THE TURBAN FOR THE CROWN

The Islamic Revolution in Iran

Said Amir Arjomand

New York Oxford
OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS
1988

OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS

Oxford New York Toronto
Delhi Bombay Calcutta Madras Karachi
Petaling Jaya Singapore Hong Kong Tokyo
Nairobi Dar es Salaam Cape Town
Melbourne Auckland

and associated companies in
Berlin Ibadan

Published by Oxford University Press, Inc.,
200 Madison Avenue, New York, New York 10016

Oxford is a registered trademark of Oxford University Press

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Arjomand, Said Amir.
The turban for the crown. (Studies in Middle Eastern history)
Bibliography p. Includes index.
1. Islam and politics—Iran. 2. Iran—Politics and government—20th century.
3. Iran—Politics and government—1979– . I. Title.
II. Series: Studies in Middle Eastern history (New York, N.Y.)
DS316.6.A74 1988 955'.05 87–15231

1 3 5 7 9 8 6 4 2

Printed in the United States of America
on acid-free paper

Contents

Chronology of Significant Events in Iranian History Since 1500

1501	Foundation of the Safavid empire and establishment of Shi'ism as the state religion of Iran.
1587–1629	Reign of 'Abbas the Great; centralization of Safavid state.
1722	Afghan conquest of Isfahan and the overthrow of the Safavid Dynasty.
1736–47	Reign of Nader Shah Afshar; subversion of Shi'ism.
1747–early 1760s	Anarchy and the dominance of tribal warlords.
mid-1760s–1779	Pacification of the tribes and the reign of Karim Khan Zand.
1779–94	Tribal anarchy and the rise of the Qajars.
1770s–1800	Independent growth of the influence of the Shi'ite hierocracy.
1796	Coronation of Aqa Mohammad Khan Qajar.
1797–1834	Reign of Fath 'Ali Shah Qajar; concord between the state and the Shi'ite hierocracy.
1834–48	Reign of Mohammad Shah Qajar.
1848–96	Reign of Naser al-Din Shah Qajar.
1848–51	Centralizing reforms of Mirza Taqi Khan, Amir Nezam.
1891–92	Nationwide protest against the tobacco concession is led by the Shi'ite religious leaders and results in its repeal.
1896–1907	Reign of Mozaffar al-Din Shah Qajar.
Aug. 5, 1906	Iran is granted a parliament (*Majles*) in response to popular agitation led by the Shi'ite religious leaders.
1907–09	Reign of Mohammad 'Ali Shah Qajar.
Oct. 25–Dec. 19, 1907	Reforming cabinet of Naser al-Molk, who also serves as finance minister.
Feb. 29, 1908	Sani' al-Dawleh, minister of public works since Oct. 1907, also takes over the ministry of finance.
June 23, 1908	Bombardment of the Majles and restoration of autocracy.
July 1909	Conquest of Tehran by the Constitutionalists and restoration of constitutional government.
1909–25	Reign of Soltan Ahmad Shah Qajar.

Oct. 30, 1910–Mar. 11, 1911	Reforming (second) Cabinet of Mostawfi al-Mamalek; Sani' al-Dawleh serves as finance minister until his assassination on Feb. 6, 1911.
Nov.–Dec. 1911	Occupation of Northern Iran by Russian troops and aborting of the Constitutionalists' reforms.
Oct. 1925	Abolition of the Qajar Dynasty.
Dec. 1925	Reza Khan is declared Shah and monarchy is transferred to the Pahlavi Dynasty.
1925–41	Reign of Reza Shah Pahlavi; formation of a centralized bureaucratic state.
1941–79	Reign of Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi.
1944–53	Nationalization of oil, masterminded by Mohammad Mosaddeq, dominates Iranian politics.
1963–79	Mohammad Reza Shah's programs of reform and modernization, officially designated the "White Revolution" and the "Revolution of the Shah and the People."
Feb. 1979	Overthrow of the Pahlavi Dynasty and end of monarchy.
Dec. 1979	Ratification of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran by national referendum.

fundamental precept of pre-Islamic statecraft contained in the testament attributed to Ardashir, founder of the Sasanian Empire. This time, the eventual result was not a heretical mass uprising but a massive revolt led by the beleaguered guardians of Shi'ite orthodoxy. During the reign of Mohammad Shah (1834–48), the tension caused by the centralization policies, first of Qa'em-Maqam the younger and then of Haji Mirza Aqasi, aggravated by the strong Sufi inclination of the monarch and Aqasi, produced a rift between the state and the hierocracy. Naser al-Din Shah's (1848–96) first prime minister, Amir Nezam, had no doubts about the necessity of breaking the hierocratic power for the success of his centralizing reforms.[8] Nevertheless, the Babi millenarian uprisings, whose aim was the overthrow both of the Qajar state and the Shi'ite hierocracy,[9] drew the *'ulama* closer to the state. The rift between the hierocracy and the state was largely repaired after the fall of Amir Nezam in 1851.[10] The theory of the two powers, and of the interdependence of kingship and religion, was reiterated during the reign of Naser al-Din Shah, as they were in the first decade of the present century by Shaykh Fazlollah Nuri.

The rift between the hierocracy and the state could not become critical so long as the attempts at centralization and modernization of the state remained feeble and largely ineffective, as they did in the nineteenth century. It did become critical and irreparable in the twentieth century when effective measures towards centralization and modernization of the state were taken under the two Pahlavis.

Confrontations with the State During the Constitutional Revolution

Despite the endemic possibility of conflict, the dual structure of religious and political power prevailed throughout the Qajar period. The existence of this dualism in the power structure offered possibilities that would not be neglected by leaders of political movements in the modern period. Ironically, it was the late nineteenth century advocates of reforms, as well as the large merchants, who first thought of exploiting the influence of the leading figures in the Shi'ite hierocracy, and the latter's independence from the state, for the purpose of putting pressure on the ruler to carry out badly needed reforms and to preserve the national economic interests against imperialist encroachment. The idea worked brilliantly. A handful of intellectual activists, with the strong support of the important merchants, were able to uncover the tremendous political potential of the use of clerical domination over the masses for the purpose of mass mobilization. A nationwide embargo on the use of tobacco could thus be successfully orchestrated in 1891 and early 1892, and it led to the repeal of a monopolistic tobacco concession to a British company.[11] A decade and a half later the endemic rivalry within the hierocracy and the clashes between the hierocracy and the state were exploited by the advocates of constitutional government to generate a national movement and to obtain the grant of a constitution from the monarch in 1906.

graphs, we discussed the historical roots of unrivaled clerical domination over the masses. This domination entailed a considerable measure of populism in the orientation of the hierocracy. Not unlike the Spanish clergy from the seventeenth century to the first decade of the nineteenth century, the Iranian *'ulama* frequently took up the cause of the oppressed against the arbitrary excesses of temporal authorities. More important, from the 1870s onward the hierocracy emerged as the champion of the Islamic nation against the economic penetration and cultural influence of foreign powers. Not unlike the Spanish priests and monks who led the masses in the war of independence against Napoleon and "atheistic France" and whose wrath was subsequently turned against the "atheistic liberals,[39] the Shi'ite hierocracy led the Muslim nation of Iran against the economic domination *and* the cultural influence of the imperialist infidels. To their traditional pattern of activity in defense of Islam—the persecution and killing of heretics, such as Sufis and Babis (most of whom subsequently became Baha'is)—was added combating foreign cultural influences and the violation of traditional cultural and religious norms by an increasingly Westernized political elite.

However, a serious emphasis on social justice was lacking in the teachings of the Shi'ite religious institution. This was due in part to the extensive participation of the *'ulama* in the Qajar polity and also to the fact that prior to the advent of modern (party) politics the loyalty of the masses could be taken for granted once heresy was suppressed. The situation changed drastically from 1962 to 1978 when the religious institutions came under relentless attack by the Pahlavi state and had to court the masses more assiduously in order to mobilize them in their defense. Its populism became markedly more pronounced and an emphasis on social justice began to enter the writings of the clerical pamphleteers.[40]

During the 1928 to 1941 period, the hierocracy were perhaps too surprised and stunned to react effectively. In any event, the foremost religious leader of the time, the Grand Ayatollah 'Abdo'l-Karim Ha'iri, opted for political quietism and building up of a center of religious learning in Qom. (This apolitical action was continued in the period after World War II by the Grand Ayatollah Hajj Hosayn Borujerdi, who led the hierocracy until his death in 1961.) After the fall of Reza Shah, a nationwide agitation of the hierocracy was led by the Grand Ayatollah Tabataba'i Qomi in 1944. The hierocracy demanded a more strict observance of the provisions of the Shi'ite Sacred Law on morality and succeeded in removing the prohibition on wearing the veil and clerical garb.[41] Imitating cultural patterns of the Western infidels came under heavy attack. A collaborator of Qomi and an early supporter of Reza Shah, Ayatollah Abo'l-Qasem Kashani, remained active in politics and became a dominant figure on the political scene until 1953. Emerging from the rigors of Reza Shah's dictatorship, the hierocracy showed an appreciation for the constitution, which subjected the power of the monarch to very considerable restraints. Kashani's platform, therefore, combined the elements of opposition to foreign domination over the Islamic people (the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company in Iran and Israel in the Middle East) and appeal to the Sacred Law,

with a somewhat novel stress on the Constitution as the source of legitimacy.[42]

As we have pointed out, by 1911 the Shi'ite hierocracy was predominantly hostile to Constitutionalism. Nevertheless, because of their amorphous organization, the hierocracy did not, and could not, act as one body. The religious leaders had played a prominent role in the initial phase of the Constitutional Revolution and a few religious dignitaries, most notably Sayyed Hasan Modarres, had remained active in the nationalist provisional government in Kermanshah and in the parliamentary politics of the early 1920s. It was therefore possible for the religious leaders to appeal to the Constitution plausibly and effectively from the 1940s onward in order to protest against the arbitrariness of the state. At the same time, most of the *'ulama,* including Grand Ayatollah Borujerdi, were becoming increasingly alarmed by the growth of the Tudeh party and drew closer to the monarch. Even Ayatollah Kashani abandoned Mosaddeq for the Shah. In 1925, the leaders of the Shi'ite hierocracy had supported the foundation of the Pahlavi Dynasty as a bulwark against republicanism; in 1953, they supported the preservation of monarchy and the return of the Shah as a safeguard against the spread of communism.

Thus, most religious leaders had forgotten their old grievances against the first Pahlavi by the 1950s and were ready for an accommodation with the young Shah, who was more than conciliatory while his rule remained precarious[43]—most but not all, and certainly not Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, who saw the reassertion of royal power and the initiation of a new reform program by Mohammad Reza Shah in the 1960s as replete with motifs already encountered during the dreadful reign of the first Pahlavi. In 1962 Khomeini emerged as one of the leading figures in an anti-government protest that the Islamic revolutionary leaders of the 1980s are unanimous in regarding as the beginning of their movement.[44] Early in October 1962, the government publicized a bill for the election of town councils that eliminated the profession of Islam as a condition for the electors and the candidates, used the term [oath by] "the Heavenly-Book" instead of the Koran, and enfranchised women. Khomenini vigorously reacted against all these propositions. He denounced the bill as the first step toward the abolition of Islam and the delivery of Iran to the Baha'is, the presumed agents of Zionism and Imperialism who were implicitly enfranchised by the bill alongside women. The enfranchisement of women was vigorously denounced as a ploy to destroy family life and spread prostitution. Clerical agitation continued and was intensified after the Shah proposed, in January 1963, a national referendum on six principles of his reform program, subsequently to be called the "White Revolution." Khomeini denounced the referendum vehemently. The Shah's suddenly increasing social activism and mobilization drive, in the form of a widely publicized Peasants' Congress to celebrate the land reform in January 1963, must have alarmed Khomeini and roused his apprehension. In March 1963, holding a copy of the Koran in one hand and a copy of the Constitution in the other, Khomeini publicly accused the Shah of violating his oath to defend Islam and the Constitution.[45] The authoritarian rule of the Shah was denounced as a violation of the Constitution, and he was attacked for the maintenance of relations with

the state apparatus by the clerical hardliners. The move entailed a setback for "the Household of the Imam," his son-in-law, Ayatollah Shehab al-Din Eshraqi, who had been favorably disposed toward Bani-Sadr and who died in September 1981, and for his son Ahmad, who was forced to give a few recantatory interviews regretting his past support for the "Hypocrites" (*monafeqin*)—that is, the Mojahedin—and join the chorus denouncing "the accursed Bani-Sadr" and "the accursed Qotbzadeh." The purges of the nonloyalist civil servants were carried out with particular thoroughness in the Ministry of the Interior where all mayors and provincial governors (both categories are appointees of the central government) were replaced. The teachers and other employees of the Ministry of Education also suffered particularly vicious and widespread purges. Meanwhile, the Revolutionary Guard was becoming much more homogeneous. Many of the "less Islamic" Guards did not report to work or were purged after the explosion at the IRP headquarters and in the subsequent months.

By January 1982, the clerics were feeling considerably safer and moving around with fewer or no bodyguards. Their perception that the Hypocrites were finished was perhaps somewhat premature, and violence erupted again in the summer of 1982. By the autumn of 1982, however, this assessment had come true. Statements by the Prosecutor General of the Revolutionary Courts that 90 percent of the organized networks of the Mojahedin were destroyed seem to have been fairly realistic. The definitive consolidation of the theocratic regime in Iran may therefore be dated from December 15, 1982, when Khomeini issued a decree promising the people of Iran a post-revolutionary era of security and stabilization. By this date over 10,000 Mojahedin had been killed or were awaiting execution and other organized armed opposition groups had been largely destroyed.

From April 1982, Khomeini and his followers began to devote themselves fully to the resolution of the twin problems of succession and of the legitimacy of Islamic theocracy, both of which were crucial to the long-term survival of the regime. This resolution removed the most insidious obstacle to the survival of theocracy: clerical opposition to theocratic government and certain aspects of the legacy of the Shi'ite tradition itself. The theory of theocratic government, as propounded by Khomeini and incorporated into the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran, extends the Shi'ite norm of juristic authority as elaborated in the nineteenth century into a new sphere. Leaving aside rival theories of government such as democracy and national sovereignty, Khomeini's theory of the Mandate of the Jurist is open to two forceful objections in terms of the *Shi'ite* tradition. The first, fundamental objection is that the mandate or authority of the Shi'ite jurists during the Occultation of the Twelfth Imam cannot be extended beyond the religiolegal sphere to include government. The second objection is that this mandate refers to the *collective* religiojuristic authority of *all* Shi'ite jurists and cannot be restricted to that of a single supreme jurist or, by extension, to a supreme council of three or five jurists (as envisioned in the Constitution of the Islamic Republic).

The above doctrinal objections to the *velayat-e faqih* have been voiced by the Grand Ayatollahs Kho'i, Qomi, and Shari'at-madri who, furthermore, pointed to its inconsistence with the principle of the sovereignty of the people, to which the Constitution of the Islamic Republic also pays lip service, and by Ayatollahs Baha' al-Din Mahallati, Sadeq Ruhani, Ahmad Zanjani, 'Ali Tehrani, and Mortaza Ha'eri Yazdi. The opposition of the last two ayatollahs, who were among Khomeini's favored students, and of Ayatollahs Mahallati and Qomi, who were his close associates in 1963 and were imprisoned with him, must have been particularly disappointing to Khomeini but did not deter him. Of the above-named, Mahallati died in August 1981, Zanjani in January 1984, and Ha'eri Yazdi in March 1986. Qomi has been under surveillance in Mashhad, Tehrani has fled to Iraq, and Kho'i resides in Iraq. Shari'at-madri was repeatedly humbled and, despite his subsequent acknowledgment under intense pressure of the legitimacy of theocratic government, subjected to a campaign of merciless vilification and character assassination until his death in Qom in April 1986. Other clerics who share the views of these Shi'ite dignitaries have been intimidated into silence or, whenever possible, obliged to declare their support for the *velayat-e faqih*.

The beginning of the rift between the militant followers of Khomeini and the *'ulama* who considered them overly politicized predates the revolution. Although active in protesting against the arrest of Khomeini and the other religious leaders and in securing their release from prison in 1963, Grand Ayatollah Shari'at-madri was uneasy about the primacy of political concerns in Qom and founded the Dar al-Tabliq for traditional apolitical missionary activity and learning. This was resented by Khomeini and his militant followers because it deflected clerical energies from political activity. There were even clashes between the two groups in December 1964. Although Khomeini and Shari'at-madari, who was by then the most influential of the Grand Ayatollahs residing in Iran, presented a united front against the Shah during the last months of his reign, differences between them surfaced soon after the revolution, and, as we have seen, resulted in serious violent clashes between the supporters of the two ayatollahs in Tabriz before the end of 1979. Against this background, one can see that the first obstacle to be removed was Shari'at-madari. In April 1982, in a move unprecedented in Shi'ite history, seventeen out of the forty-five professors of the Qom theological seminaries were prevailed upon to issue a declaration "demoting" Shari'at-madari from the rank of Grand Ayatollah. In May to June 1982, the leading pro-Khomeini clerics further decided on a purge of the pro-Shari'at-madari *'ulama* and of other "pseudo-clerics" reluctant to accept the *velayat-e faqih*. The Society of Militant Clergy was put in charge of confirming the true clerics.

Hand in hand with the demotion of Shari'at-madari and the silencing of clerical opposition came a sustained effort to promote the theory of *velayat-e faqih*. Ayatollah Khaz'ali, who presided over a series of seminars convened for the discussion of *velayat,* confirmed the principle that "the Jurist (*faqih*) is the lieutenant of the lieutenant of God, and his command is God's com-

mand" (March 1982). However, at this stage the ayatollahs were just beginning to address the issue of succession to Khomeini; opinions predictably varied as to the precise institutionalization of the *velayat-e faqih* and different positions were publicly aired by the militant ayatollahs themselves. There was a concerted attempt to address Ayatollah Montazeri as the "Esteemed Jurist" (*faqih*), Grand Ayatollah, and so forth. There were, however, dissenting voices in this regard, and the campaign of designation slackened in April and May.

Having pushed aside Shari'at-madari and the dissident pseudo-clerics in the spring and summer of 1982, the clerical rulers of the Islamic republic still had to reckon with another organized group of importance that was opposed to the doctrine of *velayat-e faqih,* the Hojjatiyyeh. Masters of identifying and isolating political problems and dealing with them one by one, the clerical ruling elite postponed the settling of the affair of the Hojjatiyyeh until the summer of 1983. The Hojjatiyyeh, or the Charitable Society of Mahdi, the Proof of God (*anjoman-e khayriyyeh-ye hojjatiyyeh-ye mahdaviyyeh*), was founded after the coup d'etat of August 1953 by Shaykh Mahmud Halabi, who has remained a close friend of Khomeini. Its aim was the "propagation of the religion of Islam and its Ja'farite [i.e., Shi'ite] branch, and the scientific defense of it." It was one of the relatively few centers of religious activity other than the *madrasas* that was allowed to function after 1963, and many clerics and lay Islamic activists took part in its readings and discussions. Khorasan was its strongest regional base. The society's efforts prior to the revolution were directed against Baha'ism as the chief enemy of Islam to be refuted and combatted. After the revolution, as the suppression of Baha'ism became the general clerical policy, the society turned to Marxism as the archenemy of Islam to be eradicated. As a society devoted to the Mahdi, the Hojjatiyyeh could not accept Khomeini's extension of the religiolegal authority to political rule, which it considered the nontransferable prerogative of the Mahdi. The founder and directors of the society insisted on this position and resisted the pressure from the younger, more politicized members to revise its charter, with the result that many of the members who were or hoped to become prominent in the theocratic regime left it to join the ranks of the IRP. The society supported the Islamic Republic, without considering it sanctioned by the Sacred Law, and accepted Khomeini's political leadership but refrained from designating him as Imam.

The Hojjatiyyeh first impressed the ruling powers in Iran with their organizational strength and disciplined control over the members in 1981, during the second presidential elections, in which Raja'i was elected. Four hundred thousand votes (about 2.5 percent of the total) were reportedly cast for the Twelfth Imam, the Mahdi.

From late 1981/early 1982 onward, the Hojjatiyyeh had been under intermittent fire from the IRP militants who were prodded into doing so by the Tudeh Party. The Tudeh ideologues, from whom the IRP cadre took many of their cues at the time, were anxious to isolate the economically conservative activists of the Islamic movement, a few of whom were affili-

ated with the Hojjatiyyeh. However, the hour of reckoning did not come until July 1983. The IRP followers of the Line of Imam mounted their full-scale attack and succeeded in persuading Khomeini to refer obliquely to the position of the Hojjatiyyeh as crooked and deviationist. The society wisely avoided a showdown and suspended all its activities indefinitely in deference to the opinion of "the esteemed leader of the Islamic revolution." The Hojjati Ministers of Commerce and Labor submitted their resignations.

The chief accusation leveled against the Hojjatiyyeh by the IRP was that they confined their missionary activities to the cultural level, the level of ideas; they were therefore stationary as opposed to dynamic and had a dry and empty view of Islam. This critique implied that they were not ideological and did not subscribe to the politicized ideological Islam of Khomeini and his followers. A second charge was that they did not accept the *velayat-e faqih* as legitimizing government by the hierocracy during the Occultation of the twelfth Imam, the Mahdi.

In a long series of polemical articles against the Hojjatiyyeh in the *Ettela'at* during September and October 1983, the society was vehemently attacked for being opposed to intervention in politics in the name of religion and for advocating–like the Baha'is whom they attacked in their apologetics for Islam–the separation of religion and politics as concocted by the imperialist propaganda machine. They were further attacked for their separation of religious authority (*marja'iyyat*) from political leadership, which enabled them to endorse Khomeini merely as a political leader and not "as a leader to whom obedience is obligatory [as a religious duty]." In October 1983, the author of the articles reacted sharply to the surreptitious use of the issue of the Hojjatiyyeh by the Tudeh Party to create division within the Islamic movement by attaching the label of "Hojjati" to prominent clerics and high government office holders. The Tudeh's attacks on the Hojjatiyyeh were said to have been hypocritical, stemming from the ulterior motive of creating divisions within the ruling clerical elite and the Islamic nation. Nevertheless, in the concluding article in the series, the author (inadvertently) repeated the Tudeh's chief argument against the Hojjatiyyeh: opposition to the Line of Imam in matters of economic policy.

Thus, while the above view of the Hojjatiyyeh primarily emphasized their rejection of the theory of *velayat-e faqih* and accused them of having swallowed the imperialist-inspired belief in the separation of religion and politics, the Tudeh view underscored the social and especially economic conservatism of the Hojjatis. The Tudeh Party had succeeded in giving wide currency to a scheme for dividing the ruling elite of the Islamic Republic into radicals and conservatives in terms of respective positions on socioeconomic policies and had astutely labeled the latter group as the Hojjatis. The schema contains elements of truth and was plausible enough to be seriously misleading: while the Hojjatis were socioeconomically conservative, not every socioeconomically conservative cleric was a Hojjati or necessarily sympathetic to the Hojjati's doctrinal position.

Western analysts, who are almost constitutionally indisposed to attach-

preme Judiciary Council. Furthermore, the performance of the IRP in mobilizing support for the regime did not prove to be too impressive. By 1984, it was becoming clear that the IRP would only play a secondary role in the Islamic regime. It was decided that its role in political mobilization would henceforth be ancillary to that of the *imam jom'ehs*. Thus, it was to the *imam jom'ehs*, in March and April 1984, that Khomeini entrusted the task of mobilizing the people for participation in the elections for the Second Majles. By the end of 1984, the IRP's local network was in effect put under the broad supervision of the *imam jom'ehs* as the Islamic Republic's "strong arm of general mobilization." Late in summer 1985, it was decided to reduce the activities of the IRP and close some of its branches. On June 1, 1987, Khomeini ordered the complete suspension of the activities of the IRP in response to a request by President Khamene'i and Majles Speaker Hashemi-Rafsanjani. In their request, Khamene'i and Hashemi-Rafsanjani, surviving founders of the IRP, had pointed out that the party had achieved its purpose of establishing the *velayat-e faqih* and the distinctive institutions of the Islamic Republic of Iran; its activities would henceforth encourage party politics (*tahazzob*) and have a divisive effect on the community. The suspension of the Islamic Republican Party underscores the unique identity of religious and political community in the Islamic Republic of Iran. By thus rejecting the party in favor of the mosque (controlled by the *imam jom'eh*) as the organ of communal unity and mobilization, the clerical rulers of Iran have once more demonstrated their remarkable determination not to imitate foreign—in this case, East European—models of political organization.

In addition to these core Islamic institutions that distinguish the Islamic Republic of Iran from other contemporary political regimes, a host of other organizations operating in social, economic, and charitable fields has come into being as a result of the revolution. These organizations were set up by special decrees issued by Khomeini. As they are at best secondary features of the Islamic political order, only some of the more important ones need to be mentioned: The Foundation for the Disinherited (*Bonyad-e Mostaz'afin*) and the Committee to Aid Imam Khomeini were set up early in March 1979, followed by the Housing Foundation (*Bonyad-e Maskan*) in April and the Jihad for Reconstruction (*Jehad-e Sazandeqi*) for rural reconstruction in June 1979. Subsequent organizations include the Foundation of 15 Khordad (June 5, the date of the 1963 uprising), the Commission (*setad*) for Economic Mobilization, and the Commission for the Reconstruction and Renovation of the War Zones.

The Islamic theocratic state has all along been conceived of as a totalitarian state with full control over the moral attitudes and political opinions of all its citizens. The clearest manifestation of theocratic totalitarianism have been the ruthless persecution of the Baha'i religious minority—a community of over a quarter of a million, some two hundred of whom have been executed and the rest forced to convert or subjected to the most horrendous disabilities. But it is not by any means confined to sectarian intolerance. A plethora of institutions for the strict enforcement of morals—conceived of as