Presupposition of Revealed Truth: On First Principles, Revelation, and the Ground of Rationality

By Iman Motlagh Arani

Abstract

This article examines the philosophical necessity of beginning from divine Revelation as the foundational axiom of thought. It challenges the modern assumption that rationality must be self-grounding, arguing instead that every philosophical system depends on unprovable first principles. Drawing on thinkers such as Wittgenstein, Heidegger, Collingwood, and Gilson, the study contends that Revelation—far from being irrational or fideistic—functions as the only legitimate meta-rational ground for reason itself. The argument is developed historically through the lens of Lactantius, who proposed that without the "rule of faith," philosophy remains adrift among competing opinions. From this starting point, the article explores the Bahá'í paradigm in which the Manifestation of God is not only the source of revealed truth but also the ontological and epistemological axis around which all knowledge coheres. Revelation is shown to be the origin of philosophy, the ground of metaphysical closure, the telos of epistemic integration, and the condition for ethical world-building. The article concludes by reinterpreting ten interrelated Bahá'í philosophical studies as logical consequences of adopting Revelation as the first principle. In so doing, it defends faith not as an abandonment of reason, but as its fulfillment—an alignment with the source of intelligibility and the foundation for true rationality.

Prologue: Why Start Somewhere?

The paradox that every rational argument ultimately begins with something that cannot itself be rationally proven—an axiom, a presupposition, or a fundamental insight—underscores the

inherent limits of logical deduction and the foundational, often unexamined, nature of certain beliefs or starting points in any system of thought. This challenge to the self-sufficiency of pure reason reveals that even the most rigorous logical frameworks rest upon immediate, unprovable assumptions. These foundational elements are not the conclusions of reason but rather its conditions of possibility.

This insight is not novel. Across the history of philosophy, thinkers have grappled with the problem of beginnings. Ludwig Wittgenstein, in *On Certainty*, notes that "justifying the evidence comes to an end," and what lies at the bottom of language and thought is not a proof, but "our acting, which lies at the bottom of the language-game" (Wittgenstein, 1969, p. 51). For Wittgenstein, foundational propositions are not justified by derivation but are simply accepted—they form the unshakeable bedrock upon which further reasoning proceeds. "If someone knows something, the question 'how does he know?' must be answerable," he writes, "but this answer is given according to generally accepted axioms" (p. 65). These axioms are not chosen arbitrarily, but neither are they provable; they are "exempt from doubt" and form the "scaffolding of our thoughts."

R. G. Collingwood takes this further in *An Essay on Metaphysics* by distinguishing between relative and absolute presuppositions. Absolute presuppositions, he argues, are those foundational beliefs "never questioned, never verified, and never even stated" (Collingwood, 2002, p. 11). Unlike hypotheses, they are not open to empirical testing or logical revision; they are the unspoken conditions that define a particular intellectual framework. "An absolute presupposition is one which stands, relatively to all questions to which it is related, as a

presupposition, never as an answer" (p. 31). In other words, they are not conclusions of reasoning but the unstated assumptions that make reasoning possible in the first place.

Martin Heidegger emphasizes that philosophy itself cannot be grounded in proof. In *Contributions to Philosophy*, he writes, "In philosophy propositions never get firmed up into a proof... because here what is 'true' is not a 'proposition' at all" (Heidegger, 2011, p. 133). Instead, philosophical thought begins with an ontological involvement, a transformation of the thinker, such that "with the very first step, a transformation of the man who understands takes place" (p. 134). In *Being and Time,* Heidegger declares that concepts like "being" are "always already there," and cannot be deduced from anything more basic (Heidegger, 2010, p. 7). Even the attempt to prove the external world is a "scandal of philosophy" because Dasein, human existence, is fundamentally "being-in-the-world"—already embedded within a context that cannot be objectified (p. 205, 344). "Being means ground—ground means Being: Everything is turning in circles here" (Heidegger, 1974, p. 211). For Heidegger, the fact that foundational philosophical concepts cannot be justified from without is not a flaw but a testimony to their ontological primacy.

Hans-Georg Gadamer likewise stresses that beginnings in philosophy are immediate and not derived. In *The Beginning of Philosophy*, he notes, "The beginning is not something reflected but rather something immediate" (Gadamer, 2001, p. 18). Thought always begins in medias res—with an orientation, a tradition, a set of assumptions that are operative before they are thematized. The philosopher, Gadamer suggests, cannot start from nowhere; inquiry presupposes direction, and "the anticipation of the end is a prerequisite for the concrete meaning of beginning" (p. 20).

Even post-structural critiques affirm the same insight. Jacques Derrida, in his deconstruction of structuralist thought, exposes how even purportedly "scientific" systems rely on unexamined axioms. The idea of a fixed "center or origin," Derrida argues, contradicts structuralism itself, which asserts that language is constituted by differential relations. The very axiom of "the arbitrariness of the sign," while foundational, is unprovable. Derrida's point is not that systems are invalid because they rest on unprovable assumptions, but that no system can escape this structure of groundlessness.

These philosophical perspectives converge on a critical point: rational inquiry depends upon pre-rational foundations. But this raises a further and more urgent question: *How do we know which axioms to choose?* And even more importantly: *Are all presuppositions equal in validity or worth?*

The answer is clearly no. Some axioms produce coherence, orientation, and flourishing; others produce contradiction, confusion, or incoherence. Heidegger distinguishes between guiding questions and grounding questions—between questions that explore what something is and questions that investigate the ontological conditions of its possibility. He argues that metaphysics must be overcome because it rests on inadequate presuppositions about being. Gadamer warns that interpretation without a proper philosophical starting point leads to historicism without meaning. Wittgenstein distinguishes between hardened, foundational propositions and fluid, testable ones. All these distinctions suggest that some starting points are deeper, more fruitful, or more originary than others.

This brings us to the central question of this article: *What if the most legitimate first principle is not a humanly posited axiom, but a divinely revealed truth?* What if, as Lactantius argued in late

antiquity, true philosophy is impossible unless one accepts the rule of faith? Lactantius contended that the only way to adjudicate between the competing claims of philosophical schools is by beginning from Revelation. Without such a criterion, philosophy is adrift in a sea of contradictory opinions. “True philosophy,” he writes, “must begin from divine instruction.” The knowledge of truth precedes the ability to judge truth from falsehood. One must already possess the truth in order to measure the adequacy of philosophical claims.

The Bahá’í Writings offer a modern and profound expression of this idea. They assert that divine Revelation is not a belief system imposed upon reason, but rather the precondition for the proper exercise of reason itself. “The essence and the fundamentals of philosophy have emanated from the Prophets,” we are told. “The beginning of wisdom and the origin thereof is to acknowledge whatsoever God hath clearly set forth.” Revelation is not something that bypasses the intellect—it illuminates it. It orients it toward reality. “How can feeble reason encompass the Qur’án, Or the spider snare a phoenix in his web?” the Writings rhetorically ask. The Word of God transcends ordinary human comprehension, being “higher and far superior to that which the senses can perceive… It became manifest without any syllable or sound and is none but the Command of God which pervadeth all created things.”

The Bahá’í texts teach that human faculties themselves are fundamentally rooted in the divine. “Man’s power to comprehend, move, speak, hear, and see all derive from this sign of his Lord within him.” Therefore, for reason to function properly, it must be aligned with its divine origin. The Manifestation of God is “the key for unlocking the doors of sciences, of arts, of knowledge, of well-being, of prosperity and wealth.” To seek knowledge while ignoring the One who is “the Object of all knowledge” is to be veiled from truth itself. “We have decreed, O people, that the

highest and last end of all learning be the recognition of Him Who is the Object of all knowledge."

Far from supplementing reason, Revelation reconfigures its task—orienting knowledge within a divine order rather than grounding it autonomously. It discloses a structure of truth that precedes conceptual elaboration. To recognize the Manifestation of God is to begin philosophy properly. "Whoso achieveth this duty hath attained unto all good; and whoso is deprived thereof hath gone astray, though he be the author of every righteous deed." Revelation reorients human understanding by placing it within the cosmic order. It transforms epistemology from a speculative exercise into an act of spiritual alignment.

This article begins, therefore, with a claim both simple and radical: that the presupposition of divine Revelation is not only rationally permissible, but philosophically necessary. Revelation does what no human axiom can do: it reveals the unknowable, orders the knowable, and calls the human mind into its true task—not self-grounding, but response. In the sections that follow, we will examine the philosophical crisis of first principles, the historical argument of Lactantius, and the Bahá'í model of knowledge, reason, and Manifestation. We will ask: Where do first principles come from? What justifies a presupposition? Is reliance on Revelation irrational? And what if—before all speculation—the truth must be revealed, not invented?

1. The Question of First Principles: Axioms, Presuppositions, and the Ground of Rational Inquiry

The problem of how we establish the fundamental starting points of thought—and whether these initial positions hold equal weight—is central to philosophical inquiry. All rational arguments,

whether in philosophy or science, must begin with certain unproven assumptions, concepts, or principles that are taken as given. These foundational elements are often referred to as first principles, and understanding their nature is crucial to comprehending the scope and limits of any philosophical system.

First principles manifest in various forms within philosophical discourse, including *archai*, axioms, presuppositions, and foundational propositions. The Greek term *archē* (ἀρχή) carries both the sense of temporal beginning and the speculative, logical basis of things. Hans-Georg Gadamer notes in his work *The Beginning of Philosophy* that the word *archē* in Anaximander's aphorism "archēn eireche ton onton to apeiron" means not only a temporal beginning but also something more fundamental: an ontological condition. First principles are not simply logical premises; they are ontological commitments embedded within every mode of inquiry. Gadamer highlights that even the effort to begin philosophy presupposes a situatedness—a "fore-understanding"—within a tradition. This implies that what counts as a principle is never purely neutral or rationally chosen, but is always historically and existentially situated.

Wittgenstein makes a similar point, though in the context of language and epistemology. In *On Certainty*, he explains that the process of giving reasons and justifications comes to an end. Foundational propositions are not grounded in further reasoning but are exhibited in our practices. These are not only logical axioms but also hinge-propositions that constitute the scaffolding of thought. "Giving grounds, however, justifying the evidence, comes to an end," he writes. "But the end is not an ungrounded proposition: it is an ungrounded way of acting." Foundational truths are not proven but lived. Even the act of asking "how do you know?" assumes a horizon of background certainties that are not themselves justified. Wittgenstein thus

exposes the limits of rational justification and the circularity of grounding: the fact that any rational system depends on unwarranted yet indispensable presuppositions.

The earliest Greek philosophers began wrestling with these issues under the language of *archai*. Parmenides defined Being as the ultimate, self-evident principle and denied the reality of change or multiplicity, arguing that what truly is must be ungenerated, undivided, and eternal. In contrast, Heraclitus emphasized flux, arguing that fire, strife, and becoming are the true conditions of existence. Yet even in his thought, a unifying principle—*logos*—governs this flux, suggesting an ordering intelligibility beneath the changing appearances. These two figures—Parmenides and Heraclitus—represent opposed but equally foundational stances on what the first principle of philosophy ought to be: immutable Being or dynamic becoming.

Plato attempts to mediate this opposition through his theory of Forms. He posits that true knowledge pertains not to the world of becoming but to the eternal Forms, which are the true objects of intellect. The Form of the Good, in particular, is the highest principle, even "beyond being" in dignity and power (*Republic*, Book VI). The soul must ascend dialectically from opinion to knowledge, culminating in the vision of the Good. This ascent is not purely rational in the modern sense; it is also existential, requiring the transformation of the soul. In Plato's *Meno*, Socrates demonstrates that knowledge is recollection, implying that the first principles are somehow innate yet forgotten, requiring recovery rather than discovery. Thus, for Plato, first principles are not simply axioms to be chosen, but metaphysical realities to be contemplated and reawakened in the soul.

Aristotle's contribution lies in organizing knowledge systematically under the principle of non-contradiction and in positing self-evident first principles for each science. In *Metaphysics* (Book

IV), he asserts that all sciences proceed from first principles that are not demonstrable within the system but are evident in themselves. His conception of philosophy as the science of being qua being makes *ousia* (substance or essence) the focal point of metaphysical inquiry. Yet, even Aristotle acknowledges that Being is said in many ways (*pollachōs legetai*), implying that the first principle is complex and cannot be reduced to a single genus. Time, change, causality, and substance all require unique starting points, and yet these must somehow be unified under *archai*. His definition of time as "the number of movement according to the before and after" reveals the dependence of temporality on prior concepts of movement and number, each of which must themselves be grounded. Thus, Aristotle provides a methodological model for axiomatic reasoning while acknowledging the ontological multiplicity of Being.

Descartes offers a radically different model in the early modern period. Faced with skepticism, he seeks a starting point that is indubitable: *Cogito ergo sum*. The cogito is not derived from prior premises but is known through immediate intuition. It functions as an epistemological first principle—a self-evident truth from which further knowledge can be deduced. Descartes' method of doubt serves to clear away all uncertain beliefs in order to isolate what cannot be doubted. Yet his reliance on the veracity of God to guarantee the truth of clear and distinct perceptions reintroduces a theological premise at the heart of his rationalism. Moreover, his division between res cogitans and res extensa (thinking substance and extended substance) leads to a dualistic metaphysics that leaves unresolved tensions about how mind and body, or reason and world, interrelate.

Kant critiques both rationalism and empiricism by proposing a transcendental method: rather than ask what beings are, he asks under what conditions knowledge of beings is possible. His

synthetic a priori judgments—statements that are necessarily true yet not tautological—reveal that the mind contributes essential structures to experience. Space and time are forms of intuition; categories such as causality and substance are forms of understanding. For Kant, reason does not discover first principles in the world, but imposes them. Yet reason cannot reach the unconditioned: the noumenon (thing-in-itself) remains unknowable. This limitation exposes reason's inability to ground itself. Kant's first principles are regulative rather than constitutive; they organize experience but do not disclose metaphysical truths about ultimate reality. This marks a significant rupture from the ancient understanding of *archē* as a metaphysical origin.

Hegel responds to this rupture by reconceiving first principles as dynamic. In his dialectical method, presuppositions are not static axioms but moments within the unfolding of Spirit. The true is the whole, and the whole is the process of becoming. The Logic begins with pure Being, which immediately collapses into Nothing, and from their unity arises Becoming. These are not arbitrary concepts but necessary movements within the dialectic. Hegel rejects fixed foundations in favor of a self-mediating system, where presuppositions become content and the process itself is the ground. His notion of *absolute knowing* is not a fixed state but a reconciled self-consciousness that sees itself in its historical unfolding. Thus, for Hegel, the first principle is not a proposition but the dialectical movement of Spirit coming to know itself.

Heidegger criticizes the entire metaphysical tradition, from Plato to Hegel, for what he calls the forgetfulness of Being. The greatest presupposition is Being itself, which is never questioned because it is always presupposed in every question. In *Being and Time*, he seeks to recover the question of Being by analyzing human existence (*Dasein*) as the site where Being is disclosed. The ontological difference between Being (*Sein*) and beings (*Seiendes*) is his central insight, yet

it is a difference that is not itself a being and cannot be represented conceptually. Heidegger emphasizes that our understanding of Being is always already shaped by our thrownness into a historical and linguistic world. In *Contributions to Philosophy*, he introduces the concept of the "grounding question" (*die Grundfrage*) as more originary than the traditional guiding question of metaphysics. This grounding is not a logical deduction but a "leap" (*Sprung*) into a new thinking. For Heidegger, the presupposition of Being is not merely unproven; it is the enabling condition of all thought, and yet it escapes capture by thought. This makes the first principle not a given axiom but a concealed event (*Ereignis*), a self-concealing disclosure.

In all these thinkers—from the Presocratics to Heidegger—there is agreement that philosophy must begin somewhere. But the nature of this beginning varies: for some, it is a metaphysical substance; for others, a logical axiom, a transcendental structure, or a dialectical movement. What unites them is the recognition that this beginning is not neutral. As Gadamer explains, philosophical inquiry is always embedded in tradition; its beginnings are interpretive, not objective. Collingwood calls these unspoken foundations "absolute presuppositions," which are never questioned but shape all inquiry. Wittgenstein refers to them as the "hinges" on which the door of thinking turns. Heidegger describes them as the withdrawal of Being itself. Philosophy cannot escape these presuppositions—it can only try to make them more visible.

Thus, the task of grounding philosophy requires not the elimination of presuppositions but their illumination. It demands an awareness that even the most rational systems rest on something given, accepted, or disclosed. The crisis of foundations in modern philosophy is not simply a crisis of logic but a crisis of orientation: where and how does thought begin? This question sets the stage for contrasting proposals—especially those, like Lactantius, who argue that philosophy

must begin not from within reason but from without, through a disclosed Revelation. That challenge will be the subject of the next section.

2. Revelation and the Non-Neutrality of Beginnings

Philosophy, by its very nature, demands a starting point, and this initial choice of principles or assumptions is never a neutral one. It profoundly shapes the trajectory and conclusions of the philosophical system that follows. Philosophers are, in principle, free to choose their starting points—but once these are chosen, they become bound to the logical and metaphysical consequences that follow. This principle holds true across the history of thought, from Parmenides and Plato to Bonaventure and Gilson. The foundation a thinker lays—whether the Good, Being, the Cogito, or Revelation—conditions the entire edifice of truth constructed upon it.

Étienne Gilson emphasizes this insight in his *Unity of Philosophical Experience*, arguing that while philosophical systems diverge in content, they often share hidden structural affinities rooted in their beginning points. Errors at the outset, he observes, can "pervade the whole science of being, and bring about the ruin of philosophy" (Gilson, *Unity* 27). For instance, if "being" is reduced to a purely logical abstraction rather than recognized in its existential fullness, then metaphysics becomes a sterile exercise in conceptual formalism, rather than a science of what truly is. In Peter Abailard, for example, Gilson locates the beginning of a long descent in which grammar and logic displaced metaphysics, and philosophical inquiry came to be treated as a subfield of linguistic analysis rather than a reflection on real being.

Gilson affirms that the first principle of philosophy should be "what is actually first in reality," not what is most accessible to reason. This is a decisive claim. It implies that true philosophical beginnings must conform to an ontological priority, even if they are not immediately evident to discursive reason. He argues that metaphysics properly begins with the intuition of being (*esse*) as existence—not with concepts, definitions, or categories. Being must be grasped directly, not derived by deduction. Philosophy, therefore, is not merely the construction of a system from axioms but the attunement to the most fundamental dimension of reality.

For Christian thinkers like Bonaventure, this priority of reality is inseparable from Christ. Bonaventure declares that "one must always begin with the centre and the centre is no other than Christ: *ipse est medium omnium scientiarum*" (Gilson, *Christian Philosophy* 29). Philosophy, for him, does not merely point toward theology as a later synthesis; it is theological from its origin. This theological orientation was not a limit on rational inquiry but its consummation, offering a comprehensive vision that integrates metaphysics, ethics, and eschatology. For Bonaventure, starting without Christ is not a neutral philosophical act—it is a spiritual error that leads to fragmentation and futility.

This view is deepened by Lactantius, whose account of philosophical beginnings stands as a counterpoint to every secular or rationalist paradigm. In *Divinae Institutiones*, Lactantius asserts that no human being can begin rightly in philosophy unless God has first taught him. "Solus potest scire qui fecit," he writes: only the one who made all things can know all things. If He condescends to teach us, we must listen. The rationalist, by contrast, wanders "without a guide," and cannot arrive at certainty. In Lactantius's judgment, speculative reason detached from Revelation is not a path to wisdom but a labyrinth of uncertainty. Philosophy, severed from

divine instruction, is condemned to circulate among appearances, incapable of accessing what is (Gilson, *Spirit* 32).

This epistemological submission to God is not merely fideism. It reflects a precise metaphysical insight: that truth is not the product of discursive elaboration but the result of divine self-disclosure. Lactantius does not reject reason; he reorients it. Reason is most rational when it is illumined by Revelation. Without such illumination, even first principles become deceptive. The act of faith is therefore not irrational; it is the necessary condition for rationality itself. The philosopher who relies solely on himself becomes lost in abstractions. Only the one who begins with what is given by God can attain to what is true.

St. Augustine's philosophical journey powerfully illustrates this point. As Gilson recounts, Augustine initially adheres to Manichaean rationalism, drawn by its promise to explain all things without recourse to faith. Yet its cosmogony proves puerile, and its rationality sterile. Disillusioned, Augustine turns to Cicero's skeptical humanism, and then to Neoplatonism under the influence of Plotinus. But even in Plotinus, he finds only fragments. The truths that Neoplatonism glimpsed in part had already been fully revealed in the Gospel of John and the Book of Wisdom. Augustine thus discovers that the truths reason vainly sought were offered him by faith—purified, justified, and made universally accessible (Gilson, *Christian Philosophy* 7).

Faith, then, is not the enemy of philosophy but its completion. In *De Utilitate Credendi*, Augustine declares that believing is necessary even to assure the rationality of reason. Gilson interprets this to mean that divine Revelation not only offers salvific knowledge but also secures the epistemic reliability of reason itself. What Greek philosophy had reserved for an elite, Christianity universalized through faith. Revelation does not bypass reason—it restores it.

This, according to Gilson, is the structure of medieval Christian philosophy. It is not "philosophy plus theology" but a form of inquiry whose beginning, method, and telos are already shaped by Revelation. This does not preclude the use of Greek metaphysics. On the contrary, thinkers like Aquinas integrate Aristotle into a broader theological framework. Aquinas maintains a formal distinction between philosophy and theology, but he sees them as complementary. When reason is joined to faith, it is "deepened and enlightened by the higher wisdom in which it dwells" (Gilson, *Unity* 60). His starting point in Christian Revelation enables him to perceive truths in Greek philosophy that the Greeks themselves could not fully articulate. Without Revelation, metaphysics remained partial. With it, the composition of essence and existence becomes the core of a philosophy that is both rational and sacred.

Thus, Lactantius stands as a decisive witness to the possibility that philosophy must begin from Revelation. He marks a rupture from all paradigms that begin from the self, or from pure thought, or from logical necessity. For him, the only true beginning of wisdom is to listen to God. Revelation is not a supplement to philosophy—it is its ground. Without a divine criterion, no rational method can guarantee truth. And without truth, the philosopher has only system without certainty, and logic without illumination.

This leads us to a final and pressing question: Can any secular axiom offer a better foundation than Revelation as truth disclosed? If every philosophy begins somewhere, and if every beginning is a choice with consequences, then the issue is no longer whether to presuppose, but what to presuppose. The Bahá'í Writings affirm that the Manifestation of God is the axis of both knowledge and existence, the Word through whom all things are known. In the following

section, we will explore how Bahá'í thought responds to this question and offers a metaphysical paradigm grounded in divine self-disclosure, action, and the integration of all forms of knowing.

3. Revelation as the First Principle and the Criterion of Legitimate Philosophy

Philosophy has always required a beginning, a principium, a foundational point from which thought proceeds. The historical record of philosophy is, in fact, the history of diverse attempts to determine and justify such a beginning. From the Presocratics to contemporary thinkers, each philosophical system has relied on certain axioms, archai, or presuppositions that shaped not only its methodology but also its conception of truth, knowledge, and reality. Yet not all beginnings are equal, and not all axioms are self-evident. The question must be raised: upon what basis does one assert a principle as foundational? If the foundation is not self-evident, can it serve as a ground for reason? And if it is derived from elsewhere, does it not then cease to be a true first principle?

The case of ancient and medieval philosophers provides a powerful framework for understanding this dilemma. Early thinkers such as Parmenides began from the axiom that thought and being are the same—what is thinkable must be, and what is not thinkable cannot be. This equation of thought with being led to a radical denial of change, multiplicity, and becoming. Heraclitus, in contrast, began from the axiom that flux is the nature of reality, and thus posited fire and conflict as ontological constants. Plato attempted to reconcile these extremes through the theory of Forms, grounding true knowledge in eternal, unchanging realities accessed through the rational soul. Aristotle, though more empirically inclined, still began from metaphysical axioms such as the principle of non-contradiction and the reality of substance. The entire edifice of Aristotelian metaphysics—causality, essence, substance, teleology—presumes these axioms, none of which

are derivable through pure demonstration. They are accepted because they are deemed to make intelligibility possible.

Christian thinkers such as Augustine and Bonaventure offered a different model. For Augustine, the philosophical search for wisdom culminated not in abstract dialectic but in the encounter with revealed truth. His De Utilitate Credendi outlines the necessity of faith as the precondition for rational inquiry. The truths that Neoplatonism glimpsed dimly—unity, the Good, the Logos—were already present in full clarity in the Gospel of John. For Bonaventure, philosophy not only culminates in Revelation but begins from it. Philosophy cannot begin without Christ, for He is its object and end. It is a decisive orientation. This approach is echoed in the writings of Lactantius, who contended that only God, the Creator, possesses full knowledge and that only through His condescension to teach can humanity attain certainty. Without Revelation, reason is condemned to wander without a guide. Lactantius thus places Revelation not as a supplement to reason but as its source, its first principle.

This view receives renewed articulation in Étienne Gilson, who warns that errors at the beginning of philosophy—at the level of presuppositions—pervade the entire system and may result in the ruin of metaphysics. Gilson identifies this foundational decision as the most decisive moment in philosophical construction. For him, true philosophy begins not from logical constructions but from what is ontologically first in reality. Revelation provides such a beginning: not constructed by reason but given to it, not deduced but disclosed. This is why he speaks of the divine word as the source of the metaphysic of mysticism—an insight also found in Aquinas, who affirms that theological truths proceed from articles of faith, not demonstrable premises. Gilson notes that while human reason can unfold certain implications of faith, it cannot

generate or comprehend the Revelation from which it proceeds. Revelation, then, is epistemically primary, non-derivable, and self-evident within the theological-philosophical framework it grounds.

This leads us to challenge the claim that secular or naturalistic axioms are self-evident. Consider Descartes's cogito: "I think, therefore I am." This is often presented as an indubitable foundation. But is it truly self-evident? The cogito depends on an act of self-reflective consciousness, which presumes a stable "I," the reliability of introspection, and the priority of subjective awareness over objective being. None of these are demonstrably self-evident; they are posited. Kant's synthetic a priori judgments attempt to rescue reason from both empiricism and dogmatism by asserting that the mind imposes necessary conditions on experience. But even here, the "transcendental unity of apperception" is assumed, not proven. The categories of understanding—substance, causality, unity—are declared necessary for experience, but their necessity arises from the structure of the mind, not from reality itself. Hegel attempts to overcome this limitation through dialectic, in which the beginning is not a static axiom but a process. Yet the process itself must begin somewhere. Hegel begins with "pure Being," which immediately becomes "Nothing," from which "Becoming" arises. But why begin there? On what basis is that triad privileged as the starting point of all thought?

These examples show that the true origin of thought lies not in what reason elects, but in what discloses itself to reason. The Manifestation is not posited; it is given. Collingwood's concept of absolute presuppositions sharpens this distinction: they are the operative frameworks within which reason functions, not verifiable premises. Revelation, if accepted as such, would serve as the divine horizon enabling intelligibility. They are what make reasoning itself possible.

Revelation, if accepted as an axiom, functions precisely in this way. It is the divine self-disclosure that orders the intelligibility of the world. It is not proven by reason; it is what makes reason capable of arriving at truth. Justin Martyr emphasized this in his Apologies, arguing that Revelation shows itself not in abstraction but in practice. The true mystics of the Christian tradition did not merely speculate; they lived the reality of divine truth. Their lives testified to the transformative power of Revelation, making it visible in action, community, and sanctity.

The Bahá'í Writings take this insight further. They assert that the Manifestation of God is not only the bearer of Revelation but the ontological source of all knowledge. "The essence and the fundamentals of philosophy have emanated from the Prophets," we are told. "The beginning of wisdom and the origin thereof is to acknowledge whatsoever God hath clearly set forth." Revelation is not added to reason; it illumines and purifies it. "How can feeble reason encompass the Qur'án, Or the spider snare a phoenix in his web?" Revelation transcends the reach of unaided reason. It is not irrational; it is super-rational—a light in which reason discovers its true function. "The knowledge of the Reality of the Divinity is impossible and unattainable, but the knowledge of the Manifestations of God is the knowledge of God." The Manifestation is the true mirror of the divine, the channel through which the unknowable becomes known.

From a phenomenological perspective, this structure of knowledge is not alien. In Husserl's thought, the a priori is given through "eidetic intuition"—direct apprehension of essence that is not derived from experience but disclosed to consciousness. For Heidegger, truth is not correspondence but aletheia—unconcealment. The foundational event of thought is not the deduction of truth but the happening of revelation, the Ereignis of Being. Revelation, in this sense, is the irruption of meaning that makes all understanding possible. The Bahá'í Faith

articulates this in theological form: “We have decreed… that the highest and last end of all learning be the recognition of Him Who is the Object of all knowledge.” Revelation, then, is the ground not only of faith but of philosophy. It is the first principle that is not posited but disclosed, not deduced but revealed. To begin from Revelation is not to abandon reason but to align it with its true source. It is to begin where truth begins.

This foundational role of the Logos as the first principle is not unique to the Bahá’í Faith. It is affirmed across Abrahamic traditions, revealing the continuity of Revelation as the true arche. In Christianity, the Gospel of John declares: “In the beginning was the Word (Logos), and the Word was with God, and the Word was God” (John 1:1). Christ later prays, “Glorify me in your own presence with the glory that I had with you before the world existed” (John 17:5), affirming his pre-existence as the Logos. In Islam, the Prophet Muhammad is reported to have said: “I was a prophet when Adam was between water and clay,” a declaration interpreted within Sufi and Shi‘i traditions as affirming the primacy of the Muḥammadan Light (Nūr Muḥammadī). In the Bahá’í writings, ‘Abdu’l-Bahá teaches that “the first thing which emanated from God is that universal reality, which the ancient philosophers termed the ‘First Mind,’ and which the people of Bahá call the ‘First Will.’” This Logos precedes all creation and is the medium through which the divine attributes become manifest.

Therefore, the Manifestation of God is not merely an epistemological foundation but the ontological point of emergence for reality itself. Revelation is not simply the best starting point—it is the only true one. Its status as axiom is not artificially imposed but eternally given. Just as matter emerges from divine Providence, knowledge arises from the Manifest Word. Revelation is not a foreign intrusion into reason—it is the light by which reason sees.

4. Consequences of Choosing Revelation as First Principle

If Revelation is acknowledged not merely as one epistemic possibility among others, but as the true and non-derivable first principle of thought—what classical metaphysics might have called the ἀρχή or principium—then the structure of knowledge, ethics, theology, and science must be reconfigured from the ground up. Within this paradigm, reason does not stand alongside the Manifestation but unfolds through it. The Manifestation grounds both the intelligibility of being and the legitimacy of knowing. The historical effort of Western philosophy to establish a rational or experiential basis for truth has culminated not in certainty, but in fragmentation. The Bahá'í writings, by contrast, propose a coherent resolution: Revelation is not arbitrary intrusion but the only adequate origin, because it alone discloses the structure of reality in a form both knowable and transformative. The ten articles by Iman Motlagh Arani collectively illustrate the far-reaching implications of this stance. Each article develops one of the necessary consequences of grounding philosophy and science in the Manifestation of God as Logos, First Will, and epistemic criterion.

The first and most meta-philosophical articulation occurs in *Wisdom and Philosophy in the Bahá'í Faith: On the Divine Horizon of Ḥikmat and the Boundaries of Speculative Reason* (Motlagh Arani, 2023j). Here, the ancient quarrel between philosophy and Revelation is reconceived: not as rivals, but as two dimensions of a single ontological process. The article defines ḥikmat (wisdom) as both divine and rational—but not autonomous. True philosophy must recognize its boundaries. The Manifestation of God is presented as the ontological fulcrum of truth: the necessary ground of any metaphysical inquiry, and the horizon within which reason

realizes its own limits and vocation. When Revelation is accepted as axiom, philosophy is not destroyed but purified—freed from self-enclosure and directed toward telos.

This metaphysical grounding necessitates a revision of theology itself. In *The End of Theology: Bahá'í Metaphysics and the Limits of Speculative Reason* (Motlagh Arani, 2023m), speculative theology is shown to reach an inevitable terminus. The unknowability of God (dhāt) renders any conceptual elaboration of the divine essence into idolatry. This article marks the closure of onto-theology by affirming the Manifestation of God as the only viable bridge between transcendence and cognition. Metaphysics must therefore become relational, anchored in the revealed Word. Theology begins to function not as theory, but as interpretation and surrender—an act of recognizing the *given*, rather than constructing the divine.

The End of Theology II: The Metaphysical Status of Cosmos and the Resolution of Kant's Antinomies in Bahá'í Metaphysics (Motlagh Arani, 2023j) extends this shift into cosmology. Here, the Kantian antinomies—freedom vs. determinism, beginning vs. infinity—are shown to arise from a speculative framework devoid of ontological anchoring. By placing the Manifestation at the metaphysical center, the cosmos is no longer conceived in isolation but in relation to divine volition. Revelation resolves antinomies not by dialectical synthesis, but by grounding metaphysical categories in an intentional, non-dual origin. Reality is neither infinite nor finite in itself—it is willed, and that will is disclosed through Revelation.

With metaphysical closure comes ethical reorientation. *The Bahá'í Praxis: Translating Theology into Social Action* (Motlagh Arani, 2023d) transforms the abstract structures of theology into praxis. Revelation becomes not only the source of knowledge, but the demand for action. The notion of ʿamal al-wāḍiḥ al-mubīn (clear and manifest action) is introduced as the fulfillment of

truth in the world. Revelation thus yields civilizational consequence: law, justice, compassion, and global ethics are no longer accidental products of human will, but necessary emanations of divine orientation. In this frame, to know is to act; and to act justly is to conform to the divine order revealed in the Word.

But praxis is fragile. *Thresholds of Just-Being: Deficiency, Demise, and the Ontology of Belonging* (Motlagh Arani, 2024f) reveals the ontological instability of religious identity when severed from the Manifestation. The term *nur noch* ("just still") captures the mode of residual or deficient belonging—a state where belief persists but without epistemic or ethical vitality. Without Revelation as a living axiom, identity collapses into abstraction or nostalgia. The article thus affirms Revelation not only as the origin of thought, but the continuous sustainer of existential coherence. Ontology, in this model, is not static being but responsive belonging.

The ethical horizon of this reconfiguration is developed in *Beyond Totality: Bahá'í Ethics and the Prophetic Epistemology of the Other* (Motlagh Arani, 2024a). Here, the Levinasian "Other" and Foucault's aesthetics of existence are measured against a prophetic model of subjectivity. Revelation becomes the *address of the divine*—a call that structures the moral self through responsibility and love. Ethics is no longer a matter of rupture or self-formation, but the ontological response to the Manifest Word. The self is summoned into world-building responsibility, not through compulsion, but through the attraction of divine justice.

The epistemological structure underlying this ethical and metaphysical system is articulated in *The Spectrum of Knowledge in the Bahá'í Faith: Material, Conceptual, Existential, Moral, and Divine Forms of Knowing* (Motlagh Arani, 2024n). This article introduces a sevenfold typology of knowledge: material, conceptual, existential, moral, divine, intrinsic divine, and true

knowledge in conformity with reality. These layers are not arbitrary but structured responses to Revelation as origin. The typology functions as a hierarchical cosmology of cognition, in which empirical facts are not rejected but contextualized within broader ontological and ethical meaning.

This epistemology is brought into direct confrontation with modern theory in *Bahá'í Epistemology and the Modern Landscape of Knowledge: From Scientific Realism to Discourse Theory and Virtue Epistemology* (Motlagh Arani, 2025f). By reasserting Revelation as first principle, the article critiques the fragmentation of modern thought—its isolation of reason from telos, and fact from value. The Bahá'í model is not anti-modern, but trans-modern: it integrates reason, language, and virtue within an ordered system whose coherence arises from the Word. Revelation becomes not a supplement to knowledge, but its organizing telos.

The consequences of displacing Revelation are examined in *Superstition and the Structure of True Knowledge: A Bahá'í Critique of Khurāfāt and Epistemic Deviation* (Motlagh Arani, 2025a). When the epistemic hierarchy is broken—when Revelation is no longer the principle—superstition, occultism, and epistemic disorder arise. This article critiques both irrational religiosity and reductionist scientism as forms of misplaced causality. Revelation purifies thought not only spiritually but logically: it restores the structure of explanation and prevents the inflation of symbolic language into metaphysical error.

Finally, *Toward a Unified Bahá'í Paradigm of Science: Integrating the Seven Modes of Knowledge through Complexity, Revelation, and Praxis* (Motlagh Arani, 2025j) synthesizes these strands into a new model of scientific rationality. Science, when built upon Revelation as its first principle, becomes a tool for civilizational guidance. Complexity theory is enlisted to

show that knowledge systems must be non-linear, layered, and self-organizing, and that Revelation alone can provide the orienting telos to sustain such a model. Science becomes integrated with ethics, ontology, and education—not as an ideology, but as a method animated by divine purpose.

Together, these ten articles represent a philosophical project. Each articulates a different dimension of what it means to begin from Revelation, rather than reason alone. They do not reduce philosophy to theology; rather, they disclose how philosophy becomes itself only when it recognizes its dependence on the Manifest Word. Revelation is not a foreign imposition on reason—it is its first act of recognition, its own origin made manifest.

5. Is Faith Rational? Reconsidering Reason's Foundations

Affirming Revelation as first principle is not a negation of reason but a recognition of its existential dependence. Reason, to fulfill its vocation, must begin not in autonomy but in response to disclosed truth. What modern critique calls irrational in faith is, in truth, structurally no different from any philosophical grounding—it simply names its source. Revelation does not interrupt the philosophical project; it completes it by grounding reason in a disclosed origin. Whether it is Descartes' cogito, Kant's synthetic a priori, or Hegel's unfolding of Spirit, these beginnings are not derivable within the systems they inaugurate. They are absolute presuppositions, as R.G. Collingwood argued—not verifiable, but operative conditions for thought itself (Collingwood, 1940/1998, p. 32). Revelation, understood properly, functions precisely in this way: as an ontological disclosure that grounds intelligibility, not as an arbitrary claim to be defended externally. Its claim is not to oppose reason but to transfigure it—

Revelation does not bypass cognition, it enables the horizon within which understanding becomes possible.

Etienne Gilson repeatedly emphasized that beginning with Revelation is not an abandonment of philosophy but its preservation. Revelation, as expressed in the divine name "Ego sum qui sum," is not a hypothesis but a self-manifesting truth that illuminates being from within (Gilson, 1937/2002, p. 67). The choice is not between reason and faith, but between a reason condemned to circularity and one guided by a disclosed origin. Aquinas likewise taught that theology proceeds from articles of faith, not demonstrable premises (Aquinas, *Summa Theologica*, I.1.2). The theologian does not derive conclusions from reason alone, but integrates philosophical truths as *revelabilia*, not *revelata* (Gilson, 1937/2002, p. 112). For both thinkers, Revelation enables philosophy to attain a higher clarity, not through abstraction, but through the light of grace.

The Reformed Epistemology of Alvin Plantinga strengthens this claim by defending belief in God as "properly basic" (Plantinga, 2000, p. 394). Just as our belief in other minds or the external world is not inferred from arguments, but arises from properly functioning cognitive faculties, so too belief in God is rational without external evidential grounding. The sensus divinitatis, implanted by God, yields justified belief in His existence when functioning within the appropriate environment (Plantinga, 2000, p. 395). Nicholas Wolterstorff extends this by arguing that trust, rather than deductive certainty, is the normal stance of human life—and that reason itself is dependent on fiduciary structures (Wolterstorff, 2001, p. 51). Thus, to begin from Revelation is no more irrational than to trust memory or perception.

Wittgensteinian thinkers, especially D.Z. Phillips, also defend religious belief as internally rational. Faith belongs to a distinct "language-game" in which meaning is given by use and

practice, not by conformity to external epistemic rules (Phillips, 2001, p. 230). Asking whether God exists as a matter of empirical fact misses the nature of religious utterance. Such questions impose the grammar of physical objects onto spiritual realities. As Phillips asserts, the believer is not engaged in scientific hypothesis but in an existential relation to the divine, one whose criteria of rationality arise within its own form of life (Phillips, 2001, p. 294). Faith is not a failure of reason but a mode of engagement in which life and meaning cohere.

Heidegger, though not a defender of doctrinal religion, offers a powerful phenomenological vindication of this insight. He holds that no philosophy begins from nowhere. All understanding emerges from "factical life-experience" and is shaped by historical thrownness (Heidegger, 1974, p. 354). Revelation, as aletheia—the disclosure of Being—is not a claim to be verified, but an event that makes intelligibility possible. In *Contributions to Philosophy*, he writes that skepticism is both the beginning and the end of philosophy, unless a more primordial origin is disclosed (Heidegger, 2011, p. 89). Theology, if true, is not a competitor to philosophy, but its ground. As Brian Crowe notes, for Heidegger, Christian faith can be a paradigmatic instance of a basic experience that orients life and thought (Crowe, 2006, p. 343).

This grounding is transformative. As Paul Ricoeur and William James suggest, the meaning of belief is found not in abstraction but in action (Joy, 2011, p. 138; Long, 2000, p. 190). Revelation does not terminate in concepts but in life. The Bahá'í Writings echo this: “The essence of faith is fewness of words and abundance of deeds” (Bahá’u’lláh, 1873/1992, p. 139). Action completes knowledge. Foucault, too, warns against reducing thought to theory, insisting that philosophy must demand personal and political transformation (Joy, 2011, p. 150).

Faith, in this view, is the act by which reason ceases to revolve in speculative abstraction and orients itself toward disclosed truth. It is neither irrational submission nor epistemic resignation, but a response to the ground of being. It is, rather, the moment when reason recognizes its own limits and turns to what transcends it. Rahner suggests that Revelation is the appearing of absolute being for human transcendence (Long, 2000, p. 213). Heidegger calls this the "event" (*Ereignis*) in which Being grants itself. Gadamer sees in the beginnings of philosophy not a closed system but an openness to what lies beyond (Gadamer, 2000, p. 18).

The Bahá'í perspective articulates this most clearly: the Manifestation of God is the source, not only of moral guidance, but of ontological disclosure. Revelation is not added to reason, but the condition of its possibility. The Divine Manifestation is the mirror through which the unknowable God is reflected into the world of names and forms. Knowledge of God is impossible without this Mirror. Revelation is not irrational; it is reason's completion, reason's homecoming. Only from this ground can we construct a philosophy adequate to the human condition—one in which truth is not only known, but lived.

Conclusion: The Manifestation of Truth and the Completion of Philosophy

Philosophy begins not with thought alone, but with the decision to begin—with an axiom, a source, a first word. For centuries, this beginning has taken many forms: substance, thought, being, doubt, the cogito, the moral law. But all such foundations ultimately reveal themselves as chosen rather than discovered, posited rather than disclosed. This article has argued that the only truly first principle is not invented by reason but revealed to it. The Manifestation of God, in Bahá’í metaphysics, is not simply a religious figure but the ontological axis of intelligibility itself—the origin of philosophy, the telos of theology, and the measure of action.

To choose Revelation as a first principle is not to abandon rationality but to fulfill it. Revelation is not an interruption in reason's trajectory; it is the light by which reason sees. It is not fideism, but meta-rational alignment with the source of meaning. As thinkers from Augustine and Bonaventure to Heidegger and Plantinga have variously affirmed, reason always already operates within a horizon of presuppositions, intuitions, and conditions that it cannot itself justify. To begin from the Manifestation is to cease pretending that reason can ground itself, and instead to receive a foundation that grounds both thought and life.

This foundational claim is not merely conceptual—it reorders the entire task of philosophy. Beginning from Revelation entails the end of speculative theology: the Divine Essence is unknowable; God is not an object of inference or deduction. Metaphysics is not abolished, but purified. Epistemology, too, is no longer the quest for certainty through abstraction but the unfolding of knowing across a teleological spectrum—from empirical perception to divine knowledge, from material data to existential transformation. This epistemic typology becomes coherent only within a framework where Revelation is not an object among others, but the very horizon of intelligibility. Without this orientation, the hierarchy collapses into fragmentation.

This article has also shown that accepting Revelation as the first principle renders possible a unified Bahá'í paradigm of science. In *Toward a Unified Bahá'í Paradigm of Science*, epistemic pluralism is restructured not through relativism or reductionism but by applying the Manifestation as the orienting axis across all modes of knowing. It also clarifies why superstition arises: when knowledge is disconnected from its divine order, as argued in *Superstition and the Structure of True Knowledge*. Similarly, *The End of Theology I* and *II* demonstrated how speculative reason finds its completion, not its refutation, in revealed metaphysics. Revelation

does not silence philosophy—it gives it voice, a theme carried further in *Wisdom and Philosophy in the Bahá'í Faith*, which positions ḥikmat not as abstract system-building but as the lived intelligence of Revelation's transformative horizon.

Ethically, the Manifestation becomes the measure of truth and the call to action. The critique of metaphysical totality and aesthetic self-cultivation developed in *Beyond Totality* and *The Bahá'í Praxis* gains its force precisely because Revelation is the ground of moral obligation. Ethics becomes prophetic praxis—not only the response to the Other, but the enactment of the Word. This ethical turn completes the trajectory begun in *Thresholds of Just-Being*, which diagnoses ontological deficience and residual belief as failures of alignment with the Manifestation's call. The Manifestation does not merely interpret the world—it transforms it. Hence, *The Bahá'í Epistemology and the Modern Landscape of Knowledge* affirms that knowledge, to be true, must conform not only to reality but to revealed purpose.

These ten inquiries only acquire coherence when understood as radiating from a single center: the Manifestation of God as the disclosed origin of knowledge. They are not discrete explorations, but variations on one metaphysical theme. The Manifestation of God is not simply a prophet among prophets but the cosmological and epistemological center from which reason, ethics, metaphysics, and praxis all emerge and toward which they all return.

To speak of the "end of theology" is not to close the book of truth but to reopen it—now written in the form of deeds. "The essence of faith," Bahá'u'lláh declares, "is fewness of words and abundance of deeds." Revelation thus ends speculation by inaugurating action. It invites the philosopher not merely to think, but to build—to act justly, to love wisely, to know truly, and to serve the unity of the world. This is not the negation of philosophy, but its resurrection.

References

Bahá'u'lláh. (1992). *The Kitáb-i-Aqdas: The Most Holy Book*. (Reprinted from original 1873 edition). Bahá'í World Centre.

Collingwood, R. G. (1998). *An Essay on Metaphysics*. (Original work published 1940). Clarendon Press.

Crowe, B. D. (2006). *Heidegger's Religious Origins: Destruction and Authenticity*. Indiana University Press.

Fronda, E. S. B. (2010). *Wittgenstein's (Misunderstood) Religious Thought*. Brill Academic Publishing.

Gadamer, H.-G. (2000). *The Beginning of Philosophy*. Continuum.

Gilson, É. (1991). *The Spirit of Mediaeval Philosophy*. University of Notre Dame Press.

Gilson, É. (1993). *Christian Philosophy: An Introduction* (A. Maurer, Trans.). Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies.

Gilson, É. (2002). *The Unity of Philosophical Experience*. Ignatius Press.

Heidegger, M. (1974). The principle of ground. *Man and World, 7*(3), 209–221.

Heidegger, M. (2011). *Contributions to Philosophy (From Enowning)*. Indiana University Press.

Joy, M. (Ed.). (2011). *Continental Philosophy and Philosophy of Religion*. Springer.

Long, E. T. (2000). *Twentieth-Century Western Philosophy of Religion 1900–2000*. Springer.

MacIntyre, A. (1957). *Difficulties in Christian Belief*. Routledge.

Motlagh Arani, I. (2024n). *The Spectrum of Knowledge in the Bahá'í Faith: Material, Conceptual, Existential, Moral, and Divine Forms of Knowing*.

Motlagh Arani, I. (2025f). *Bahá'í Epistemology and the Modern Landscape of Knowledge: From Scientific Realism to Discourse Theory and Virtue Epistemology*.

Motlagh Arani, I. (2025j). *Toward a Unified Bahá'í Paradigm of Science: Integrating the Seven Modes of Knowledge through Complexity, Revelation, and Praxis*.

Motlagh Arani, I. (2023m). *Superstition and the Structure of True Knowledge: A Bahá'í Critique of Khurāfāt and Epistemic Deviation*.

Motlagh Arani, I. (2023e). *The End of Theology: Bahá'í Metaphysics and the Limits of Speculative Reason*.

Motlagh Arani, I. (2023j). *The End of Theology II: The Metaphysical Status of Cosmos and the Resolution of Kant's Antinomies in Bahá'í Metaphysics*.

Motlagh Arani, I. (2023d). *The Bahá'í Praxis: Translating Theology into Social Action*.

Motlagh Arani, I. (2024f). *Thresholds of Just-Being: Deficiency, Demise, and the Ontology of Belonging*.

Motlagh Arani, I. (2024a). *Beyond Totality: Bahá'í Ethics and the Prophetic Epistemology of the Other*.

Motlagh Arani, I. (2023j). *Wisdom and Philosophy in the Bahá'í Faith: On the Divine Horizon of Ḥikmat and the Boundaries of Speculative Reason*.

Phillips, D. Z. (2001). In D. Z. Phillips & T. Tessin (Eds.), *Philosophy of Religion in the 21st Century* (pp. 39–42, 68–72, 87–89, 147–149, 283–284). Palgrave.

Plantinga, A. (2000). Alvin Plantinga. In E. T. Long (Ed.), *Twentieth-Century Western Philosophy of Religion 1900–2000* (pp. 392–395). Springer.

Wittgenstein, L. (1969). *On Certainty* (G. E. M. Anscombe & G. H. von Wright, Eds.). Basil Blackwell.

Wolterstorff, N. (2001). Nicholas Wolterstorff. In D. Z. Phillips & T. Tessin (Eds.), *Philosophy of Religion in the 21st Century* (pp. 43–65). Palgrave.