1. With this paper I do not so much intend to make a “scientific communication”; I rather wish it to be a methodological reflexion in answer to the question: how and how much do I, as an islamist, give my contribution to “history of religions” in studying Islam? In other words, in how much does the study of so-called “superior” religions fit into History of Religions as a unitary discipline? I shall not base the development of this paper on mere theoretical considerations; but rather on some concrete examples of research method within the Islamic field. It is my opinion, though, that similar concrete examples might be found in a parallel way, in other fields of research (such as History of Christianity, Buddhism etc.). As we are here assembled to commemorate our late regretted and common master Raffaele Pettazzoni, this talk of mine could perhaps be considered as a sort of continuation of the seminaries that he used to keep, a few years before he died. These seminaries usually dealt with specific arguments (for instance, “God’s omniscience”, or “the meaning of culture” etc.) and Pettazzoni used to invite to them several specialists of various cultural areas that would be interested in History of Religions.

2. First we must see if we may (and if we may, in how far) talk about “superior religions” the way I did before. Even if we—obviously enough—do not imply by the word “superior” any intrinsic evaluation, it still remains ambiguous and vague. The word “superior” could make sense in a purely exterior typology, where distinction could be made between religions whose documents are not written hence they may be studied using ethnological methods, and religions which possess a rich written documentation and are thus liable to a philological study. If this were to be true, those who refuse any unitary value to the History of Religions would have a right to say that such a discipline dissolves into single sections of various religious philologies and into ethnology.

A distinction between “natural” religions and “founded” religions might sound different and perhaps more historical. But this too is
acceptable only by half; the role of personalities, that are perhaps nowadays hidden behind legend, in the creation of religions that might seem “natural” at first sight, should be checked thoroughly and studied well. We would be faced then with a major or minor importance of their “founders”: Buddha would be different from Kṛṣṇa (presumed founder of Hinduism according to certain Indian tendencies) only because study could be based on historical documents, for the former, and perhaps also because his personal foundation-work would have been more intense or effective. The same could be said about other cultural areas.

I believe that it would be a better typology to distinguish between two fundamental types of religion (each with its various subdivisions, of course): the archaic religions and the monotheistic ones. This is also Pettazzoni’s opinion, expressed in his studies about monotheism, which are too well known here for me to resume them 1). I only want to stress the point that, according to the regretted Master, a clear typological distinction should be made between the concept of a “Great God” or Supreme Being, present in various archaic religions, and that of a One and Only God, to be found in monotheism. The former comes from a mythical perception of the sky, the latter is the outcome of the polemic, revolutionary, anti-polytheistic labour of a prophetic-historical founder, who might even use any god of the archaic pantheon (in Islam, for instance, Allāh-Hubal) after having changed its functional value completely. In this specific sense, according to Pettazzoni, monotheism is a very rare phenomenon in History of Religions; during a certain period of his studies he even used to think that this phenomenon was unique (Israelitic monotheism, that would have influenced even Zoroastrianism) 2).

M. Eliade makes a quite similar typological distinction, although from a different point of view, especially in his Mythe de l’éternel Retour where the distinction between archaic religions and monotheistic religions is based on their different conceptions about the religious meaning of “Time” 3). In fact, the distinction between the two types does not only invest the idea of God, but the entire religious pheno-

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2) Cfr. La religione di Zarathustra, Bologna, 1920, p. 79 ff. Obviously the idea is now obsolete, but it is interesting to show Pettazzoni’s approach to the definition of monotheism.

menology as well. Even if the external features of single phenomena in archaic and monotheistic religions might at times seem similar, their way of functioning is really different. One very plain example: Incarnation has similar phenomenological aspects but “works” in a very distinct way there where we have an incarnation of a Unique God into a man-god, from there where it is meant that one or more men incarnate a “neutral” divine principle (to theion) or a single aspect of divineness. Although phenomenologically they might seem similar, there is a deep functional difference between Christ and one of Viṣṇu’s avatārs. Thus I believe that in this sense a wisely built typology might help to reinforce the historical method. And to this purpose, the concept of “functioning” in a given typological context is of main importance. And here I repeat a definition of G. Widengren, whom we could not suspect of absolute historicism. This author used very aptly the following words in a note on his study on Muhammad 4) (and better credit should be given to these words, if we consider that not always does the Author himself keep his own suggestion in mind): “… Any conception whatsoever must not be isolated, but treated in its natural environment of related ideas, with which it is intimately bound up. Only in this manner are we able to trace the real origin of a religious idea. The atomistic method here leads us quite astray”.

In the ambit of monotheistic religions we may—the way I have tried to do it in two articles of mine that I am not to repeat here 5)—make a further typological distinction between primary monotheisms (Hebraism, Islam) and secondary (Christianity, new religions that had their origin in Islam, especially Bahā‘ism) whose characteristics have rather different structures and functions.

Here too I will avail myself of the example of “Incarnation” which some phenomenologists keep considering in too superficial a manner. Talking about a phenomenon that is frequent in various so-called “extreme” sects of Islam, even authoritative islamists (which in this case prove to be bad historians of religion as well as bad philologists), uphold that to some extreme Shi‘ites 6) Ali is an incarnation of God, or prophet X or Y are incarnations of God. But the term used for

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5) A. Bausani, “Note per una tipologia del monotheismo”, in SMSR, XXVIII, 1957, pp. 67-88. A. Bausani, “Can Monotheism be taught? (Further considerations on the typology of Monotheism)”, in Numen X, 3, 1963, pp. 167-201. Naturally another subdivision, by types, may be made for “archaic” religions, but this is of no interest here.
“incarnation” in Islamic texts, where they polemically want to define the typical incarnation of secondary monotheisms, and especially the one accepted in Christianism, is *ḥulūl*, which is always kept very markedly distinct from any other form of manifestation of the divinity in man, and especially from the typologically and functionally very different form of *mazbar*, which means “manifestation”. Nowhere, absolutely nowhere in the most extremist sects of Islam, can we find *ḥulūl*. Even when a person is said to *be* God, this *be* is always explained, not as an incarnation, but rather as a *mazbar* i.e. a manifestation, with terms that have been borrowed from the Near-Eastern and Gnostic metaphysics of light.

The unique God and his inaccessible essence remain up high; the man-god is nothing but a very pure mirror in which God reflects himself. Whoever passes in front of a mirror wherein the sun is reflected (these are words which I heard personally from authoritative representatives of some “extreme Islamic sects”) may justly say: “this is the sun”, even though the sun remains in its inaccessible position in the sky, and the mirror is still nothing but a mirror in itself. So the Christian who says: “Christ *is* God”, and the Khurramdini who says: “Ali *is* God”, both give to the word *is* a very different meaning, which is something the historians of religions should keep in mind. At page 45 of his already mentioned book Widengren says instead: … “Of a still higher degree is of course the Imām according to the dogma that he is not only a god but God, Allāh who is *incarnate* in the successive chain of the Imāms who are the Apostles…” . But we can see from the quotation of al-Dailamī, mentioned by the very Author himself to support his theory, that *incarnate* is nothing but an extrapolation. “And the people say of Ali: He was God who *appeared* in Adam and the Apostles and Imāms…”. In our colleague’s sentence there is the word ‘dogma’ which should also be further discussed; it throws a better light on the typology of monotheism. In some way acceptable, at times even fundamental where secondary monotheism are concerned, this term surely may not be accepted for primary monotheisms. In the case of Islam and the Islamic-Christian polemics, *dogma* is usually translated with *ẓann* (opinion) or even with the word *xurāfāt* (superstitions, imaginary ideas, fantasies). Thus there could not be any typological justification for using “dogma” in Islam.

Thus we have seen that a first important range of historical-religious studies on Islam is a general one about the typology of Islam and of its sects. To achieve this, philology might be of precious help (and
examples of this have been given above) to help us to correct errors to which pure phenomenology could lead; however, philology is nothing but a, quite indispensable, help and this is why Islam could not be studied by a specialist in Arabic or Persian philology only; it needs a historian of religions specialised in Islamic philology.

3. The monotheistic religions, whereof Islam is perhaps the most radical “incarnation” possible, present other very interesting and typically historical-religious problems. One of them, and a fundamental one, is the problem of the very origin of monotheism, that has not been satisfactorily solved yet, in my opinion. A historical-religious study about the origins of Islam in its Arabic milieu seems very useful to me. A passage or transformation of the concept of a “God of the race”, to that of a “Unique God”? Psychological projection of the Founder? Derivation from a “primitive” pseudo-monotheism of the Great Sky-God? etc.

Personally I take the first solution for more valid and in an article in “Numen” I have tried to construct its successive psychological stages perhaps in a somewhat imaginative way: more or less in accordance with the psychology of a primary monotheistic type, with its typically voluntaristic and anti-ontologic theology. But the archaic religion-type, which is much more “natural” than monotheism (and Pettazzoni’s opinion about the rarity, the uniqueness of the “monotheistic” phenomenon confirms it) still remains and influences monotheism. No concrete, historical example gives evidence of an absolute theoretical type of monotheism.

And here we get to the most fascinating problems that we may call—to use a term which in my opinion is erroneous, but is also very popular, and mentioned in the title of a famous book on Islam 6)—“pagan survivals” in monotheism, here more specifically in Islam.

In the title of the mentioned book both terms, ‘pagan’, generic and worn out, and “survivals” are wrongly used. The title should be changed, as I have proved in an article of mine 7) into a more exact one, i.e. “Integration of archaic elements in the Islamic religion” (or more generically, in monotheistic religions).

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7) A. Bausani, “Sopravvivenze pagane nell’Islam o integrazione islamica?” in *SMSR*, 37 2, 1966, pp. 189-209. It could be said that the very fact that Westermarck talks about survivals in the “Mohammedan civilization” and not (in the title) in the “Islamic religion” diminishes the weigh of my assertion, but in fact “Islam” and “Mohammedan civilization” seem identical to him (and to others).
Several studies have been written on this behalf, as far as Christianity and Hebraism are concerned, as well as for Islam. Starting with the above-mentioned typology, the problem of integrations or survivals develops somewhat differently in the two different subtypes. In secondary monotheisms (the ones that take their origin from another monotheism) the problem is perhaps more complicated. That phenomenon which I called "fermentation of the divine" in one of my papers, and which causes a proliferation of angels and angel-like bodies within the frame of a too monolithic primary monotheism, creates the impression of substratum influences; but more often these pretended substratum influences are purely theological creations. To stay within the limits of new religions born from Islam, and to avoid entering the too burning ambit of Christianity, let us consider those intellectualistic and theologizing items of pleromas, intellectual agents, logoi, forces; at times they were believed to be influenced by archaic substratum remainders of genii and divine polytheistic divinities, whereas they are nothing but speculations 'coming from above', that create a sort of theological mythology that derives from an Iranian tendency to theologize, as I have tried to explain elsewhere 8). These phenomena should be kept distinct from the real substratum influences that are integrated in the monotheistic religion. In other words, although these items might go under a same paragraph in a phenomenological treatise, the "Thrones and Dominations" and the "Guardian Angel" should be kept typologically separate and should be studied historically in a different way.

But even in the less complex primary monotheisms (such as Islam) integration of archaic elements should be studied with great care. In a study of mine, about the "Sacred Madman" in Islam 9), I stressed the point that, although the Islam as a type of religion might seem less fruitful as far as comparative historical-religious studies are concerned, it offers a very interesting "laboratory" for the study of the historicization of myths. For instance, the Sacred Madman or Trickster, who had a specific mythical or semi-mythical aspect in archaic cultures, has here become a historical personality: adventures that are to be found in very ancient mythical cycles are here ascribed by "eye-witnesses" and annalists to this or that personality that has really lived. These, I added in my article, are Islam's real "myths" (integrations of archaic elements in Islamic monotheism) while other myths are typical of

8) A. Bausani, Persia Religiosa, Milano, 1958, p. 73 ff. and passim.
9) A. Bausani, "Note sul ‘Pazzo Sacro’ nell’Islam", in S.MSR, XXIX, 58, pp. 93-107.
nascent secondary monotheisms more or less kept in embryonal stage (imamite angelism of ghulmaww) and are rather an intellectual reformulation of theological concepts. In the mentioned article I tried to prove how the two types of “sacred madmen” of the Islamic culture were an integration in it of a reflection of the two types of the image of the “Devil” existing in archaic religiosity. That study was intended to give a start to an examination of other aspects of Islamic culture, which, until now, Islamists have studied whether philologically or ideologically, or juridically, but not specifically as far as history of religions is concerned. Unfortunately other activities and interests have made it impossible to me to go ahead with this study.

Numerous further examples prove the possibility of historical-religious approach to the various phenomena of the Islamic culture. Here are a few of them.

4. Prayer, for instance. Prayer has been studied under various aspects: juridically (due to Islam’s particular structure, the șalāt, “canonical prayer”, is included in the Muslim lawbooks), theologically, historically within the Islamic mystics, all but for its historical-religious aspect. Even the studies done on the religious history of Islamic prayer, for instance Mittwoch’s 10), remain a rather extrinsic history. The Author does ascribe the single “pieces” of the functioning mechanism to Christian, Hebraic and other influences, but he fails to locate their functioning within the frame of Islam’s concrete typology. How does, for instance, șalāt al-istikṣaq, “ad impetrandam pluviam”, integrate with the Islamic religious type, it being an almost universal historical-religious phenomenon? It is obvious that, if the various pieces and aspects of Islamic prayer are “preislamic survivals”, this must be true for all religions, because nīl sub sole novi; but in this case, history, deprived of the help of an intelligent functional typology, remains nothing but pure destructive analysis. I would like to mention here the name of Michelangelo Guidi, whom I consider my master in this field: his way of locating the problems in his studies on Muhammad and early Islam 11) is particularly well grounded from the historical-religious viewpoint.

Another example could be the Islamic concept of Satan. Again I refer to a paper of mine, on Satan, and the way he is understood by a modern Muslim poet 12). Historical influences helped me to go back from Muhammad Iqābāl to orthodox and mystical concepts in Islam; and further I tried to reconstruct how Islam could integrate an archaic Satan with its positive and negative values, in a monotheistic typology, and how such an archaic Satan had suffered a transformation of values. Historically and typologically I consider Zwi Werblowski’s thesis, Lucifer and Prometheus, on Milton’s Satan as most illuminating 13). The very fact that my study on the Islamic Satan has been effected only by 1955, shows how little has been done to study Islam on a historical-religious level.

Another field that has been studied thoroughly, but only rarely from a historical-religious point of view, is Muslim Mysticism. Even in scientific texts, but more still in Encyclopaedias and popularizing treatises, we can find affirmations such as the one of our learned colleague J. Duchesne-Guillemin, who, in the Symposium at Spa on “Unity and Variety in Muslim Civilization”, simply declared: “Sufi mysticism... is perhaps Christian and Gnostic in origin... but certainly not Muslim”. And further he speaks of “the Dervish orders... the origin of which was perhaps Buddhist, Manichean or Shamanist, but certainly not Muslim” 14). In various articles of mine I have reacted against this apparently historical position which means instead, —in my opinion—to vanify history.

One can study Muslim mysticism from a concretely historical point of view, only if one keeps the functional typology in mind. That is to say, the single “pieces” of Muslim mysticism may be taken from this or that source (the way it happens with any other phenomenon in any other recent religion) but they have their proper function inside a typically and typologically Islamic context. In ignoring this historical-typological method one will get lost in useless and endless discussions about pantheism or non pantheism in Muslim mystics (especially for some of them). When typology is ignored, terms are twisted into an artificial conceptual translation (f.i. *wahdat-i vujud* = pantheism); no distinction is made between theopanism and pantheism, the Islamic

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14) Unity and Variety in Muslim Civilization, Chicago, 1955.
and monotheistic Unity of God gets confused with the archaic “unity of the being”; nirvāṇa is identified with fanā, and so on. Here again I would like to mention the name of a late regretted Italian orientalist, Martino Mario Moreno. Although he was not officially considered as a historian of religions, his work on the presumed similarities between Indian and Muslim mystics proved him to be it more than are many other islamists.

Methodical errors such as these mentioned for mysticism are frequent in another, somewhat analogous, field: “Sects”, or Heterodox Muslim Communities. The problems involved with this specific argument are too many to be examined here. Presently H. Corbin’s metaphysical-iranophile school seems to take up again, in an undoubtedly fascinating way, an already old tendency that had appeared to be out of date: to interpret Muslim heresy as an Aryan reaction (Persian, in particular) to a “semitic Islamism”, and thus to level, in an antihistorical way, the most different phenomena under a metaphysical common denominator. In a recent book K. E. Müller tries to demonstrate (and this is easy if again one takes single isolated pieces away from their functioning in a whole) the total non-islamicity of certain extreme sects, of the yazidi and Nusairī type. According to Müller, these would have put on only a superficial Islamic aspect, but would really be remainders of real preislamic religious communities, or even ethnic groups with “agricultural old-mediterranean” beliefs. At the same time quite a few islamists consider the Bahāʾi religion,—a secondary monotheistic religion that has its origin in Islam, the way Christianity has its origin in Hebraism,—as a “Muslim sect”, thus completely showing to ignore any typology whatsoever. Even as far as the very origin of Shi‘ism is concerned, only few seem to have followed the direction, brilliantly started by Sabatino Moscati in his 1955 article in Rivista degli Studi Orientali. Here the author puts the problem historically and finally distinguishes clearly the double aspect of the first Shi‘a, the political one and the more definite religious one.


16) His thesis shows already in his title (K. E. Müller, Kulturhistorische Studien zur Genese Pseudo-islamischer Sektengesellschaften in Vorderasien, Wiesbaden, 1967). The sects studied include Yazidi, Ahl-i Ḥaqq, Nusairī, Druzes, with hints at other groups.

17) In H. Laoust’s excellent work, Les Schismes dans l’Islam, Paris, 1965, pp. 363 to 370, devoted to the study of Bābism-Bahā’ism, though well informed, end by considering the new religion as a “Muslim sect”.

Penetration and integration in Islam (I am here stressing the term “integration” that should correct and further explain the term “penetration” of single fragments) of legends and ideological cycles, whether Near-Eastern, Iranic and Indian, in the ocean of Muslim folk-tales, is another very interesting working field for the historian of Islamic religion. The ta'zīé, for instance (Persian religious folk-dramas) have started to be explored only lately, and offer fascinating possibilities for research on monotheistic-Islamic transformations (demythologization, pseudo-historical integration etc.) of cycles of mythological or semi-mythological motives, even extremely old. As a matter of fact, the numerous studies made on the ta'zīé used to be either mostly philological, or, whenever they showed historical-religious attempts 19), they were conditioned by the fact that only a limited number of ta'zīé was on hand, and usually only ta'zīe directly connected with the Karbalā drama. Nowadays the wealthy material which the Ambassador E. Cerulli offered as a gift to the Vatican Library (more than 1000 booklets of such dramas! 20) allows to study various aspects of one and the same motive and shows how the Karbalā drama was used as a pretext for treating the most different historical-religious materials 21).

In studying ta'zīies, one should avoid a double methodological danger. First to fall into pure philology; second to bend to an “easy comparativism”, exemplified by Ch. Virolleaud’s study, who ignores the peculiar monotheistic typology of Islam, and of Shi'a Islam in particular.

5. To conclude with: Islam is still waiting for a thorough historical-religious study. This pessimistic affirmation does not want to deny the validity of some historical-religious studies about Islam already existing. What I mean is that such studies are still rather exceptional and even

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19) Ch. Virolleaud, for instance, in his Le théâtre persan ou le drame de Kerbela, Paris, 1950. Virolleaud’s method in this work of his is a rather superficial comparatism.

20) The catalogue of this material (precious because it is divided according to subjects): E. Rossi-A. Bombaci, Elenco di dramma religiosi persiani (fondo mss. vaticani Cerulli), Città del Vaticano, 1961.

these studies have remainders of old-fashioned philological com-
paratism. In my opinion the most valuable study of the kind is my
friend and colleague G. Widengren's, whose credit it is, among others,
to have taken up the problem again of the Manichean influences on
early Islam, in a more precise and richer way. If I may allow myself
to find some defects in this work, I would locate them especially in
the very fact that the author bases himself too much on "lexical ele-
ments", at times isolated from their context, using an "atomistic
method" very much in contrast with the *aurea maxima* that Widengren
himself mentions in his work and which I have quoted before. To
give but two examples of this: the purely lexical parallelism between
*ar-rūḥ al-amīn* and *ar-rasūl al-amīn* does not seem enough to me to
justify the important historical-religious conclusions (over and above
their being true) he is making. And further, the mere fact that Ka'b ben
Zuhair's panegyric to the Prophet (wherein the author follows the
literary conventions of the preislamic epoch) says as follows: "... the
Apostle is a light by which we are enlightened" is but a very feeble
pretext to a possible identification of the Prophet with the qur'anic
"light of God".

In spite of this, G. Widengren's book is a very important milestone
in the way to a historical-religious study of Islam\(^{22}\). A study which,
and I repeat this as a conclusion, should be based on a *historical
functionology*. If we ignore one of the aspects indicated
by one of these three words; that is, if we fall into a typology that
ignores the function of the single elements in a whole, or if we make
a history that ignores the typological structure, we shall continue pro-
ducing islamological works, perhaps of high value, but which will not
fit, *stricto sensu*, into the History of Religions. And this would justify
the suspicion of our colleagues "historians of religion" towards the
specialists of the single "superior religions", whom they, at times duly,
accuse of wanting to let their quite interesting philological or historical
studies go for historical-religious works, when they are not.

**DISCUSSION**

**Borrmans (Rome).** — Professeur, j'ai été très intéressé par votre
conférence. Dans la perspective de ce que disait le Pr Bianchi et de
son souhait de voir établir une typologie, j'aimerais que l'on se pose,

\(^{22}\) Also in other works G. Widengren rightly emphasizes the importance of Islam
for a phenomenological approach to the History of Religions. See for instance G.
Widengren, *Some Remarks on the Methods of the Phenomenology of Religion*, in
toujours dans le cadre de ces recherches de typologie, le problème des relations structurales entre une religion et une langue. Dans le cas de l'Islam et de la langue arabe, il y a, en effet, une relation presque intrinsèque, relation qui, dans le développement théologique même de la pensée musulmane, a produit parfois un rétrécissement de la réflexion, dans la voie dite orthodoxe, alors que peut-être, dans les autres voies, il n'en a pas été de même. Une autre typologie devrait d'ailleurs s'intéresser à ce classement en orthodoxie et hétérodoxie, entre membres d'une même religion. Pour en revenir à la relation étroite qu'il y a entre la langue arabe et la pensée religieuse musulmane, il convient de souligner combien le vocabulaire "religieux" (musulman en l'occurrence) de certaines nations africaines, du Maghreb par exemple où le berbère est demeuré la langue de certaines régions montagnardes, est typiquement arabe, au point que l'on recherche difficilement le vocabulaire religieux "de base" que possédait cette langue (le berbère) avant son islamisation. Il convient donc de prévoir un "type" spécial pour ces religions où langue déterminée et foi ont en quelque sorte partie liée.

Bausani. — Après avoir rappelé son intérêt pour ces questions linguistiques, le Prof. Bausani se dit parfaitement d'accord sur le lien très fort qui existe entre la religion et la langue de l'Islam, ce qui est vrai aussi pour ces territoires islamiques qui sont encore plus marginaux que ceux qu'il avait mentionnés (p. ex. l'Indonésie). Il y a eu en Indonésie une renaissance des études arabes, tandis qu'autour des siècles XVIe et XVIIe la prédominance était plutôt du Persan. Depuis le XVIIIe siècle le pélerinage et les contacts avec le monde arabe ont été un élément unitaire important, comme on voit pour ce qui est de l'étude de l'arabe dans un monde si éloigné comme celui de la Malésie et de l'Indonésie. Mais on aurait à ajouter beaucoup pour ce qui est des rapports intrinsèques entre Islam et langue.