynical political system centred as much on theatrical conflict as on real solutions; and a valueless legal structure so often held in contempt by criminal and law-abiding citizens alike. Given McGlinn's telling point that many of the worst disasters of western society are attributable to turning away from the movement towards individuation (81) it would be tempting to paraphrase Winston Churchill's observation about democracy and conclude that western individualism is the worst social system ever devised—except for any of the alternatives.
This, however, would be wrong, just as Churchill was wrong about democracy. The Bahá'í teachings offer a model of interdependence between individualism and community which goes beyond Enlightenment values without denying their individual focus. We would like to explore briefly this interdependence from political, legal, and economic perspectives.
The partisan political system commonly associated with western society is, in some ways, less individualistic than it might appear. Both the emphasis on political parties (groups) and the manipulation of the electorate by frequently shallow campaigning and advertising run counter to the trend of individuation. These features are absent in Bahá'í administration. Of course, it is easy to spot communal elements in the Administrative Order, both in its structure and in its key tool, consultation; the absence of individual authority, the principle of universal acceptance of decisions, and the idea that contributions to consultation are the property of the group, and not the contributor, spring to mind.
There is, however, an underlying reliance on individuals which should not be ignored. The principle that condemns "excessive centralization"⁽³⁾ finds practical expression in the evolution of the structure and functioning of Bahá'í administration. The central building blocks of the Bahá'í World Order are the local Spiritual Assemblies. It is these bodies that 'Abdu'l-Bahá and Shoghi Effendi first nurtured as the prerequisites to the formation of global institutions, and it is the maturity of the local institutions which will coincide with the Lesser Peace. Most important, however, are the repeated affirmations by the Universal House of Justice of the vital role of the individual.⁽⁴⁾ The effectiveness of consultation depends on the participants' ability to be open and frank with their views - evoking a "clash of differing opinions"⁽⁵⁾ - as well as courteous and respectful. An electoral system without nominations or campaigns opens up a much wider range of choices for the voters, and places a heavier responsibility on them as individuals. As the House of Justice explains, "... a pattern is set for institutional and individual behaviour which depends for its efficacy not so much on the force of law, which admittedly must be respected, as on the recognition of a mutuality of benefits, and on the spirit of cooperation maintained by the willingness, the courage, the sense of responsibility, and the initiative of individuals—these being expressions of their devotion and submission to the will of God."⁽⁶⁾ We are being challenged to see individualism in a new light, appropriate to the era of human maturity.
This transformation in the meaning of individualism can also be seen in the legal sphere. Post-Enlightenment legal systems reflect a view of human nature which says that the most natural and best expression of a human being is the use of their rational faculty. An outgrowth of this faith in human rationality is the belief that individuals and society are best served by allowing for an unfettered expression of one's rationality. This perception of human nature has caused a troublesome conflict to emerge. Since individuals must be free to act rationally, the existence of any laws is problematic because by necessity they limit autonomy and independence. However, some laws are necessary, if only to maintain a degree of order and co-existence. The predominant solution to this paradox has been to make individual freedom the yardstick with which all laws are measured and enforced.
This centrality of individualism to post-Enlightenment legal systems has become problematic for two reasons. First, by making individual freedom an end it itself, rather than a step in a process of development, current conceptions of individualism fail to include the notion of personal responsibility. Legal theorists presumed that the free exercise of one's rational faculty would result in the assumption of responsibility by individuals. However, this has not proved to be the case. Instead, individuals have assumed that they have freedom to be responsible for only those matters in their self-interest. Consequently, in many societies they have abdicated certain personal responsibilities by relying excessively on the state for support in various forms (and as an entity to be blamed for personal dissatisfaction)—ironically, passing responsibility to a collective body.
A second problem is that this ethic of individualism does not inculcate a sense of social responsibility and concern for the communal welfare. Enlightenment theorists presumed that at some point the free exercise of rationality would result in the appearance of communal values of fairness and equity, and eventually a semblance of social justice. This has not occurred. Enshrining individual freedom at the heart of the legal system has contributed to the deconstruction of social values rather than the appearance of them.
Should we, then, forsake individual freedom and emphasise the development of communal values in the legal system? Most certainly not. Bahá'u'lláh demonstrates that, contrary to Enlightenment beliefs, a legal system can encompass both an ethic of individualism and an ethic of communalism without contradiction. The reason, He suggests, is that there is no substantive difference between the goals and values of individualism and the goals and values of communalism. 'Abdu'l-Bahá illustrates this point:
In man there are two natures; his spiritual or higher nature and his material or lower nature. In one he approaches God, in the other he lives for the world alone. Signs of both these natures are to be found in men. In his material aspect he expresses untruth, cruelty and injustice; all these are the outcome of his lower nature. The attributes of his divine nature are shown forth in love, mercy, kindness, truth and justice...⁽⁷⁾
In other words, the central feature of a Bahá'í community, which is unity, also constitutes the dynamic force which underlies the human reality. Thus, within the Bahá'í schema a focus on the true individual self, if done with a consciousness of human purpose, necessarily leads to the development of a communal ethic. From this perspective, the intense exploration of self which the Enlightenment has spawned is invaluable, since it has trained individuals to explore independently the dimensions of their being. Bahá'u'lláh, however, has provided a focal point for that exploration which does not result in the domination of either an individualistic or a communal focus.
The goal of Bahá'í legal systems, therefore, will not be the preservation of individual freedom, but rather to establish patterns of interaction most conducive to the appearance of unity—a goal which harmonizes with both a focus on the individual and the creation of a community. The Kitáb-i-Aqdas makes this point, stating that the laws of Bahá'u'lláh are at once "the breath of life unto all created things" and "the highest means for the maintenance of order in the world and the security of its peoples."⁽⁸⁾ This is one possible understanding of Bahá'u'lláh's description of the Aqdas as the "Unerring Balance"⁽⁹⁾—this balance being between the spiritual reality of the individual human being and the social environment in which that individual grows and develops.
Much the same point is demonstrated in the Bahá'í approach to economic questions. Orthodox liberal economics is built on Adam Smith's famous observation of the "invisible hand"—the tendency of markets to direct self-interested behaviour in directions that serve the social good. Economists recognize exceptions to this rule—so-called market failures—which are so prevalent that it may be more reasonable to view them as the rule than as the exception. Examples include externalities (we ignore the environmental impacts of pollution because we are not obliged to pay for them); public goods (we are not motivated to provide an adequate number of lighthouses because we cannot oblige all of the beneficiaries to pay for them); rent-seeking (we use monopoly power, lobbying, advertising, or other means to manipulate free-market outcomes for private gain at the expense of society); and the pervasive costs associated with dishonesty (politely referred to, depending on their form, as adverse selection or moral hazard).⁽¹⁰⁾ Every one of these is as much a moral failure as it is a failure of the market. Despite these problems, however, most economists remain sceptical of non-market solutions because it is generally assumed that the only alternative is government intervention—which has an almost universal reputation for wasteful ineffectiveness.⁽¹¹⁾
It is significant that the strength of individualistic capitalism, contrary to popular belief, is not based solely on the acceptance of greed as the prime social motivation. Rather, as pointed out by the Austrian school of economics, this strength is also a result of "informational efficiency," the sheer practicality of a system which makes most of its decisions at a hands-on level in response to simple price signals and does not attempt to compile and manipulate masses of complex information. Psychologically, it is also apparent that people respond more readily when they feel they have some control and have a sense of belonging, regardless of any other motivation.
Complete socialization is not only impossible but most unjust, and in this the Cause is in fundamental disagreement with the extreme socialists or communists. It cannot also agree with the other extreme tendency represented by the "Laissez-faire" or individualistic school of economics which became very popular in the late eighteenth century, by the so-called democratic countries. For absolute freedom, even in the economic sphere, leads to confusion and corruption, and acts not only to the detriment of the state, or the collectivity, but inevitably results in the end jeopardizing the very interests of the individual himself... The Cause can and indeed will in the future maintain the right balance between the two tendencies of individualism and collectivism, not only in the field of economics, but in all other social domains.⁽¹²⁾

Consider, for example, how the Bahá'í teachings propose to address the issue of economic injustice. While there are provisions for profit sharing, progressive income tax, and regulation, it seems that the fundamental approach is individualistic. Quite aside from the explicit affirmation of private property rights, this can be seen in the operation of the Law of Huqúqu'lláh, which though morally binding is never to be enforced. Responsibility is placed squarely on the individual. 'Abdu'l-Bahá's explanation is particularly illuminating:
Man reacheth perfection through good deeds, voluntarily performed, not through good deeds the doing of which was forced upon him. And sharing is a personally chosen righteous act: that is, the rich should extend assistance to the poor, they should expend their substance for the poor, but of their own free will, and not because of [sic] the poor have gained this end by force. For the harvest of force is turmoil and the ruin of the social order. On the other hand voluntary sharing, the freely-chosen expending of one's substance, leadeth to society's comfort and peace. It lighteth up the world; it bestoweth honour upon humankind.⁽¹³⁾

At last we have come to the nub of the matter. The political, legal and economic institutions we devise are physical reflections of how we perceive the reality of the human species. Most economists would dismiss 'Abdu'l-Bahá words as utopian fantasy, because of the ingrained perception of human beings as selfish and materialistic—an ironic outcome to the intellectual individualism of the Enlightenment, which upheld human nobility in the face of the traditional Christian perception of a fallen being. By contrast, the Bahá'í conviction that a human being is "a mine rich in gems of inestimable value"⁽¹⁴⁾ lays the foundation for the moral autonomy spoken of by McGlinn (80). Bahá'u'lláh suggests why this is so: "The embodiment of liberty and its symbol is the animal."⁽¹⁵⁾ Animals must be free to roam, and only need to construct a social environment for the purposes of survival. Beyond this, community represents a dangerous limitation. Human purpose, however, transcends mere survival, and has both an individual and a communal dimension.⁽¹⁶⁾ Moreover, even the individual dimension—which can be expressed as the development of virtues or spiritual qualities—becomes meaningful primarily in relationships between people and not in isolation.⁽¹⁷⁾ While nature is characterized by interdependence in much the same way as human beings, the healthy evolution of the human reality requires that we consciously choose to develop it—an expression of the unique human capacities to know, to love, and to will.⁽¹⁸⁾ Taking McGlinn's observation that the bases of feudal and capitalist societies were position and property respectively (76), we might offer as the basis for Bahá'í society the principle of service:
... the honour and distinction of the individual consist in this, that he among all the world's multitudes should become a source of social good. Is any larger bounty conceivable than this, that an individual, looking within himself, should find that by the confirming grace of God he has become the cause of peace and well-being, of happiness and advantage to his fellow men? No, by the one true God, there is no greater bliss, no more complete delight.⁽¹⁹⁾

The Bahá'í teachings, therefore, offer more than a mere balance between individual and community. Rather, they appear to embody a synthesis (we admit this sounds suspiciously dialectical) in which we embrace a holistic or communal worldview, but one which respects the instrumental freedom of individuals to choose their degree of participation. Alternatively expressed, it is an approach in which self-fulfilling individuals will increasingly orient themselves to the needs of the whole because they have, of their own accord, come to appreciate the objective interrelationships that bind us as the "members of one body."⁽²⁰⁾ Rather than self-centred individualism, we are offered other- or community-centred individualism. Might this not be another interpretation of the rich phrase "unity in diversity"? At any rate, it is one approach to understanding the following statements of Bahá'u'lláh:
The best beloved of all things in My sight is Justice.... By its aid thou shalt see with thine own eyes and not through the eyes of others, and shalt know of thine own knowledge and not through the knowledge of thy neighbour.⁽²¹⁾
The purpose of justice is the appearance of unity among men.⁽²²⁾

Commentary on Barney Leith's "Bahá'í Review: Should the 'Red Flag' Law be Repealed?" The Bahá'í Studies Review 5.1 (1995): 27-35.
Commentator: Roxanne Lalonde
Barney Leith suggests that it is "no longer possible or right for National Assemblies to try to control the kinds of things Bahá'ís publish about their Faith" (35). With all due respect, I disagree with both Leith's suggestion and his choice of words.
My first concern is with the use of the term "control" in characterizing the environment in which National Spiritual Assemblies function. The implications of that term bring to mind one of the central themes of the Universal House of Justice's 19 May 1994 letter to the National Spiritual Assembly of the Bahá'ís of the United States, in which Bahá'ís are called upon to free themselves of suspicion of the institutions that serve them. The House of Justice reinforces the need for cooperation between the institutions and the members of the community.
Leith's assertion that it is no longer "right" for National Assemblies to "try to control" what Bahá'ís publish is unclear. Is he saying that it is now incorrect for National Assemblies to do so or that they no longer have the right to do so? To what incident or phase in the evolution of the Faith is he referring when he distinguishes between this period in time and some time in the past when it was right for National Assemblies to do so? Questions quibbling with semantics or murky writing aside, given that authority held by the institutions is divinely conferred, the entire notion has no foundation.
Leith also suggests that "it is no longer possible" for National Assemblies to "try to control" what Bahá'ís publish. Divorced from the discussion of the liberties associated with the electronic media, this statement may look like an attempt to limit the purview of a divine institution. Granting Leith the benefit of the doubt that that was not his intent, let us remind ourselves that "the power to accomplish the tasks of the community resides primarily in the mass of the believers".⁽²³⁾
Therefore, any action we take that ignores or disobeys the guidance of our institutions retards the progress of the Cause. Loving cooperation is the key to ensuring that the relationship between individuals and their institutions, regardless of the circumstance, flourishes in a harmonious and unifying environment.
A carte blanche dismissal of the review process as a solution to the challenges it creates is not a constructive option. In fact, such a dismissal would ultimately do more harm than good in this early phase in the development of the Bahá'í Faith. The Universal House of Justice has reminded us in recent letters that the international Bahá'í community is still in an immature phase in its development, both in the evolution of its institutions and in its standing in the world. Protection is just as important as propagation for the foreseeable future.
In the interests of making a constructive rather than merely critical contribution to this discussion, I address three issues: (1) interpretation of reviewing criteria, (2) Bahá'í academics, and (3) electronic communications, all of which rest on the quintessential matter of the individual believer's attitude toward the standards set by Bahá'u'lláh and enacted through the Administrative Order.
Review criteria
In Leith's account of two overturned review decisions, a National Spiritual Assembly rendered a judgement that reflected one of the operating principles articulated by Shoghi Effendi: be rigid in principle, flexible in application. When a National Assembly delegates its authority, the onus is on the members of the appointed committee to strive to meet the standards set by the Universal House of Justice, ensuring that the principles of the Faith remain at the forefront of their vision. The appeal process serves as a protection when an apparently unjust decision is made by such a committee. In all cases, the standard that Bahá'í scholars, editors, reviewers, and publishers must strive for is that of Bahá'u'lláh and the Covenant, not of the secular or academic world that surrounds us. It is only when we lose sight of that vision that we run the risk of producing/publishing work that does not meet those exalted standards.
The challenges in the review process are more a reflection of limited expertise during these early stages in the growth of the Faith than of problems inherent in the process itself. As more Bahá'ís devote their lives to acquiring expertise to serve the Faith and humanity, our still tiny pool of resources for these endeavours will become an ocean of wealth. One of the current knowledge gaps reflects a lack of sustained international cooperation among those interested in developing these resources. This gap is more indicative of the stretched resources of the Faith than a lack of will or desire. The Associations for Bahá'í Studies could work in conjunction with administrative institutions to compile a comprehensive database of international human resources. Such an endeavour would fall directly in line with initiatives currently being launched around the world through the development of teaching and training institutes.
Bahá'í academics
One of the more challenging issues involves Bahá'í academics seeking to publish works about the Faith in non-Bahá'í publications. Leith identifies situations and cites opinions that have contributed to a contentious atmosphere fuelled by the secular ethics of Western society. These are among the most stark examples of Bahá'ís applying non-Bahá'í standards and ethics to a Bahá'í process, an ambition ultimately doomed to fail, but which can cause much damage and grief.
Leith addresses apparent sacrifices that Bahá'í scholars make by submitting to the review process. Rather than being a restriction, the review process is a protection both for the Bahá'í Faith itself and for individuals who seek to publish works about it. By ensuring that the tone and content of such works meet Bahá'í standards, individual scholars are saved from making errors of interpretation that may need to be corrected later (surely an embarrassment any academic wants to avoid) and demonstrate their love and respect for the institutions of their faith in an era of dissent.
One source of guidance, now out of print, might assist Bahá'í academics by focussing on the standard associated with serving Bahá'u'lláh. In an article published in the inaugural issue of The Journal of Bahá'í Studies, Moojan Momen suggested five prerequisites that Bahá'í scholars should follow to acquire adequate armour to withstand the "tests that will arise in their work": (1) "absolute purity of motive"; (2) "a profound sense of personal humility"; (3) "loyalty to the Covenant"; (4) commitment to sustain one's personal deepening in the Faith parallel to scholarly studies; and (5) commitment to remain active in the Bahá'í community. Ignoring any of these guidelines, especially the latter two, can lead to estrangement from the Bahá'í community and spiritual stagnation and decay.⁽²⁴⁾ We would be well served by this article being reprinted. Perhaps some of the distress and alienation felt recently by some Bahá'í scholars who have felt penalised or punished by the review process might have been lessened or avoided if this advice had been more readily available and heeded. If we remain constantly focussed on Bahá'u'lláh as our standard and obedient to his institutions, especially the Universal House of Justice, our infallible source of guidance today, we will reap the benefits of whatever sacrifices we make in the process.
Electronic communications
The Guardian's prediction of the development of an efficient system of international communication has been dramatically fulfilled. The numerous forms of multimedia insinuate themselves into our lives, or at least the lives of that minority of us with access to the technology. Bahá'í administrative institutions are in the awkward position of trying to address this technological explosion proactively, having to play catch-up much of the time due to activities in parts of the world where human and other resources are stretched to the limit.
The review process does not have to be revised to address these developments and challenges. It is founded on divine principles, which do not change to suit the audience or the medium. Again, Shoghi Effendi's guidance to be rigid in principle and flexible in application serves us well. It is the responsibility of individual Bahá'ís not to take advantage of the gap between the emergence of new media and direct and exact guidance from the institutions on how to function in these new and unfamiliar territories.
Bahá'í scholarship as service
Bahá'í scholars are at the forefront of endeavours to assist others to broaden their understanding of the Bahá'í teachings and to enlighten the masses of humanity to Bahá'u'lláh's message. We cannot do that effectively, however, if we allow ourselves to be distracted by the deficiencies of the society that surrounds us. The Universal House of Justice reminds us that the Bahá'í community "must increasingly become renowned for its social cohesion, and for the spirit of trust and confidence which distinguishes the relationship between believers and their institutions."⁽²⁵⁾
We are reminded of Shoghi Effendi's longing for a loving, enthusiastic, and joyous relationship between Bahá'ís and the institutions serving their communities, instructing us to commit ourselves wholeheartedly to their support and, in turn, calling upon those serving those institutions to be "ever mindful of the attitude and manner prescribed for the conduct of their duties," striving "continually to approach the exalted standard set out in the Teachings."
These guidelines hold true for Bahá'í scholars, editors, reviewers, and publishers as we engage in our collective effort to bring Bahá'u'lláh's Message to greater numbers of people. By keeping Bahá'u'lláh's standard at the forefront of our vision, we contribute constructively to achieving a stage of maturity when the review process will be abolished by the Universal House of Justice because it is no longer necessary.

Commentary on Barney Leith's "Bahá'í Review: Should the 'Red Flag' Law be Repealed?" The Bahá'í Studies Review 5.1 (1995): 27-35.
Commentator: Sepideh Taheri⁽²⁶⁾
The Universal House of Justice
An impression gained from several sources⁽²⁷⁾ is the questioned validity and appropriateness of the decision of the Supreme Body to continue the practice of pre-publication review. The premise that informs our belief in the practicality and the incorruptibility of Bahá'u'lláh's "new and wondrous System" is that He has established an Institution that is protected "under the wing of His sanctity and infallibility,"⁽²⁸⁾ which "will take decisions and establish laws through the inspiration and confirmation of the Holy Spirit."⁽²⁹⁾ A situation where the Universal House of Justice may be "out of touch" with the changing needs of the times and the Bahá'í community, by definition, could never occur. To imply that the House of Justice has failed to make the correct judgement of the state of the maturity of the believers and has not understood the frustration of some academics, and to suggest a seemingly more up-to-date version of the truth, is evidence of the need to re-examine the basic premises of Bahá'í doctrine.
Freedom of expression
In 1989, the Universal House of Justice issued a highly significant document in reply to "evidences of a confusion of attitudes among some of the friends when they encounter difficulties in applying Bahá'í principles to questions of the day," and suggested that "at the heart of this confusion are misconceptions of such fundamental issues as individual rights and freedom of expression in the Bahá'í community." The House of Justice then clearly identified the source of the difficulties: "an inadequacy of Bahá'í perspective on the part of both the individual believers and their institutions."⁽³⁰⁾
This document merits study in sufficient depth, for in it are enshrined answers to many questions that may cause confusion. Following a statement of several salient points, the House of Justice examines the theme of liberty as it is perceived from an adolescent, rebellious Western liberal democratic versus the Bahá'í perspective, which inevitably represents a departure from the former both in origin and concept. It then addresses more specifically the issue of freedom of expression—a fundamental principle of the Cause—for the exercise and maintenance of which the Administrative Order provides unique methods and channels, which "are amply described in the writings of the Faith, but they are not yet clearly understood by the friends." The concern of some of the friends regarding the temporary necessity of review before publishing is addressed:
That the Faith has emerged from obscurity on a global scale is certain...but that it marks the attainment of the community's maturity is entirely doubtful...Can the friends forget the oft-quoted warning of 'Abdu'l-Bahá concerning the bitter opposition that will confront the Cause in various lands on all continents? Those who are anxious to relax all restraint, who invoke freedom of speech as the rationale for publishing every and any thing concerning the Bahá'í community, who call for the termination of the practice of review now that the Faith has emerged from obscurity - are they not aware of these sobering prospects?...
The Faith is still in its infancy. Despite its emergence from obscurity, even now the vast majority of the human race remains ignorant of its existence; moreover, the vast majority of its adherents are relatively new Bahá'ís. The change implied by this new stage in its evolution is that whereas heretofore this tender plant was protected in its obscurity from the attention of external elements, it has now become exposed. This exposure invites close observation, and that observation will eventually lead to opposition in various quarters. So, far from adopting a carefree attitude, the community must be conscious of the necessity to present a correct view of itself and an accurate understanding of its purpose to a largely sceptical public. A greater effort, a greater care must now be exercised to ensure its protection against the malice of the ignorant and the unwisdom of its friends.
Where do the deficiencies lie?
From a careful perusal of the above-quoted document and observation of the thinking current among some of the friends, it becomes clear that the problem lies not in the principle of review itself, but from one or more of the following sources:
- An inadequate Bahá'í (versus old world) perspective of the relationship between the individual and Bahá'í institutions, which may equally apply to members of the institutions themselves.
- An inadequate understanding of the spirit and form of Bahá'í consultation, which can release tremendous forces of inspiration into any endeavour.
- Sometimes individuals who have been appointed to a review body may not be appropriately qualified to pass judgement on a particular work.
- In some cases scholars may have used an inappropriate style, and even appeared to challenge, in their writings, "the veracity and honour of the Central Figures of the Faith or of its Guardian,"⁽³¹⁾ or written in such a way that implications are made which are in conflict with the reality of the Faith.
- A sometimes underdeveloped atmosphere of tolerance and understanding among the believers towards approaches to the Faith in ways unfamiliar to them.
What is to be done?
If the concerns that have arisen are due to our own shortcomings, instead of labelling them as impossible of attainment, we should rejoice at the prospects of arriving at satisfactory solutions to each and every one of them:
- Rather than considering a review body as a "restrictive" agency, individuals might try to consult the institutions and other believers even before the formal review process, which may well inspire them to perfect their work in ways that they would not have appreciated before.
- A Bahá'í scholar will humbly supplicate Bahá'u'lláh to guide him and inspire him and make his will entirely absolved in the Will of God: "Inspire then my soul, O my God, with Thy wondrous remembrance, that I may glorify Thy Name."⁽³²⁾
- Having placed his whole trust in Bahá'u'lláh, he should then rest assured in His unfailing promise: "He that giveth up himself wholly to God, God shall, assuredly, be with him; and he that placeth his complete trust in God, God shall, verily, protect him from whatsoever may harm him."⁽³³⁾
If, therefore, the scholar produces a work, which after frank and prayerful consultation with the review body, is deemed unsuitable for publication, he may consider, with equanimity, the objections raised and see if they can be remedied. If despite his attempts to do so, the work is still deemed unsuitable, he should acquiesce to the judgement of the institutions and patiently continue to improve his work, beseeching Bahá'u'lláh to guide and inspire him. Indeed, far from withdrawing from the Faith and becoming apathetic, he would do well to remind himself of the admonition of Bahá'u'lláh: "He, Who is the Eternal Truth, beareth Me witness! Nothing whatever can, in this Day, inflict a greater harm upon this Cause than dissension and strife, contention, estrangement and apathy, among the loved ones of God."⁽³⁴⁾ The scholar will then remain assured that: "If ye follow in His way, His incalculable and imperishable blessings will be showered upon you,"⁽³⁵⁾ and will humbly seek Bahá'u'lláh's help in pursuing his calling in this world and serving the Cause for which he was created in the first place.
Where do we go from here?
Although the "red flag" law was repealed shortly after the introduction of the motor car, as the speed and the number of the vehicles increased, so did the number of rules and regulations controlling the manner of driving them, and far from leaving everything to the good sense of the drivers, the driving authorities made sure that everyone strictly adhered to a very rigid set of laws, which would ensure the freedom and safety of all people, and imposed heavy penalties for breaking even minor ones. So now that the information super-highway is here, it would be to the advantage of all the Bahá'ís to be increasingly vigilant that anything they write is in keeping with the spirit and form of the Cause of God.
Despite our sincere intentions, we can be far from wise or mature, and are constantly in need of guidance to ensure that maturity is attained with the minimum of trauma to the body of the Cause. We need not look upon this practice as a form of control or censorship, but both the scholars, the reviewers and the institutions of the Faith are challenged to grow to regard it as a form of constructive consultation which could significantly contribute to the richness, sense of freedom, and growth of the community, and take steps to make it as such. "The All-Knowing Physician hath His finger on the pulse of mankind"⁽³⁶⁾ through the instrumentality of the Universal House of Justice who will alter the practice of review at precisely the right moment—and certainly not one heartbeat later.

Author's response to Commentaries on "Bahá'í Review: should the 'Red Flag' law be repealed?"
Barney Leith
I am grateful to Sepideh Taheri and Roxanne Lalonde for their commentaries on my paper. However, I do not believe that they have adequately answered my concerns with the present practice of Bahá'í review. Taheri acknowledges some of the deficiencies of the current review process, but then places the duty of answering the question "What is to be done?" squarely in the lap of the scholars. Lalonde also places the onus for change on the individual. I do not deny that scholars need to find ways of working that are consistent with the spiritual and ethical prescriptions of the Faith, but, as the House of Justice has pointed out in the letter of 29 December 1988 to the followers of Bahá'u'lláh in the United States, there is a reciprocity built into the Administrative Order:
Within this framework of freedom a pattern is set for institutional and individual behaviour which depends for its efficacy not so much on the force of law . . . as on the recognition of a mutuality of benefits, and on the spirit of co-operation . . . Thus there is a balance of freedom between the institution . . . and the individuals who sustain its existence.
It is clear that the House of Justice is guiding the institutions to move from an authoritarian mode of decision-making to an integrative mode, in which they wholeheartedly promote unity in diversity, transformation and growth. It would seem to be congruent with this evolution of thought and practice in the life of the Bahá'í community to make review more of a consultative process.
The kernel of Lalonde's commentary addresses three issues. In relation to review criteria, she suggests that there is an onus on members of national committees to strive to meet the standards set by the Universal House of Justice. But this begs the question. The House of Justice has established two criteria, but leaves it to National Assemblies or their review bodies to define what these mean, presumably in the context of local culture and acceptability. To say that the standard Bahá'í scholars, editors, reviewers and publishers must strive for is that of Bahá'u'lláh and the Covenant does not dispose of the issue either. Clearly whatever is published should promote unity and be conformable with Bahá'u'lláh's teachings on wise utterance, but we still have to explore what that may mean in our particular circumstances. We have only to look at the different ways 'Abdu'l-Bahá and Shoghi Effendi related to and guided the Bahá'ís in the East and in the West to see that local susceptibilities matter.
In relation to the challenges faced by Bahá'í academics, I am interested to read an extract from a memorandum addressed by the Universal House of Justice to the International Teaching Centre on 10 February 1981:
In the field of Bahá'í scholarship we feel that it is most important not to stifle the development of Bahá'í scholars by an attitude of censorship or undue criticism.
I believe that scholars have been less than tactfully treated in the past by the institutions and have even been marginalised. If this were not the case, why would the House of Justice have made this reference to "an attitude of censorship or undue criticism"? It is clear that change in the Bahá'í community is always a mutual process. The institutions, just as much as the individual believers, need to take the posture of learners if they are not to inhibit growth.
Lalonde asserts that the review process, founded as it is on divine principles, does not have to be revised to address developments in electronic communications. But it is a matter of fact that Bahá'í review is not now applied to the electronic media; I believe, for the reasons I stated in my paper, that the guidance in the 1971 Memorandum on Publishing could not be applied to the electronic media.
On 24 February 1995 the International Teaching Centre wrote to the Continental Boards of Counsellors to convey guidance that the Teaching Centre had received from the Universal House of Justice about Bahá'í involvement in electronic communications:
It will take wisdom on the part of the institutions to utilize the positive aspects of the technology for the benefit of the Faith, while at the same time protecting the Faith from its ill-advised or malicious use.
Interestingly, National Assemblies are advised not to have "different policies for their national communities on certain matters raised on electronic forums" as this may cause confusion. Rather, "...there are many knowledgeable Bahá'ís involved with the discussion groups who help provide accurate information about the Faith as well as thoughtful ideas." The House even goes so far as to advise against interference by the institutions with postings on public forums.
In relation to electronic communications, the House of Justice seems to leave much to the judgement of individuals. The institutions are not to be proactive in reviewing material on the Internet, but should react to the concerns of individuals.
I suggest that, far from needing no revision, review requirements have already been varied for electronic communications. The institutions are not having to "play catch-up" as Lalonde asserts. They don't actually have to do anything at the moment other than deal with questions and concerns that individuals bring to them.
It seems that two standards now exist: the stricter standard of Bahá'í review applies to printed matter; the more relaxed approach outlined above applies to the electronic media. Undoubtedly printed documents, especially books, still carry more authority than matter on the Internet, and are likely to be more permanent. However, this is already changing, and it will be interesting to see if the two standards will persist or if the Universal House of Justice will find it needful, in the fullness of time, to change the guidance either on review of printed matter or on review of electronic material.

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End Notes (Use [BACK] to return to article.)

Universal House of Justice, Individual Rights and Freedoms in the World Order of Bahá'u'lláh (Wilmette: Bahá'í Publishing Trust, 1989) 7.
"The Bahá'í conception of social life is essentially based on the principle of the subordination of the individual will to that of society. It neither suppresses the individual nor does it exalt him to the point of making him an antisocial creature, a menace to society. As in everything it follows the 'golden mean'" (Shoghi Effendi, cited in Universal House of Justice, Individual Rights 20).
Shoghi Effendi, The World Order of Bahá'u'lláh: Selected Letters (Wilmette: Bahá'í Publishing Trust, 1991) 41.
The vital role of the individual in the unfoldment of the Bahá'í World Order is emphasised throughout the Writings of Shoghi Effendi and the Universal House of Justice. Examples of this can be seen in the annual Riván messages of the House of Justice in which the following remarks have been made: "... it is primarily to the individual believer 'on whom' as the beloved Guardian averred, 'in the last resort depends the entire community'" (1984); "Armed with the strength of action and the co-operation of the individual believers composing it, the community as a whole should endeavour to establish greater stability in the patterns of development, locally and nationally..." (1984). For more examples, see Universal House of Justice, A Wider Horizon: Selected Messages of the Universal House of Justice, 1983-1992 (Riviera Beach, Fl.: Palabra Publishing, 1992) 1-95.
'Abdu'l-Bahá, cited in Principles of Bahá'í Administration 87.
Universal House of Justice, Individual Rights 9.
'Abdu'l-Bahá, The Bahá'í Revelation (London: Bahá'í Publishing Trust, 1955) 264.
Bahá'u'lláh, Kitáb-i-Aqdas: The Most Holy Book (Wilmette: Bahá'í Publishing Trust, 1993) 21-22.
Ibid. 56.
For an exploration of these issues from a Bahá'í point of view, see Gregory C. Dahl, "Evolving Towards a Bahá'í Economic System," Bahá'í Studies Notebook III.3/4 (1984): 39-52; and William S. Hatcher, "Economics and Moral Values," World Order 9.2 (1974-75): 14-27.
Study of the development of political and legal structures using an 'invisible hand' approach has likewise failed to demonstrate that evolutionary forces will necessarily favour systems that tend to operate for the public good. For a summary discussion, see Malcolm Rutherford, Institutions in Economics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994) 88-91.
Shoghi Effendi, letter of 25 August 1939, cited in Hooshmand Badi'i, comp., The True Foundation of All Economics (Kitchener, ON: Allprint-Ainsworth, 1994) 106-107.
'Abdu'l-Bahá, Selections from the Writings of `Abdu'l-Bahá (Haifa: Bahá'í World Centre, 1978) 115.
Bahá'u'lláh, Tablets of Bahá'u'lláh Revealed After the Kitáb-i-Aqdas (Wilmette: Bahá'í Publishing Trust, 1988) 162.
Bahá'u'lláh, Kitáb-i-Aqdas 63.
Bahá'u'lláh's dual statement of human purpose is given in the short Obligatory Prayer and in another well-known passage: "I bear witness, O my God, that Thou hast created me to know Thee and to worship Thee" (Bahá'í Prayers [Wilmette: Bahá'í Publishing Trust, 1991] 4); "All men have been created to carry forward an ever-advancing civilization" (Bahá'u'lláh, Gleanings from the Writings of Bahá'u'lláh [Wilmette: Bahá'í Publishing Trust, 1971] 215).
See, for example, John S. Hatcher, The Arc of Ascent (Oxford: George Ronald, 1994) 79.
For a discussion of these human capacities, see Hossain B. Danesh, The Psychology of Spirituality (Ottawa: Nine Pines/Paradigm Publishing, 1994).
'Abdu'l-Bahá, The Secret of Divine Civilization (Wilmette: Bahá'í Publishing Trust, 1957) 2-3.
Bahá'u'lláh, Kitáb-i-Aqdas 41.
Bahá'u'lláh, The Hidden Words of Bahá'u'lláh (London: Bahá'í Publishing Trust, 1975) Arabic no. 2.
Bahá'u'lláh, Tablets 66-67.
Universal House of Justice, letter to the National Spiritual Assembly of the Bahá'ís of the United States of America, dated 19 May 1994.
Moojan Momen, "Scholarship and the Bahá'í Community," The Journal of Bahá'í Studies 1.1 (1988): 30-31.
Riván 153 letter to the Bahá'ís of the world.
The following is an extract of a longer article written regarding the practice of pre-publication review.
For example, the Leith article and various postings on Bahá'í Internet discussion lists.
'Abdu'l-Bahá, cited in Compilation of Compilations, vol. 1 (Australia: Australia Bahá'í Publications, 1991) 322.
Ibid. 323.
Universal House of Justice, letter to the followers of Bahá'u'lláh in the United States of America dated 29 December 1988, published as Individual Rights and Freedoms in the World Order of Bahá'u'lláh (Wilmette: Bahá'í Publishing Trust, 1989) 3.
From a letter written on behalf of the Universal House of Justice to an individual believer dated 18 July 1979, cited in The Bahá'í Studies Review 5.1 (1995): 136.
Bahá'u'lláh, Prayers and Meditations by Bahá'u'lláh (Wilmette: Bahá'í Publishing Trust, rev. ed. 1987) LVI.
Bahá'u'lláh, Gleanings from the Writings of Bahá'u'lláh (Wilmette: Bahá'í Publishing Trust, 1976) 233.
Ibid. 9.
Ibid. 9.
Ibid. 213.