BAHÁ'Í STUDIES REVIEW, Volume 7, 1997 || Contents by Volume || Contents by Title || Contents by Author || A review of secondary literature in English Nazila Ghanea-Hercock |
Abstract This paper examines some accounts published in English on the persecution of Bahá'ís in the Islamic Republic of Iran. Various writers have identified misinformation, perceived favouritism under the Shah's regime, charges of espionage, and theological conflicts with Islam as the main motives for the attacks on the Bahá'ís. The response of certain parts of the international community, such as the United Nations, various national governments, and the Bahá'í community itself, have helped mitigate the persecution in some respects, but have had little impact in other respects. Introduction |
Background to the revolutionary persecution
The Hojatiyeh aimed to "win back" Bahá'ís to Shi'ism through propaganda, infiltration, persuasion and confrontation. Rejali emphasises how the Pahlavi regime allowed anti-Bahá'í activities in Iran since the 1950s, as "the Hujjatiyeh [sic] served to ensure the loyalty of the religious right to the Pahlavi state."(8) "The anti-Bahá'í campaign by the ulama [clergy] suited the Shah: it diverted public attention away from the problems of the ailing economy. And by identifying with the widely prevalent prejudice against Bahá'ís, the Shah's regime improved its popularity."(9) Such was the popular support of this anti-Bahá'í stance that Rejali claims that the Hojatiyeh had over twelve thousand members by 1977. Other authors have also written about the background to the post-1978 persecution of the Bahá'ís in terms of the Hojatiyeh.(10) Martin, for example, emphasises the links between the SAVAK and the Hojatiyeh in outlining the long-standing and formal suppression of the Bahá'ís. He describes the Hojatiyeh organisation as "one of several instruments of social control in the Pahlavi state...a tool of the Pahlavi regime's oppressive policies."(11) |
Bahá'ís in post-revolutionary Iran Several publications have been written by individual Bahá'ís highlighting the events of the 1980s and 1990s. Accounts include those of eyewitnesses, such as the 1993 publication by Olya Roohizadegan(18) and the 1982 reports of the persecution by William Sears(19) and by Geoffrey Nash.(20) However, one of the earliest and most noteworthy non-Bahá'í publications on the situation was published by the London based charity "The Minority Rights Group." Their first report was published in 1982(21) and was revised and updated in 1985.(22) A four page update to this edition appeared in 1991. The author, Roger Cooper, explains how he came to write the report in a later book and explains how the report had to be reprinted several times and became "something of a best-seller."(23) |
"Causes" of persecution discussed in secondary literature 1) Misconceptions Bahá'ís are not alone as troubled religious minorities(26) in the Islamic Republic. Iran has long been homogenous in terms of religion, with non-Muslims accounting only for around 1 per cent of Iran's population, and Sunni Muslims for 10 per cent. About 89 per cent of the population is therefore Shi'i. The mere existence of religious minorities has therefore proven legally and socially problematic, posing a particular challenge for the Islamic Republic. This was especially so in a revolution which was, "presented as an attempt to restore authentic cultural tradition to the masses at the expense of alien ideologies...[and] the creation of an Islamic government, in which Shi'i values...reign supreme."(27) Therefore, as Kazemi and Hart have concluded, "A high price has been paid for the ruthless cultural revolution and the all-encompassing attempt to Islamicize the polity."(28) The situation for all religious minorities is still perilous. They are disadvantaged at every juncture in life, from university entrance,(29) to work in the public or even private(30) sectors, to the legal system where even members of recognised minority religions receive lower awards in injury and death lawsuits. 2) "Beneficiaries" of the Shah's regime? 3) Spies? Cooper analyses the accusation of the Bahá'ís being agents of Zionism and imperialism and questions this perception of Bahá'ís by the Iranian authorities and populace. Simpson refers to this public image of the Bahá'ís, "It seems to be widely accepted in Iran, despite all the evidence to the contrary, that the British instigated and encouraged the Bahá'í religion in order to undermine the authority of the Islamic clergy...and that they are today under the control of Israel."(39) Anti-Bahá'í polemical writers such as Noori, have no doubt about the shadowy origins of the Bahá'í Faith and Qadianism. He claims, "These are two creeds which were invented by both the Western and Eastern (Russian) Imperialism. Bahá'ísm and Qadianism are two deviated faiths...These are two cancerous glands which colonial powers have placed inside the Islamic world."(40) Najafiyan(41) uses the fact that a Russian ambassador accompanied Bahá'u'lláh to the borders of Iraq on his exile as proof of the "fact" that the Bábís were spies for the Russians. He also accuses the Bábís and the Bahá ís of fostering political links with, not only the Russians, but also the British and French consulates, Greek and Balkan rebel leaders in Adrianople, the Ottoman empire, the British King George V, US imperialism, Zionism, the Pahlavi leaders and the Ba'athist Party in Iraq! Keddie, on the other hand, challenges the linkage made between Bahá'ís and Israeli espionage by explaining that, even of the Jewish leaders in Iran, very few were killed on such charges.(42) One could extend the argument in response to Noori and Najafiyan's claims and question why such high percentages of Bahá'ís were supposedly spies? Would one not expect western powers to be a little more sophisticated than to select all their spies from the most hated and conspicuous minority community in Iran? Despite the UN's clear refutation of espionage and political charges against the Bahá'ís, little has changed in the position of the Iranian government. In May 1996 Chief Justice Ayatollah Mohammad Yazdi struck a blow to any hopes of a possible solution to the scapegoating, as he stated in a meeting in Qom, "The Bahá'í sect is not a religion, but a web of espionage activities...[Western powers are] using the human rights issue as a means to pressure other countries...[Iran will] never abandon the application of Islamic law just to please international organisations."(43) International law allows a state much more extensive rights in protecting itself from subversive terrorist activities, than from curbing the legitimate rights of religious minorities. It is this margin of advantage that Iran has always sought, even under Muhammad Reza Shah, and continues to justify in relation to the Bahá'ís. 4) Incompatibility of religious claims I Islamic law the rights of non-Muslims can basically be divided into the rights of non-Muslims in a Muslim state that are "People of the Book," (Jews and Christians primarily, and Zoroastrians and Hindus, who have been recognised as having equal rights as the "People of the Book"), and the rights of non-Muslims who are not "People of the Book". A separate but even more fundamental distinction is whether the non-Muslim is an apostate,(48) having converted from being a Muslim to another religion. The legal distinctions in the right to religion under Islamic law rest on these two issues. It is clear that Iran's Bahá'ís are disadvantaged on the basis of both issues: recognition and the original religious background of significant numbers of their followers. Keddie emphasises the consequences of this lack of legitimacy from which Bahá'ís suffer, "it appears that it is chiefly the Bahá'ís lack of legitimate religious status under strict Muslim law that has rendered them vulnerable."(49) Akhavan also points out this structural basis of the Islamic-Bahá'í conflict and claims that the case, "represents a significant challenge for the task of creating a more tolerant Islamic theology."(50) Kazemzadeh emphasises the hatred of the clergy in the persecution of the Bahá'ís, "Of course, in the clerical republic there would be no room for Bahá'ís, hated as renegades and unprotected by the Koranic [sic] injunction to tolerate Christians and Jews...The establishment of the Islamic Republic made it seem possible for the clerical extremists to carry out a final solution of the Bahá'í question."(51) Dowty argues along similar lines in explaining that, "The outlook for Bahá'ís was, therefore, bleak when fundamentalist Muslim clergymen took over Iran in early 1979...True to their beliefs, the clerical rulers denied legal status to the Bahá'í religion...The ayatollahs aim at nothing less than the total elimination of the Bahá'í faith, whose very existence is regarded as a threat to the truth of Islam,"(52) and Moore refers to the alienation of the, "Iranian Bahais and Jews along with the more liberated women."(53) Other reasons that have been given for the Bahá'í persecution have included the direct opposition of the teachings of the Bahá'í Faith with the traditionalist agenda of the revolutionary government. Simpson claims that the Bahá'ís "have paid the penalty for being heterodox at a time of fierce religious orthodoxy."(54) Kazemi and Hart concluded "The regime's policies have been particularly detrimental to women and certain religious and ethnic minorities such as the Bahá'ís and the Kurds."(55) In the eyes of the Iranian clergy and leadership the Islamic revolution naturally demanded the eradication, or at least the total exclusion, of the Bahá'ís. |
Revolutionary fervour or official policy?
Further evidence for this perspective, of direct governmental backing, came in 1993. A document that had been leaked was exposed by the Bahá'ís as further evidence of the claim that the persecution of the Bahá'ís in Iran was sponsored from the highest echelons of the Iranian regime. The government policy directive on the Bahá'ís was reported in the UN Special Representative's 1993 report.(60) According to the directive, the supreme revolutionary council reportedly instructed government agencies to block the progress and development of the Bahá'ís community, expel Bahá'í students from universities, cut their links with groups outside Iran, restrict their employment and deny them "positions of influence." The government claims that the directive is a forgery. However, it appears to be an accurate reflection of current government practice and was acknowledged as such in UN circles and by various governments such as the United States. Most unbiased observers welcomed the uncovering of this document as an explicit piece of evidence of the continued government position on the Bahá'ís. Iran had learnt to become a little more subtle in attacks on Bahá'ís, in order not to attract international criticism and economic sanctions, but its position on the Bahá'ís had not changed and there was no intention of toleration. Even in March 1996, the non-governmental human rights organisation Human Rights Watch-Middle East concluded that, "Members of the Bahá'í faith are forbidden to practice their religion."(61) Therefore, as Simpson has stated, "The regime as such may not have instituted this pogrom against the Bahá'ís, but it has taken administrative measures against them which amount to full-scale persecution."(62) The recent survey of Iran in The Economist confirmed this perspective in its statement that, "the regime remains unremittingly savage towards the unhappy Bahais who, charged with apostasy, face the death sentence and often receive it."(63) |
Genocide? In 1985 Cooper did not recognise the Bahá'í situation as genocide, and asserted, "Those who speak of genocide should remember that even at its highest estimate the number of Bahá'ís killed is only a tiny fraction of the whole community, though none the more excusable for that."(64) Several later writers rejected this analysis and did use the contentious term for the Bahá'í case. Such writers included Leo Kuper, Helen Fein, Alex Schmid and Paul Allen. In 1982 Kazemzadeh claimed that "The threat of genocide hangs over the Bahá'ís of Iran,"(65) and Akhavan referred to "the genocidal campaign"(66) against the Bahá'ís in Iran. None of the United Nations bodies, however, have ever used the term in relation to the Bahá'ís, as there is a "psychological reluctance within the United Nations to use the term genocide," as, "charges of genocide immediately close off the possibility of discourse."(67) The Bahá'í International Community did, however, use the term, in a somewhat milder form in 1990 when its representative stated that the institutionalised persecution from which the Bahá'ís had suffered, "would have assumed the proportions of genocide had the international community not intervened."(68) Prospects for recourse Cooper's report had rejected as futile the potential success of any direct intervention in Iran as a means of ending the Bahá'í persecution. He compared the Bahá'í persecution to that of the US embassy hostage taking early on in the revolution and states "The lesson to be learned from the hostage crisis is that patient negotiating, however frustrating at times, is more effective than direct political or military action."(71) Paul Allen, however, analysed the international legal mechanisms for the enforcement of international human rights standards, and concluded that the Bahá'í case "represents an extreme example of post-Charter human rights violations."(72) He therefore proposed that the General Assembly or Security Council create a new human rights procedure that would enable the use of economic sanctions mandatory on all UN members, followed by the exercise of "military force to compel the recalcitrant government to protect its citizens' human rights."(73) The aim would be to give "oppressive governments ample time to improve their human rights record. Yet its provisions do not allow oppressed groups to suffer indefinitely."(74) This suggestion was not considered in any of the UN bodies who continued to act on behalf of the Bahá'ís in Iran, nor was it taken up in any of the interventions of the Bahá'í International Community. Its proposals are indeed highly controversial in the field of international law, and other states would have been unlikely to support such extensive measures, for fear of reprisals against themselves at some future date. Nevertheless, it represents how the clarity and the almost universal support for the innocence of the Bahá'ís of Iran galvanised actors on many different levels to try to protect a minority group. It is ironic that the protection of the Bahá'ís fell outside UN Chapter VII protection because of their refusal to take up arms and "because their passivity prevents threats to or breaches of the peace."(75) |
Conclusion Most references to the recent persecution of the Bahá'ís in Iran come from: political studies of Iran's revolutionary years, debates about political Islam and, more recently, studies in the public international law field concerning religion and human rights. Few authors have attempted to get in touch with Bahá'ís either outside the country or inside Iran, with the notable exception of Simpson,(76) UN investigators(77) and Kuper. Few non-Bahá'ís even refer to the very extensive UN documentation on the issue. The problem of misinformation therefore continues. This lack of careful analysis is reflected most strikingly in the frequency of incorrect spellings of the word "Bahá'í" and in the wildly varying estimates of the number of Bahá'ís remaining in Iran.(78) Publications about the present condition of the community in Iran, sociological studies about those who emigrated in the aftermath of the revolution and the pattern of their resettlement, up-to-date historical studies about the community, comparisons with the fate of other minorities in Iran(79) and legal studies about the pattern followed by the refugees, would fill a void in the existing literature. Whilst Bahá'í information agencies and national spiritual assemblies have focussed their attentions on regularly updating relevant international bodies, the diplomatic community, and governmental agencies who intervene on behalf of the Bahá'ís in Iran and the media, much less attention seems to have been concentrated on the equally crucial task of informing the academic community. This, of course, is a much more decentralised and diffuse task, but might be attempted through more academic studies and expansion of present international Bahá'í web sites to include information on the circumstances of the community in Iran.(80) The case of the Bahá'ís of Iran is distinct enough not only to continue to gain government and academic support world-wide, but also to help clarify and advance international human rights law for minorities, to confirm the illegality of cultural genocide, to confirm the right to freedom of religion and to curtail governmental abuses of human rights. The dreadful precedent to this experience can be seen in the tremendous spirit released by the massacre of Jews during the second World War, into the codification of the norms of modern human rights. It is therefore critical to ensure not only that this case is successfully resolved, but also to channel the support that has arisen into galvanising the general development of international human rights law and solidifying its painful lessons into greater judicial guarantees for the future. |
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