FOREIGN SERVICE
JOURNAL
2.00
June 1985

ADMITTING THE SHAH



Gary Sick (right)
on the decision
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FOREIGN SERVICE

ADMITTING THE SHAH

President Carter, National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski, and aide Gary Sick confront the difficult choice of whether to admit the deposed shah of Iran to the United States for medical treatment, despite embassy warnings that a takeover would be likely. In our article "The Emperor and the Embassy" (page 24), author Gary Sick tells how political pressure and the news of the monarch's illness swayed senior advisers to admit the shah, while bureaucratic creep was rebuilding an already-attacked embassy.

CONTENTS

"The Independent Voice of the Foreign Service"

THE FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL is the magazine for professionals in foreign affairs, published monthly except August by the American Foreign Service Association, a private non-profit organization. Material appearing herein represents the opinions of the writers and does not necessarily represent the official views of the foreign affairs agencies, the U.S. government, or AFSA. The Editorial Board is responsible for general content, but statements concerning the policy and administration of AFSA as employee representative under the Foreign Service Act of 1980 in the ASSOCIATION NEWS and the ASSOCIATION VIEWS, and all communications relating to these, are the responsibility of the AFSA Governing Board.

JOURNAL subscriptions: One year (11 issues), $15. Overseas subscriptions (except Canada), add $3 per year.

Second-class postage paid at Washington, D.C., and at additional post office. POSTMASTER: Send address changes to FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL, 2101 E Street NW, Washington, D.C. 20037.

Microfilm copies: University Microfilm Library Services, Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106 (October 1967 to present).

The JOURNAL welcomes manuscripts of 1500–4000 words for consideration by the Editorial Board. Author queries are strongly urged, stamped envelope required for return. All authors are paid on publication.

June 1985. Volume 62, number 6. ISSN 0015-7279.

Association Views

Principles and Rewards

Every now and then we come across a statement about the Foreign Service that goes to the heart of the issues that face us now. The remarks by Howard Stoffer to his mid-level class this winter is one such statement, and we are pleased to print some of his comments here.

Mid-Level Class 7 is comprised of approximately 80 officers, representing nearly one and a half percent of the officer corps. We are the next generation of the Foreign Service....We are prepared to do our jobs and do them well. But we ask that our sacrifices be recognized by the public and the leaders we serve. We want to be able to maintain our sense of duty, dedication, and integrity during the course of our careers. However, the future looms uncertain as unfounded criticism at home of the loyalties and capabilities of the men and women of the Foreign Service continues, while attacks on our very lives escalate overseas.

It was an outrage that on the very day two members of the Foreign Service community were executed by terrorists aboard a hijacked aircraft [in Teheran], we were told to expect the same five percent cut in salary as all other federal civilian workers. It is a matter of principle, not money. The military was exempted and even recommended for an increase. We too should be exempted....The Department of State is the only national security agency without an exemption from the control of the Office of Personnel Management. The irony is that we are the oldest and most established national security institution in the government.

We expect every effort will be made to provide reasonable and effective security at our missions overseas. We have a right to expect appropriations for this purpose to be made available....Our safety and security is not open to negotiation and compromise. We are often told that this is a bad year to get new monies....The Foreign Service cannot afford to wait for a good year.

Another major concern stems from those who persist in calling us irrelevant, ineffective dilettantes—overpaid, underworked, and disloyal to our political masters. This phenomenon is not a new one, but is getting worse....The senior leadership of the department must address such charges, and our supporters in Congress and the White House should be urged to confront these unfair and unfounded assaults on our loyalty, integrity, and devotion. If we make no such challenges, then we cannot expect the president or Congress to make the commitment of resources we need to do our work most effectively....

[We need to] make the Foreign Service a respected and trusted institution again. We will need resources to do that. We will need a major effort on the part of our officers, especially the senior officers, to carry the argument convincingly to the White House and the Congress. We must all take every opportunity to educate the public about the Foreign Service. Above all else, we want to be utilized, listened to, and included in the process of policy formation. That is our greatest reward.

LETTERS

Mistaken Identity?

Evan Galbraith, responding to a rebuke by Lawrence Eagleburger [DESPATCH, April] which included the charge that Galbraith was "not prepared to accept discussion" from his Foreign Service subordinates, is quoted as saying that Eagleburger must have been speaking about me. Without attributing undue solemnity to the ambassador's remark, let me affirm that in my two years in the State Department, I never found myself averse to such discussion. Nor, unlike my approximate namesake, did I ever notice any lack of courage by career officers in promoting their professional viewpoint.

I have, in an earlier issue of the JOURNAL ["The American Ambassador," June, 1969], regretted the ridiculous arrangement by which, with some care, we select and train people to represent the United States abroad, advance them thoughtfully and after due consideration over their working lifetimes, and then give the very top jobs, presumably the best and most demanding, to uninformed, fiscally unbuttoned fertilizer manufacturers. And I have regretted the way in which our Foreign Service officers, in contrast with those of other countries, accept such uninformed intrusion.

The Foreign Service and its alumni should protest to the White House and Congress far more openly and vigorously the appointment of these unqualified amateurs, apart perhaps from appointments to such largely ceremonial posts as London. And officers should press the point by requesting transfers from service under the more ridiculous malperformers, see that the press and public are made appropriately aware of their acts of untutored incompetence—the host country will always know of them anyway—and otherwise see that these diplomatic careers are as thoughtfully unpleasant and unrewarding as is consistent with the national interest. Officers should never cover for inexperienced assininity, as is now the nearly universal practice, by saying, "Well, you know he is really doing *quite* well."

On this particular matter Evan Galbraith, however exceptionally, may be right. In opposing politically sanctified,

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professionally uninformed intrusion, the Foreign Service, if not lacking in courage, is certainly too polite, passive, and tolerant.

JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH
Cambridge, Massachusetts

Perverting Principles

The JOURNAL's recent articles by Harry Rositzke ["The Third Option," December] and Barton J. Bernstein ["Pig in a Poke," April] are outstanding. They both underscore remarkable failures of CIA so-called "covert" operations in Latin America and state or suggest the degradation of our government's international standing produced by such misadventures. As a retired FSO who, more than once, had occasion to regret such perversions of inter-American principles and obligations, I found them particularly noteworthy.

Without expressing any opinion on the appropriateness or value of covert operations by our government in other parts of the world, I venture to suggest that those in Latin America of other than a strictly intelligence-gathering purpose have been failures, often disastrous ones. From the Castillo Armas "victory" in Guatemala in 1954 through the Bay of Pigs and up to the Reagan administration's current "covert" war against the Sandinistas in Nicaragua, they have been or are proving to be counterproductive. This is particularly dismaying when one considers the number of useful, constructive projects consistent with our inter-American obligations that might have been carried out with the millions of dollars they cost.

EDWARD A. JAMISON
Foreign Service Officer, retired
Chevy Chase, Maryland

Unique Connection

Curtis F. Jones's excellent article ["The Questionable Alliance," February] calls attention to the nearly unquestionable and unique U.S.-Israeli connection. Any criticism in print of that relationship is regarded by professional pro-Israelis as darkly dangerous (see the March 11, 1985, edition of *Near East Report*).

Is it not odd that, in this country of extraordinary freedom of expression, one should regard the JOURNAL's publication of Jones's article as courageous? But that was one of the first things that came to mind as I read it. We have learned, or been taught, to close our minds when it comes to matters Israeli. I am reminded of a Kuwaiti ambassador's observation that U.S. presidents seem only to become aware of the tragedy of the Palestinians once they are no longer in office.

LEE DINSMORE
Foreign Service Officer, retired
Elcho, Wisconsin

All hail to you, editors, and to Curtis Jones for "The Questionable Alliance" with Israel. We have all been subjected for decades to such intense Israeli influence that we badly need reminders of the excessive sacrifices we make for that state. It is hard to remember that this alien influence is far more pervasive and powerful than, for instance, that of the Deutsch-Amerika Bund in 1938–41.

Along with Jones's low-key inventory, other costs deserve emphasis, such as the two hotline nuclear colloquies with the Kremlin, in 1967 and 1973, each time with the possibility of Armageddon for the sake of three million Israelis. How many times are we prepared to do this for Israel? And can anyone doubt that as a nation we

lose the respect of our real allies by our continual timid deferring to Israel?

Currently, our authorities, despite monstrous deficits, are planning once again to give Israel some $1000 per capita, instead of aptly directing their government to the International Monetary Fund. And for years we have meekly allowed Israeli occupation forces to forbid us to provide even modest development aid to terrorized Palestinians. Rather than an alliance, this is a dubious one-sided relationship which cries out for a return to dignity through sober reappraisal.

GEORGE F. BOGARDUS
Foreign Service Officer, retired
Bethesda, Maryland

Salaries for Spouses

The JOURNAL's articles on working spouses [March] make it simultaneously clear that the Foreign Service Associates proposal is an excellent one and that formidable bureaucratic, organizational, and budget obstacles will stand in its way. The issue's summary of the solutions to or evasions of this problem by other diplomatic services suggests a simple first step for the U.S. Service that would require a minimum of bureaucratic and organizational change.

The Foreign Service should pay a salary equal to a flat percentage (perhaps 15 percent to start) of Foreign Service employees' salaries directly to their spouses in the spouse's name. It would be considered a salary, not an allowance, earned by the work of moving, settling, and moving again, by coping with the special problems of overseas family life, and by the sacrifice of other opportunities to earn. Complaints about differences in the amount of support spouses give to the embassy community, in the hardships at various posts, and in job opportunities between posts should be rejected. These differences are inescapable and create inequities in the payment of all Foreign Service salaries and benefits. In addition, the work for which this "spouse's salary" would be paid must be done to a considerable extent by all Foreign Service spouses.

Payment of a "spouse's salary" would make a start toward achieving many of the objectives of the Associates proposal. It would be much easier for the Foreign Service community to accept paid spouses as Associates later on, whether the program is accepted in its present form or another. Spouses might use the salary to upgrade their skills, widen their job searches, and to supplement lower salaries for jobs than they would normally accept. Spouses now doing unpaid community or representational work could consider their "spouse's salary" as partial payment, and so indicate on resumes.

JOHN L. WASHBURN
Foreign Service Officer
Jakarta, Indonesia

Teaching Negotiation

I agree with the premise of David Newsom's DIPLOMACY column ["An Unpopular Act," March] that negotiation and compromise are basically unpopular in our society and that much of the Foreign Service's mission, to conduct diplomacy, involves these two activities. I found curious the need to mention the truism that others approach negotiations in a different manner then we do. What really distressed me, however, was the failure to note that, despite its core nature to the Foreign Service, we have been very negligent in teaching negotiating skills. Indeed, I doubt that most senior FSOs have ever taken a

course in negotiations or read any of the basic literature in the field. It is only in the last three years that the Foreign Service Institute has included a short course in negotiations in its mid-career course, and that at the urging, I understand, of one of the Service's outstanding negotiators, John McDonald.

I am indebted to Ambassador McDonald for helping me lay out a course on negotiating practices and principles at the National War College. His lecture on U.S. negotiating practices has been consistently well-received by NWC students. I would hope that all FSOs serious about their craft would become familiar with Fisher and Ury's *Getting to Yes,* Nierenberg's *Fundamentals of Negotiations,* and McDonald's own *How to be a Delegate.*

GORDON R. BEYER
International Affairs Adviser,
National War College
Washington, D.C.

Untraditional Diplomacy

I call to your attention a three-quarter-page advertisement in the November 25 issue of the *San Francisco Examiner* in which the U.S. ambassador to Costa Rica, Curtin Winsor Jr., writing on embassy stationery, urges Americans to visit Costa Rica. There, in a "safe, tranquil, and unabashedly pro-American country," they can enjoy "the finest tarpon fishing in the world," "world-class white water rapids," and modern resorts on uncrowded beaches. And if just a visit isn't enough, the ambassador writes, many tourists might be induced by "The Little Country That Can" to settle there permanently and join the 20,000 Americans who have already made their homes there.

The political appointee ambassador, unskilled in traditional diplomacy, is not a new phenomenon, as the JOURNAL so often points out. In the past, he has often been ignorant but kindly and, for the most part, inactive except socially. There was, for example, the man who, on being made ambassador to Sri Lanka, revealed frankly he hadn't a clue as to the name of the prime minister. Then there was the ambassador to Singapore who, according to his deputy chief of mission, hadn't known there were two Koreas or that there had once been a war between Pakistan and India.

Ambassador Winsor is not precisely of this pattern. He seems more in the developing-activist Reagan mode—men who involve themselves in matters far removed from traditional diplomacy. Witness the endorsement by many of his colleagues in Latin America of Jesse Helms's candidacy for the Senate.

In the October JOURNAL, there is a comparison of the foreign policies of the Democrats and the Republicans. For the latter, "democracy is under attack throughout the hemisphere," with "Marxist Nicaragua" threatening Costa Rica, the potential vacation subdivision, as well as El Salvador and Guatemala. Just assume that 20,000 more Americans decide to settle there permanently, joining those already there. You would have such a substantial colony of Yankees, the Nicaraguans wouldn't dare subvert or attack.

JORMA L. KAUKONEN
Foreign Service Officer, retired
Mill Valley, California

Insignificant Ranking

The November issue of the JOURNAL contains an interview with Lawrence Eagleburger in which he says, "...the military does better; there is an honorable career ending at the rank of colonel."

For the general populace, "colonel (retired)" has some significance; "FSO-2 (retired)" does not. In fact, other than ambassador, the Foreign Service has no titles of significance for the general public. I recall that in the early 1960s, Russ Fessenden,

who was deputy chief of mission to the European Communities, was introduced to a group of visiting Americans as "Minister Fessenden." He later received a thank you letter from a member of that group with the salutation "Dear Reverend Fessenden."

Even the numbering system in the ranking of FSOs seems to be inverted. In most organizations, the lowest rank is one, while Foreign Service officers work up from eight to one.

Usually in the military or Foreign Service, if one retires early, one anticipates searching for another job. A rank of significance to the general populace will assist in that search. This was not necessarily true in my case, since I was recruited by a large corporation, based essentially on the recommendation of an officer in that corporation with whom I had served in the Foreign Service some 15 years previously. Nevertheless, I sometimes felt that, in the continual jockeying for positions in the corporate structure, I would have been better protected with an outside rank that would have been of significance.

Now that I am retired for a second time, a retired rank would be less meaningful. I do not, however, say that I am a "Foreign Service officer class one (retired)."

HOYT PRICE
Foreign Service Officer, retired
Benton, Arizona

The Nuclear Game

A couple of observations are in order regarding the conflicting views of John McKesson and David Linebaugh [LETTERS, April] on the subject of what prompted the Soviets to return to nuclear-arms negotiations.

McKesson is right in insisting that the Soviets walked out of meetings and purposely stalled until the presidential elections, hoping to get a better deal. They also anticipated such a peace-endangering reaction would incite Western European wimps to greater efforts to getting the United States to make concessions to the U.S.S.R. The only so-called concession—in essence, simply an agreement—was that the United States would talk about the Strategic Defense Initiative, nothing more.

As to the Soviets' wanting merely "to prevent the militarization of space," as Linebaugh says, it is sheer wishful thinking. The U.S.S.R. has been actively pursuing this path for several years with a modicum of success. But now they have raised heaven and earth to prevent our country from embarking on a comparable effort, even of just a research and development nature. With an unholy fear of losing their clout in the nuclear game, they hope that American wimps will come to the rescue and convince the administration to desist from development of the SDI. The Soviets are, of course, prepared to acceed to widely trumpeted, small numerical concessions or to junking of obsolete systems, like the SS-20. This is all good for propaganda exploitation amongst the naive and inveterate Reagan-haters. Will we ever learn?

CHARLES KATSAINOS
Washington, D.C.

Clarification

In the April LETTERS, a line was dropped from a letter by John A. McKesson. The sentence, in which Mr. McKesson quotes a review by David Linebaugh, should have read (omission is in italics), " 'Burt argued that the Soviets would not negotiate reductions in the levels of SS-20 missiles *until after the United States began deploying Pershing IIs and cruise missiles* in Western Europe.' " We regret the error.

The Journal welcomes letters to the editor but reserves the right to edit for clarity and shorten for space considerations.

Books

Books

Managing Moscow. *By Harry Rositzke. William Morrow and Company, 1984.*

President Reagan has consistently expressed concern about the Soviet threat. On April 2 he told the *Washington Post* that some people claim the U.S. weapons arsenal is at parity with the Soviet Union's. "This is the most ridiculous thing I've ever heard. The Soviet Union virtually outnumbers us in any type of weapon you want to name...has consistently modernized their land-based nuclear missiles...they outnumber us in conventional weapons...their navy has several hundred more ships than we have...we haven't caught up with them...."

Reagan expresses what *Managing Moscow* describes as "fear ranging from the hysteria of the Forties to the pervasive anxieties of the Eighties." This fear "has dictated most of our actions abroad for a generation." We feared Stalin's Soviet Union after the devastation of World War II. We feared the U.S.S.R. when we had a monopoly on atomic weapons. We feared it in the 1950s and 1960s even with our overwhelming military superiority. We feared it after its break with China. Now we fear it because of its arms build-up.

Rositzke eliminates hysteria and sticks to the facts about U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union, be they favorable or unfavorable. For example, he says there can be no argument about the conventional arms balance: The Soviets have more men and tanks. But the West has the advantage in anti-tank weapons. Reagan and others exaggerate the missile gap by playing up the number of Soviet land-based missiles and playing down the U.S. advantage in sea- and air-delivered weapons.

"There are not many experts, in or out of the Reagan administration, who take seriously the possibility of a Soviet nuclear strike against the United States or a Warsaw Pact invasion of Western Europe. No one, during my 25 years in Washington or publicly since, has even been able to draw up a scenario that would make either action appear useful to the Soviet national interest," writes Rositzke. Thus, President Reagan has concerned himself with

military power to contain a mostly political threat.

The author uses the word "demitente" to describe what our policy should be toward the Soviet Union: part containment and competition and part negotiation and accommodation. The United States should disengage itself from the concept of military containment and pursue a forward economic and social strategy consisting of aid programs and free trade and should downplay the military aspects of foreign policy. Such a policy assumes that goods are a far more effective weapon than guns in ensuring a successful future for the United States. We live in a crowded, hungry world and must respond to its needs.

Rositzke has important things to say about U.S. foreign policy, but the writing is glib and superficial and the title is misleading—there is no suggestion in the book that Washington could "manage" Moscow. The author should consider a revision. —DAVID LINEBAUGH

Endless Enemies: *The Making of an Unfriendly World. By Jonathan Kwitny. Congdon & Weed. 1984. $19.95.*

Unmanifest Destiny: *Mayhem and Illusion in American Foreign Policy from the Monroe Doctrine to Reagan's War in El Salvador. By T.D. Allman. Dial. 1984. $19.95.*

While attending a 1980 briefing on "the communist insurgency" in El Salvador, journalist T.D. Allman suddenly realized why he felt a powerful sense of deja vu. Twelve years earlier, he recalls in *Unmanifest Destiny*, the same U.S. colonel had given him the same briefing in Laos. The incident was revealing but hardly surprising, Allman writes, for U.S. foreign policy has followed an unbroken line from the nineteenth century to the present. Wherever U.S. colonels, AID directors, or diplomats brief journalists, one is certain to find violence, chaos, and death. Only the locales change.

The book's subtitle—*Mayhem and Illusion in American Foreign Policy from the Monroe Doctrine to Reagan's War in El Salvador*—pretty well describes its content and tone. Ours has been an ideological, doctrinaire approach to foreign policy, Allman claims, guided by myths and fantasies about our destiny but devoid of any moral touchstone. As a consequence, the United States has, for much of its existence, been "the single most important enemy of liberty in Latin America," giving our foreign policies a certain "symmetry" to those of the Soviet Union.

Current U.S. policy toward Central America provides the motif for this wide-ranging, if overly long, book, but Allman roams into lengthy discourses on the Monroe Doctrine and the Mexican war. Discussion jumps from Coolidge's policy in Nicaragua to Nixon's in Cambodia; from William Henry Harrison, the "hero of Tippecanoe," and William Walker, "the grey-eyed man of destiny" who ransacked Nicaragua in the 1850s, to John C. Calhoun, Herman Melville, and Joseph McCarthy. But always Allman returns to his primary theme: the United States' distorted views of its manifest destiny have resulted in a twin assault on freedom—our neighbors' and our own. We have violated our principles in the guise of defending them. And we have done so in the mistaken belief that a U.S. war of conquest could confer freedom on others. Instead, we have only subverted our own liberties.

This is an antiquated argument, although Allman updates it to encompass the first Reagan administration. The volume's strength lies in its discussion of U.S. policy toward El Salvador over the past five or six years. A poignant section details the efforts of the families of the four American churchwomen murdered in El Salvador in 1980 to obtain some semblance of justice. If even half of Allman's account of the obstruction they encountered in Washington, as in San Salvador, is accurate, it is a damning story.

Jonathan Kwitny's *Endless Enemies* is less vitriolic, but its focus and message is much the same. Why, both authors ask, has the United States intervened so frequently, and usually with consequences so counterproductive, in the affairs of underdeveloped nations around the world? The dust-jacket of *Endless Enemies* promises a look at "how America's worldwide interventions destroy democracy and free enterprise and defeat our own best interests." At times, Kwitny's arguments approach the preposterous, as when he suggests that, had the CIA not overthrown Iranian Premier Mohammed Mossadegh in 1953, the Soviet Union would not have invaded Afghanistan more than a quarter of a century later. Or again, when he asks whether anyone has considered that, from 1953 until the Carter administration, "the man in charge of U.S. foreign policy had been on the Rockefeller family payroll." The Soviets, Kwitny is quick to add, are hardly paragons of virtue, and Marxism has "almost invariably brought about the vengeful destruction of productive power, not the thoughtful redistribution of it." Unfortunately, Third World nations need protection from the CIA and U.S. multinational corporations; this need has given Moscow a global influence its doctrines and performance do not deserve.

Kwitny, far more than Allman, acknowledges that the United States is a land of good deeds and great promise. All we must do, he asserts, is return to our principles, live up to our democratic, capitalistic ideals. His silence on how a mighty nation can do this suggests that, to his mind, it involves little more than a matter of will. Such an answer will hardly satisfy the foreign policy professional or the academic. But Kwitny (like Allman) has not directed his book at these groups and writes instead for a nonscholarly, nonprofessional audience.

Both Allman and Kwitny are journalists who combine historical analysis (of varied quality) with journalism's immediacy to address contemporary problems. Both are harshly critical of U.S. interventionism and neither makes much effort to balance his account with references to times when U.S. policy has been a force for good. It would be easy to ignore these volumes; their overstatement and hyperbole, coupled in Kwitny's case with a breezy style, begs you not to take them seriously. But neither book should be dismissed, for, beneath the bombast, both authors probe fundamental issues and raise questions of profound importance for the conduct of U.S. foreign relations. Of the two volumes, Kwitny's is the livelier, Allman's the more tendentious. Many will reject the conclusions the books offer, but the questions need to be asked.

—Robert M. Hathaway

The Checkered Career of Tobias Lear. *By Ray Brighton. The Portsmouth Marine Society, 1985.*

Some of the most interesting episodes from the earlier part of U.S. history have been lost or forgotten, so Ray Brighton deserves a round of cheers for *The Checkered Career of Tobias Lear,* which contains a lot of material rescued from lost letters and fragmentary archives. George Washington chose Lear, a Harvard graduate from a well-to-do New Hampshire family that lost most of its wealth during the American Revolution, to serve as his private secretary. Lear held the post during most of the first presidency, and was holding Washington's hand when the president died. Lear later arranged Washington's papers and was subsequently accused—probably rightly—of destroying some that could have been embarrassing not only to Washington, but Thomas Jefferson and Alexander Hamilton as well. The author makes a

good case that Lear's destruction of the papers led to his appointment to government positions by both Jefferson and James Madison.

President Jefferson rescued Lear from financial ruin (he had been involved in some unwise land speculation in Washington, which was then under construction) by appointing him consular agent to Haiti. There, Lear's possessions were destroyed by rampaging soldiers. Congress ruled that he had suffered through his dedication to duty but, since there was no legal justification for doing so, it did not compensate for his losses. Most modern diplomats could certainly sympathize with such a fate.

Subsequently, Lear became the senior U.S. diplomat in North Africa and successfully concluded a treaty with Tripoli that ended the war with the Barbary pirates. He was initially hailed for the achievement, but his political opponents later condemned him for including a secret understanding that allowed the Dey of Tripoli to hold hostage the family of Lear's brother—who had fought with the Americans to overthrow the Dey—for four years.

Numerous quotations from original sources make the book slow reading, but the fascinating material makes up for this minor flaw. *The Checkered Career of Tobias Lear* is highly recommended.

—Benson L. Grayson

Bureaucrats and Policy Making. *Edited by Ezra N. Suleiman. Holmes & Meier Publishers, Inc., 1985. $37.50 (cloth), $16.95 (paper).*

Most Foreign Service officers would have abhorred this kind of book a decade ago. Now interest in the roles of senior career officials and what the Heritage Foundation terms "political executives" is on the rise, and this collection of essays on the structures, performances, and attitudes of the senior civil services in eight developed countries is, to say the least, topical. *Bureaucrats and Policy Making* is a good comparative sampling, though the authors address the issues solely within their national contexts.

The review of the U.S. civil service is enlightening on the historical circumstances that shaped U.S. attitudes toward it. It is somewhat reassuring to learn how democratic and responsive the government service is and that the controversy over political appointments is not new. It is also easy to discern, however, why the Foreign Service's desire to play a meaningful policy role raises cants of elitism. The Service and the Office of Management and Budget are cited as the two U.S. examples of a would-be "British administrative class." I would have added Treasury as well.

The other country reviews will be useful primarily for testing previous impressions. This reviewer, for example, found the discussion of the Japanese civil service heavy on structure and light on sociology. The review of the Italians is devastating: Their civil servants have "deep aspirations...to a noncompetitive society of equals." The French are notable for their unashamed elitism and the manner in which they induce careerists to become political (a French civil servant can campaign for elective public office on full salary and return to the job if defeated). The author uses a stultifying metaphor for the United Kingdom's pontifical generalists: "The concept of impartial partiality differs from nonpartisanship in the way that bisexuality differs from asexuality." Norway seems a career paradise, though times have changed since the mid-nineteenth century credo about "[guarding] the public interest, unhampered by arbitrary pressures," e.g., legislatures, interest groups, and citizens. The piece on Chile's service unfortunately suffers from a lack of post-1973 data or analysis.

The review of West Germany's civil service brings out interesting contrasts to U.S. Foreign Service concerns. First, the "predominant concern [of the senior civil servant], even in terms of working time, is policymaking and program development rather than program management." Second, career servants are used almost exclusively, "...unlike the ill-defined circle of personal advisers to be found in American federal departments." And third, a rotational system governs selected civil servants whose jobs require their full agreement with the government. When the government changes, these professionals are retired temporarily—with pay—until recall. I can think of several colleagues who would have favored having that option available to those in the U.S. Foreign Service.

The wide variety among countries in career mores and public expectations is impressive. While the egalitarian U.S. stance is particularly laudable, we are also the only country where public attitudes usually prevent former career civil servants from becoming elected representatives. Neil Armstrong, a civil servant, walked on the moon on a national holiday without receiving overtime because of the congressional paycap. Any Foreign Service veteran can sympathize.

—Robert E. Fritts

PERIODICALS

"Exporting Idealism: The Right Kind of Intervention." *By Harden Smith. Washington Monthly, Vol. 17, #3, April 1985.* Although the United States is frequently criticized for interfering in other countries' internal affairs, the reality is that it is often reluctant to intervene enough, writes this former Foreign Service officer. We commonly supply economic and development assistance, and even military aid, but avoid giving advice or help for developing political institutions. Yet the other forms of assistance all work to destabilize traditional political structures. All too often, the resulting political transition is hostile to U.S. interests.

This is particularly likely when the United States provides a corrupt, authoritarian regime with economic and military aid, but refrains from pressuring a Ferdinand Marcos, for example, into adopting acceptable democratic behavior for fear of seeming to intervene. A few small initiatives calculated to demonstrate the importance attached to democratic institutions and practice—such as inviting Benigno Aquino to the White House before he returned to Manila—could go far toward preventing the need for a much more costly intervention later.

We should discuss sensitive political issues with governments we are helping, and must be prepared to complain publicly if they neglect or subvert the development of healthy governing institutions. In some cases, we should even use the CIA to destabilize harmful forces, such as the Salvadoran death squads. Our diplomats, and the administration, must be willing to apply political leverage and displease top officials in the host country.

"Multinational Peacekeeping in the Middle East and the United Nations Model." *By Richard W. Nelson. International Affairs (London), Vol. 61, #1, Winter 1984–85.* The conditions that determine the success of a peacekeeping operation are governed more by political than military factors. One operation that did not meet those conditions was the multinational force stationed in Beirut in 1982–83. As a result, writes Nelson, it suffered a humiliating end.

The MNF overstepped the general rule of peacekeeping that armed force can only be used in self-defense. It also lacked a clear and appropriate mandate, especially after the Palestinians had been evacuated. Instead, it was vaguely obligated to assist in restoring the sovereignty of the Lebanese government. Moreover, the intention was that it do this by creating a buffer zone, not through bombing. Broad political support is also essential for any peacekeeping operation to succeed, as is the cooperation of all the parties concerned. The first MNF, which oversaw the Palestinian withdrawal from Beirut, met these conditions, but the force that returned to Lebanon after the Sabra and Shatila massacres did not. Eventually, the MNF came to be seen as being supportive of the Christian Phalangists, and it was then doomed to failure in its peacekeeping mission. Finally, the MNF lacked the unified military command and broadly international troop composition that could have prevented it from being viewed as a NATO rather than a non-aligned force.

Peacekeeping, however, is still a workable concept. The Sinai Multinational Force and Observers is another example of a peacekeeping group that lacks U.N. supervision, but in contrast with the Beirut MFO, it has been operating relatively successfully since it was established under the Camp David accords.

"Protectionism and World Politics." *By Susan Strange. International Organization, Vol. 39, #2, Spring 1985.* The experience of the early 1980s has demonstrated that protectionism does not pose a great threat to the world trading system, argues this well-known economist. The argument that it does is part of the liberal mythology we must finally discard. True, free trade is no longer effectively enforced by international rules such as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. But both states and corporations do have an interest in succeeding in the world economy; during the last decade they have pursued this interest by constructing a variety of bilateral (and sometimes multilateral) trading bargains. Because this web of contracts has become so widespread, the current decline of the GATT is irrelevant.

These contracts have also proven to be a more effective way than international rules for states to pursue their primary obligation—security. Liberal supporters of free trade have mistakenly assumed that a government's first responsibility is to act efficiently in the international market, but this ignores its need to preserve strategic industries and encourage domestic economic stability.

Nor have the liberals succeeded in prov-

ing that the recent growth of protectionism has been detrimental to the world economy. Certainly the developing countries have continued to sell their manufactured goods at a healthy rate despite restrictions on those items. Their sales seem to be determined, not by tariffs, but by world economic growth. The serious economic disorders of the last few years can be better explained by mismanagement of monetary supplies and credit and turmoil in the world oil market than by protectionism.

"Famine, Development, and Foreign Aid." *By Nick Eberstadt. Commentary, Vol. 79, #3, March 1985.* The official development policies of the United States have strayed from their original purposes to the point where they are now sometimes having the opposite effect than the one intended, argues Eberstadt. Even though the net transfer of financial resources from the western countries to the developing world since 1956 is estimated at almost two trillion 1985 dollars, it is clear that the results have not been very impressive.

Indeed, many Third World countries are now less able to feed themselves or attract private investment than they were before. Foreign aid, which was intended to encourage Third World countries to participate in the global economy, seems to have encouraged them to avoid the sometimes painful domestic policies—controlling the money supply and shifting resources to the export sector—that are needed for such participation. Foreign aid has also made it possible for recipient governments to extend their control over the economy and distort it in a way that inhibits widespread growth. Thus they have been able to use foreign aid to stymie its intended goals. The final result is that the values, institutions, and international economic arrangements that we cherish for ourselves have become more distant—not less—for the people of the Third World.

"When to Intervene." *By Charles Krauthammer. New Republic, #3,668, May 6, 1985.* For the United States to intervene in other countries, that intervention must be both morally justified and strategically necessary, writes this columnist. American interventions have traditionally been justified by claiming they were crusades for democracy. But history shows that this was often no more than an excuse for many other motivations. But defending democracy is a worthwhile endeavor and its historical misuses should not limit its legitimate use now. Americans should be confident enough to define international morality in their own terms. This is not parochial; it is parochial to limit our values to only a few mostly white western countries.

But foreign policy is not philanthropy—one only intervenes where it is not simply morally justified but strategically necessary. The satisfaction of these two conditions is more important than the requirements of international law, world public opinion, or even the sentiments of our allies. Instead of wondering whether a country is worth defending, we should determine which are and work to support regimes that are compatible with our long-term interests.

"Dissent And Decision-making: A Study of George Ball's and John McNaughton's Opposition to the Vietnam War." *By Ross A. Kennedy. Fletcher Forum, Vol. 9, #1, Winter 1985.* Both Under Secretary of State George Ball and Assistant Secretary of Defense John McNaughton dissented from U.S. policy toward Vietnam during the period 1965–67. But although neither dissented so effectively that U.S. policy was changed significantly, they did so in different ways and with different results, writes Kennedy. Eventually, however, both men left the arena of Vietnam policymaking, convinced that dissent had outlived its usefulness.

Ball operated at the highest levels of the government. However, he allowed himself to be put on the defensive at meetings with the president, so that even those who were sympathetic on some points were reluctant to give him any support. He also argued for drastic adjustments in policy such as withdrawing from Vietnam, rather than for modest changes such as controlling escalation. As a result, Ball's efforts reinforced the consensus against his views. It also reinforced his isolation, and eventually he left the government.

McNaughton operated at a lower level and for a superior—Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara—who demanded absolute loyalty once a decision had been made. As a result, McNaughton could not be open about his dissent. He had to work through McNamara, as the secretary's confidence in him was his only source of power. Yet, McNaughton was more successful than Ball in provoking a discussion of U.S. policy. This was due to his pursuit of more limited goals: instead of arguing for radical shifts in policy, he concentrated on trying to minimize U.S. objectives. Although McNaughton has been criticized for not addressing the fundamental failings of U.S. policy, in the end he was more effective than Ball, who did pose such questions.

CONGRESS

Squeezing State

By LARRY KNUTSON

On the floor of the House of Representatives the subject was money and how to squeeze some of it out of the federal budget. "I think that a lovely place to start would be the State Department authorization," said Representative Trent Lott (R.-Mississippi), the House Republican whip. "If you cannot save a little money in the State Department, I just wonder where in the world we are going to be able to save it."

Lott no longer has much to wonder about. The House followed his advice and on May 9 adopted an amendment freezing spending for State, USIA, and the Board for International Broadcasting at the levels set for fiscal year 1985, allowing only a four percent inflation factor for the next two fiscal years.

The House action, coupled with earlier reductions made by the House Foreign Affairs Committee, cuts a total of $193 million from a two-year authorization Secretary of State Shultz originally had called "a good bill in harsh times." These reductions are not the last word, however, as the measure had yet to be considered by the Senate.

Even in its reduced form, the bill does contain important funding for security improvements at U.S. diplomatic posts. But Shultz had contended that the administration's request for $3.89 billion in FY 1986 and $4.16 billion in FY 1987 marked "the absolute bottom line in resources I believe are needed to increase our security." Shultz argued that the balance between security costs and operating expenses is so delicate that "the only way we could adjust to additional cuts is to postpone vitally important security projects."

"If our already austere budget is cut further, I will be obliged to tell our people abroad that they will have to continue to run heightened risks, that we cannot provide them with the additional protection that we all recognize they should have," Shultz said. "These people are professionals, and I am confident they will accept those risks, but I hope we can avoid such a situation."

Earlier, Shultz had told the House committee that 139 of 262 U.S. posts overseas do not meet new minimum security standards and are in need of "replacement or significant overhaul." The House panel expressed concern in its report that the costs of such an undertaking could reach $3.5 billion and said that the department needs to adopt a cost-efficient and businesslike approach in dealing with security projects.

As the House adopted a long series of amendments to the authorization bill, one of the casualties was the plan for State to accept a gift of a permanent residence for the secretary. This was intended to avoid the $200,000 cost of installing security equipment at the home of each new secretary. But Representative Thomas E. Petri (R.-Wisconsin) called that a bad idea, one that could create "a new class of great princes and dukes in our midst." Petri argued that the plan would create a precedent that would likely lead to permanent residences for a large number of high-ranking officials, including the secretaries of defense and treasury.

"By and by, all major officials, and maybe also the Speaker of the House, will hold forth like great lords in grand princely palaces scattered across the city," Petri said. And that would not only be "totally inappropriate to a democracy," it would be costly as well. "The wealthy donors of these mansions are going to take charitable deductions based on inflated valuations, avoid capital-gains taxes, and cost the taxpayers probably millions of dollars per residence, enough to overwhelm the alleged security-expense savings, without even considering the maintenance costs," Petri said.

The authorization bill as passed by the House has one provision that committee staff members say "should make the Foreign Service officer elated." Essentially, it makes the federal pay cap more flexible and permits Foreign Service personnel to collect performance pay. It would also erase a regulation that has limited performance pay to no more than 50 percent of Foreign Service employees in any one fiscal year. And it would set the minimum individual award at five percent of basic pay "in order to guarantee that awards are meaningful." The maximum award is 20 percent of pay.

The pay cap would be avoided by providing that any performance pay not payable in a given fiscal year because of the cap may be paid in a lump sum at the beginning of the next fiscal year. Another provision allows payment to be made even in

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Larry Knutson covers Capitol Hill for the Associated Press.

the event of the employee's death. However, since this provision is not included in the Senate version of the bill, its fate will be determined by the House-Senate conference that reconciles the two measures.

There were dozens of amendments lying in wait for the authorization bill when it reached the House floor. In one, the House voted to cut the U.S. contribution to the United Nations by 15 percent in FY 1987, amid loud complaints that U.N. officials are paid "outrageously high" salaries and other benefits. The reduction was delayed by a year, supporters said, in order to give the criticism time to sink in and perhaps to spur changes.

And, after much debate, the House voted to kill one of the smallest programs in the bill, a $25,000 authorization to provide special religious sensitivity instruction for Foreign Service personnel being posted to the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and Asia. Representative Dan Burton (R.-Indiana) ridiculed the idea, contending that Foreign Service officers can learn about religious practices at their public libraries. He also said that it might be unconstitutional and the cost would undoubtedly grow. Representative Lawrence J. Smith (D.-Florida) objected in vain that "to talk in terms of $25,000 a year for training for some of our diplomats as being excessive or costly when it comes to understanding religious rights in places like Czechoslovakia or the Soviet Union or Bulgaria is a little beyond the pale."

The House ignored the advice of the bill's floor manager, Daniel Mica (D.-Florida), and approved an amendment requiring the State Department to fire all Soviet citizens employed at the U.S. embassy in Moscow and the consulate at Leningrad. Jim Courter (R.-New Jersey) said that the more than 200 Soviet citizens employed at these posts represent unacceptable security risks. "There is no doubt in my mind that some of the Soviet personnel are in fact agents of the KGB," Courter said. Mica remarked that the department is already at work on a plan to reduce the number of Soviet employees and to improve embassy security. And he cautioned that an outright ban on hiring Soviet employees "could be hurtful to our intelligence needs." He said he could not explain further except in secret session. But he did say that U.S. intelligence officials fear that sending 200 or more Americans to the Soviet Union as chauffeurs, custodians, and janitors could create "more of a target for the Russians than the personnel we already have there, resulting in a greater danger."

"To add, without some real careful thinking, 200 or 300 new Americans and all of their housing and all of their facilities and eventually all of their families to the network that we are already trying to secure, I think would be an error," Mica said.

The most controversial amendment was a non-binding resolution calling on President Reagan to respond to the Soviet Union's refusal to apologize for the killing of an American Army major by a Soviet sentry inside East Germany by declaring Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin *persona non grata*. Democrats called the amendment an attempt to paint them into a politically embarrassing corner. They objected that, if Dobrynin were actually expelled, Moscow would retaliate by expelling U.S. Ambassador Arthur Hartman. The result, they said, would be a virtual breaking of diplomatic relations. The amendment was adopted, 322 to 93, after its sponsor, William Broomfield (R.-Michigan), told the House: "Let's send a clear signal to the Kremlin leaders over the murder of an innocent man." But Dobrynin is not expected to be sent packing.

In another amendment passed by the House and introduced by Robert A. Smith (D.-Missouri), the Foreign Service Institute, currently spread out in rented quarters in four separate buildings in Rosslyn, would be brought under one new roof in Arlington. Smith said moving to permanent quarters would save roughly $45 million in rent over the next 30 years. According to the Foreign Affairs Committee, the present facilities are "expensive and ill-suited for an educational activity." The amendment would authorize construction of a $61 million facility with about 342,000 square feet of usable space, about double that currently available to the institute. It permits the State Department to make $11 million available over the next two fiscal years for site acquisition and design work.

There are other provisions of interest:

- The House committee expressed concern in its report "that the State Department has not made sufficient progress over the last decade in realizing equal employment opportunities for women." It called on the department to review its personnel policies in that regard;
- Stating that the threat of terrorism can cause damaging strain, the House panel asked State to review the need for more mental health professionals "to serve at high-risk overseas missions"; and
- Both Senate and House bills elevate the directors of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research and the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs to the rank of assistant secretary of state. The move would subject the heads of those bureaus to the Senate confirmation process. □

CLIPPINGS

Sexism at State

"In a class-action suit nine years in the making, Foreign Service women are contending the 'men's club' atmosphere of the State Department continues—despite repeated cases of proven discrimination. 'The evidence is overwhelming,' said lawyer Bruce Terris, who represents 500 to 700 current and former Foreign Service officers from 1976 to the present. The government's lawyer, Stuart H. Newberger, denied the charges."

Judith Horstman in USA Today, May 7

Mountain Molehill

" 'It wasn't the best deal we ever made,' said a U.S. official. 'They got the mountain and we got the swamp.'

"The revelation last week of electronic eavesdropping at the U.S. embassy in Moscow has again raised questions about the sites chosen for the new Soviet and American embassies being built in each country. After six years of negotiations ending in a 1969 agreement, the Soviets were provided with a location on Mount Alto in northwest Washington, D.C., one of the highest spots in the area, while the U.S. was left to build in low, marshy ground near the Moscow River."

Time, April 8

Wars of Words

"First came plain old *diplomacy*, from the Greek word for a letter that has been folded over so that its contents cannot be readily seen....Secretary Kissinger let it be known that he preferred *quiet diplomacy*, a formulation that diplomats liked because it seemed to describe action and promised results from behind-the-scenes maneuvering.

"In January 1976...Bryce Harlow asked Richard Allen, the foreign-policy analyst, to write the national-security section of that year's platform. Mr. Allen agreed, upon the proviso that it not be cleared with Henry Kissinger.

" 'A strong and effective program of global public diplomacy is a vital component of U.S. foreign policy,' read the document, and this *public diplomacy* was taken, as intended, to be an emphasis different from the *quiet diplomacy* that led to the detente that held sway during the era of Henry the K.

" 'It meant a strong and effective United States Information Agency,' recalls Mr. Allen today, 'taking the offensive in the war of ideas against the Soviet union.' The phrase was considered more acceptable than *propaganda*...."

William Safire in the New York Times Magazine, April 20

"Now just a damn minute. When I find six pages of *Publishers Weekly* devoted to 'a major new commitment to the provision of U.S. books abroad' and a proposal to give a $12 million annual book budget to USIA, I find myself struggling with latent isolationism demanding to be expressed....I and other U.S. taxpayers will have to put up the $12 million for the program. And it isn't even going to be for me....

"Had USIA proposed it without National Security Council endorsement, it would have been seen as an attempt by those insidious liberals in the media to spread the propaganda of past failed administrations....I marvel at the twist and turns of policy in our complex society. If the White House (whence comes the NSC's voice) can coopt the New York publishing industry for a mere $12 million, it will be the slickest deal since the Dutch bought Manhattan for $24."

Lachlan P. MacDonald in Publishers Weekly, April 12

The Reign in Spain

"Diplomacy is a quiet art, pursued far from the spotlight. Television demands not only conflict and controversy, but instantaneous response. Whether one appears on one of the Sunday morning interview shows, or responds to a question shouted in the 10 feet between the door of the sedan and the entrance of the State Department, answers cannot be given frivolously....

"During my tenure at State, there was an attempted coup in Madrid. At my morning press briefing I was not in possession of any clear answers. Afterward, I went to a half-hour meeting, after which I was again asked by the press about the situation in Spain. I didn't know—having been cooped up for half an hour—but instead of saying precisely that, I told the reporters, 'It's too early to say.' My remark was immediately interpreted in Spain as a biased position in favor of the abortive military takeover and it took me weeks to clarify what I had said."

Alexander Haig in TV Guide, March 9

Snarling Bureaucrats

"To hear its counselor tell it, the State Department is a bureaucratic snarl in which U.S. foreign policy falls victim to competing factions, blunders, missed opportunities, inefficiencies, faulty decision-making processes, and a host of other crippling and debilitating maladies.

" 'What we need is somebody to shake up the whole damned structure,' said Edward J. Derwinski, who was an Illinois congressman for two dozen years before he moved to the State Department job.

"Too much policy is made by career State Department employees with no political loyalties to a president....And, in the shuffling of White House personnel since President Reagan began his second term, he said, 'State Department careerists...are using the vacuum to shove more career people into ambassadorships, and the White House isn't retaliating fast enough. I think one out of three ambassadors, at a minimum, ought to be political appointees.' "

Bill King in the Washington Times, April 29

"The State Department has categorically denied that its counselor, Edward J. Derwinski, questioned the loyalty of Foreign Service officers....State Department spokesman Edward Djerjian said that Derwinski had asked him to say the article interpreted some of his views with a negative cast that was not intended."

Federal Times, May 13

Paying Spouses

" 'When [the Foreign Service Associates proposal, which would pay spouses who do work at posts] first came up, I, in typical male-chauvinist fashion, had my doubts,' [former Under Secretary for Political Affairs Lawrence] Eagleburger says. 'But the more I listened to my wife, and the more I looked into it, I realized she was correct. I became an ardent advocate. Foreign Service wives—and lots of other wives too—work for the U.S. government, and the U.S. government has been getting it for free...that's not right. For common justice, they ought to be paid for it.' "

Joanna Biggar in the Washington Post Magazine, April 14

CLIPPINGS records statements in the media on the Foreign Service and the agencies.

QUESTIONNAIRE: SPOUSES

What follows is the second in a series of questionnaires on topics of concern to our Foreign Service readers. It is not intended as an official study but as an informal sampling of opinion. All replies will be confidential. The results will be tabulated and presented in a future issue of the JOURNAL. Please complete this page and send it to FSJ Questionnaire #2, 2101 E Street., NW, Washington, D.C. 20037. Thanks!

Because this survey is intended to measure the attitudes of Foreign Service employees, it should not be given to the spouse to complete, but should be filled out by the employee.

1. Are you ☐ male or ☐ female?

2. How long have you been in the Foreign Service?
☐ 1-5 years ☐ 6-10 years ☐ 11-20 years ☐ more than 20 years ☐ retired

3. Are you ☐ single ☐ married ☐ divorced?

4. If divorced, did the demands of the Foreign Service and its lifestyle contribute to your divorce?
☐ not at all ☐ some ☐ was the primary cause

Questions 5-9 are for married personnel (Please note: "work" refers to a paid activity.)

5. If married, which of the following best describes your spouse's current situation?
☐ does not work and does not care to
☐ does not work but would like to
☐ does primarily volunteer work
☐ works, but not in field of choice
☐ works in field of choice
☐ other _____

6. Has your membership in the Foreign Service affected your spouse's choice of whether to work or in what field?
☐ not at all ☐ some ☐ was a major factor

7. Which of the following best describes your spouse's situation the last time you were posted abroad and he/she accompanied you?
☐ working outside the FS, but on the mission staff
☐ primarily engaged in volunteer activities
☐ working on contract to the U.S. government
☐ FS employee (tandem) ☐ non-working
☐ working in the host-country economy
☐ other _____

8. Which of the following best describes your spouse's situation the last time you were posted in the United States and he/she accompanied you?
☐ working outside the FS, but for the U.S. government
☐ FS employee (tandem)
☐ working outside the government
☐ non-working
☐ primarily engaged in volunteer activities
☐ other _____

9. Has your spouse ever left a job to accompany you to a post? ☐ yes ☐ no

10. When you served abroad, has your spouse ever stayed behind? (Please check all that apply.)
☐ for professional reasons
☐ for considerations of danger or health at post
☐ for personal or family reasons
☐ never stayed behind

11. How much of a consideration is the availability of employment for spouses when you are bidding on posts?
☐ not at all ☐ of some consideration ☐ a major consideration

12. Are you familiar with the Foreign Service Associates proposal? ☐ yes ☐ somewhat ☐ no

13. If you are familiar with the Associates proposal, are you in favor of it? ☐ yes ☐ undecided ☐ no

14. Please indicate the level of your agreement or disagreement with the following statements (fill in the blanks with the appropriate number. 1: agree strongly; 2: agree; 3: undecided; 4: disagree; 5: strongly disagree):
_____ The Foreign Service is fundamentally incompatible with a two-career family.
_____ Spouses who accompany FS employees overseas should receive some remuneration for their efforts.
_____ Having spouses and families overseas is important for the FS.
_____ FS spouses should be willing to do representational and other traditional activities even if they do not receive payment.
_____ The foreign affairs agencies have been helpful in dealing with the problems of two-career families.

15. Which of the approaches listed below should be given priority in attempting to resolve the issue of spouse employment overseas (please number in order of importance, with 1 being the most important and 5 least important):
_____ Spouses should automatically receive a percentage of the FS employee's salary.
_____ More bilateral arrangements should be made, permitting spouses to work in other countries.
_____ More efforts should be made to provide employment for spouses in the mission.
_____ The foreign affairs agencies should not make any particular efforts; it is the individual's responsibility.

Please feel free to comment further.

_____

_____

_____

10-25-50

Foreign Service Journal, June 1975: "The Vietnam war is over....As the situation in Vietnam deteriorated, AFSA became increasingly concerned for the safety of American Foreign Service personnel, and on several occasions expressed to the department at very high levels our view that American personnel should not become hostages for a bankrupt policy line, and that the department should move first to get dependents and then employees out as quickly as possible....While this nation's interests will be ill served by another 'China Hands' debacle, it does not mean that we should pretend that Vietnam never existed. The career Service left behind in Vietnam a record of dedication and sacrifice, and in many cases, of courageous reporting and responsible dissent. Yet as an institution, we also made mistakes."
AFSA Editorial

Foreign Service Journal, June 1960: "An officer in London...thought he would like to have some fun with his friends in Paris. He provided himself with a set of false whiskers, a pair of dark glasses, and a small cake of soap, and went and stood in the visa line at the Paris embassy. At what he considered the psychological moment, and the height of the morning rush, he keeled over on the floor, soap-suds foaming from his mouth, in an excellent rendition of an epileptic seizure. For the next ten minutes all was confusion as flocks of vice consuls gathered him up and toted him into an inner office, to treat him with smelling salts, ice water, and other available remedies. The climax came when he sat up, ripped off his disguise, and shouted cheerily, 'Hi, fellows! How are things in Paris?' "
Frank Snowden Hopkins

Foreign Service Journal, June 1935: "A direct printer cable circuit to be operated between Washington and London was formally inaugurated on May 1, in Washington at the Department of State and in London at the American embassy, by an exchange of messages between Secretary Hull and Ambassador Bingham."

10-25-50 records excerpts from previous issues, with an eye toward how much things have changed—or remained the same.

DESPATCH

Easing Away

Without any announcement, the White House has put into effect a new rule to limit tours of non-career ambassadors at two and a half to three years. About 30 envoys have been notified thus far they are being replaced under the rule, according to the State Department. Career chiefs of mission will have a similar replacement rule, but most would be transferred normally after about that much time.

"It's not really a rule, it's an understanding," the department's chief of presidential appointments, Jane Mossellem told the JOURNAL. While ambassadors are traditionally expected to offer letters of resignation on the changing or reinauguration of an administration, they were not last winter. The new rule—or understanding—is meant as a more graceful way of replacing political appointees, a necessity after the administration decided to shake up the ambassadorial corps following the inauguration. Some ambassadors, however, both career and non-career, are expected to receive extensions.

Compensating Hostages

When the hostages returned from Iran four years ago, they received ticker-tape parades, medals, awards, and a promise that the government would reimburse them for their ordeal, in a manner similar to compensation given to prisoners of war. Despite the finding of a presidential commission that they should receive $12.50 per day for their incarceration, however, no hostage has received a dime.

Two bills on Capitol Hill promise to redress that failure. H.R. 2019, introduced by Representative Patricia Schroeder (D.-Colorado), is meant to replace the expired Hostage Relief Act of 1980 and put into place a permanent system for treating hostages who are incarcerated as a result of an action directed against the United States. Like the 1980 act, H.R. 2019 would provide educational benefits and tax relief to hostages and their families, but it mandates compensation payments to the Teheran hostages. The amount of compensation, however, is not specified, and the bill allows for flexibility to meet special circumstances. A similar measure sponsored by the administration, H.R. 1956, authorizes payments but does not require them. Schroeder's bill in addition provides for Foreign Service National employees who become hostages and for domestic hostage situations, such as might occur at the United Nations, but it leaves out the armed services. "We think the uniformed services should be covered so their people, such as military attaches, receive equal treatment," State legislative analyst Torrey Whitman told the JOURNAL. The department nonetheless would be pleased if either passed, although it expects stiff questioning on the Hill about measures to avoid diplomats' being taken hostage at all.

A previous attempt to produce permanent legislation failed in 1983, when a bill sponsored by the administration failed to clear both houses. The current bills are given greater odds of being enacted.

Discrimination Allegations

In the last ten years, the portion of female Foreign Service officers in the Department of State has doubled, from nine percent of the corps to 18. Of the 822 senior FSOs in the department, however, only 30 are women, and only three of the 41 positions on State's current organizational chart of its top hierarchy are held by women: the chief of protocol, the coordinator for international communications and information policy, and the assistant secretary for consular affairs.

Evidence of discrimination in the department is "overwhelming," according to a group of female FSOs who have filed a class action suit against State. Some 500 to 700 women are represented by the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs include retired FSO Alison Palmer, who began the action in 1976. The suit is currently in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. The women contend that State is still a men's club and their attorney, Bruce J. Terris, has said that women are not considered appropriate for certain positions. Female officers are frequently discriminated against in assignments, areas of specialization, promotions, evaluations, and awards, he said, and too many are assigned to consular work rather than the political, economic, and administrative cones.

State has denied the charges. U.S. Attorney Stuart H. Newberger said that an "old boy network" once existed, but not anymore. "The Foreign Service, like society, has changed over the last 10 or 11 years." In an address earlier in the spring, Secretary Shultz noted the legislative requirements to broaden the Service's representativeness and said that 30 percent of entering classes are female. "As the new recruits rise in their careers, we will find increasing numbers of them in senior department positions," he said.

Palmer, for one, gives credit to State for sincere efforts to improve the situation. "The problem now does not involve recruitment," she said. "That issue has been settled. The issue now involves promotions and assignments." Newberger said that the numbers in the higher ranks had improved: "More women have moved up through the Service, as the State Department had planned."

In AID, female employees are making similar claims. In a 30-page study published by the Women's Action Organization, the authors contend that in that agency, too, women are shunted into specialties such as health and nutrition, rather than "fast-track fields leading to senior administrative posts," according to Marilyn Zak, WAO vice president. The report says that the many female political appointees in the agency at present inflate the representation of women without helping promotion prospects for female career employees.

The agency, however, notes that 34 percent of its entrants and 36 percent of the agency workforce are female and disputes WAO's statistics. WAO in turn says that the agency's inclusion of staff positions historically held by women plays down the relatively low numbers in the higher ranks. Only three AID mission directors are women, according to WAO, and only 11 of 263 members of the Senior Foreign Service.

DESPATCH is a compendium of news about the Service. It is written by the editor and does not necessarily represent the views of the Association.

Counterpoint

IMPROVEMENTS ARE BEING MADE IN FSN ADMINISTRATION

ERNEST C. RUEHLE

IN HIS ARTICLE in the last issue entitled "Members with a Difference," John Grimes discusses the situation of Foreign Service National employees and focuses on three broad areas: compensation, position classification, and employee-management relations. As director of the Office of Foreign Service National Personnel, I would like to comment on what we have been doing recently.

The authority for compensating FSN employees is contained in the Foreign Service Act. Section 408 authorizes "compensation plans...based upon prevailing wage rates and compensation practices...for corresponding types of positions in the locality of employment." Thus, FSN compensation is tied neither to local inflation rates nor to the exchange value of local currency to the dollar, except as these factors influence local compensation practices.

For many years, the State Department used typical U.S. wage-setting approaches to establish FSN compensation levels. We followed prevailing practice, but sometimes at a considerable distance. In 1980, after some of the events cited in Mr. Grimes's article took place, the foreign affairs agencies recognized that revised methods of implementing the act were necessary to cope with rapidly changing situations and introduce modern practices for setting pay.

Mr. Grimes's article reflects problems regarding FSN compensation and other conditions of employment which were of concern to department management officials as well. Most of these have been changed since 1980. Specifically:

Changes in local pay levels took too long to be reflected in FSN salaries: Interagency policy now permits the implementation of a revised local compensation plan when full salary information collected at the post is received in the department, which advances the effective date by one or two months from the previous timing. In countries with volatile economies, with annual inflation rates of more than 100 percent or devaluation rates of local currency to the dollar of over 100 percent, the ambassador has been granted authority to adjust the FSN salary schedule on an interim, emergency basis, based on projected salary movement. The former practice of one FSN salary review per year is no longer observed, and in some countries, increases can come as often as once per month.

Real wages of FSN employees declined by 50 percent when salary data were unavailable: There are only two Eastern European countries (out of a total of 140 localities with different FSN compensation plans) where available salary data are meager, and even in these countries, imaginative techniques have produced reliable salary information. Furthermore, regulations now being published authorize a mission's FSN compensation rates to exceed locally prevailing salary practices in an economic crisis when such practices are unmeasurable and government operations are significantly impaired because of low FSN salary rates (which may result in improper diet, impaired performance, etc.).

Employees under the Civil Service retirement system at a post receive significantly less in total compensation than those not under the system but cannot withdraw from it without penalty: The Civil Service retirement system was designed for American employees in the United States. Although used for FSNs for many years, it has frequently resulted in over or under compensation, compared with local practice. The U.S. laws governing the Civil Service retirement system are not flexible and do not lend themselves to adaptation to meet 140 different foreign conditions. Legislation passed in 1983, at the department's request, now permits the establishment of alternatives to this system, such as provident funds, which parallel prevailing retirement practices. Interagency policy is to facilitate participation by posts in local retirement systems and to permit the voluntary withdrawal of FSN employees from the Civil Service retirement system to enter the local one where it is to their individual advantage to do so.

To turn to the second topic, the new interagency FSN position classification method was developed and implemented to establish a basic worldwide system that could be monitored from Washington. The need for such a method arose because of the sometimes devastating effect on FSN morale of varied systems that were often subject to manipulation and favoritism by American supervisors. The example in Mr. Grimes's article only confirms the need for a universally accepted, centrally controlled, single-standard system. The reaction of FSN employees at posts where the system has been in place is generally positive.

Finally, Mr. Grimes's article will serve an extremely useful purpose, from a management viewpoint, if it makes other members of the Foreign Service focus on the importance of the FSN contribution to the functioning of our overseas missions. It is in the area of employee-management relations, where these other members are actively involved, that our system is

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

Foreign Service Nationals work hand-in-hand with American employees to keep embassies running smoothly. A Hungarian employee (far left) goes over a letter with American Pat Forner, while Donna Hamilton checks a consular report with an FSN in Thessaloniki (top) and local employees in Maracaibo (above) discuss the Venezuelan provisional passport with the vice consul (right).

most deficient. And while policies and guidance are formulated at the headquarters level, it is at the operating level that implementation determines their success.

Despite repeated instructions to the field (most recently in the just distributed *Foreign Service National Personnel Administration Handbook*) to establish post grievance systems so FSN employees can seek redress from real or perceived mistreatment, too many posts have taken no positive action to comply. We also are concerned that management officials at a number of posts still have not established open lines of communication with FSN employees, either directly or through FSN employee associations. Revised regulations, now being drafted, will address this problem, and Foreign Service inspectors will be asked to monitor their implementation.

Recognition of union representation of FSN employees is not required by U.S. law, as Mr. Grimes acknowledges. The complexities of representing management in negotiations with foreign unions would place an impossible burden on our transient American staff, and Washington backstopping of these efforts with 140 different foreign unions would be impossible. We think it unlikely that foreign unions would accept the U.S. government's injunction against striking or against bargaining with federal employees or their union representatives on the issue of wages or position classification. Congress considered these factors in its review of Foreign Service Act legislation.

MR. GRIMES IMPLIES that without formal union organization, FSN employees will not receive the quality of personnel administration and management attention that they deserve. Interest in FSN personnel at the highest levels of management in Washington belies that judgment. A January cable (State 11288) from Under Secretary for Management Ronald I. Spiers and then-Director General Alfred L. Atherton advised posts of developments in the FSN personnel field. We hope that FSN and American personnel have been, or will be, apprised of the information in that cable.

There is a new commitment to providing administrative and personnel officers with better training, to prepare them to take on the complex responsibilities of administering an FSN personnel program. Rotational assignments of career mobility officers to our office ensures their in-depth knowledge of this facet of administration prior to their first overseas personnel assignment.

Although Mr. Grimes describes it as minuscule, the Office of Foreign Service National Personnel has been increased from a complement of nine in 1980 to 22. Of the 11 "ordinary Civil Service" professional members of our staff, three have served overseas as members of the Foreign Service, two of them as personnel officers. Our Civil Service employees are so highly regarded by the regional bureaus and by overseas posts that their travel is funded by the regional bureaus so they can provide guidance, counseling, and workshops to both FSN employees and American management officials.

A recent, unsolicited cable from a Latin American post reads: "The worldwide FSN personnel system grows better and more responsive as time passes, thanks to the fine professional staff of the Office of Foreign Service Personnel and the support of the bureaus."

Thank you, Mr. Grimes, for giving us an opportunity to talk about the work we are doing, the direction in which we're going, and the improvements we mean to achieve. We have some distance to go, but we are proud of the progress we've made in five years. □

The deposed shah of Iran during a hospital interview in 1980. The monarch's mortal illness turned the tide of opinion within the NSC to allow his entry into the United States.

THE EMPEROR AND THE EMBASSY

The shah's entry into the United States was expected to trigger a hostile reaction, but neither the embassy nor Washington made adequate preparations

GARY SICK

THE MOST DRAMATIC collision between the United States and the Iranian revolution began, typically, with a telephone call in the middle of the night. Dawn arrives in Teheran seven and a half hours before the sun rises on the east coast of the United States, so at four o'clock in the morning in Washington it is approaching noon in Teheran—plenty of time for something to go wrong.

I was awakened early on Sunday morning, November 4, 1979, by a telephone call from the White House Situation Room informing me that the U.S. embassy in Teheran had been overrun. We had been expecting trouble ever since the shah was admitted to the United States two weeks earlier, so I was not entirely surprised. After a few mumbled questions I got up and dressed in the dark, then drove through the empty streets of the capital listening to the bulletins coming in on the radio. Unshaven and a bit bleary-eyed, I had no reason to suspect that this predawn shuttle was to become a routine part of my life for the next 14 months.

This was not the first attack on the embassy. Nine months earlier it had been attacked and the ambassador and staff taken captive. On that occasion, only days after the collapse of the Bakhtiar government, Ibrahim Yazdi and other members of Ayatollah Khomeini's retinue had personally intervened within 24 hours to set them free and to provide some measure of protection to the embassy in the form of a band of revolutionary guards.

By November, Yazdi had become the acting foreign minister, and in the previous few weeks we had received assurances from him and Prime Minister Bazargan that the embassy would be protected. They were disturbed—as were many Iranians—by the sudden admission of the shah to the United States, but

they were also men of integrity who took their responsibilities under international law seriously.

Driving through the deserted streets of Washington that Sunday morning, I felt no sense of complacency. But listening to the bulletins coming out of Teheran, I took some comfort in the belief that those charged with responsibility in the revolutionary regime would exert their best efforts to resolve this new crisis as quickly as possible. And so they did—for about 36 hours, until they were swept from power in a new swerve of the revolution.

But that was not yet evident as I joined the small group assembled that morning in the State Department Operations Center, listening anxiously to the telephone reports coming in from Teheran. Each telephone line was connected to a small speaker on the long table, and the voices were personally familiar to all of us as friends, colleagues, acquaintances. Elizabeth Ann Swift, who was reporting on an open line from the embassy, had been in my office only a few weeks earlier. Her voice from Teheran had the same unhurried professionalism and edge of determination that had impressed me during our earlier conversation, when she was assessing the difficulties for a woman reporting on political developments in a revolutionary Islamic society.

Each of us in the room bore some measure of responsibility for the circumstances the voices were describing, and in those long morning hours, as one telephone line after another abruptly went silent, each of us had to ask ourselves the questions that would trouble many Americans in the long months ahead: Why had we let it happen? Could it have been prevented? Why had the shah been allowed to come to the United States at this delicate moment?

A lot had happened in the last nine months. The shah had proved to be as indecisive in exile as he had been in power, and this presented a disagreeable problem for the U.S. government. Originally, the shah was supposed to fly from Iran directly to the United States. He decided to stop in Egypt, however, and his visit there continued for a week. Then he flew to Morocco as the guest of King Hassan. In the meantime Khomeini returned to Teheran, the Bakhtiar regime collapsed and, on February 14, the U.S. embassy was attacked.

Had the shah come to the United States in January 1979 as expected, his presence would have been regarded as entirely normal. Even Khomeini had expressed no objections. But as the political situation deteriorated and the United States maneuvered to retain some measure of contact with Iran, the shah's indecision and procrastination gradually transformed what would have been a routine event into a political issue.

Washington had had no direct contact with the shah during his visit to Egypt and was not consulted about his trip to Morocco. A senior U.S. intelligence official was sent privately to establish contact with the shah and his party there, spending nearly two hours with them on February 11. He found the shah to be virtually a broken man, traumatized by events and lacking any plans for the future. The shah gave no indication of a desire to move to the United States, and no further arrangements were made, although the invitation remained open. Three days later the first attack on the embassy occurred, and Washington began to reconsider the wisdom of permitting the shah to come.

It seems likely that the shah, in these initial weeks of exile, continued to hope that events would turn in his favor. If he was to be called back to Iran, it would obviously be preferable to return from an Islamic country rather than the United States. However, after the military collapse on February 11, he may have concluded that any hope of returning in the near future was unrealistic. On February 22 the shah sent a message to Richard Parker, the U.S. ambassador to Morocco, that he had decided to move to the United States within the next week or so.

In a meeting the following day, the Special Coordinating Committee of the National Security Council decided to send the intelligence officer to talk to the shah once more. He was to inform the monarch that the invitation remained open but let him know that the worsening situation in Teheran and the large numbers of pro-Khomeini Iranians in the United States created security problems. The message was that the shah forgo, at least for the moment, accepting the U.S. invitation.

THE TIMING OF the shah's request was impossibly bad. In addition to the attack on the embassy, the collapse of the Iranian military, and the sudden emergence of *komitehs* (self-appointed revolutionary "committees" that sprang up spontaneously in almost every neighborhood and that were randomly arresting Americans throughout the city), there was a further problem of which almost no one—including the shah—was aware. At the very moment when the shah let it be known that he wished, finally, to accept the January invitation, the ambassador to Iran, William Sullivan, was engaged in delicate negotiations with the revolutionary authorities to protect the lives of a group of official Americans trapped at a remote location in northern Iran and to secure their safe departure. A move by the shah to the United States at that moment would have endangered their safety, invited mass arrests of Americans in Teheran, and almost certainly prompted another attack on the embassy, which was still digging out from the damage of the week before.

National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski, who had chaired the SCC meeting that had stepped back from an unqualified invitation, found himself in the position of personally delivering the message. In the middle of the night of February 26, former Iranian Ambassador Ardeshir Zahedi called Brzezinski from Switzerland, inquiring whether the shah could come to the United States in the next three or four days. Brzezinski reiterated that the invitation remained open but described some of the difficulties the shah would face by a move to the United States. He told Zahedi that someone would talk to the shah in the next few days. The next day Brzezinski, who was intensely uncomfortable about denying asylum to a man who had been an ally for many years, raised the matter with the president, suggesting that the decision be reconsidered. President Carter reacted angri-

The shah no doubt realized that knowledge of his medical condition would have serious political implications, so he took extreme measures to keep it secret

Those charged with responsibility in the revolutionary regime exerted their best efforts to resolve the crisis as quickly as possible—until they were swept from power in a new swerve of the revolution

ly, commenting that he did not want the shah in the United States playing tennis while Americans in Teheran were kidnapped or killed.

By the first week in March, both the shah and his Moroccan hosts were becoming anxious. King Hassan was politely letting the shah's entourage know that his continued presence was becoming a liability. The shah, in turn, had contacted a series of other governments without success.

On March 6, Deputy National Security Adviser David Aaron informed Carter that if the shah came to the United States, it was entirely possible that a "guerrilla group could retaliate against the remaining Americans, possibly taking one or more Americans hostage and refusing to release them until the shah was extradited." The president then approved a plan to seek other possible countries of asylum.

The shah would not take no for an answer. Regardless of the admittedly serious problems it might create for the United States, he had unequivocally decided to go there. At the same time, Zahedi retained a distinguished American lawyer who was also a former government official as counsel to assist in the shah's arrival. This man met with Under Secretary for Political Affairs David Newsom and, after some discussion, agreed with Newsom that this would be an "inauspicious" time for a visit. Instead, he agreed to assist in the widening efforts to locate an alternative site.

On March 14, the problem was discussed again in the White House Situation Room. Vice President Mondale, Aaron, Newsom, and Deputy CIA Director Frank Carlucci reviewed the shah's travel plans. They agreed that the danger to Americans in Teheran would be extreme if the shah came. Four countries were identified as possible temporary refuges, and efforts were made to quietly sound them out. As part of this effort, Vance and Newsom phoned David Rockefeller, chairman of the Chase Manhattan Bank, and former Secretary of State Kissinger to seek their assistance in convincing the shah. Both men were close friends of the shah, and both indignantly refused. In their opinion, to refuse him admittance—even at the risk of U.S. lives—would be a disgrace.

Both men nevertheless were to play a central role in this drama of a man without a country. The shah, recognizing finally that he could not travel to the United States for the time being, and under growing pressure from Morocco to depart, appealed directly to Rockefeller to help him find asylum. Rockefeller and Kissinger suggested the Bahamas. On March 30, the shah flew there. The Bahamas proved an unhappy choice. The villa where the shah was housed was visible from a public beach and provided no security. Moreover, its cost proved to be prohibitive. He remained there unhappily for more than two months.

BY THIS TIME, communications between the shah and the United States were strained. The shah had let it be known that he attributed the loss of his throne to the policies of the Carter administration. This theme was picked up and embellished by Kissinger in a public campaign on the theme of "Who lost Iran?" Moreover, by this time the shah had come to rely heavily on the advice and assistance of Robert Armao, a young U.S. public relations consultant and former aide to the late Vice President Nelson Rockefeller. Armao was decidedly hostile to the Carter administration

As time went on, whatever problems the shah encountered were referred first to David Rockefeller and his organization and only secondarily to Washington. Although Washington was not entirely displeased with this arrangement at the start, Armao's suspicions and lack of cooperativeness severely complicated relations between Washington and the shah during the course of the hostage crisis.

In the meantime Rockefeller, Kissinger, and John McCloy maintained a drum roll of appeals for the shah to be admitted. Kissinger called Brzezinski on April 7 and, at Brzezinski's suggestion, followed up with a telephone call to Carter. Rockefeller saw the president two days later and raised the issue again. Carter, irritated by these approaches, rejected them. Kissinger responded with a speech on April 9 attacking the Carter administration for treating the shah "like a Flying Dutchman looking for port of call."

Although the president's views were shaped by the need to protect the lives of Americans in Iran, his attitudes were far less absolute than they may have appeared at the time. In early May, arrangements were quietly worked out for the shah's children to continue their education in the United States. Teheran was informed of these plans, resulting in the first official warning that there would be "serious problems" if either the shah or his wife were admitted to the country.

During this same period, there was an exchange of messages between the president and the shah in which the monarch inquired whether his wife might visit the United States for medical treatment. In view of the Iranian warning, Secretary Vance recommended against it. Carter disagreed and said that he would be prepared to permit her to visit only for medical treatment. To the best of my knowledge, this offer was never accepted, but it suggested that the president made a distinction between a visit for medical treatment and a visit for other purposes. That distinction became critically important some five months later.

In June, the shah shifted his residence to Mexico, but throughout the summer of 1979 the issue of his possible entrance continued to be discussed, largely as a political problem. Governmental chaos in Iran, combined with continuing reports of executions and gross violations of human rights, increasingly tended to make the shah's regime look relatively mild in comparison to Khomeini's extremism. Moreover, the question of "Who lost Iran?" gave every indication of becoming a major issue in the next election.

By the end of July, Mondale had begun to shift his position toward favoring the shah's entry. He put his views to Carter in a memorandum on July 23. Two days later Vance sent a message to L. Bruce Laingen, the charge d'affairs in Teheran. Noting that the shah could remain in Mexico at least through October, Vance asked for Laingen's assessment of the Iranian goverment's reaction if the shah's entry was accompanied by formal renunciation of his claim to the throne and his agreement to forswear political activity while in the United States. Laingen replied that the shah's

entry would be prejudicial to U.S. interests, but that the situation might become more manageable in the late fall if progress were made in resolving the power struggle in Iran.

At the same time, Henry Precht, State's desk officer for Iran, was asked to develop a scenario for possible admission of the shah that would minimize adverse effects. Precht proposed waiting until the provisional government had been replaced by an elected government, then inform it of the intention to admit the shah as part of the process of putting old issues to rest. Precht himself had serious doubts about whether this scheme would work—doubts that were more than shared by the diplomats in Teheran. At a minimum, Precht believed, the embassy would require a more effective local guard force than the revolutionaries, and he also proposed sending additional U.S. security guards.

For some months the shah seemed to be settling into his new life in Mexico. He received a series of visits from political figures and old friends. But there was also a dark side. Since his departure from Morocco, the shah's grievous illness, carefully concealed for so many years, had begun to flare up.

According to the medical history that eventually became known, the shah had discovered a lump above his abdomen while on a skiing trip to Switzerland in 1974. He contacted two French doctors, Jean Bernard and Georges Flandrin, who discovered an enlarged spleen. They diagnosed the shah's malady as lymphoma, a cancer of the lymph system. During the following five years the shah was treated with chlorambucil, which reduced the swelling and kept the disease in check. However, by the time he arrived in the Bahamas, his condition had begun to deteriorate. The lymph nodes in his neck had become swollen and painful, and Dr. Flandrin, who was called to the Bahamas, diagnosed a second form of cancer known as Richter's syndrome, which is usually fatal.

Under normal circumstances a patient with this condition would have been admitted to a hospital for tests and exploratory surgery. In this case, treatment was confined to a stronger series of anti-cancer drugs. They succeeded in reducing the swollen glands but the side effects were so serious that the drugs had to be discontinued during the shah's stay in Mexico. His health continued to deteriorate.

The shah's cancer was, without question, one of the best-kept state secrets of all time. The United States was informed of the monarch's illness by some of Rockefeller's aides at the end of September 1979 and discovered that the illness was cancer only on October 18. We were not alone. Despite theories and rumors to the contrary, French intelligence was unaware of the shah's condition, although his two doctors were French. The shah's wife and his twin sister learned of it only after he had left Iran.

THE SHAH NO DOUBT realized that knowledge of his medical condition would have serious political implications, so he took extreme measures to keep it secret. However, by failing to take proper medical precautions, he may also have shortened his life. By September 1979 the shah was suffering from a variety of complications that could no longer be concealed and required urgent attention. In addition to the cancers and the side effects of the treatment, gallstones were blocking his bile duct, causing him to become jaundiced. His condition had incorrectly been diagnosed as malaria in Mexico, and in the course of treatment his jaundice became worse. He had sharp stomach pains, fever, chills, and nausea.

Armao contacted Dr. Benjamin Kean of New York Hospital, a specialist in tropical diseases who had treated Armao. Kean visited the shah on September 29 and quickly determined that he was not suffering from malaria, but he was unable to pinpoint the problem. The shah volunteered nothing and refused a blood test, so Kean returned to New York. Several weeks later Armao called him again to say that he had learned that the shah had cancer, that he had had it for years, and that Dr. Flandrin had arrived from France. Kean returned to Cuernavaca on October 18.

In the meantime the United States had learned almost nothing of the shah's condition. Reed had called Newsom on September 28 to say that the shah had fallen ill in Mexico and might need to come to the United States for treatment. The under secretary was aware of Rockefeller's interest in getting the shah into the United States and treated the report with caution. Ironically, only the night before, Vance had spoken to the Council on Foreign Relations in New York, laying out the reasons why the shah had not been permitted to enter the United States. Those reasons had not changed from February, and they had been reinforced only days earlier by Laingen, who was in Washington for consultations and continued to advise that the entry of the shah would be dangerous for Americans in Teheran. Laingen was contacted once again, and he reiterated that the tenuous U.S.-Iranian relationship could not weather the shock of the shah's arrival.

On October 17, as Kean was leaving for his second trip to Mexico, Reed called Newsom to inform him that the shah's condition had deteriorated further and that diagnoses were contradictory. Newsom asked that Kean examine the shah and then consult with the State Department medical director, Dr. Eben H. Dustin. Kean met the French doctor in Cuernavaca the next day and learned the entire history of the shah's illness. It appeared to Kean that the shah was probably suffering from obstructive jaundice. The condition had been allowed to go untreated for more than six weeks and now required immediate surgery. In addition, it was likely that the shah had a cancerous spleen and a cancerous tumor in his neck that no longer responded to drug treatment. Further complications were added by the effects of his previous drug treatment and uncertainties about the extent of the effects of his lymphoma. At a minimum, the shah required the medical attention of a team of doctors and specialists with access to sophisticated tests and analyses of the sort that could only be provided by a large medical center. Kean strongly recommended admitting the shah to a facility in the United States.

Vance received a report of this startling news that night, and he summarized the situation for the president and his key advisers the following day. Vance concluded that the United States could not refuse the

The president made a distinction between a visit for medical treatment and a visit for other purposes—a distinction that was to become critically important

Barbara Walters interviews the shah on Thanksgiving Day 1979. The deposed ruler talked freely about his illness, long held as one of the best-kept state secrets ever.

shah access to medical treatment, and he recommended permitting entry. The president now found his advisers unanimous that the shah should be admitted. The president gave his approval in principle to proceed, subject to confirmation of Vance's information. But Carter had no illusions about the risks. Looking at his group of advisers, he wondered aloud what advice they would give him when the Iranians took the embassy in Teheran and held the Americans hostage. Unfortunately, this sardonic comment was to prove more prophetic than he had expected.

ON SATURDAY, October 20, Dustin submitted a formal report based on his consultations with Kean and the medical adviser at the U.S. embassy in Mexico City. Dustin concluded that the situation was urgent, since each day lessened the chances of successful surgery to open the obstruction. The report was forwarded to Carter at Camp David by Warren Christopher, who was acting secretary in Vance's absence, together with a proposal developed by Vance. The secretary's recommendation to the president called for an immediate approach to Bazargan and his provisional government, notifying them of the shah's condition and the humanitarian need for him to be admitted for treatment. A judgment would then be made on the basis of the reaction.

The president said that the department should not make any request but rather inform Iran that the shah would be coming to New York. On the following day, Laingen, accompanied by Precht, who had recently arrived in Teheran, called on Bazargan and Yazdi. Laingen described the circumstances and said that Washington had decided to admit the shah purely for humanitarian purposes. He stressed that the decision was not politically motivated and did not reflect a decision with regard to the shah's permanent residence.

Bazargan and Yazdi made it clear that this was unwelcome news. They expected that the shah's arrival would cause problems, and they were skeptical about the accuracy of the U.S. statements, but their overall reaction was subdued. They were clearly surprised to learn of the shah's malignancy. Bazargan and Yazdi asked for a review of the medical findings by Iranian doctors to verify the diagnosis. They strongly preferred that medical treatment take place outside the United States, possibly in Western Europe; moreover, if the shah had to come to the United States, they disliked the choice of New York, evidently on the grounds that the shah would have direct access to political elements hostile to the revolution.

Laingen and Precht agreed to pass on to the shah's doctors the names of two Iranian physicians identified by Yazdi to see what might be worked out. Laingen requested additional protection for the embassy and for Americans in Teheran. On the following day extra police took up positions around the embassy. They remained on duty in the days that followed. Based on Laingen and Precht's report of their discussion, the president gave the order later that day to admit the shah. The possibility of directing the shah to a city other than New York was considered and rejected, on the grounds that treatment would have to be delayed during the process of locating adequate facilities. The shah was issued a tourist visa, and he arrived in New York by chartered jet the following day.

Could the shah in fact have been treated in Mexico?

In retrospect there is little doubt that he could have been, even though all the required expertise and technical equipment were not necessarily available in a single location. It was believed—with considerable justification—that the shah was on the verge of death, and there was no inclination to risk his life further by disputing the weight of unanimous expert opinion.

Did Carter make the decision to admit the shah on the basis of political expediency? The president had already looked favorably on a request for medical treatment in the United States—even in the face of a direct warning by Teheran. Carter was convinced the shah was dying and needed urgent attention. That was the reason for his decision, just as it was for Vance to reverse his earlier position. No one who knows Vance could seriously suggest that he would have exposed the personnel of his department to serious risks in the hope that it might somehow improve the president's standing in the polls.

On the other hand, it would be naive to argue that the president and his advisers were oblivious to the political consequences. Many of them had concluded that the shah should be admitted long before his condition became known; the president himself was uncomfortable refusing hospitality to a former ally. Carter could scarcely have hoped that his decision would suddenly improve his political fortunes. However, he could be certain that if he refused to allow the shah access to treatment—possibly contributing to his death—he would be severely criticized not only by Rockefeller and Kissinger but by virtually all Americans. In short, there was an underlying disposition to permit the shah into the country, and the shocking news of his illness swept away any remaining inhibitions.

More serious is the question of why the government did not take more extensive precautions to protect the safety of its people in Iran once the decision had been made to admit the shah. That question haunted all of us who shared responsibility for what happened later.

In the sense of providing for the physical security of the embassy, nothing was left undone. After the February attack, a full-scale security survey was conducted, resulting in major modifications. The entrances to the chancery building were equipped with heavy steel doors, backed by automatic alarm systems, electronic surveillance cameras, and remote-controlled tear-gas devices. Windows were fitted with bulletproof glass, steel boxes filled with sand for ballistic protection, and steel grills installed. The embassy was stocked for self-defense, and contingency plans were developed for a staged withdrawal in the event of an attack. Defenses were designed to permit the embassy to hold out unassisted for two to three hours until help could arrive. In fact, it worked exactly as planned—but help never came.

Ultimately, every embassy in the world must rely on the good faith and protection of its host. Physical attacks on embassies and diplomats are distressingly frequent, and countries occasionally react slowly to such attacks, particularly if they wish to make a political point. However, until the incident in Teheran, there was no modern precedent for a country's renouncing its international obligations entirely and throwing its support to the mob.

Another mistake was to place an unrealistic degree of confidence in the "moderates" who were nominally in charge of the provisional government. This was part of a pattern that had emerged immediately after the fall of the shah and dominated policy throughout the summer of 1979. During that period, as Washington turned its attention to other crises, day-to-day policy on Iran took the form of small, incremental decisions on such issues as embassy staffing, the myriad commercial tangles that had to be unraveled, and local negotiations about embassy security. This was the natural province of the State Deparment, and the man in charge was Precht. Throughout the summer, as the new regime struggled to cope with bureaucratic chaos, tribal dissidence, and disputes over the shape of a new constitution, Precht essentially ran a one-man show.

He had been one of the earliest to argue that once the shah was gone, moderate elements would reassert themselves and gradually establish a regime compatible with long-term U.S. interests. When Bazargan and his moderate associates were appointed to head the provisional government in February, Precht had a personal stake in showing that he had been right. Only three weeks after the collapse of the Bakhtiar government, Precht prepared an analysis of Iran intended to serve as the basis of discussion with NATO capitals. This assessment, which purported to be the official U.S. government position, was written and sent without any coordination outside the State Department. Although it listed the problems facing Bazargan, it devoted most of its discussion to the "elements of strength" that Precht perceived. He thought that Iranians were fatigued with the turmoil of the previous year and sought a return to normal conditions under a moderate, anti-Soviet leader such as Bazargan. Iranians, he said, were basically a pragmatic people. Even during the height of the revolution, they had found ways to pull back from the brink of anarchy. Consequently, he expected them to find face-saving compromises to their problems, particularly since he saw no apparent alternative to the Bazargan government.

This message inspired a scathing retort from Ambassador Sullivan in Teheran, who commented that the factors listed as strengths of the Bazargan government simply did not exist. Politically and economically, things in Iran were getting worse, not better, and a battle was shaping up between Khomeini, who wanted total Islamization of Iranian society, and moderates such as Bazargan, who were trying ineffectually to be all things to all Iranians. Precht was also challenged directly in a meeting at the department, where several of us argued with him at length that his interpretation was unrealistically optimistic and flew in the face of the facts.

However, in that meeting and in every other encounter throughout the summer, Precht argued doggedly that Bazargan and company were steadily gaining strength. Although he did not again make the mistake of putting his views in writing as official policy, Precht never wavered. Many of his colleagues vigorously disagreed, but he had the ear and the confidence of the assistant secretary for the Near East, Harold Saunders, and it was his optimistic philos-

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Americans easily forgot that the political existence of the moderate Iranian officials hung from the slenderest of threads; the weight that we placed on them almost certainly hastened the day when they snapped

ophy that shaped the many small but important decisions about manning and operating the embassy.

Throughout the summer, Bazargan and his associates had been critical of the past U.S. role in Iran, and they made no attempt to conceal their displeasure with the policies that had supported the shah during the revolution. Nevertheless, they were interested in resolving the many problems the revolution had left in its wake, and they were prepared to deal coolly but correctly with U.S. representatives. No such contact was possible with the clerical factions around Khomeini, so almost by necessity the United States came to rely more and more on these individuals as its essential link to the new regime in Teheran.

Government-to-government contacts became more frequent and more significant in the month prior to the attack on the embassy. In early October, Yazdi met with Vance for the first high-level policy discussion between the two countries since the fall of the shah. Vance outlined U.S. interest in the continued independence and territorial integrity of Iran and suggested that the two countries would do well to put the past behind them. Yazdi asked about U.S. policy with respect to the shah. Vance replied that we had told the monarch that we did not believe he should come to the United States at this time. What the future might hold, he could not say.

The following day Yazdi and an Iranian general spent several hours meeting with U.S. political-military officials for a discussion of the very thorny issues relating to Iran's arms purchases. It was agreed that talks would continue with defense officials in Teheran, and shortly thereafter the United States announced that it was prepared to make a small quantity of military spare parts available to Iran.

In view of the deep animosities on both sides, these first high-level contacts were about as productive as could be expected. A dialogue had begun that was at least civil, and preliminary steps had been taken to address a few of the difficult issues that the revolution had created. Although both sides were wary and skeptical, there appeared to be a genuine prospect of establishing some limited but useful dialogue.

That impression was reinforced even after the shah entered the United States. On November 1, Brzezinski found himself at an anniversary celebration in Algiers with Bazargan, Yazdi, and Mustapha Ali Chamran, the Iranian minister of defense. A few days earlier, when Laingen learned of the forthcoming Algiers meeting, he had urged that Brzezinski or others in the U.S. delegation meet with the Iranians, in the belief that "the more contact with this group the better." He had mentioned the possibility to Bazargan, who seemed interested.

When the Iranians arrived in Algiers, they suggested a private meeting and Brzezinski agreed. Yazdi used the occasion to stress to the adviser that the shah's presence in the United States disturbed them. Brzezinski emphasized the strategic interests that Iran and the United States had in common, and held out the possibility of cooperation, including the possibility of continued military aid. When Brzezinski returned to Washington, he was quite positive in his evaluation of the three Iranian leaders as intelligent and sensible men who had impressed him with their seriousness and their realistic appraisal of the problems facing the new regime. It is ironic that this meeting, which visibly swayed the harshest U.S. critic of the revolution, provided the excuse four days later for expelling Bazargan and Yazdi from the government. Dealing with these men in the daily language of diplomacy, Americans easily forgot that their political existence hung from the slenderest of threads. The weight that we placed on them almost certainly hastened the day when the threads snapped.

AT THE TIME that U.S. policy was coming to rely more and more on moderates in Teheran, a more insidious process was under way at the bureaucratic level, essentially invisible to policymakers in Washington. During the nine months between the two attacks on the embassy in Teheran, each embassy office gradually attempted to build itself back to a relatively normal operating capacity. Daily problems had to be researched, routine reports had to be compiled, and standard bureaucratic procedures quietly reasserted themselves as they do in any governmental organization.

All embassies are acquainted with the problem of bureaucratic "creep," the impulse to add additional personnel and resources to deal with the complex array of issues encountered in the relations between any two major nations. This process is inevitable, and it normally occurs at the working level, where it is essentially invisible to the policymaker. In the case of the Teheran embassy, the governing attitude (as reflected in the view of Precht on the desk in Washington) was to encourage normalization and therefore to permit the embassy to increase gradually in size and operating capacity. That process was further stimulated by pressures from groups in the United States to reestablish full consular operations as quickly as possible so Iranian Jews and Baha'is, who felt threatened by the new Islamic regime, could get exit visas.

In the days immediately following the February attack, the White House had insisted on reviewing plans for restaffing the embassy. In early March a "bare bones" plan was formally approved. Over the summer, however, each agency gradually increased its representation in Teheran. By the time the attack occurred on November 4, the number of persons assigned to the embassy had increased significantly beyond the number originally approved. The total of about 70 at the time of the takeover was not necessarily excessive in terms of the issues demanding their attention, but it was no longer the skeletal force that had originally been approved.

More difficult to explain is the proliferation of files. Prior to February 1979, Sullivan had properly ordered all reference files boxed and shipped back to Washington, retaining only a thin working file in each office. These were destroyed quickly in mid-February as order collapsed in Teheran. Unknown to anyone in the White House, when the embassy was reconstituted after the first attack, the various agencies simply shipped back many of the file boxes.

The embassy failed to take advantage of the time after the entry of the shah to rid itself of this paper albatross. As a result, when the attack finally came, it

was impossible to shred and burn everything, with the result that a very large quantity of classified information fell into the hands of the student militants. Laingen, who performed with such dignity and courage throughout the hostage ordeal, bears a heavy responsibility for this failure to take elementary precautions.

The militants who took the embassy later made a great show of laboriously piecing together shredded documents, but most embassy files were taken intact. All of the most sensitive policy documents were held in Laingen's office and, when the attack occurred, Laingen was at the Foreign Ministery and the Marine guards were unable to get into his office. Consequently, the files in their entirety fell into the hands of the students. Copies of these and other documents were subsequently published in Teheran in a series of more than 40 volumes. The most regrettable effect of the files' falling into the hands of the students was that every Iranian who had had any contact with the embassy in the normal course of diplomatic reporting was potentially subject to blackmail or persecution. The effect was particularly devastating for Bazargan and his Liberation Movement, since several members had been in touch with embassy officials in the course of the revolution to make arrangements to minimize violence.

Otherwise, the effects of the loss were more embarrassing than substantive. The students who captured the embassy were convinced that the United States had secretly managed political events in Iran for years, that it had directed the shah's campaign against the revolution, and that it was engaged in efforts to destabilize the country and undermine Khomeini's regime. They must have been disappointed when they found nothing to support these paranoid notions.

Because of the quantity of material, we could never be sure exactly which items were in Iranian hands or how they might be used. As a consequence, Carter eventually ordered a review of all material relating to U.S.-Iranian relations so we would not be taken by surprise. However, the student militants seemed content to reserve their secret library for use in the internecine political warfare in Teheran. With the exception of the show trial of Liberation Front member Abbas Amir-Entezam in March 1980 (which resulted in a sentence of life imprisonment for treason and must have sent shivers down the spine of any Iranian who had ever talked to a U.S. embassy official), the purloined documents had very little practical effect on the evolution of the crisis.

THE FINAL QUESTION that must be addressed is why the embassy was not evacuated when the shah was admitted to the United States. In retrospect, it is curious that this issue was scarcely discussed at all, not only in Washington but even among those in the embassy. The explanation seems to lie in a combination of three factors.

First and most important, of course, was the belief that the formal assurances from the government of Iran would be honored in the event of an attack. That belief was not rooted merely in historical precedent and wishful thinking. It seemed to be given practical substantiation on November 1 when an attack on the embassy was widely anticipated. On that date, a massive anti-American demonstration was scheduled that could easily have escalated out of control. In preparation, the embassy staff was dispersed throughout the city, with only essential security forces remaining in the compound, and maximum security precautions were put into effect. A series of meetings was held in Washington to review contingency plans. On October 31, I reported to Brzezinski's office that the situation would be monitored on a minute-by-minute basis, and if there was any evidence that Iranian authorities were not prepared to provide adequate protection, we would have to consider evacuation. However, the Iranian government went to great lengths to prevent an incident. Augmented police protection was provided around the embassy, and the route of march was altered at the last minute to keep the bulk of the demonstrators at some distance from the compound. At the end of the day on November 1, Laingen was able to comment that perhaps the worst had now passed. There is no doubt that the prompt and effective action by the Iranian government on that day allayed the worst fears of Americans both in Teheran and in Washington. It may also have contributed to a somewhat reduced state of alert that made the surprise attack that occurred three days later all the more effective.

The second factor that inhibited any consideration of a total evacuation was the awareness of the overwhelming importance of Iran in the politics of the region: Vital U.S. interests were at stake, and there was a deep reluctance to cut the remaining diplomatic, commercial, and even personal ties that had bound the United States and Iran together for so many years.

Finally, there was the dedication and professionalism of the men and women who had accepted assignments in Teheran at a difficult and dangerous time. Many of them had long experience in Iran, spoke the language, and knew and liked the Iranian people. All were there, not because they expected it to be easy or pleasant, but because there was an important job to be done. Many disagreed sharply with the decision to permit the shah to come to the United States, and they were intensely aware of the animosities building in the society in which they lived. Yet they resisted the impulse to turn and run.

In retrospect, that attitude may appear to be unduly romantic, and many of the hostages would later regret that they had not spoken out more forcefully. When these men and women were welcomed home many months later to an unprecedented outpouring of national love and respect, I would like to believe that some of that emotion was a tribute to all those Americans who daily serve their country in conditions of great uncertainty and personal risk and who choose to stay rather than run. □

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Gary Sick, the principal White House aide for Iran during the Iranian revolution and the hostage crisis, served on the National Security Council staff under Presidents Ford, Carter, and Reagan. This article is adapted from the book All Fall Down *©1985 by Gary Sick. Reprinted with the permission of Random House Inc.*

SECURITY AND TERRORISM: QUESTIONS, MISGIVINGS REMAIN

FRANCES G. BURWELL

A RECENT SURVEY by the JOURNAL has revealed that many Foreign Service personnel have little confidence in the ability of the foreign affairs agencies to ensure adequate protection against terrorism for their employees. More than 70 percent of those who responded to a questionnaire in the March issue did not think that the government had done all it could to safeguard employees in recent years. Almost 80 percent, for instance, believed that the bombing of the Beirut embassy annex last year could have been prevented by taking reasonable security measures. The questionnaire also revealed that more than half the respondents viewed retaliation against terrorists—which has been much touted as a suitable response by Secretary of State Shultz—as the least important step to be taken in enhancing security. Increasing the physical security of buildings, decreasing the number of personnel in dangerous areas, and improving intelligence capabilities were all deemed more important.

When asked to comment on the results of the questionnaire, Assistant Secretary for Administration and Security Robert Lamb said, "We think that protection of our embassies and employees is among the highest priorities in the department. We are doing more today than we have at any time before. But it is not just the department's responsibility, the individual also has responsibilities....Even when security is inconvenient, we have to impose security measures on missions....The Foreign Service today ranks among the most dangerous of professions. We have an obligation to overcome that danger to ensure that our people have a secure environment in which to do their jobs."

Some caution must be used in interpreting the data from the questionnaire. Because it was distributed by printing it within the JOURNAL, the survey assesses the opinions of JOURNAL readers, not all Foreign Service employees. And, as with any questionnaire that must be returned by mail, those most concerned about the topic are most likely to respond. The response rate, however, was two percent, which is high for this kind of survey; the current figures are based on 182 responses. And because all respondents were from the Foreign Service community and the replies were so lopsided, the results suggest feelings probably held by the Service as a whole. Furthermore, the distribution of the respondents across gender, length of career, and type of post accurately reflects the make-up of the entire Service, once the retired respondents (20 percent of the total) are taken into account.

The questionnaire, which was sent to approximately 8000 career Foreign Service people, both active and retired, queried them on their attitudes toward terrorism and related security issues and asked them to rate possible responses to what many believe is a growing terrorist threat against diplomats. Not surprisingly, the survey showed that 91 percent either agreed or strongly agreed with the statement that, "Being in the Foreign Service will become increasingly dangerous during the next 10 years," and 89 percent either agreed or strongly agreed that "Foreign Service personnel anywhere in the world are likely targets of terrorist attack." Yet despite this overwhelming awareness of the dangers facing them, 82 percent of the respondents either agreed or strongly agreed with the statement that "Embassies must maintain some degree of openness despite the risks." When asked whether "the foreign affairs agencies have done all they could over the last few years to safeguard employees against terrorists," 30 percent disagreed strongly, 42 percent disagreed, and 16 percent were undecided, leaving only 12 percent in agreement. Asked their opinion of the statement, "Given our earlier experience, the most recent bombing in Beirut could have been prevented by reasonable security precautions," 40 percent agreed strongly and 39 percent agreed.

When it came to judging what was most important in lessening security threats, opinion was divided: 39 percent thought increasing the physical security of embassies and other buildings was most important; 27 percent chose decreasing the number of personnel and missions in dangerous areas; 27 percent gave priority to improving intelligence capabilities to detect threats, and only 9 percent thought retaliation against those responsible for terrorist actions was most important. In fact, when asked to rank these four options from most to least important, the greatest degree of agreement among the respondents was that 58 percent thought retaliation was least important.

These attitudes remained fairly constant regardless of differences in type and location of posting, sex, retired or active status, and time-in-service. The only significant variation was that those stationed in Washington were more critical of the adequacy of security precautions there, while those overseas, many of whom had not been in Washington for some time, tended to remain undecided on this point.

"Those of us who serve in relatively dangerous posts are skeptical of the real concern in Washington for our safety. I have come to believe that another incident will stimulate an immediate, dramatic response, but that implementation of security arrangements will founder in the system."

"Too frequently, chiefs of mission, called upon to make hard decisions regarding decreasing staff, burning files, evacuating post, first think in terms of, 'Will this action embarrass the host government?' rather than, 'What will be the best way to protect my staff and sensitive files.' "

ALL THIS SKEPTICISM comes six months after the State Department launched a massive effort to improve the security surrounding its facilities, both overseas and in Washington. The September 1984 bombing of the embassy annex in Beirut—the third bombing of U.S. facilities in that city and the fourth car bombing in the Middle East in 18 months—focused the attention of Congress on the security problems facing diplomats and galvanized the department into action. State already had in place the Security Enhancement Program, which had been started in 1980 as a five-year plan for improving security at designated posts. Between 1982–84, however, the department responded to budgetary pressures by reducing the funding requirements of the SEP and the number of posts involved. But even where projects were undertaken—$110.6 million was appropriated through fiscal year 1984 for use at 140 posts—the General Accounting Office found delays in completion. The FY 1985 State Department budget originally requested $152 million for security-related expenditures. But immediately after the embassy annex bombing, the administration submitted a request for a supplemental appropriation of $110.2 million for FY 1985 alone. This was part of a larger authorization of $366.3 million for security improvements that was quickly approved by Congress. This money was used to hire more security officers, improve perimeter security, fund research and development on security techniques, and increase the number of armored vehicles. In February, the department returned to Capitol Hill to request another supplemental appropriation for FY 85 of $236.2 million. This money, which is expected to be approved and received by August, is to be used for improving security in Washington; rebuilding or replacing current facilities at 13 posts (Manama, Doha, Kuwait, Mogadishu, Muscat, Dhaka, Sanaa, Amman, Damascus, Tegucigalpa, Djibouti, Cairo, Lahore); computerizing Marine control booths at eight posts; improving emergency communications; purchasing armored vehicles; and adding staff to the security force and the Office for Counter-terrorism. The FY 1986 budget request asks for $401 million in FY 1986 and $421 million in FY 1987 for security items, including hiring more security officers, replacing or rebuilding threatened or inadequate overseas facilities, increasing training on security and emergency matters, and improving communications and information security systems. [For a report on the State Department's FY 1986–87 budget as passed by the House of Representatives, see CONGRESS, pp. 16-17.]

The State Department's efforts have also been guided by the Advisory Panel on Overseas Security, which was appointed by Shultz in July and is chaired by retired Admiral Bobby R. Inman, former director of the National Security Agency. In a preliminary report, the panel recommended that 139 overseas facilities be replaced or substantially overhauled. The panel's final report is expected to be submitted sometime in June, but, according to Lamb, the department has already started to implement some of the recommendations.

All this activity, however, does not seem to have impressed the respondents to the questionnaire, many of whom used the opportunity to comment, not on the new security programs, but on their general concerns about protection from terrorism. A very few argued that the recent emphasis on security had been overdone and that Foreign Service personnnel should be willing to face the risks. But the majority seemed more sympathetic to the opposite view and ready to welcome any improvements in security. At the same time, however, there was little optimism that diplomacy could be made a safe profession: "I have a fatalistic attitude toward security threats," said one. "At best we can only make it more difficult for terrorists to do their job. We will never be 100 percent safe."

Although few respondents commented directly on the department's programs, many did voice concerns on a major aspect of those programs—improving the physical safety of buildings. The vast majority welcomed the current efforts to tighten security around embassies, but they differed on how much further it should go. Some disagreed with the idea of fortress embassies: one respondent claimed that recent security precautions had already led to a decline in business executives visiting the commercial section, another commented that embassies should not become "accessible only to terrorists willing to lay down their lives." Others, however, called for even more stringent security measures and, in a few cases, for keeping visitors to an absolute minimum. Many suggested specific measures: hidden entrances for emergency escape, an electronic entry-pass system, teleconferencing instead of traveling to dangerous places, etc. One person pointed out that the recent security measures had created new hazards:

> Since the Beirut tragedies, this mission has been in a frenzy of wall-building and gate/barrier installation. The snag is that when we are coming to work, there can be a line of 2-10 vehicles outside the wall waiting to be admitted one by one for under-the-hood inspection and underbody inspection with mirrors. One terrorist could do a job on us as we wait for up to five to seven minutes to get into the compound. I am not a security specialist, but I am not an idiot either. There must be a better solution than what we have now. [This post is on the list for early building of a new facility.]

Some respondents appeared concerned that the emphasis on improving embassy security was making it easier to neglect the security of two other vital aspects of diplomacy abroad—housing and personnel. In particular, housing compounds were seen as large targets, and the guards were clearly not viewed seriously. As for the safety of individuals, one person wrote, "Personnel safety is more important than building security! A diplomat has to move among people to do his or her job, not just sit in a fortified chancery." Among the suggestions for improving individual security were hiring more bodyguards, distributing personal radios, holding more briefings, and requiring better training. One respondent also commented that security officers should be willing and able to cope with the needs of everyone on the post staff, because the chief of mission is not the only individual at risk.

Training, like physical security, came in for quite a few comments from our readers. Clearly, the respon-

"I believe the Foreign Service—like the armed services—is for the security of the United States. Its men and women are engaged in increasingly hazardous duty. Just as in the armed services, personnel should be selected and promoted in part for their willingness to face danger in the course of their duty. They should also be rewarded accordingly."

"I have been held hostage and abducted twice, once with my daughter when she was 13 months old. During my 20 years' service, I have seen too many alarmists, bad reporting, confused decision-making, and very frightened employees."

"If the U.S. would stop treating every area of the world as a vital U.S. interest, which many parts truly are not, then our lower profile would dramatically improve our security."

dents felt the need for more training, especially of the "hands-on" kind. Particular suggestions included defensive driving, surveillance techniques, emergency medical training, and firearms instruction. Some stressed the need for more briefings and drills at posts to create a better awareness of the dangers and appropriate responses. Currently, all State, AID, and USIA personnel who are posted overseas are required to take the day-long seminar "Coping with Violence Abroad" at the Foreign Service Institute. The institute encourages adult dependents to attend, and about half of each class is usually made up of family members. FSI also includes discussions of security and terrorism in many other courses, even language and area studies, and the mid-level course, which is currently available only to State Department personnel, includes a simulation in which the participants pretend to be the emergency action committee of a mythical embassy. As part of the State Department's enhanced program, the mobile security teams expect to hold more drills at overseas posts. During FY 1985, some 22 major exercises at posts are planned, and in FY 1986 the department intends to increase that number to 36, with participation from an additional 15–20 posts also expected. Other training programs are also under review, including those at FSI.

"One officer here lost the key used on three main doors, and the lock was not changed and no violation given. Security and senior staff allow local contractors access to the embassy with no escort. Several first-tour employees have no idea how to use destruction devices properly, and the post security officer will make no attempt to show them. [This post] could be a Beirut waiting to happen."

"My last post was Beirut, and I would comment that no precaution will guarantee that an attack against personnel or facilities will not take place. All we can hope to do is make an attack sufficiently difficult to dissuade a would-be attacker. Neither in Washington nor overseas have we done that very effectively."

"All of my previous tours have been at posts in war zones or where coups and riots were the routine. I am now serving at my first non-differential post and I feel less secure than at any previous post because so little attention is given to security."

SOME RESPONDENTS ADDRESSED the issue of responding to terrorism. Although Secretary Shultz has warned several times that the United States will retaliate against terrorists, there was little support for this strategy among those answering the questionnaire. Not only was it generally considered to be the least important option considered, a number used the comment section to express doubts that retaliation would deter "fanatics" and determined terrorists, and to warn that it could expose posts to even more danger. Instead, this suggestion was rather typical: "We have to stay one step ahead of [terrorists], decrease our own vulnerability, and have the best possible information on worldwide terrorist networks." Some other suggestions were that sterner measures, perhaps even sanctions, be taken against those countries that aid terrorists, and that host governments be given assistance so that they can fulfill their responsibilities. A few expressed the belief that U.S. policy—and especially the perception in many Arab countries that we are closely allied with Israel—was responsible for increasing the threat facing diplomats and suggested that such policies be reconsidered.

By far the most comments, however, focused on the need to treat terrorism as a serious threat, both at posts and in Washington. As one person put it: "We are *still* not taking security seriously enough, against terrorists or penetration. Until we do, which means a real revolution in our self-perception as 'open' people, deaths and serious security leaks will continue to our detriment." Several respondents claimed that security problems were neglected, or security officers hindered in their work, for reasons of convenience or politics. "I was in Beirut for eight weeks in [late] 1983. We never had one security drill or briefing during that time." "At this embassy, intelligence regarding possible threats...has been closely held by senior and intelligence officials in order not to 'frighten and alarm' people." "[We should] deny management and executive personnel the ability to override security for commercial and cosmetic reasons." "An additional mechanism to reduce staff in threatened areas should be available to employees other than to wait for the ambassador to declare a reduction to essential personnel. The majority of ambassadors tend to hang in there so as not to alarm the host government."

This need to reduce staff in some situations was brought up by several respondents, who made clear that part of taking the threat seriously is to know when to close down. "Who are we trying to impress with an 'open, friendly' embassy in a dangerous situation? We kept Teheran and Beirut open too long and with too many personnel." "The greater perception of risk results from our policy of attempting to maintain large numbers of civilians in areas of semi-military hostilities....Diplomats cannot perform their functions from bunkers and should not be assigned where they cannot function in reasonable safety."

Some respondents seemed to think that one way of encouraging people to take matters seriously would be to impose stricter personal accountability. "In security, the buck seems to stop nowhere. Despite security disasters, which senior officers have been cashiered?" This question of individual accountability has also been brought up by members of Congress. When Robert B. Oakley, the director of the Office for Counter-terrorism and Emergency Planning, testified in early March before the House subcommittees on International Operations and Arms Control, he was questioned sharply by several members. Representative Daniel A. Mica (D.-Florida) was especially concerned about what he saw as a lack of accountability and fuzzy lines of command both overseas and in Washington. The Inman panel also addressed this issue in a letter accompanying its preliminary report: "Our outsider view of the lessons to be learned from the four major attacks on American installations is crystallized in the panel's concern for the need to clarify lines of responsibility and establish a culture in the Foreign Service requiring accountability by individuals for failure to take prudent action." Under Secretary for Management Ronald I. Spiers has since said that the department has accepted the panel's recommendation that a "board of inquiry with powers of establishing accountability" be convened in all cases when terrorist incidents result in significant damage or casualties.

The steps the department is taking in its current security-enhancement effort will clearly be welcomed by our respondents. However, it is just as clear that there is much skeptism that anything will change significantly. Improvements are needed not only in physical facilities and training, but in attitudes, both in Washington and overseas. The risks involved in a Foreign Service career have grown so great that it is no longer possible merely to accept them as part of the job. As one respondent wrote: "We should all be prepared to die for our country, but there is no hurry; it is even better to live for America." □

Frances G. Burwell is associate editor of the JOURNAL.

An Interview with John W. Ford

The Rio Treaty and Collective Security in Latin America

John J. Harter

The Rio Treaty, formally known as the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, was signed at the Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Continental Peace and Security in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, on September 2, 1947, and went into effect in December 1948 after 14 signatory nations ratified it. The Permanent Council of the Organization of American States acts as the "Organ of Consultation" under the treaty. John W. Ford, who served as a Foreign Service officer with the Department of State from 1947–75, was special adviser to the OAS secretary general from 1975–1984 with responsibilities relating to the Rio Treaty. The following are edited excerpts taken from interviews that took place in Washington, D.C.

When did you first become actively involved in a Rio Treaty case?

On July 14, 1969, while I was the acting U.S. representative to the OAS, El Salvador's armed forces invaded Honduras, and Honduras appealed to the OAS for help, invoking the Rio Treaty. In response, several of my colleagues at the OAS—the ambassadors of Argentina, Ecuador, the Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Costa Rica, and Nicaragua—and I began shuttling back and forth between the blacked-out cities of Tegucigalpa and San Salvador as a peace committee. Our immediate objectives were to obtain a prompt cease-fire, to get the troops back from their eyeball-to-eyeball confrontation, to arrange an exchange of prisoners, and to establish a demilitarized zone. All that required countless hours of negotiations with senior officials on both sides. We must have met with each president a dozen times. The individual commanders—especially the Salvadorans—did not want to withdraw from their advanced positions. But we stuck with it, and eventually we pulled it off.

What were the origins of the Rio Treaty?

Its origins go back to mutual defense arrangements that developed in the late 1930s and World War II. Early in 1945, the Western hemisphere countries that had cooperated in the war effort agreed to continue the war-time regional security system. They developed the so-called Act of Chapultepec, which branded an attack on one nation in the system as an attack on all and provided for formal consultations to determine appropriate responses including application of certain sanctions. The Rio Treaty, in effect, culminated the process that began at Chapultepec and created a mechanism for the Americas that, by allowing the responses to be coordinated, could forestall or suspend military actions.

It was not an automatic process, however. Any action under the treaty—such as collective military action, the recall of ambassadors, the breaking of diplomatic relations, the imposition of economic sanctions, arbitration, mediation, or conciliation—must be explicitly authorized by the Permanent Council of the OAS acting provisionally as the Organ of Consultation. If attacked, any country may take any immediate actions in its own defense it deems necessary, pending a decision by a meeting of consultation on how, if at all, collective security should be enforced. There is also an important provision in the Rio Treaty that ensures that no signatory country will be required to use force against its will.

Is there any conflict between OAS responsibilities under the Rio Treaty and those of the United Nations?

No, because, when the U.N. Charter was drafted in San Francisco in 1945, just a few weeks after Chapultepec, the Latin-American representatives were anxious to ensure a certain degree of autonomy and independence for the regional organization. Article 51 of the charter, therefore, essentially incorporated provisions of the Act of Chapultepec. I think the Latin Americans weren't sure just where the United Nations might go, and they didn't want to forfeit the jurisdiction of their own regional body—which had demonstrated its utility for more than 50 years—to an organization where the so-called "big powers" could paralyze regional action through the veto.



John Ford meets with then Governor of Georgia Jimmy Carter and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger in 1974 during a meeting of the OAS General Assembly.

"Never offer good offices unless you are going to be neutral to the very end. If you change course in mid-stream, you forfeit your potential for mediating the conflict"

There is no veto in the OAS, and invoking the Rio Treaty has, on several occasions, prevented crises in the western hemisphere from spilling over to the U.N. agenda. It only makes sense that a regional organization of 31 participating states, interrelated by history, culture, and geography, can resolve their disputes more easily within their own family, so to speak, than through a global body comprising 159 nations. In that respect, I feel the OAS and its treaty instruments have served the United Nations well.

What is the treaty's purpose?

The Rio Treaty, as a mutual defense treaty, is intended to ensure that whenever aggression is perpetrated against any state in the western hemisphere, the signatory states will act collectively to restore peace and bring about the status quo antebellum. In that sense, it might be regarded as a sort of multilateralization of the Monroe Doctrine.

It does not define aggression, but instead, like common law, it relies on precedents to establish the meaning of aggressive acts and the proper remedy for them. Upward of 18 cases have been considered by the OAS under the treaty, and the resulting case law pretty well establishes a viable framework for collective responses to aggression in the hemisphere.

Was the 1969 war between El Salvador and Honduras the first time you dealt with the treaty?

No, I first became aware of the Rio Treaty during the Cuban missile crisis in 1962. I was serving on a senior Foreign Service officer promotion panel that fall when I was suddenly instructed to leave the panel and resume my normal duties as executive secretary of the Policy Planning Council, to help its chairman, Walt Rostow, cope with a burgeoning problem. About 20 days before the crisis broke into the open, Secretary of State Dean Rusk convoked an informal meeting of Latin American foreign ministers and the OAS secretary general to brief them on developments in Cuba. Secretary Rusk persuaded them that it was their crisis as well as ours. The meeting was not tied up with a formal agenda, voting, official minutes, or resolutions, and it was closed to the public and the press. But when it was over, the foreign ministers issued a communique endorsing the U.S. position that firm action should be taken to prevent the Soviet Union from converting Cuba into an armed base for communist penetration of the Americas. I think Rusk's briefing helped to ensure the Latin Americans would support our later proposal at the OAS to quarantine Cuba, which received unanimous Latin American approval under the Rio Treaty.

You obviously consider Latin American support for the U.S. position in the Cuban missile crisis important.

That is not just my opinion. I have examined some of the fascinating oral history memoirs at the John F. Kennedy Library in Cambridge, Massachusetts, and found ample evidence. Excerpts from Robert Kennedy's memoirs, as published in *McCall's* magazine in November 1968, for example, clearly show that Latin American support under the Rio Treaty was crucial to U.S. success in that crisis. The correspondence between President John F. Kennedy and Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev also revealed that Latin American support was a severe psychological blow to the Soviets, and perhaps decisive in influencing Khrushchev to change course.

Going back to the 1969 conflict between El Salvador and Honduras: did your peacekeeping team finally accomplish its objectives there?

It was a long, hard battle, but eventually we had a demilitarized zone. By late July, I attended an OAS meeting convened under the auspices of the Rio Treaty at which 19 foreign ministers demanded the withdrawal of Salvadoran troops and a return to the status quo. They clearly meant to impose sanctions against El Salvador if its troops were not completely withdrawn from Honduran territory within a certain number of hours.

However, we had to stay on top of this for some time. As late as September or October, it appeared that hostilities would break out again. My six colleagues had already returned to the United States by then, and the Salvadoran president tried to explain to me why he had to send his troops into Honduras.

What were the president's arguments?

He claimed that he would be ousted from office if he didn't act. He said key citizens of El Salvador considered his military officers "panty waists" and were leaving women's panties in the barracks to prove it. He also said Salvadorans who had taken up residence in Honduras some years previously were being pushed back into El Salvador by the Hondurans, and this was causing unemployment and other problems for El Salvador. Anyway, he alleged he was only practicing a Korea-type limited police action by invading Honduras, and that his actions were only a warning to Honduras to cease violating the human rights of Salvadorans living there.

What was your response?

I couldn't conceal my anger, because we had valid reports from the OAS Human Rights Commission that Salvadoran officers had been guilty of serious violations of human rights—all the problems that are normally so prevalent in wartime—but he was completely oblivious to all that. He sent Francisco Jose Guerrero, his foreign minister, to speak with me at my hotel after midnight one night—the same night that our intelligence reports said the Salvadoran Air Force was ready to take off on a warning flight over Tegucigalpa. There was clearly danger that war would break out again, but I finally convinced the foreign minister, after much heated conversation, that they should cancel that flight. And they did, so the cease-fire held.

You were involved in some very tense situations there...

Yes, and I was struck by the extraordinary dedication of some of the international civil servants wearing the OAS armband. Many members of the OAS secretariat risked their lives in peacekeeping operations, and two of our military men were killed in the demilitarized zone. One of them was an American pilot.

Just after witnessing the American pilot's death, I saw some 50 drawings pasted up all over the airport in Tegucigalpa showing Uncle Sam whipping the OAS foreign ministers into submission. The Hondurans were upset with the United States because we maintained strict neutrality as members of the Peace Committee. I was so angry, I ripped down about two dozen of the drawings and took them to the commissioner of customs and said, "This is a disgrace. An American military officer has just lost his life while pursuing peace for Honduras." The commissioner went with me to remove the rest of the drawings.

What kind of instructions did you have when you embarked on that mission in July?

Very little. In fact, a tepresentative of the National Secutity Council staff called me on July 15, just a few hours before I boarded the plane to go down there, to say President Nixon himself wished a clatification of U.S. policy. I told him that our policy there should essentially be multilateral—that we should, as one member of a team of seven nations, work toward a common goal of ending the loss of life of young soldiets. The consequent successes and failures of our mission would then be attributable collectively to seven nations and not just one. I felt strongly that we should not try to carry the whole burden of bringing about and enforcing peace in Central America, and that the United States should follow an overall policy of strict neutrality between Honduras and El Salvador. My experience in that conflict clearly demonstrated to me that multilateral diplomacy, under certain circumstances, can achieve more than bilatetal diplomacy.

Of coutse, the El Salvador–Honduras situation remained tenuous for years. The conflict did in fact break out again in 1976. But, as soon as a few mottars were fired back and forth, we re-created our OAS military observer teams and sent them out again, and they brought order back pretty quickly. Our OAS helicopters continued to patrol the Honduran-Salvadoran border until a few years ago when we withdrew them as they became targets of guerrilla fire.

What were your principal conclusions from that experience?

Among other things, that experience brought home to me that Foreign Service officers assigned to work with multilateral forums, such as the OAS, need better and more specialized training. In retrospect, I think it was very unfortunate that I had no prior training or briefing on Rio Treaty precedents before I undertook highly personal responsibilities relating to them. In fact, I recall that I first read the text of the treaty, from cover to cover, while aboard a DC-3 bearing OAS insignia, shuttling between Tegucigalpa and San Salvador. This situation has recently been rectified thanks to a course on multilateral diplomacy at the Foreign Service Institute inaugurated by Steve Low, the director of FSI, and John McDonald, who directs the course.

Were you involved in any other Rio Treaty operations that antedated the 1969 El Salvador–Honduras fracas?

In 1967, when I returned from a tour as consul general in Barcelona, Spain, I was assigned to the U.S. mission to the OAS. Just about that time, Venezuela appealed to the OAS for help in countering the men and arms that Cuba had landed on Venezuelan shores. I was despatched to Europe, armed with OAS resolutions, to persuade the NATO governments to cut off government sales and credits to Cuba. Unfortunately, the Europeans simply did not sympathize with commercial sanctions against Cuba and saw no teason to curtail their commercial transactions with it.

Can you cite other examples of collective peacekeeping under the Rio Treaty?

There was a lot of commotion in the Caribbean area in 1960 after the government of Rafael Trujillo in the Dominican Republic attempted to assassinate Venezuela's President Romulo Betancourt. Venezuela invoked the Rio Treaty, and the OAS Permanent Council voted to impose sanctions against the Dominican Republic.

Can you point to any other country that has clearly benefited from the Rio Treaty?

Costa Rica, one of the most democratic states in Latin Ameria, has called upon the OAS for help in safeguarding its sovereignty on seven different occasions. It invoked the Rio Treaty several times, and each of those appeals btought a positive and consttuctive response. The Costa Rican foreign minister said at a meeting in Brasilia last November that his countty, as a small nation without an army, owes its very life—its independence and sovereignty—to the Rio Treaty. He encouraged some of the smaller OAS countries, like Barbados and the other newly independent English-speaking Caribbean countries, to sign and ratify the treaty. Costa Rica first invoked the Rio Treaty on December 11, 1948, soon after it went into force, against a Nicaraguan threat. Other small countries in the Central American–Caribbean area have also invoked the treaty several times. For example, there was an imbroglio over bordet disputes between Haiti and the Dominican Republic in 1950 and an invasion of Guatemala by anti-communist exiles in 1954.

Did the Rio Treaty have any relevance to the 1982 war in the Falkland Islands?

That was a good example of misuse of the Rio Treaty, and some expetts believe the treaty was severely damaged there. The Argentines invoked its provisions after they invaded the Falklands—or the Malvinas—when the British were ready to retaliate. Yet, the tteaty was principally designed to deter aggression, and in that case, Argentina was the invading country. A proper use of the treaty would have required Argentina to return to the status quo, under penalty of being declared an aggressor, subject to the imposition of sanctions. But Argentina's purpose in invoking the treaty was to bring the whole emotional aura of Latin American solidarity into play in support of its claim to sovereignty over the Falklands.

The Argentines got the vote they wanted, but that was a very short-term victory. It didn't by any means

"Cuba is a bona fide signatory of the Rio Treaty, yet it has repeatedly violated it and the OAS Charter through countless interventions in the internal affairs of other Latin American states"

"The sanctity of borders must be preserved at all costs, but the principle of non-intervention cannot be used as an excuse to permit the interventions of others"

bring about U.S. neutrality in the hostilities, which was really their major objective, although they did succeed in establishing at the OAS another juridical base for their claim. The 17 countries that voted in favor of the Argentine position all had small and underdeveloped economies and were in no position to impose sanctions on the United Kingdom, or the European Community, which, of course, supported the United Kingdom. If they cut off their trade with Europe, individually or collectively, those countries would have been cutting their own throats. But they knew in advance that the Rio Treaty's provisions for action would not be implemented—and that is more evidence of the treaty's blatant misuse. Such misuse can erode the treaty's effectiveness, just as its proper use builds it up. Misuse was also furthered because Argentina was able to exclude from voting most of the English-speaking Caribbean states which had not signed or ratified the Rio Treaty.

How did the United States emerge from the Falklands crisis?

Not at all well. Secretary of State Haig tried very hard to dissuade Argentina from trying to use the Rio Treaty. Only Chile and Trinidad and Tobago—and initially Colombia—took positions similar to ours. The government of Colombia changed in the middle of that crisis, and the new one sided with Argentina. I think we erred when we failed to enunciate clearly and early the precise nature of U.S. commitments under the Rio Treaty. When the treaty was negotiated in 1947, and before it was ratified, Secretary of State George Marshall announced—despite the Monroe Doctrine—that we would not hold it relevant to former colonial possessions of the European powers in the Americas. He said the United States would remain neutral in any situation involving such territories, and we would work toward having these particular situations of sovereignty resolved through peaceful means. We should have reiterated that to all OAS members when Argentina first invaded the Falklands, but we didn't, and, in my opinion, this historic U.S. position was not well understood in Latin America. It is also my impression that the United States didn't take sufficient cognizance of the importance of the Rio Treaty, or of what the United States itself had said about it in the past.

Do you think we should have been neutral there?

I do. Adlai Stevenson once drilled into me a cardinal rule for cases involving U.S. good offices: "Never offer good offices or get yourself into a negotiating situation between conflicting countries unless you are going to be neutral to the very end. If you change signals in mid-stream, you forfeit your potential for mediating the conflict." Following that principle, we could have taken a multilateral approach to the situation in the Falklands from the beginning. We should have proposed, for example, a team of seven high-level representatives from Latin America and Europe to shuttle between London and Buenos Aires under OAS auspices, as our peace committee flew back and forth between San Salvador and Tegucigalpa in 1969. The United States itself should never have borne the entire responsibility for mediating that kind of conflict. Sure, we would get enormous credit if we brought about a mutually acceptable solution, but the positions of the British and the Argentines were too far apart and too emotional. The risk of excessive blame for failure falling on the United States was too great. Besides, when the United States speaks to Latin Americans, our voice will always be stronger if it is part of a chorus that includes other Latin American voices. In fact, there was one proposal during the Falklands crisis that the Vatican, France, Canada, all OAS permanent observers, and four OAS member countries should attempt the good-offices role there, but, unfortunately, nobody took it seriously.

Is the Rio Treaty applicable to internal subversion arising from intervention by outside forces?

Yes, it is. The treaty speaks of indirect, as well as direct, aggression and it has been applied that way a number of times, including when the Dominican Republic's government tried to assassinate the Venezuelan president. The OAS has been used quite successfully no less than a dozen times in cases involving subversion.

Could and should the Rio Treaty be invoked in Central America by the United States or the Contadora countries?

That is certainly a possibility. But the United States hasn't wanted to create any appearance of sabotaging the good-offices role of the Contadora countries. I still hope those countries succeed in negotiating agreements that will bring peace to Central America, because that would be a constructive force for that area. The OAS role, I would hope, would be to monitor the agreements. But they have been trying for two years now, and if those efforts do not work, the principal victims of subversion there might themselves invoke the Rio Treaty. Costa Rica has threatened to do so several times.

If the Contadora countries invoke the Rio Treaty, do you think the United States would or should countenance its use?

Certainly, I think the United States would be very happy to have the Contadora countries recognize that there is aggression and subversion in Central America that must be curbed. But the nation that invokes the Rio Treaty should be sure that it can get the votes to support action and should orchestrate its implementation. And there is a real problem in dealing with outlaw nations that respect no treaty. Cuba has never renounced the Rio Treaty. It is still a bona fide signatory. Yet it has repeatedly violated the treaty and the OAS Charter through countless interventions in the internal affairs of Latin American states. And at least three of the Contadora countries themselves intervened in Nicaragua in 1979 when the target was the brutal Somoza dictatorship. These same countries now insist on free elections in Nicaragua, but this sounds like hypocrisy. They talk a lot about non-intervention, but they sent in troops, arms, patrols, and aircraft to overthrow a government. So they tend to be selective in choosing when and where to condemn agression. If the sanctity of borders were honored, there would never be export of revolution. The

sanctity of borders must be preserved at all costs, but the principle of non-intervention cannot be used as an excuse to permit the interventions of others. The weak countries in Latin America that are unwilling to take an appropriate initiative in such situations are the ones most likely to suffer in the long run.

How does the U.S. invasion of Grenada in the fall of 1983 relate to the issues we have been discussing?

That was handled outside of the OAS. The countries immediately concerned with their own security and that of Grenada—the countries associated with the Eastern Caribbean—had never ratified the Rio Treaty, despite their membership in the OAS. In fact, Trinidad and Tobago and the Bahamas are the only Caribbean countries that have ratified it. But several small island countries felt prompt and secret action was necessary and appealed directly to the United States for help.

Suppose those small Caribbean countries had ratified the Rio Treaty and had invoked it.

Most of the Latin American countries didn't really know what was going on in Grenada and probably couldn't have gotten the votes. And by the time they tried, the advantage of surprise would have been lost. Frankly, representatives of many of the Latin American countries that condemned us publicly and eloquently at the time have told us privately and confidentially since then that they were pleased at the combined U.S.–Eastern Caribbean action. For multilateral diplomacy to work effectively, nations need to be willing to voice their true sentiments publicly as well as privately.

What, in your view, would have happened in Grenada if the United States had not intervened?

Look at what was uncovered there. There were massive stocks of arms. The government of Grenada already had been subverted, and the island was being developed as a base for leap-frogging operations into, for example, nearby Barbados and Trinidad and Tobago. In the short term, I think there would have been a bitter power struggle in Grenada, but I think over time a hard-line Marxist-Leninist government would have evolved as a new element for active communist subversion in the Caribbean basin.

Hasn't there been an effort to revise the Rio Treaty?

There was a so-called reform movement in the OAS in the early 1970s that negotiated some amendments to the treaty. The most important of those was intended to make it easier to remove sanctions, once imposed. The original treaty required a two-thirds vote for either imposing or removing them. It seemed logical to require solid support before putting sanctions into effect, but it is very difficult to get a two-thirds vote for lifting them, so this amendment would remove them by simple majority vote. I think that amendment would be useful. But another amendment, in my view, would weaken the treaty. A new Article Six would seemingly require the consent of both parties to the conflict before Organ of Consultation assistance could be provided.

Also, the preamble of the amended treaty incorporates the concept of collective *economic* security, to be developed in a separate treaty. One of the major forces underlying the reform movement and charter and treaty amendments was the feeling of some Latin American foreign ministers that the inter-American system should do more to promote more rapid economic development and better access for Latin American exports to U.S. markets. The United States, needless to say, was less than enthusiastic and, in ratifying the amended Rio Treaty, was reserved on its reference to collective economic security.

Are those amendments likely to go into effect?

Well, despite all the work that went into the negotiation of those amendments, only seven Latin American countries have ratified them. I don't detect any strong drive in Latin America today for concluding the ratification process. Meanwhile, the original 1947 Rio Treaty, as it stands, is a very valuable instrument. It has suffered blows from all sides during recent years, but I don't think it is at all beyond redemption.

A number of governments have pronounced the Rio Treaty dead any number of times over the years, but I feel it is still viable and useful. It is there for those who choose to use it in the interest of peace and collective security. It has served the nations of the Americas very well, despite having been bypassed, ignored, and misused recently by OAS member states, large and small. We must go back to it, and try to perfect it through proper use. If we build up a series of successful precedents in the future, as we have in the past, we will gradually strengthen the principle and practice of collective security as a major guarantor of peace.

Can you think of specific steps that could be taken to reaffirm or bolster the Rio Treaty?

In the first place, we should encourage Canada to seek OAS membership and likewise encourage Caribbean OAS member states who have not done so, to ratify the Rio Treaty. We should use the treaty to protect the sanctity of borders, regardless of the nature of the governments within those borders. We should do a much better job of keeping OAS member states fully briefed on subversive activities, which have plagued the hemisphere since the days when the Nazi fifth column operated there. Finally, we should try to strengthen the role of the OAS secretary general. These suggestions put a high premium on professional diplomacy and on an active Department of State that recognizes not only the weaknesses but also the potential of multilateral diplomacy as a complement to bilateral diplomacy. If the OAS charter and the Rio Treaty continue to be weakened, Balkanization of the western hemisphere could result. As the Colombian magazine *Consigna* observed several years ago, "The OAS is the only thing that separates us from total fragmentation and perhaps war." □

"A number of governments have pronounced the Rio Treaty dead, but it is there for those who choose to use it in the interest of peace and collective security"

John Harter has served some 30 years as a Foreign Service officer, including tours in Chile and the Office of Regional Economic Affairs in the State Department's Bureau of Inter-American Affairs.

THE JOURNAL

Unleashing the

When five Americans are taken hostage during the Congolese civil war, the United States and Belgium launch a daring rescue mission

MAX W. KRAUS

IN APRIL 1964, my plane tickets from Phnom Penh, Cambodia, to Stanleyville in the Republic of the Congo were in my pocket and my belongings were packed for shipment. Just before I left, I spent two hours in the front office of the USIS building dodging rocks that a few hundred demonstrators were throwing between the concrete louvers. So, as I left for my new post, I felt I was leaving the front lines.

The Congo seemed to have calmed after the turmoil that followed independence in 1960. At that time, the military had mutinied against their white officers, the economy had begun to crumble as many Belgian businesspeople and planters fled the country, and the mineral-rich province of Katanga had declared itself independent. With the heart of Africa in turmoil, the United Nations sent in troops to end the Katanga secession and re-establish order.

The U.N. intervention seemed to have stabilized the situation by the time I arrived in Stanleyville. Phil Mayhew, my new deputy, met me at the airport. A man of 30 with short-cropped blond hair and the athletic build of an ex-Marine, Mayhew had just finished a tour in Laos and been detailed to USIA.

The morning after my arrival, Mayhew took me to the consulate to introduce me to Consul John Clingerman and his staff. The consulate was a spacious, white, one-story building set on a large lawn upriver from my apartment. The Stars and Stripes flew from a tall flagpole in the middle of the grass. Clingerman, a tall, gaunt man of 33, had been in Stanleyville almost two years since his previous assignment in Katmandu. The other Americans at the consulate were Vice Consul David Grinwis, his secretary, Joan Allen, and three communicators, James Stauffer, Donald Parkes, and Ernest Houle.

USIS published and distributed a monthly newspaper and newsreel, both of which praised the policies and actions of the Congolese government. Unfortunately, I found out during the first few weeks that the government was thoroughly corrupt and oppressive. Teachers had not been paid for six months because the provincial minister of education had stolen the pay sent up from the capital. The deputy provincial governor, I was reliably informed, made a habit of lighting his cigars in night clubs with 100 franc notes. With bribery rampant in the government, justice was a mockery.

This situation provided fertile soil for a rebellion, which began in January 1964. By May, the insurgency had spread from its starting point in Kwilu province, where things were not going well for the rebels (who called themselves Simbas, the Swahili word for lion), to the eastern Congo. Albertville and Uvira on the shores of Lake Tanganyika and Bukavu, the capital of Kivu province, became the first hot points. Bukavu was a good 300 miles from Stanleyville, but we started to follow the uprising's progress closely.

Little more than a month later, the pace of events accelerated. On June 30 the last U.N. peacekeeping forces were withdrawn. Six days later, Congolese President Joseph Kasavubu fired Cyrille Adoula as prime minister and asked Moise Tshombe, the former leader of the Katanga secession, who had recently returned from exile, to form a new government for the country, one-fifth of whose territory was already controlled by the rebels. The United States was surprised and shocked by this development.

Tshombe announced that he wanted to form a government of national reconciliation and released a number of political prisoners. He also tried to negotiate with the leaders of the rebel movement, which was badly fractured. A number of rebel leaders rallied to Tshombe's government, but Christophe Gbenye, a former government minister who led the Conseil National de Liberation, and other key figures posed demands Tshombe could not accept. The attempted reconciliation failed, and the Armee Nationale Congolaise and the rebels continued to fight. Tshombe also attempted to beef up the ineffective army by bringing in white mercenaries. But by the fourth of August, the Simbas were on the outskirts of Stanleyville.

On the morning of that day, Michael Hoyt, who had replaced John Clingerman as acting consul, informed me that the embassy had instructed us to evacuate Stanleyville. Mayhew and I went to the consulate and helped him burn the classified files in empty oil drums on the lawn. Hoyt told us to close the USIS center, go to our apartments, and pack two suitcases each. We were then to go to the airport, help with the evacuation of women and children, and get aboard a flight ourselves.

When we had finished packing and were ready to leave for the airport, Mayhew and I heard firing in Lumumba Square. From the front balcony we could see a detachment of the ANC at the end of the square nearest the airport. They were shooting toward the opposite end, but we could not see anyone else there. It obviously was not a propitious moment for a dash to the airport.

After about 20 minutes the firing stopped, and Mayhew and I decided to leave. When we arrived at the airport, a crowd had gathered around a DC-3 bearing the blue insignia of the United Nations on its tail. Mayhew and I helped load it, and a second plane which arrived soon afterward, with women and children. The pilot of the second plane told us there was one more on its way, which probably would be the last.

I called Hoyt at the consulate and told him and his colleagues to get to the airport as quickly as possible. He told me

Max W. Kraus is a retired Foreign Service officer who served with USIA from 1956–75.

Red Dragon

Magda French

the Simbas already had the consulate surrounded and he, Grinwis, Parkes, and Stauffer—Houle had not yet made it to the consulate—could no longer risk the drive to the airport.

It was not until almost 20 years later that I learned from then Ambassador to the Congo G. McMurtrie Godley that not all of us were *supposed* to leave. "This is hindsight, of course," he told me in an interview in 1983, "but when we suggested to the department the evacuation of Hoyt, Grinwis, and the communicators, Washington came back loud and clear in the negative. Of course, we had little experience with hostages being held by irresponsible revolutionaries, but the department thought the nucleus of a consulate should be left behind in Stanleyville to deal with Gbenye and the other revolutionaries and report back to the department."

NIGHT HAD FALLEN by the time Mayhew and I boarded the last flight out. We flew over lush rain forest to Leopoldville. The heating system in the cabin did not work and I was grateful when the pilot invited me up to the cockpit—until he said, "I hope this old crate holds together until Leopoldville. It hasn't been flown in six months."

The plane did hold together until Leopoldville, and Godley and John Mowinckel, the public affairs officer there, who had become my boss during my brief stay in Stanleyville, welcomed us at the foot of the ramp when the aircraft taxied to a stop. Mowinckel had planned to visit all USIS posts in the Congo but never made it to Stanleyville before my hurried departure. When I told him, "I thought *you* were supposed to visit *me*," he replied, "Am I glad to see you! You are our new press attache."

The Congo was beginning to rival Vietnam as a crisis, and about 100 newsmen from all over the world were in Leopoldville to cover the story. The already overworked officers in the political section had to deal with them in the absence of a press attache, a position nearly always filled by a USIS officer. Now I was tapped for that job.

The morning after my arrival, Mowinckel picked me up at my dingy hotel. First he took me to the ambassador's office to be briefed on the latest developments, including the fate of Hoyt and his four companions in Stanleyville, who had been taken hostage by the Simbas. Soon afterward it was time to face the press at the first of my twice-daily briefings. I armed myself with biographical data on the five hostages.

About two o'clock on the night of August 5, a phone call from Mowinckel roused me from a deep sleep. "Where, precisely, is the flagpole on the consulate lawn in Stanleyville?" he wanted to know. My answer was not terribly coherent, and he told me to come to the embassy right away. There I found a meeting of senior officers, the "itty-bitty country team," as it came to be known, planning a helicopter rescue of Hoyt, Grinwis, Houle, Parkes, and Stauffer. The exact location of the consulate flagpole was of crucial importance to this plan. Mayhew and I pinpointed it on a detailed plan of the consulate and offered to go along with the rescue team, which was to consist of a few Marine security guards under the command of Colonel Knud Raudstein, the military attache.

Mowinckel, a tall, heavy-set man, and the CIA station chief, who matched him in size, also wanted to volunteer. This is how Mowinckel recalls that night: "The tension was almost unbearable and everyone's nerves were near the breaking point. Larry and I went into the ambassador's office to make our offer, and I was so tense I might have hit him if he had said the wrong thing. Godley was sitting behind his desk, looking very weary, and asked, 'What do you guys want?' I said, 'Sir, we want to go along.' He looked at us over his granny reading glasses and said, 'Hell, you two bastards are too goddamned fat!' and that broke the tension." Our offer was also turned down.

But in the end, "Operation Flagpole," as the mission was code-named, never came off. It was scrubbed for a variety of

reasons, among them that Houle was still in his apartment and not yet with the others.

A few days later, Nicolas Olenga, the commander of the Simbas, met with the foreign community in Stanleyville and claimed that "thousands" of U.S. soldiers were fighting in the Congo. He declared the consulate staff *persona non grata* and said they would be expelled. Hoyt reported this to Leopoldville by commercial telegram but warned against making any "special transportation arrangements."

The following day Simbas searched the consulate building. They ordered Hoyt to open the vault, but he could not because a rebel had earlier fired a bullet into the lock. During this visit all five Americans—Houle had finally joined the others the previous day—were beaten and forced to chew on U.S. flags as though to eat them. Then the Simbas put them on a truck and told the hostages they would kill them near the Lumumba monument. Instead the rebels took them to a former ANC camp and imprisoned them.

Back in Leopoldville, our worries over our colleagues grew, as we lost contact with the hostages when they were moved from the consulate. Various sources told us, however, that the Simbas had rounded up all foreigners in the eastern Congo, brought most of them to Stanleyville, and were holding them there.

Hoyt occasionally sent telegrams, clearly written under duress and to suit the Simbas' purposes. The rebels also put Radio Stanleyville on the air, and Hoyt and other hostages sometimes broadcast appeals to their governments calling for the withdrawal of the white mercenaries. Otherwise, they were forced to warn, the lives of the hostages were in danger. Congolese refugees from Stanleyville told blood-curdling accounts of mass executions and even cannibalism during purges of Congolese officials and supporters of the Adoula and Tshombe governments.

On August 30 the white mercenaries retook Albertville. The Simbas named their new foes "*Les Affreux*," ("the Horrible Ones") and rounded up more hostages in the eastern Congo to use as bargaining chips. By early September the rebels claimed to be holding some 500 people, the Congo had become the top foreign story in the world press, and attendance at my briefings had grown even further.

In Washington, a formal Congo working group had been set up on August 29. Headed by Joseph Palmet, it included representatives of all government agencies concerned with foreign and military policy. A few days later the Sttike Command in Tampa was ordered to prepare a military operation for the five Americans in Stanleyville, but again, as in the case of Operation Flagpole, the plan was never carried out.

At the same time, the Organization of African Unity held a special session in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, as part of the effort to find a diplomatic solution to the civil war. Tshombe had been barred from an OAU summit in Cairo two months before, but now a delegation led by him was seated. Aftet five days of deliberation, the OAU developed a nine-point resolution. Hailed as "the miracle of Addis," it did little more than appeal for a cessation of hostilities and call for "national reconciliation." Unfortunately, the 10-nation ad hoc commission created under the resolution was chiefly interested in removing the mercenaries from the Congo and paid scant attention to the hostages.

While these diplomatic efforts were proceeding, the Red Cross tried to get the hostages in Stanleyville released, or at least determine their condition. A Swissair plane loaded with medicine was cleared to land on September 25. The Red Cross team, headed by Gaius Cassius Senn, the Swiss delegate, never saw the hostages, but Senn warned that any bombing attacks on Stanleyville and other rebel-held towns would be tantamount to a death sentence for at least the American hostages.

During the end of October and the fitst half of November, the danger for the 5000 non-Congolese still in rebel-held territory increased as the insurgents realized the tide was turning against them. A mixed group of mercenaties and ANC troops, undet the overall command of Belgian Colonel Frederick Van de Waele, was rapidly approaching Stanleyville. In tesponse, the threats broadcast by Radio Stanleyville grew more strident.

On November 8, Belgian Foreign Minister Paul Henri Spaak visited Washington and suggested that Belgium and the United States launch a joint military mission to rescue the hostages in Stanleyville and other towns in the eastern Congo. U.S. C-130 military transport planes would drop a battalion of Belgian paratroopers over Stanleyville. The operation was code named "Operation Dragon Rouge."

D-DAY FOR THE ASSAULT was not yet set when I was briefed on Dragon Rouge, because there was to be a last-ditch diplomatic attempt to obtain the release of the hostages. Obviously, secrecy was vital for the success of the rescue mission. The hostages surely would be massacred if the Simbas got wind of the plan. The covet

story for Operation Dragon Rouge, in case of a leak, was that it was a joint Belgian-U.S. "long-range airborne training exercise."

A leak was not long in coming once the troops and planes arrived on Ascension Island on November 18. Speculative stories appeared in Brussels, Paris, and London about the joint training exercise. The Belgian government finally acknowledged on November 20 that its paratroopers were on Ascension with the aid of U.S. planes to effect, if necessary, "a humanitarian rescue mission" in the Congo. From the time I was told about Operation Dragon Rouge until the Belgian—and subsequent U.S.—press release I tried to play dumb at my briefings. "Belgian paratroopers? U.S. C-130s? Ascension Island? I don't know what you are talking about," was the line I told the newsmen.

In such a situation, it is absolutely vital that a spokesman know the plans in detail, and this was driven home to me just a few days after the public announcement about the contingency planning for a rescue mission. D-day for Dragon Rouge was finally set for Tuesday, November 24; H-hour for six a.m. But on the evening of November 22, Yves Losay, the Agence France-Presse bureau chief, called me from the telex room at the main post office. Two British correspondents, he said, were filing stories saying the parachute drop over Stanleyville was coming off next morning. Could I confirm that news? he wanted to know. I told him to hold everything, that I would come to the telex room as quickly as I could.

After a quick check with the ambassador to make sure the plans had not been changed, I raced to the telex room and confronted the two British newsmen. "I admit I haven't been candid with you during the past week," I told them, "and you know why I haven't. There are a lot of human lives at stake. But I swear to you by everything that is holy to me that this time I am telling you the truth: The operation is not coming off tomorrow. I can't tell you when it will come off, but it won't be tomorrow, and if you file your stories an awful lot of people will get killed. So I beseech you to kill your stories." They told the telex operator to stop his machine.

Two days later, the Belgian paratroopers landed in Stanleyville. As the Simbas marched 250 hostages toward the airport, a confused shooting spree began and the Simbas killed 33 people. But the paratroopers saved the rest of the hostages. I was at Ndjili airport in Leopoldville that afternoon when the first C-130 carrying 120 of them, including Hoyt, Grinwis, Houle, Parkes, and Stauffer, landed. I ran out on the tarmac to greet my friends.

Operation Dragon Rouge broke the back of the Simba rebellion, though it took several months to clean out pockets of resistance. The original plans for the rescue mission envisaged other airborne operations against Bunia, Paulis, and Watsa, where there were sizeable concentrations of hostages, but only Operation Dragon Noir against Paulis was carried out. Some 375 foreign nationals were rescued there, but only after 21 Belgians and one American missionary were killed when the rebels heard reports from Stanleyville about Dragon Rouge. These two operations saved many lives and were a military success. Yet U.S. support for Tshombe and his mercenaries exacted a heavy price in diplomatic opprobrium from other African and Third World countries. I was by no means the only American in Leopoldville who wondered whether the game was worth the candle. □

PEOPLE

1985 Merit Award Winners

The four review panels of the AFSA Committee on Education have completed their work on the 1985 AFSA/AAFSW Merit Awards, Chairman Claude G. Ross has announced. Due to extremely close scoring, 25 awards of $500 each are being made this year instead of the usual 22. This year's awards for academic excellence and outstanding leadership are given in honor of Horace G. Torbert Jr. for his years of effective and devoted service as the chairman of the committee from 1978–83. The review panels consist of 24 volunteers from State, AID, USIA, AAFSW, and the retired Foreign Service community. Funds for these awards are provided jointly by the AAFSW Bookfair and the AFSA Scholarship Fund. The graduating high school students who received awards and Honorable Mention are listed below.

WINNERS

Mitchell Gratwick Baker
Alison Louise Becker
Matthew Tobias Diamond
Thomas Victor Diamond
Claudia Anne Edwards
Charles William Henebry Jr.
Edward T. Hoganson
Charles Evan Iceland
Sharman Ellen Jacoby
Lisa Fox Langhaug
James Walter LeBlanc
Maria Consuelo Maisto
Christopher David Marin
Thomas Samuel Rackmales
Nina Valerie Ragone
Benjamin Francis Raley
Stephanie Elizabeth Schollaert
Peter DuBois Seymour
David Foster Stearns
Deborah Ida Sutter
Claudia Maria Taylor
Mark Conrad Thormann
Johnna Boulds Tipton
Bettina von den Steinen
Sarah Manth Winder

HONORABLE MENTION

Tara Elena Boonstra
Aaron Charles Courtney
Andrea Kathleen Ellis
Rachel Leigh Holmes
Pamela Lynn Houdek
Mary Xuan Dziem O'Riordan
Elizabeth Sue Robinson
Elizabeth Gail Tarrant

This year 12 young women and 13 men were winners; 7 women and one man received honorable mentions. Of the 25 winners, 16 attend schools overseas, in the United Kingdom, Austria, France, Uruguay, Mexico, Ecuador, Kuwait, West Germany, Canada, Pakistan, Egypt, Greece, India, and Indonesia. The other winners attend schools in Maryland, Virginia, Colorado, Connecticut, and Florida. Pictures and biographies of these students will appear in the September issue.

Deaths

SERLE EVANS, wife of retired Foreign Service officer F. Bowen ("Bo") Evans, died of cancer in New York City on January 10. Ms. Evans accompanied her husband on assignments with USIA in London, Colombia, Venezuela, and the Caribbean.

In addition to her husband, who resides in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, she is survived by a son and a daughter.

HARRY B. COOK, a retired Foreign Service officer, died December 20 in Belen, New Mexico, from a heart attack. He was 64.

Mr. Cook served in the Navy from 1938–61. During World War II, he served in the Asiatic Fleet and was assigned to the naval attache offices in Oslo, Warsaw, Cairo, and Egypt. He also served with the Navy Recruiting Office in Philadelphia.

He joined the Foreign Service in 1965 as a budget and fiscal officer. His posts included Santiago, Quito, Bucharest, Copenhagen, East Berlin, and Manila. He retired in 1977.

Mr. Cook is survived by his wife, Maria Elena, of Belen; two sons, Harry Jr. and John; and one daughter, Elena Cook Padilla, of Augusta, Georgia.

CHARLES HUESMANN DUCOTE, a former Foreign Service officer, died April 16 following a brief illness. He was 85.

Mr. Ducote was graduated from Spring Hill College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. He then worked as an electrical engineer with Stone & Weber in Boston.

In 1928 he was appointed trade commissioner to Buenos Aires. He later served at posts including Havana, Paris, Brussels, and Budapest. During this period, he was economic counselor with the Economic Cooperation Administration and worked on developing industrial productivity under the Marshall Plan. He retired in 1951 as consul general in Madagascar.

Following his retirement, he worked as a consultant to U.S. companies on export and market development. He was vice president and general manager of Trailmobile International in New York from 1953–65.

Mr. Ducote is survived by three brothers, Aaron, of Massachusetts, Whitney, of New York, and Richard, of Delaware; a daughter, Consuelo D. Lykes, of Arlington, Virginia; five grandchildren, Consuelo L. Bangs, Karen L. Duff, and William C. Lykes, all of Arlington, and Leslie L. Lykes and Catherine T. Lykes, of Los Angeles; and by four great grandchildren.

JAMES E. MARKEY, a retired Foreign Service officer, died February 22 of a heart attack in Redlands, California. He was 62.

Mr. Markey was graduated from DePauw University. He served in the Army during World War II. He joined the State Department's U.S. Information Service (later USIA) and served in posts in Pusan and Seoul, Korea; Udorn, Thailand; Medan and Jakarta, Indonesia; Sydney, Australia; and Washington.

Survivors include his wife, Marilyn, of Yucaipa, California, and a sister, Ursula Fitzgerald, of Fairfax, Virginia.

SIDNEY PRISBECK, a retired consul general, died March 12 from Paget's bone disease. He was 77.

Mr. Prisbeck earned a bachelor's at the University of Scranton and a master's and doctorate in languages from Columbia University. He taught languages and coached football and track at Alliance College in Cambridge Springs, Pennsylvania.

During World War II, Mr. Prisbeck was a glider pilot and counterintelligence agent. Following the war, he became a consul general for more than 16 years.

Mr. Prisbeck was fluent in German, Polish, Russian, Spanish, French, Farsi, and several Slavic languages. He served in Berlin during the blockade and was the head embassy translator in Warsaw from 1951–54. From 1958–61, he ran the consulate in Khorramshahr, Iran. He retired in 1963 and moved to Tucson, Arizona. He worked there as a broker for Heritage Real Estate Company, Inc.

Survivors include his wife, Alice; a brother, Carl, of Venice, Florida; a sister, Julia, of Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania; and many nephews and cousins.

FOREIGN EXCHANGE

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ASSOCIATION NEWS

Bush, Reagan praise seven who died serving at diplomatic posts

"The names being unveiled today tell a story of our government's unyielding commitment to peace in the four corners of the earth," said Vice President Bush, reading a message from President Reagan at the annual unveiling of AFSA's Memorial Plaque on May 3 in the Diplomatic Lobby of the Department of State. "All seven were attached to our embassies abroad—all seven died in the performance of their duties. Because of their heroism, their names should forever be inscribed in the hearts of our people." Six of the dead were victims of terrorism, and Bush promised "an unrelenting pursuit of eradication of terrorists and those who sponsor their destructive activities."

"The public sees the glamour that occasionally attaches to what we do, but is only beginning to understand the growing dangers and discomfort," Deputy Secretary Dam similarly quoted from a message prepared by Secretary Shultz. "The older of the two plaques...covers the entire period from the beginning of the republic to 1967. It contains the names of 81 Foreign Service people who lost their lives around the world in the line of duty. The other plaque, started only 18 years ago, already bears 67 names."

Hundreds of onlookers from the State Department as well as returning retirees observing Foreign Service Day attended the ceremony, along with members of the families of the men who were added to the plaque this year. Those honored were Albert Schaufelberger III, shot by terrorists in San Salvador in 1983; Charles F. Soper, killed in the line of duty in New Delhi in 1983; Michael Wagner and Kenneth Welch, killed in the bombing of the embassy annex in Beirut last fall; Charles F. Hegna and William L. Stanford, shot by terrorists aboard a Kuwaiti Airlines jet in Teheran last December; and Enrique Camarena, kidnapped and killed in Mexico this year.

"Although every American is diminished when a terrorist strikes or devotion to duty leads to death," said AFSA President Dennis K. Hays, "those of us in the Service feel a special ache, for these are not just names in the news for us, they are our colleagues, our friends, our family. Those we honor today, like the men and women before them, served on different continents and in vastly different jobs, but they had but a single purpose: to represent the United States to the best of their ability under circumstances which are always demanding and often dangerous."

Hays: "Always demanding, often dangerous"

Bush: "Unrelenting pursuit of terrorists"



Brian and Christopher Welch reach up to touch the name of their father, Kenneth Welch, on the Memorial Plaque.

Hays pleads for annuity equity for new hires

"We are here today to ask that our newest colleagues, those hired after January 1, 1984, receive for their service and sacrifice consideration equal to that given to those of us vested in the old retirement system," AFSA President Dennis K. Hays told the House Post Office and Civil Service Committee in April. "No matter when hired, the Foreign Service employee and his or her family confront numerous occupational hazards that most civilian employees are not subject to."

Congress voted two years ago to bring new hires into Social Security, rather than the Foreign Service retirement system, agreeing to create a supplemental system to make up the difference. Several supplemental systems are now under consideration on Capitol Hill. At the same time, Hays asked the lawmakers to continue to permit retirement at age 50 with 20 years of service for all Foreign Service employees. After age 50, he said, more than half of Service personnel are unavailable for worldwide duty because they or a family member do not qualify for medical clearance. In addition, he noted the need for the Service to cut back its senior rolls under current legislation.

Hays also pleaded for the same "protection against arbitrary reductions in benefits as employees in private industry have. This should take the form of contractual rights."

Hatch Act amendment stalls on Hill

An amendment to the Hatch Act supported by AFSA that would have forbidden chiefs of mission from participating in partisan activities has been temporarily withdrawn following opposition from several members. The amendment, which would have applied to career and political ambassadors, was introduced by Representative Steven Solarz (D.-New York) to prevent occurrences like last fall's endorsement of Senator Jesse Helms (R.-North Carolina) by 21 noncareer ambassadors.

A revised timetable calls for hearings this June, and AFSA plans to testify in favor of the amendment at that time.

Consumables negotiations remain stalled

After agreeing in principle to an AFSA proposal during mediation, management has continued to propose an artificial distinction between consumables posts based on "degree of difficulty." According to management, only certain consumables posts would be entitled to a second allowance. AFSA believes that the justification for providing the initial allowance warrants an additional allowance when an employee's tour is extended. We have pointed out that conditions existing in consumables posts are such that degree of difficulty is not a relevant consideration. In fact, varying degrees of difficulty exist within individual posts.

As post responses to AFSA have demonstrated, an additional consumables allowance for all consumables posts would encourage employees to extend their tours. AFSA feels that such an incentive is clearly preferable to forced assignments. Moreover, it would be less expensive for management to provide an additional allowance to employees who are willing to extend or return. The alternative would be a new consumables allowance for the replacement employee, as well as one for the departing employee if he or she transfers to another hardship post, plus all of the costs and allowances involved in transfers.

By the time this update appears, the consumables allowance issue may finally have been resolved. However, based on the history of the negotiations, AFSA is not optimistic. As late as the middle of May, the joint renegotiation of the second consumables allowance for persons reassigned to consumables posts continued to be marred by the dubious intentions of the management team. Three years of negotiation and the recent non-binding mediation have resulted in little tangible progress. It appears that management is merely interested in prolonging the negotiations as long as possible.

An unfair labor practice charge that AFSA filed against the State Department is now before the Foreign Service Labor Relations Board. An FSLRB ruling that the department has engaged in bad faith bargaining may pressure it into negotiating more responsibly.

AFSA sponsors tandem-couple organization

Tandem couples now comprise almost 10 percent of the foreign affairs work force, and their numbers are growing. Almost 13 percent of all Foreign Service secretaries are part of a tandem. More than half of the tandems currently assigned overseas are serving in hardship posts, and close to half of all tandem employees are in middle grades.

In order to better understand and meet the challenges posed by tandems to the State Department and other foreign affairs agencies, a group of individuals has formed an organization to work on the variety of personnel and assignment-related issues of tandems. Specifically, the purposes of the organization are to:

- provide information to tandem employees on current laws, regulations, and policies governing tandems;
- promote regulations and policies that facilitate joint assignments;
- ensure implementation of existing tandem assignment regulations;
- support regulations and policies that improve the open-assignment process for all employees and work for career development opportunities for all spouses; and
- publicize and clarify the facts, problems, and benefits of tandem assignments both within and outside the foreign affairs community.

Those interested in joining the organization may contact AFSA's Washington office (338-4045) or Julia Moore and Razvigor Bazala (State EUR/P phone: 632-0850 or 632-0682) for more information.

Legislative Alert

The Senate Gets Serious About Cuts

By RICK WEISS, *Legislative Liaison*

Under the Senate budget resolution passed last month, the Senate requires the Governmental Affairs Committee to make $12 billion in savings from federal pay and retirement programs during the next three years. The Senate budget *suggests* the following Civil Service savings:

- an increase in the amount of money federal and postal workers contribute to their retirement funds, from seven percent to nine percent;
- no pay raises or cost-of-living adjustments next year for federal workers, civilian and military retirees, or Social Security recipients; and
- a one-year delay of within-grade/step increases starting in 1986.

The Government Affairs Committee is able to and probably will make some changes, although it must come up with approximately the same dollars savings as required in the budget resolution.

On the House side, the Democrats, after waiting for the Republican Senate to act first on the budget, now will propose their alternatives. Budget Committee Democrats have argued tentatively to freeze fiscal year 1986 cost-of-livng adjustments for military and civilian retirees, but some Democrats say the agreement will be maintained only if Social Security recipients are added to the freeze. At the same time, the Democrats tentatively agreed to provide a three-percent raise for federal workers in FY 1986. The House should pass its budget resolution at about the time you read this, and then the two chambers must begin to reach agreement on a compromise deficit-reduction budget for 1986.

The vulnerability of Foreign Service retirement can be illustrated by what Congress is doing to military retirement. A House Armed Services Subcommittee approved a $4 billion cut in the $18 billion military pension fund. The Pentagon has responded with a report that explains that $3.7 billion could be saved by stretching out retirement pay—i.e., retirees would receive 35 percent of their basic pay after 20 years of active duty, 55 percent after 25 years, and 75 percent after 30 years. In the Senate, Paul Simon (D.-Illinois) has proposed that military personnel would have to serve 25 years on active duty before collecting 50 percent of their base pay in retirement, instead of the present 20 years. He has also proposed cost-of-living allowances for military retirees on their base annual salaries instead of adding in previous COLA increases before computing the new one.

To conclude, keep an eye on the tax front too. When Congress takes up the varying tax simplification plans, some lawmakers will propose eliminating or severely reducing the tax breaks for private-sector U.S. citizens working overseas.

New chapter manual to help posts organize

A lot of AFSA's activities on behalf of Foreign Service employees are conducted overseas by chapters at more than 250 posts. To aid the men and women who run these chapters, the Association has prepared a revised manual that has been mailed to each post.

Essentially a handbook for conducting labor-management relations and for implementing AFSA benefits and services around the world, the manual contains sections on the history and organization of the Association, how to form and manage a chapter, a list of benefits and services, and some 15 appendixes.

Weiss hired as second Hill liaison

Former Deputy Assistant Secretary for Operations Rick Weiss has been hired as a consultant on AFSA's congressional relations team, where he joins Robert Beers, the Association's lobbyist on retirement matters since 1983. Funds for the congressional relations program come from the Legislative Action Fund, donations to which topped $80,000 last month [see related article].

Weiss, who retired from the Foreign Service last year, will concentrate on liaison not only with Congress but with other groups that have an impact on federal retirement, including the General Accounting Office, the Grace Commission, and policy think tanks.

When he was in the Foreign Service, Weiss worked on congressional relations for 14 years. He served in the Bureau of Administration, the Office of Management and Budget, the Department of Justice, the Drug Enforcement Agency, and in the Bureau of Legislative Affairs. He was involved in the passage of the Foreign Service Act and the Hostage Relief Act of 1980 and the International Chancery Act amendments and Foreign Missions Act of 1982. He was also active in the work behind the State Department authorization bill for fiscal years 1984–85.

"The decision to hire Mr. Weiss represents our determination to redouble our efforts on the Hill and will enable us to more effectively pursue our two-track program of working with the other federal employee organizations on one hand and hitting hard on the unique nature of the Service on the other," AFSA President Dennis K. Hays said in announcing the appointment.

Legislative fund tops $80,000 from 1450 donors in three months

After just three months, Legislative Action Fund donations surpassed $80,000 from 1450 donors, more than double the amount collected in the drive two years ago. In response, the Governing Board has engaged a second congressional liaison specialist to broaden the fight on proposed retirement cutbacks [see related article].

Rick Weiss, who joins Robert Beers, will work on issues concerning Foreign Service retirement in Congress but in addition will contact other groups that have an impact on the retirement issue. Donations to the fund, which are tax deductible, should be sent to the address below. Donors' names will be published in this space unless they wish to remain anonymous.

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Panel discusses structure, goals of public diplomacy

"There is a little bit of confusion, not only in the language but in the concept itself," Ambassador to Malta James Rentschler of USIA told an audience of agency employees at the fifth in the series Dialogs on Public Diplomacy, sponsored by AFSA's USIA Standing Committee.

Rentschler was one member of a panel that also included Gerald Helman, deputy to the under secretary of state for political affairs; Hans Tuch, recently retired as PAO in Bonn and a USIA career minister; and John Blacken, deputy coordinator for public diplomacy in Latin America at State. Their subject, "The New State of Public Diplomacy," drew attention to the creation in recent years of offices in the department dedicated to "public diplomacy." The event was held on April 11 at the Capitol Hill Holiday Inn.

The phrase "public diplomacy" was first intended to represent the adaptation of public affairs practices to traditional diplomacy, embracing both cultural and informational activities targeted to foreign peoples. In recent times, however, the phrase has been redefined to describe an aggressive and persuasive presentation of U.S. foreign policy, to foreign and American audiences alike.

The panel was in consensus on the importance of public diplomacy and even on its objectives but divided on the issue of means to achieve those ends. According to Blacken, U.S. public diplomacy in the persuasive sense, directed at American audiences, has grown because it has been important to meet competition from other sources. The Nicaraguan government has an active network in this country promoting the Sandinistas' views, he said, and U.S. policymakers have found it frustrating to have no effective way to deal with such a campaign. "USIS is facing much the same competition abroad that we are facing in the United States," he said. Helman agreed: "This administration believes strongly in the practice of public diplomacy." Admitting that disinterested private sources are often viewed as more credible than government officials, Blacken stressed the need to work through surrogates: "The best public diplomacy is that which is not perceived to be public diplomacy."

Tuch presented the traditional USIA position, defining public diplomacy as "a process of communication directed at foreign publics which tries to bring about an understanding of the ideas and ideals, the institutions and culture, and the policies and goals of, in this case, the United States." He reminded the audience that USIA's enabling legislation excludes American audiences from being a target of its public diplomacy. Agreeing with Helman that public diplomacy "consists of two related activities...information and persuasion," Tuch noted that the agency's work abroad and the work of policymakers here had to be understood in distinct terms. Helman strongly disagreed.

The issue of coordination brought greater agreement. "We have a situation here where part of our public diplomacy is conducted by one agency, part by another," said Helman. "There has been insufficient coordination between us, both on what we say and on how we say it." While not disagreeing, Tuch restricted his concern to public diplomacy overseas. His approach was structural: "USIA was created for that function, so why does State need to be involved? I have always thought that public diplomacy was what USIA was for."

Panel protests appointments from USIA director's staff

AFSA's USIA Standing Committee has protested two overseas assignments for officers on the director's own staff. Both choice positions, they were classified above the personal ranks of the appointees.

"These assignments run counter to the best interests of the professionalism we stand for, of [USIA's] personnel system...and of the two officers in question," the committee wrote. "We believe that better qualified and more experienced officers of appropriate rank were available for both positions. We further believe that the use of assignments as personal rewards contravenes the very spirit of our system, which already offers an extensive range of awards and compensation for outstanding performance."

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RETIREMENT NEWS

Retirees receive primer on AFSA, Associates, annuities

A record 125 retirees jammed two floors of the Foreign Service Club for the annual brunch following Foreign Service Day on May 4 and heard several speakers talk about proposed changes in the federal retirement system, changes in AFSA to deal with that problem, and a new proposal to pay spouses who do work for the government as Foreign Service Associates.

"The real question this year is the COLA," AFSA Congressional Liaison Robert Beers told the audience. "The goal in the Senate is a two-percent limit on the COLA this year, which, given the current rate of inflation, would amount to a two-percent cut." Inflation currently is averaging about four percent a year. The big fight in Congress is on Social Security, not federal retirement, Beers told the audience. "Our goal is to try to hold in force the present system." He went on to describe the new retirement plan for persons hired since 1984, emphasizing that retirees and most current employees are not affected by it.

AFSA President Dennis K. Hays told the audience of recent Association activity in labor-management relations and on professional issues. He said that AFSA favored a bill that would extend Hatch Act protections to ambassadors, to avoid the incident last fall when 21 non-career ambassadors endorsed a Senate candidate. The measure would apply to career ambassadors as well, he said. Hays went on to describe the tortuous negotiations over a second consumables allowance, permitting persons who had to bring consumables into hardship posts an allowance for a second batch if they sign up for a second tour at the post. He said that management had delayed implementation of the allowance and that the Association was challenging it on several fronts.

Hays introduced Rick Weiss, who was recently hired to join Beers on AFSA's congressional-relations team. "Congress wants the State Department to be successful," Weiss told the retirees. "It wants the Foreign Service to be maintained." But, he acknowledged, the Service has few votes. He described the exceptional nature of the Service but observed that "Congress does not like exceptions," making it difficult to get separate treatment on Capitol Hill. He said he planned also to consult with other groups that have an impact on the Service, including think tanks, other agencies, and commissions.

Patricia Barbis, the Association of American Foreign Service Women's delegate to the Governing Board, described the proposal for a Foreign Service Associates program that would pay spouses who do work for the government at posts. "These people perform a valuable service for the government," she said. The spouse issue is a threat to the viability of the Service, and the Associates proposal could help solve it. "We can't change society—we've got to look at the needs of the Foreign Service ten years from now," she said. She added that there is support in Congress for the plan, and that a pilot program at a few posts may be started soon. "This will keep families together and make the Service more representative of American society."

Jubilee members from left: Beam, Gerrity, Johnson, Jones, MacGregor, Trimble, Parsons, Weil.

Jubilees reminisce at fete

In an emotional, nostalgic ceremony during the annual brunch following Foreign Service Day on May 4, nine Jubilee Members received certificates "in grateful recognition of 50 years of loyalty and dedication to the highest ideals of professionalism in the career Foreign Service," an honor bestowed during the Association's 60th anniversary last fall to 51 persons who had been AFSA members for a half-century or longer. All 51 also became honorary life members.

As the nine who were able to attend the ceremony were introduced to the crowd of 125 in the Foreign Service Club, they were greeted by appreciative applause and paused to give a few remarks. Nostalgia held sway as they recalled service during the Depression, cadging bunks on tramp steamers to take home leaves, making furniture out of packing cases, war-time internments, and a role in the play of history. The consensus? "We had an awful lot of fun." Several noted the many changes in the Service during their membership in the Association, and former Under Secretary for Political Affairs U. Alexis Johnson observed that, while at first he had opposed a labor-management role for AFSA, he found that in today's world it had become necessary.

In addition to Johnson, honored at the ceremony were:

•Jacob Beam, ambassador to Moscow and to Warsaw and deputy assistant secretary for European affairs;

•Charles Gerrity, consul to Venice, Vigo, Panama, and Yokohama;

•J. Wesley Jones, ambassador to Libya, director of the office of Western European affairs, counselor of embassy in Madrid, and consul general in Nanking;

•Robert McGregor, consul general in Leopoldville, French Equatorial Africa, and the Cameroons;

•Marcelis C. Parsons Jr., deputy chief of mission in Copenhagen;

•T. Eliot Weil, deputy chief of mission in Kabul and Seoul, director of the Office of South Asian affairs, and counselor of embassy and consul general in London;

•Robert F. Woodward, ambassador to Costa Rica and deputy assistant secretary for inter-American affairs; and

•William C. Trimble, ambassador to Cambodia and deputy assistant secretary for African affairs.

A complete list of Jubilee Members was printed in the February issue.

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