COMMENTARY on Christopher Buck's "Native Messengers of God in Canada?: A test case for Bahá'í universalism," The Bahá'í Studies Review 6 (1996): 97-133.
William P. Collins

In his article, Christopher Buck suggests that Bahá'í universalism is tested by whether the Bahá'í community can officially acknowledge native Messengers of God. I grew up in Chenango County in the state of New York, no more than 50 miles (as the eagle flies) from the homeland of the Onondaga nation, the central point of the Iroquois Confederation, located just south of Syracuse, NY. There is something about the land in North America that seems to communicate the spirit of the native peoples. Although America's indigenous inhabitants were seemingly defeated by European conquerors, there is another sense in which indigenous spirituality exercised its own ineffable power over the invader, achieving a kind of back-handed triumph. Native spirituality now plays a prominent part in "new age" beliefs, as well as influencing, by osmosis, the generality of Europeans who now call themselves Americans. Long before I - an American of English and German descent - heard of Bahá'u'lláh, I knew of Deganawida ("the Peacemaker") and believed him to be a Messenger of God. It is therefore no surprise that I, as a Bahá'í, also personally believe him to have been one of God's Messengers to peoples of North America.

Buck raises some interesting points regarding the Bahá'í approach to indigenous spirituality. He identifies several concerns that he thinks are potentially controversial: (1) that there is a paradox or even a conflict between "official" and "popular" criteria for designating who is a Messenger from God; (2) that the Bahá'í Faith has a tension between its universalism on the one hand, and its "semiticentrism" on the other.

The creation of a stark contrast between "official" and "popular" forms of religion more often than not obscures a much more complex phenomenon. Religious belief within a given tradition is on a long continuum from the highly orthodox to the loosely understood "folk" beliefs that are a mix of ideas from many sources along with pieces of the orthodox. One need only study David Piff's recent doctoral dissertation for confirmation that even the most knowledgeable believers also have a reservoir of personal notions that may consist of hearsay and partially-understood orthodoxies.⁽¹⁾

It is certainly true that Shoghi Effendi wrote: "We cannot possibly add names of people we (or anyone else) think might be Lesser Prophets to those found in the Qur'án, the Bible and our own Scriptures. For only these can we consider authentic books."⁽²⁾ Buck, I think, generalises this quotation too far. It is important to note that there is an additional sentence in Shoghi Effendi's letter, not published in the source from which Buck took the quotation. The continuation is: "Therefore, Joseph Smith is not in our eyes a Prophet." It is essential to recognise this context. The Guardian was dealing with a specific question regarding whether Joseph Smith was a lesser prophet.

Can we generalise from this that (1) there were no Manifestations of God or lesser prophets beyond those in the Bible, Qur'án, and Bahá'í scriptures; or that (2) there cannot be a consensus of belief regarding indigenous Messengers? Buck clearly establishes from the Bahá'í writings themselves that there must have been other lesser prophets and Manifestations whose names are not known. What, then, about a consensus of belief among Bahá'ís regarding other Messengers? Rather than seeing Shoghi Effendi's stricture on adding names as a limiting of belief, why not see it in a different light? Shoghi Effendi limited what can be claimed "officially," particularly with regard to others, such as Joseph Smith, who were contemporary with the Báb and Bahá'u'lláh. Perhaps what he did was free the Bahá'í community to understand and accept other possible divine representatives on the basis of criteria established elsewhere in the Bahá'í writings. At the same time he limited a kind of excess of claims that would inevitably arise if the community started having official lists of prophets and messengers that would include with those mentioned in the Bahá'í writings the hundreds of contemporary religious leaders who make personal claims to such stations. I see this less as "semiticentrism" than as good management of the human tendency to stretch these categories to the breaking point. Shoghi Effendi made it easy by limiting the official lesser prophets to those named in certain religious texts.

Buck clearly has found a key in the statement by 'Abdu'l-Bahá that in America "the Call of God must have been raised in ancient times." We must surely accept Shoghi Effendi's limitation on the listing of lesser prophets and 'Abdu'l-Bahá's statement on divine revelation (Manifestations or Greater Prophets) among the indigenous people of America, without placing the two in opposition to one another. The Bahá'í writings contain, after all, indications of the criteria that distinguish Manifestations of God, including the nature of the claims made, the claimant's perseverance in the face of opposition, willingness to face death and persecution, his demonstration of God-like attributes and submission to the divine will, his revelation, the creation of a new civilization and spiritual community, the transformation of souls, and the like.

From such a perspective, whether or not Deganawida was specifically named in "authentic" scripture is rendered moot. Authentic scripture states that the call of God was raised in America. Deganawida fulfills for many Bahá'ís the criteria established in the Bahá'í writings for a Manifestation of God. We neither need convincing, nor do we require that he be listed in official Bahá'í publications. When I was attending Syracuse University in 1973 and again in 1989-1994, I learned that Deganawida was always referred to as "the Peacemaker." To utter his name - Deganawida - was to call upon his power, and thus to cause him literally to return. His name was not uttered lightly. I am comfortable, therefore, at the absence of his name from "official" lists, even as I feel comfortable putting his name in this commentary, because to call upon his name is to recognise his return in Bahá'u'lláh, the Peacemaker of our age.

Following upon the creation of the Iroquois League by Deganawida, the Iroquois Nations became the most powerful native people in North America. Through an incredibly adept diplomacy with the French and English, the Iroquois Nations maintained their independence from European conquest for over two centuries, and achieved complete domination over all of their native enemies⁽³⁾ - ruling from just west of Albany, NY nearly to the Mississippi, and from the Great Lakes as far south as Tennessee and North Carolina. The British maintained relations with the Iroquois as they did with European states, and honoured native independence until the defeat of the French in Canada. The road to the American Revolution was partly paved with the insatiable desire of English colonists to cross into Iroquois territory to settle. Yet, Buck notes, there is a tradition ascribing the American articles of confederation and their successor constitution to the influence of the Iroquois Confederation upon America's founders. A Bahá'í could think that such influence only arises from a Manifestation of God, and not simply from a mythical culture hero.

Buck proposes a listing of Messengers as follows:

Progressive Revelation
Messengers of God to First Nations
Abraham
Krishna
Moses
Zoroaster
Buddha
Jesus
Muhammad
The Báb
Bahá'u'lláh

Just as there is not a "definitive" listing of Bahá'í principles ('Abdu'l-Bahá listed them variously, and in recent years others have been added), so it would seem that there is not a "definitive" listing of Messengers of God. In his Kitáb-i-Íqán, Bahá'u'lláh also appears to include Adam, Noah, Húd, Sálih, Joseph, and others among these Messengers. Why are they not listed in Buck's schema, let alone in the earlier ones mentioned by Shoghi Effendi? The question of names of Messengers is thus in itself complex, even when looked at "officially." Rather than rigidly define an official list, it might be more helpful to consider a different schema, in which holy souls variously referred to as Manifestations, Messengers, Prophets (greater and lesser), Imams, Holy Ones, etc. are seen as actors in a larger sacred drama on the stage of history. Deganawida, Quetzalcoatl and Viracocha would definitely be among them. Should they be called Manifestations, or Messengers, or Prophets, or something else? Perhaps it simply does not matter. What does matter is the evidence that the Iroquois and other native peoples of North America received some kind of divine revelation, perhaps uncategorisable, but recognisable by Bahá'í criteria as fulfilling certain requirements for consideration as "true."

Whenever I have driven past the Onondaga Reservation on Interstate 81, I have remembered Deganawida combing the snakes from Atotarho's head, bringing him to a knowledge of the Great Peace. Whenever I have entered the boundaries of the Onondaga, the modest European-style homes only partly disguise the sacred nature of the central place, where the council fire of the Iroquois Nations burns. It is no less powerful than what I experienced entering the Bahá'í shrines in the Holy Land. One cannot deny any Messenger's truth. Learn the story of Deganawida and the Great Peace, learn the story of Bahá'u'lláh and the Most Great Peace. They are one.

COMMENTARY on Keven Brown's "Are 'Abdu'l-Bahá's views on evolution original?" and Eberhard von Kitzing's "Is the Bahá'í view of evolution compatible with modern science?", The Bahá'í Studies Review 7 (1997): 61-67.
Stephen R. Friberg

Controversies concerning evolution are a major contribution to the modern era's perception that there is a conflict between science and religion. It has often been argued that evolutionary science has shown human origins to be in the animal kingdom, contradicting the teachings of religion. A frequently voiced corollary is that human nature is best understood on this basis. Inveighing against this perspective, religionists have often characterised evolutionary findings about human origins as the secular embrace of a purely materialistic understanding seeking to undermine faith in revealed religion. The antagonisms between these two positions and their variants have persisted for more than 100 years, having solidified to form a seemingly permanent divide in Western society.

According to the Bahá'í writings, conflict between science and religion is undesirable. Rejecting the view that science and religion necessarily clash, they insist that science and true religion go hand-in-hand. They complement each other and must interact. The current task of humanity, they make clear, "is to create a global civilisation which embodies both the spiritual and material dimensions of existence."⁽⁴⁾ This requires "a progressive interaction between the truths and principles of religion and the discoveries and insights of scientific inquiry."⁽⁵⁾ In light of this view, 'Abdu'l-Bahá's commentaries on evolutionary theories and the origin of man, addressed primarily to educated western audiences in the first two decades of the 20th century, are of great interest. They appear to be the fullest and most sustained discussion of issues involving science and religion available in the Bahá'í writings, often contrasting conclusions characteristic of 19th century European philosophy with those of prophetic religion as seen through the Bahá'í teachings.

Here, I briefly outline some of the salient points in 'Abdu'l-Bahá's discussion of the origins of man, emphasising how they might be understood in relationship to modern concepts in science. I then compare these understandings with the brief comments on 'Abdu'l-Bahá's discussions of the origins of man by Keven Brown and Eberhard von Kitzing recently published in The Bahá'í Studies Review.^{(6) (7)}

'Abdu'l-Bahá uses first logical proofs, then spiritual proofs, to address issues related to evolution and the origins of man, making a clear distinction between the two.⁽⁸⁾ In his logical proofs, he strongly emphasises that humans are different from animals, although their physical body "grows and develops through the animal spirit."⁽⁹⁾ This difference is due to the rational soul, the seat of man's intelligence and spiritual receptivity:

The human spirit which distinguishes man from the animal is the rational soul, and these two names - the human spirit and the rational soul - designate one thing. This spirit, which in the terminology of the philosophers is the rational soul, embraces all beings, and as far as human ability permits discovers the realities of things...⁽¹⁰⁾

Referring to 19th century arguments about the origins of man, he argues that the physical resemblance of humans to apes is not proof that human origins lie in the animal kingdom. Although humans may have once had a different appearance, appearance is not the central human reality. As an example of how appearance may alter over time, he draws an analogy to the changes that take place as an embryo develops to an adult or a seed to a tree:

The forms assumed by the human embryo in its successive changes do not prove that it is animal in its essential character... Realizing this we may acknowledge the fact that at one time man was an inmate of the sea, at another period an invertebrate, then a vertebrate and finally a human being standing erect. Though we admit these changes, we cannot say man is an animal... Proof of this lies in the fact that in the embryo man still resembles a worm. This embryo still progresses from one state to another, assuming different forms until that which was potential in it - namely, the human image - appears.⁽¹¹⁾

In other passages, he emphasises that the human reality appears as a result of a certain composition of elements. When that combination appears, then man exists:

As the perfection of man is entirely due to the composition of the atoms of the elements, to their measure, to the method of their combination, and to the mutual influence and action of the different beings - then, since man was produced ten or a hundred thousand years ago from these earthly elements with the same measure and balance, the same method of combination and mingling, and the same influence of the other beings, exactly the same man existed then as now.⁽¹²⁾

This combination, according to 'Abdu'l-Bahá, "is the creation of God, and is not a fortuitous composition and arrangement."⁽¹³⁾ For that combination to be brought into being, however, took time. From embryonic beginnings, man evolved:

Then it is clear that original matter, which is in the embryonic state, and the mingled and composed elements which were its earliest forms, gradually grew and developed during many ages and cycles, passing from one shape and form to another, until they appeared in this perfection, this system, this organization and this establishment, through the supreme wisdom of God.⁽¹⁴⁾

From this brief outline, it is clear that 'Abdu'l-Bahá views an evolutionary process taking place over a very long time before "the perfection" that is man appeared. Similarly clear is his view that the appearance of this perfection was not merely fortuitous, but through the creative power of God. It is wrong, therefore, to view man as originating from the animals. However, it would not be wrong to say that man appeared from the animals, as long as the place of appearance is not confused with the reality of that which has appeared. Indeed, these and other statements imply that animals had to exist before humans.

Are 'Abdu'l-Bahá's views of evolution compatible with modern science? Because of the central emphasis on the equality of science and religion in the Bahá'í teachings, and because the Bahá'í Faith endorses and validates the process by which science arrives at its answers, I would expect the answer to be "yes." Nonetheless, a detailed understanding of 'Abdu'l-Bahá's comments about interpretations of evolutionary principles is quite important, if only because it strongly illuminates the Bahá'í viewpoint of the unity of science and religion. Clearly, his comments that humans do not originate from the animals appear in conflict with evolutionary science, or at least certain interpretations of it. But most of the other apparent conflicts, I think, are due to philological issues and translation problems.

'Abdu'l-Bahá's denial of the animal origins of humankind involves an appeal to the existence of our intelligence and its powers. This intelligence, he explains, is associated with certain configurations of matter and molecules. Evolutionary processes are responsible for these particular configurations, much as adult forms emerge from embryonic origins. Given suitable material configurations, intelligence becomes manifest. An analogy might be sand on the beach. By themselves, the silicon atoms composing sand exhibit no special transistor-like or computer-like properties. However, if they are layered into crystalline structures with selected impurities, then an entirely different set of properties emerges. An entirely different set of natural laws - solid state physics and the notions of band structure - come into play. The technological result is transistors, and with them, computers, the Internet, and the information age we live in. Much as the properties of transistors are not those of silicon atoms - although silicon atoms figure prominently in their composition - the capabilities of humans are not limited to those of the animal world - although humans and animals have similar biological "substrates."

The idea that our intelligence shows us to be distinct and different from the animal world is sometimes not considered to be in accord with a considerable body of interpretation and philosophical speculation developed over the last 150 years. Science, however, is distinct and different from interpretations and philosophical speculations, or even the sincere beliefs of supporters of those interpretations or speculations. If it were not, evolutionary theories would be universally condemned because of their role in the rise of modern racialist and nationalist ideologies. However, this idea is very much in accord with the modern interest in the nature of language, the mind, and consciousness, an interest that cuts across boundaries between biology, computing science, physics, the cognitive sciences, medicine, and philosophy.⁽¹⁵⁾ Gaining a fuller understanding of language, the mind and consciousness is often considered the major scientific challenge facing 21st century science. 'Abdu'l-Bahá's concern with what is specifically human about intelligence and rationality closely aligns him with current scientific, technical, philosophical, and humanitarian concerns.

'Abdu'l-Bahá's comment that rationality emerges from and is due to material configurations is strongly compatible with some of the central ideas of modern science, including those of quantum mechanics and complexity theory. It is also consistent with the modern philosophical rejection of the naive reductionism of earlier positivist philosophies. A compelling illustration of the importance of material configurations is the modern quantum mechanical explanation for the universe-wide stability, reproducibility, and repeatability of atomic behaviour. Before 'Abdu'l-Bahá's era, this stability was inexplicable. Classical models of electron motion about a nucleus predicted unavoidable instabilities and widespread variations in the atomic properties of even a single species of an atom. Quantum wave theory, introduced during 'Abdu'l-Bahá's lifetime, showed that the same atomic configuration always led to the same behaviour. Modern complexity theory describes how complex systems, though composed of elementary components obeying the simplest of laws, exhibit "emergent" properties that depend on - but that transcend - the properties of the elementary components alone. Because of examples like these, modern scientists tend to think that "higher-order" phenomena are built into the laws of nature. That is to say, intelligence, language, and creativity are as much a component of natural law as collisions between billiard balls. This is not a byproduct or an accident of "lower-order" effects, but an inescapable property of the laws of nature. So, while animal attributes may have necessarily preceded the emergence of human attributes - language, mind, rationality, and the like - such human attributes are not the properties of animals. Applied to the issue of evolution, this type of thinking suggests, in accord with 'Abdu'l-Bahá's emphasis on material composition, that human intelligence is an "emergent" phenomenon.

Eberhard von Kitzing has discussed several of these perspectives in his essay on the compatibility of the Bahá'í view of evolution with modern science.⁽³⁾ 'Abdu'l-Bahá, he has argued, does not endorse a static view of the world. Rather he speaks of dynamic processes by which "potential" becomes reality. 'Abdu'l-Bahá rejects the doctrine of "self-creational" evolution of humankind as it violates the spiritual truth "that humanity mirrors the timeless names and attributes of God." He also rejects the notion that human characteristics evolved "on the path of evolution," arguing in two ways. One is an argument from composition: similar compositions, although coming into being at separate times, will always yield the same result. Once the appropriate composition appears, potentiality becomes reality. Human potential is inherent to the laws of the universe, not something created through an evolutionary process. Also, he speaks of 'Abdu'l-Bahá's endorsing the idea of "timeless species" essence. Although humans might have once appeared in a different form, this does not mean that their essence (or potentiality) was then different. This, von Kitzing says, suggests that "timeless species essence" is compatible with evolution.

Keven Brown, in his essay on whether or not the Bahá'í views on evolution are original, argues that 'Abdu'l-Bahá considers that the "cause of formation is not via God directly, but via species essence."⁽³⁾ This view he considers as "based on the Judeo-Christian-Islamic doctrine that the formation of all things is by God's creative power." Brown argues that this viewpoint is "firmly based in Platonic essentialistic metaphysics" as "understood by Muslim philosophers." He also describes 'Abdu'l-Bahá as holding that the appearance of certain phenomena - say, mind and intelligence - is dependent on certain compositions of matter being present.

Von Kitzing's evaluation of 'Abdu'l-Bahá's point of view is much in accord with what I have outlined above, but uses different language and terminology. It does not directly relate 'Abdu'l-Bahá's thought to 20th century intellectual trends, as I have done here, but focuses more on 19th century European thinking. Brown also addresses 19th century thought, but from the perspective of philosophical developments in the Middle East. Both, it seems to me, strongly emphasise the philosophical in 'Abdu'l-Bahá's comments, appropriate enough for the 19th century when science was not so clearly delineated from philosophy. However, much of 'Abdu'l-Bahá's argument on the origins of man was addressed to educated 20th century European and North American audiences, for whom the difference between philosophy and science was becoming important. In doing so, he drew a clear distinction between rational and spiritual arguments, even labelling certain arguments as being from Middle Eastern philosophy. He also constantly emphasised the progressive aspects of modern science and technology. His approach, I think, is distinctly and clearly modern, not philosophical. Certainly, there is little reason to believe that the Bahá'í concept of the unity of science and religion is not found in nascent form in Judaic, Christian, and Islamic doctrine. But, just as certainly, it is the modern and mature forms of the concept of the unity of science and religion that are now important, and these seem to be reflected in his comments. This could well imply that his intent is better understood by correlating his rational arguments with modern scientific understandings, not 19th century philosophical ones.

'Abdu'l-Bahá's comments on evolution, I conclude, are best approached as rational arguments and spiritual truths. Then, it becomes apparent that he lays no challenge to scientific facts or to a scientific approach toward understanding evolution, but challenges as incorrect certain speculative inferences from those facts. In particular, he denies the validity of inferences which insist that human nature originates from animal nature. He rebuts this inference scientifically and spiritually. Scientifically, he argues from premises of the uniqueness of human intelligence and the universality of natural laws. Human rationality is necessarily associated with unique configurations of matter and therefore emerges from the laws of nature. Thus, to argue that humans are an accident of animal evolution is to misconstrue natural laws. While at odds with certain trends of speculation accompanying the rise of the evolutionary sciences, this approach is strongly compatible with many aspects of modern thought and science, including its distrust of metaphysical speculation. Spiritually, he argues that the prophets have always taught that human nature differs from animal nature and that recognition of this is essential to the spiritual growth of both individuals and societies.

COMMENTARY on Geeta Gandhi Kingdon's "Education of women and socio-economic development," The Bahá'í Studies Review 7 (1997): 39-48.
Erin Murphy Graham and Felicity Rawlings

"Education of women and socio-economic development" by Geeta Gandhi Kingdon is a welcome and valuable contribution to the emergent Bahá'í analysis of female education. Kingdon draws on her extensive research in the field to support her central thesis: that the promotion of female education should be a priority concern of governments and organisations worldwide. Following introductory remarks which draw attention to the prominence given to female education in the Bahá'í teachings, she sketches an overview of the appalling status of women in the developing world.⁽¹⁶⁾ The discussion then shifts to the substantial social and economic gains that female education can yield. Citing important studies undertaken in developing countries, she highlights its profound implications for, inter alia,reduced fertility and mortality rates. The second section of her paper examines some of the obstacles which often mitigate against the advancement of women: a narrowly defined gender division of labour, which prescribes a domestic role for women, and fiscal incentives to parents of educating sons - the traditional source of social security in old age. What is needed, Kingdon rightly asserts, is public education about the benefits of female education, government subsidies for girls' schooling, and a more equitable treatment of women in the labour market to improve economic returns to female education. Furthermore, she underscores the importance of the content of education.

While this paper provides a useful overview of the literature on female education, it has a few omissions. The first section of this commentary will discuss the World Declaration on Education for All. The second section will comment and elaborate on Kingdon's reference to the content of education.

The World Declaration on Education for All
Unfortunately, Kingdon makes no reference to the World Declaration on Education for All. This landmark declaration was adopted at the World Conference on Education for All, which took place in Jomtien, Thailand in 1990. The conference, which was attended by representatives from 155 governments, 20 intergovernmental bodies, and 150 non-governmental organizations has been hailed by Angela Little as "probably...the most important international educational event held in recent decades."⁽¹⁷⁾ The Declaration expresses a worldwide consensus on the importance of universal access to education and as such is an unequivocal endorsement of the cardinal Bahá'í principle of universal education, which 'Abdu'l-Bahá affirms is a "universal law."⁽¹⁸⁾

Article (3) 1 of the Declaration pertains specifically to female education:

The most urgent priority is to ensure access to, and improve the quality of, education for girls and women, and to remove every obstacle that hampers their active participation. All gender stereotyping in education should be eliminated.⁽¹⁹⁾

Since the adoption of the Declaration in 1990, governments around the world have responded by implementing a range of initiatives, with varying degrees of success.⁽²⁰⁾ The mid-decade review of progress towards Education for All has reported an increase in female enrolment from 226 million in 1990 to approximately 254 million in 1995. Literacy rates among women have increased marginally from 69 per cent in 1990 to 71 per cent in 1995.⁽²¹⁾ While these improvements are less than spectacular (the number of female out-of-school children is almost three times that of boys),⁽²²⁾ they render the 1990 literacy and enrolment figures cited by Kingdon in Table 1 (41) out of date. The 1990 figures were extracted from the Human Development Report 1995. It is regretted that Kingdon did not consult a more recent edition of the Report (or another source).

The content of education
On page 47, Kingdon raises a pertinent issue: "Access to education per se is not sufficient; the content of that education is also important, as emphasized in the Baha'i Writings." She then asks the question, "Could recognition that content of education is fundamentally important be the next stage in the convergence of secular and Baha'i thinking?" It is unfortunate that Kingdon did not include any references to a growing field of literature in international education that addresses this question. Nelly Stromquist argues that traditional attempts to increase female education have focused more on the material needs and contributions of women than on the ideological and sociological forces that operate against them.⁽²³⁾ While the increased educational attainment of women is a positive trend, the full benefits of this education will not be realised until the underlying social and cultural attitudes towards women change. In Latin America, Stromquist's region of specialisation, gender disparities in formal education are quite small, however the social, economic, and political status of women remains marginal relative to men. Clearly, gender equality requires more than equity in the "quantity" of schooling made available to women.

Many studies conclude that schools, through curriculum and teacher attitudes, only reinforce and perpetuate the gender ideologies that are at the core of existing gender inequality. For instance, Cecilia Lopez and Molly Pollack argue that many existing educational programmes serve to reinforce existing power structures and gender stereotypes rather than to challenge them.⁽²⁴⁾ Education alone will not eliminate the underlying gender ideologies and material inequalities between men and women.⁽²⁵⁾ Rather, female educational strategies need to take account of these concerns in their design and implementation.

The worldwide Bahá'í community has a critical role to play in the "convergence of secular and Bahá'í thinking." From a Bahá'í perspective, the incorporation of gender equality into the curriculum and structure of education is a compulsory element of the spiritual component of education. Bahá'ís view education as a means to eliminate the underlying ideologies that marginalise women and other disadvantaged groups throughout the world. In sum, Bahá'í education shares important features with the type that Stromquist calls for; it is education that "improves the condition of women in and through education."⁽²⁶⁾

Furthermore, the Bahá'í community offers a unique perspective in its advocacy of male participation in the promotion of gender equality.⁽²⁷⁾ Kingdon hints at this when she describes educating "people about the equity and efficiency benefits of female education" (48). In other words, both men and women must recognise the importance of female education. Hoda Mahmoudi argues that men have an even greater responsibility to promote gender equality than women, "by replacing ideals of dominance and aggression with attitudes of equality and cooperation."⁽²⁸⁾ 'Abdu'l-Bahá, in a talk delivered in Paris, declared that "When men own the equality of women, there will be no need for them [women] to struggle for their rights."⁽²⁹⁾ That is to say, when men begin to enjoy the benefits of a more gender-balanced world, their hostility towards the advancement of women will diminish. 'Abdu'l-Bahá, by making female equality a male as well as a female issue, shifts the burden of responsibility to a more balanced position. Men must do more than acquiesce to gender equality, rather they must actively promote it. If gender inequality is largely a product of male attitudes, then the transition to a more equitable world is also largely about male attitudes and participation.

In addition to emphasising male participation in promoting gender equality, the Bahá'í writings stress the need to feminise society. Moojan Momen argues that the Bahá'í goal of achieving the equality of men and women cannot be attained solely by the advancement in the status of women.⁽³⁰⁾ Instead, he advocates an intense and radical change to produce a more "feminine" society; a society described by 'Abdu'l-Bahá as "...an age in which the masculine and feminine elements in civilisation will be more evenly balanced."⁽³¹⁾ The need to feminise society has also been recognised in women's studies literature. Elise Boulding argues that feminine values are essential if humanity is to survive.⁽³²⁾ Hence, a reorganisation and reformation of values in society is imperative.

The emphasis on partnership and harmony in the Bahá'í teachings suggests a new approach to gender related development issues throughout the world. Raising the status of women demands more than simply providing greater public provision and access. A fundamental transformation in the ideological forces under which gender relations currently operate is necessary to ensure greater socio-economic development and, ultimately, the establishment of world peace. "When all mankind shall receive the same opportunity of education and the equality of men and women will be realized, the foundations of war will be utterly destroyed."⁽³³⁾ These matters aside, Kingdon has produced a persuasive and eloquently argued paper which is sure to generate further constructive dialogue.