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

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President's Views

Real Integration Needs Employee Buy-in

By Dan Geisler

On October 21, President Clinton signed the Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998, ending a long period of suspense that began back in April 1997. USAID is now under the policy direction of the secretary of State. By this time next year, the U.S. Information Agency and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency will be merged into the State Department. By the time this issue of the *Foreign Service Journal* reaches readers, the administration should have submitted its detailed plan to Congress for bringing about this integration.

More than a year and a half ago, AFSA announced a set of principles to govern the retooling of America's foreign policy structures. Today, our fundamental goal remains unchanged: to create an institution in which foreign affairs professionals can meet the expanding challenges to America's national interests. This institution must reflect the central importance of sustainable development, arms nonproliferation and public diplomacy. This institution must preserve the special missions and skills of USIA and ACDA.

The administration said it intends not just to preserve these functions, but to make them more central to foreign policy. There's cause for skepticism on this point.

The State Department, with nearly 10 times the staff of USIA and ACDA combined, is notoriously resistant to innovation. Dozens of studies, including two that were released in October by Washington think tanks, have identified problems at State. State's Strategic Management Initiative showed us only three years ago just how hard it is for State to make even minor changes. It was a struggle to abandon State's ridiculous system of colored-coded letterhead for Seventh Floor memoranda, and to abolish largely useless reports such as the Annual Minerals Questionnaire.

> *State may learn something from USIA, which is a Wang-Free Zone.*

Agency integration affords us a rare opportunity for fundamental change at Main State. It is an opportunity for State to adopt superior practices, particularly from USIA, in such areas as personnel management and information technology. USIA is a Wang-Free Zone.

The administration has not said very much about savings. But the legislation shows a clear congressional intent that integration save money. Some money may be saved by ending duplication in infrastructure and facilities. Some, but probably not very much. Economies of scale generally result from merging like-sized organizations, not from integrating two small units into a substantially larger one.

In the short term, integration will increase operating costs as we move people to new offices and make computer systems compatible. Given the severe downsizing at both State and USIA over the past eight years, Congress shouldn't expect savings through reductions either in U.S. citizen or Foreign Service national positions.

One final point. Ask a group of MBAs to list the key requirements for successful organizational change, and you'll find one item on everyone's list: employee buy-in.

In the spring of 1997, AFSA fielded volunteers to participate in the working groups that were developing the integration plan. Management communicated regularly with employees on the results. But just when management started to mold the output of the individual working groups into a proposal for the secretary of State, employee involvement ground to a halt.

That was a mistake. State, USIA and ACDA will never combine into a single, effective foreign affairs institution without the support of the people who implement the policy. That's true no matter how we draw the boxes on the organizational diagram. ■

Dan Geisler is president of the American Foreign Service Association.

J. KIRBY SIMON FOREIGN SERVICE TRUST

AN INVITATION TO PROPOSE PROJECTS FOR FUNDING BY THE J. KIRBY SIMON FOREIGN SERVICE TRUST IN 1999

The J. Kirby Simon Foreign Service Trust is a charitable fund established in the memory of Kirby Simon, a Foreign Service Officer who died in 1995 while serving in Taiwan. The Trust is committed to expanding the opportunities for professional fulfillment and community service of active Foreign Service Officers and their families.

The principal activity of the Trust is to support projects that are initiated and carried out, not in an official capacity and not on official time, by Foreign Service Officers or members of their families, wherever located. The Trust, however, will also consider proposals from other U.S. Government employees or members of their families, regardless of nationality, who are located at American diplomatic posts abroad.

In 1998 the Trust made its second round of grants — 18 in number, ranging in amount from $400 to $3000, for a total of $24,800. These grants supported the following projects (further described in a Trust announcement entitled "Grants Awarded in 1998," available on the Web — see below):

- **Facilities for the Disabled**: A science laboratory for orphaned or abandoned children at the Holy Land Deaf School in Jordan; a weekend educational-recreational center for deaf persons in Congo; an audio library for visually impaired university students in Ethiopia.
- **Facilities for Children**: A shelter for Senegalese girls abused or rejected by their families; refrigeration for a children's food and medicine dispensary in Niger; provisioning and other support for an orphanage in Bolivia.
- **Libraries**: The first library in a 300,000-person "informal neighborhood" in Lima, Peru; modernization of an English library serving the residents of Merida, Mexico.
- **Educational Expeditions**: Visits to a game reserve in Botswana for children of Foreign Service Nationals and to a new national museum in New Zealand for Maori/Pacific Island children.
- **Informal Education**: An "English Corner" in Japan, offering informal exchanges between Okinawan students and American guest speakers; educational-recreational parties on U.S. holidays for children living in a Brazilian orphanage.
- **Other Educational Programs**: An exchange program between an international school and a rural school in Honduras; provisioning for an English language pre-school in Uzbekistan; a training program in participatory musical education for Malaysian school teachers; a summer day camp in Ukraine for American and host country children.
- **Female Inclusion in Sports**: A women's softball team (the "Gazelles") in a South African township; a boys' and girls' basketball club (the "Charlotters") in Burkina Faso.

The Trust now invites the submission of proposals for support in 1999. It is anticipated that most of the new grants will fall within the same funding range as the 1998 awards. It is also expected that projects assisted by the Trust will reflect a variety of interests and approaches, some of which are illustrated by the 1998 grants. Other possible projects include, for example, studies of governmental policies affecting FSOs' professional achievement and personal well-being; measures to increase public awareness of the work of the Foreign Service and the lives of its members; or programs to expand knowledge and stimulate thought, on the part of Government personnel, concerning critical foreign affairs topics (including human rights and environmental issues).

Grants provided by the Trust can be used to defray a wide range of project expenses, such as acquisition of equipment, books and supplies, travel and data collection costs, and dissemination of materials. Grant funds from the Trust, however, cannot be used to pay salaries or other compensation to U.S. Government employees or their family members. Because of the limited resources available to the Trust, it is not in a position to support projects that, in the view of the Trustees, have reasonable prospects of obtaining all the funds they need from other sources, or that propose to conduct activities closely similar to those undertaken by other public or private programs, or that cannot be carried out effectively with Trust-size grants.

A proposal should include a description of the project, what it is intended to achieve, and the role to be played by the applicant(s); a preliminary plan for disseminating the results of the project; a budget; other available funding, if any; and a brief biography of the applicant(s). Proposals should not be longer than five double-spaced pages (exclusive of the budget and biographical material).

Proposals for projects to be funded during calendar year 1999 must be received by the Trust no later than February 28, 1999.

Proposals should be sent to the J. Kirby Simon Foreign Service Trust, by mail to 82 Edgehill Road, New Haven, CT 06511, by fax to 203-432-0063 or by e-mail to john.simon@yale.edu.

Inquiries should be directed to one of the above addresses or by phone to 203-432-2698

Further information can be found on the Web at http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/lawfac/simon/trust.htm



LETTERS

Selling Ambassadorships

In the AFSA News section of your October 1998 issue, Willard DePree has a report by an AFSA ad hoc working group on "The Selling of Ambassadorships." The American Academy of Diplomacy shares the concern expressed in this report about ambassadorial appointments that do not rest, first and foremost, on demonstrated qualifications for the job, be the appointee career or non-career, and seeks through its programs to make that point loud and clear. That has been among its central purposes since its founding in 1983.

The report includes one inaccuracy, however. It states that the academy, during the Carter administration, acted as an independent vetting body for President Carter for prospective ambassadorial nominees. The academy was not in existence at that time.

The reference should properly be to a committee set up by Carter, chaired first by W. Averell Harriman and later by former Governor Reubin Askew of Florida, that did in fact function in that manner during most of the Carter years, reportedly with some effectiveness. The academy, after its creation in 1983, did provide an independent assessment for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee until 1991 on all nominees, career and non-career. It no longer does so, except when it sees a nomination egregiously lacking in qualifications other than politically inspired financial contributions. It has done so only once during the current administration.

The academy shares the report's conclusion that an independent advisory group of some kind could well be helpful to a president in the choice of ambassadors.

Bruce Laingen
President, the American Academy of Diplomacy
Washington, D.C.

The Foreign Service Journal *welcomes your signed letters to the editor. Please mail letters to the* Journal, *2101 E St., NW, Washington, D.C., 20037; fax to (202) 338-8244; or send via e-mail to journal@afsa.org. Letters, which are subject to editing, should include full name, title and post, address and daytime telephone number.*

Remembering J.L.

J.L. Bartley knew how to work a room. Even at five and six years old, he kept a serious expression — nearly a pout — on his face until he caught your eye, your ear. Then he'd break out a funny story or a line and follow it with a huge smile.

Once when my family and his family went to the beach on Spain's eastern coast, he danced around the room singing "We Are Family" until everyone in the room was laughing and clapping along with him.

In restaurants all across Spain he refused to order anything but a hamburger and french fries — his parents became masters at the art of defining those quintessential American foods to puzzled Spanish waiters. And he introduced me to Ovaltine, because he would only drink chocolate milk, and his mother figured out mixing the chocolate powder into regular milk was the only way to get nutrients into her lanky first grader.

My family served with J.L. (who grew up to be known as Jay) and his family at the U.S. embassy in Madrid during the early 1980s. J.L. was the kid brother of Edith, one of my closest friends, so most of the time we didn't hang out with him. Edith and I rolled our eyes at his antics and sometimes we'd make him cry big crocodile tears when we didn't pay him enough attention.

But when I read the newspaper Sunday, August 9, I paid full attention. There was J.L., listed as Jay Bartley, son of Consul General Julian Bartley, among the confirmed dead from the bombing at the U.S. embassy in Nairobi, Kenya. A few minutes later I turned on CNN. Julian Bartley was also among the dead.

I grew up as a Foreign Service kid. My family knows plenty of people who have been evacuated from posts, lived through revolutions, just missed death when terrorists attacked. But for the first time, someone I know has been taken away from his family through an insane act of violence.

Even after I'd seen the names on television, I thonght there might be a mistake. Maybe there was another Julian Bartley with a son named Jay. But then the news cut to a clip of Edith reading a statement outside the State Department, confirming that her father and brother were gone. Edith, so grown up, so poised, so strong. And then the photos flashed on the screen. Julian and Jay, next to each other, both looking so much alike. There was no way to hide behind denial any longer.

I wish I could spend five minutes with those who chose to take so many lives. I want to tell them about my friend, Edith, and her mother, Sue, who just lost the other half of their family. I want to tell them that -— because of their actions —- I will never be able to listen to "We Are Family" the same way again.

And I want to tell them about J.L. and how I secretly thought it wouldn't be so bad to have a little brother just like him.

Eugenia E. Gratto
Arlington, Va.

The Behaviorists Are Coming!

In the late 1980s a pernicious trend appeared in the federal government's organizational activity. Behavioral sciences were called upon to assist in deciding how public servants were to behave and to interact with the public and with each other. Mere professionalism was not enough. Civil servants were being asked to change their culture.

Behaviorists observe certain principles in approaching their tasks which most of us who have sat through Psychology 101 or Sociology 101 will recognize.

Foremost is a mechanistic approach that is manifested in the use of terminology such as reengineering, reinvention, and human resources. Inventing and engineering apply to human manipulation of inanimate objects. We can feel Alice's anguish, when, in the "Dilbert" strip, she cries "I am not a resource!" Resources like ores, minerals and grains are easily disposed of. People, on the other hand, should be treated with dignity and understanding.

A second principle is to redefine common-sense concepts in a pseudo-scientific manner. When we first heard that USAID was going to institute "teamwork," many of us thought we knew what that was. Given a chronic scarcity of staff, we have always, and automatically, formed ourselves into teams in order to get things done. We have since found that "teamwork" means something quite different. What we now have is institutionalized and permanent, with mentors, coaches, facilitators, and leaders. Instead of being a way of mobilizing scarce resources to achieve a quick and decisive end, the chief product of teams has become dialogue and participation. Reams of paper are produced to show results, while real results are more difficult to achieve because all the responsible people are in meetings.

Two and a half years ago, some contract behaviorists came to Moscow to explain teamwork to USAID/Russia. Our Russian colleagues found this all very amusing. They explained that the "teams" the behaviorists described were exactly like the factory committees that existed under their recently abandoned socialist system.

A third principle is that all cultures are relative. Cultures have no moral content or value in and of themselves. Thus organizations do not need to take traditional values or modes of behavior into account when adopting new structures. This last tendency is the most offensive of all.

Whatever culture the teamwork concept was borrowed from, or whether it was created from scratch, in the new meaning it is not American. One of the most meaningful icons of my youth was the sign on President Truman's desk that said "The Buck Stops Here." This was not evidence of a totalitarian mindset. On the contrary, it reflected the ideals of a society that at that time held the traditional American values of self-reliance, common sense, and individual responsibility.

The attack on traditional modes of behavior takes on other forms as well. There is a sign on the wall of the room in which our team meetings are held that says "Avoid blocking behaviors such as 'yes but.'" There was a time when project committee meetings were lively and contentious affairs, where individuals did not spare each other in the discussion of goals or methodology. It was less likely to be "yes, but," than "over my dead body!" It would have been considered unprofessional to be squeamish in hard and honest debate.

In those days there was passion in our work. Passion is no longer a core value. There is no room for introverts, eccentrics, or curmudgeons. As far as I am concerned, it was precisely the high definition of character among USAID people when I joined 18 years ago that made it such an exhilarating place to work.

With changes in communications technology and in the philosophy of government coming faster and faster, it will take all our efforts to maintain USAID as a relevant player in the foreign assistance game. We have to keep our minds free of cant and jargon. We have to maintain our profes-

sionalism above all. The excessive concentration on process, internal organization, and politically correct language keeps getting in the way. Let's have some faith in ourselves, and rediscover our old values of passion, commitment, respect, and honest language.

Arthur Laemmerzahl
FSO, USAID
Cairo

Against Fortress Embassies

Most thinking about how to protect embassies from attack has focused on the building: how to armor it, distance it from the threat, defend it with police and Marines, and know when and how attacks against the building might take place. This thinking, however, is narrow and ultimately misguided. An embassy is not a building: it is a diplomatic mission. Given modern advances in communications, the mission of diplomacy can be conducted from many buildings, from vehicles, on foot, or, sometimes, even by telemetry (viewing Iraqi weapons sites, watching riots, stock markets or parliamentary sessions).

To hew to the idea that an embassy is an important building (traditionally called a chancery) housing the ambassador and his suite will simply offer bombers America's glass jaw. We cannot sufficiently fortify buildings against physical attacks without impeding the real substance of diplomacy overseas, which is accessing information and delivering representation.

There are better ways, because:

• Diplomatic information is not collected or exchanged inside a single building;

• Diplomats can work and collaborate from various sites, and none of them in the post-ideological era needs to "show the flag" or represent America (or American architecture), which is being done in any case by thousands of travelers, business people, and exported products;

• Most diplomatic activities now do not require securing sensitive information against resourceful spies. Commercially available encryption will suffice for probably 95 percent of even sensitive diplomatic traffic — and most diplomatic traffic is not sensitive.

Fortifying symbolic buildings, armoring cars, and adding guards increases defensive strength, but also emphasizes the symbolism of our buildings and vehicles. We thereby enhance the attractiveness of the targets (to terrorists) while increasingly separating our diplomats from their real functions.

What, then, to do?

• Immediately begin to reduce our dependency on chanceries by ensuring that all important diplomatic activities can be conducted outside a central chancery. Begin with the easiest functions (commercial, USIA, agriculture, treasury, economic, etc.). Let those officers work from commercially-leased offices around town(s), from their residences, or from no offices at all. Other American businesses conduct their (often sensitive) activities in this way without creating symbolic headquarters buildings. Thus, even in the short term, a terrorist attack on an existing chancery will not hobble our diplomacy.

• During the next few years, develop our capabilities of delivering all diplomatic services (informing, analyzing, representing) and consular services (visas, passports, citizen protection, authentication) away from chanceries. Improved telecommunications technologies can provide many of those capabilities.

• Wean ourselves from the notion that ambassadors need to live like potentates overseas in order to represent the U.S. properly. With a few exceptions, embassy residences so far have escaped direct attack by terrorists, but they usually are softer targets than chanceries and often are symbolic "statement" buildings themselves. (Besides, having ambassadors live in normal housing would do a better job of representing the ideals of American democracy, and might reduce the appeal of ambassadorships to non-serious, wannabe ambassadors.)

As these adaptations are made, the U.S. can sell off a great deal of expensive real estate to normal commercial and private uses. Further, to the degree that we restrain our initial urges to spend lavishly on strengthening embassy defenses around the world, we will have more money to invest in the real substance of our diplomacy, to wit, advancing our national interests abroad.

These changes have to be made gradually and subtly so that they do not give the impression that the U.S. is fleeing terrorists by cutting and running. The opposite will be the case. By getting our people out of our isolated diplomatic fortresses, our diplomacy most likely will be invigorated and made more effective. These changes respond to the new era of openness, decentralization, individual accountability, and rapid and effective communications technologies.

Charles A. Schmitz
Chairman
Global Business Access, Ltd.
Washington, D.C.
Retired FSO ■

CLIPPINGS

"The FY 1999 omnibus appropriations bill makes a strong statement that funding for international affairs programs and activities remains a high priority of this administration."

—SECRETARY OF STATE MADELEINE ALBRIGHT IN A LETTER TO THE COALITION FOR AMERICAN LEADERSHIP ABROAD, NOV. 4, 1998

WORLD NEWS: NO LONGER FIT TO PRINT

In the heyday of Walter Cronkite and John Chancellor in the 1960s, at least 40 percent of network television news was international. These days the figure is at best 12 percent and falling.

That's one of the sobering facts cited by Peter Arnett in "Goodbye World," an extensive look at the state of foreign news coverage in America published in the November *American Journalism Review*. Arnett is an international correspondent for CNN, and was formerly a foreign correspondent for the Associated Press.

Arnett focuses on the diminishing space given to international news in U.S. newspapers. He quotes Edward Seaton, the president of the American Society of Newspaper Editors: "The top 50 papers in the country do a good enough job — the other 1,550 dailies don't do anything. ... For the average citizen of the United States, there is no international news available anywhere unless there is a major crisis."

In journalism schools, and among most newspaper editors, Arnett finds a dogmatic belief has taken hold: If it's not local, it doesn't sell papers. That, despite a 1996 poll by the Pew Research Center for the People and the Press, which asked readers what kinds of news stories they follow. Fifteen percent said international news, one point below Washington politics, and slightly ahead of the consumer and celebrity news that are a staple of today's lite journalism.

Visiting newsrooms around the country, Arnett finds that the Associated Press and other wire services send some first-rate international stories to U.S. dailies, but they are seldom used. While a big story like the embassy bombings in East Africa or nuclear explosions by Pakistan and India will make the front page, such breakthroughs are rare. One study showed 2.6 percent of the non-advertising space in 10 major U.S. papers is devoted to foreign news.

Most American papers started cutting back international news in the '60s and '70s, when it became clear that TV was delivering the breaking news with an immediacy the print media couldn't match. Later, says Arnett, with the aftermath of Vietnam and then the end of the Cold War, television itself began to deemphasize world news.

That also means less coverage of the State Department — once a major news beat. Arnett found one full-time newspaper reporter stationed in Foggy Bottom (by *The Washington Times*). Other journalists, if they miss a State Department briefing, figure they can read the transcript or see it on C-SPAN or the Internet.

Newsweeklies show the same trend. *Time* magazine, which had 21 percent of its news pages devoted to international news in 1987, is down to 12.9 percent this year. *U.S. News* and *Newsweek* have also dropped to the 12-13 percent range.

One bright spot is the expansion of international business news. Of the 286 journalists stationed abroad by U.S. newspapers, 100 work for the *Wall Street Journal* (including international editions). Runners-up are *The New York Times* with 38 correspondents, *The Los Angeles Times* with 28 and *The Washington Post* with 25.

CLIPPINGS

The individual papers' efforts are dwarfed by those of the wire services: Reuters has about 1,700 journalists (including photographers and editors) in 147 foreign bureaus. Other major players are the Associated Press (400 reporters), Bridge News (formerly Knight Ridder) 300 reporters, and Bloomberg News Service with 226 reporters. Nine years ago, Bloomberg didn't even exist.

CONGRESS: FUNDING UP BUT U.N. LOSES OUT

As the 105th Congress adjourned to face the voters, it left behind a foreign affairs budget with a very mixed message. While the budget adequately funded foreign affairs agencies and the International Monetary Fund, U.S. arrears at the United Nations were once again left unpaid.

Much of the foreign affairs budget for fiscal 1999 was incorporated into a huge $500 billion omnibus appropriations bill. The total discretionary budget authority for the "150 account" for foreign affairs was $19.996 billion, versus $19.053 billion in fiscal '98 — a 4.9 percent increase. That does not include $18 billion for the IMF and an emergency supplemental authorization of $1.823 billion for embassy security, drug enforcement and other foreign operations.

As one satisfied Democratic Hill staffer wrote *FSJ*, "So much for the tight-fisted Republican Congress!"

The bill also includes the abolition of the U.S. Information Agency and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and the incorporation of their functions into the State Department. The International Broadcasting Bureau will be a separate entity. ACDA will be officially "integrated" into State on April 1, 1999 and USIA on Oct. 1.

Moves to pay U.S. arrears at the United Nations fell apart this year, as they have the last several years, because the administration and House conservatives disagree on abortion-related language. The amount due (over $1 billion) is now large enough that in January the U.S. is theoretically in danger of losing its vote in the U.N. General Assembly, though it is expected that the administration will find stopgap funding to avoid that embarrassment.

The White House got its full request of $17.9 billion for the IMF, including $3.4 billion for New Arrangements to Borrow and $14.5 billion for the U.S. quota payment. The bill added new conditions on the IMF, including interest at market rates, shorter loan terms and greater transparency.

The Commerce-Justice-State appropriation bill, which is supposed to cover budgets for State, USIA and other key functions, was tied up over the controversial issue of whether to allow statistical sampling in the 2000 census. As a result, the omnibus budget bill — which now includes the CJS package — stops funding for CJS on June 15, 1999, by which time the Supreme Court should have resolved the census question. While the bill appropriates funding for the entire year, it lacks a "trigger mechanism" to release funds after June 15, so Congress must devise one.

50 YEARS AGO

"One of the most common difficulties in the whole field of international relations arises from differences of cultural assumption. ... The problem has been succinctly stated in folk terms by the Roumanian proverb which says, 'The foreigner scratches us where we don't itch.'"

— FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL, NOVEMBER 1948

"Where patriotism is a virtue it is hard to espouse a brotherhood that laughs at boundaries."

ABBA EBAN

The Foreign Operations total is about $13.4 billion, with USAID's appropriation at $2.639 billion. Programs that came out well in fiscal '99 include development assistance, the Peace Corps, the Ex-Im Bank and assistance to the former Soviet Union.

The omnibus bill also includes language affecting retirement, evaluations and other aspects of work in the foreign affairs agencies. For those particulars, see the AFSA News section of this issue, page 1.

POVERTY AMIDST CONSUMPTION BOOM

The United Nations Human Development Report for 1998 shows that worldwide consumption has skyrocketed, but more than a billion people still lead lives of terrible poverty, the Associated Press wrote Sept. 9.

While global consumption has grown enormously, now topping $24 trillion per year, many still suffer "human deprivation and stunted lives," said the U.N. Development Program document.

The richest 20 percent of the world's population consume 86 percent of the planet's goods and services; the poorest 20 percent consume just 1.3 percent.

But even those in poor developing countries have made some progress in recent decades, the report said. Since 1960, infant mortality rates in developing nations have decreased more than 50 percent, child malnutrition has declined by 25 percent and school enrollment has more than doubled. ■

LOCKERBIE, TEN YEARS LATER

In December 1988, Pan Am Flight 103 exploded over Scotland. The consul general on the scene looks back.

BY DOUGLAS H. JONES

Winter days in Scotland tend to be what the Scots themselves call *driech*: damp, dreary and dark. Add windy and you have a pretty fair description of December 21, 1988. I had spent the better part of that day fighting traffic and the elements on the 100-mile drive to the U.S. Naval Station at Edzell, where we picked up our diplomatic pouches twice a month. Once back in Edinburgh, I ate a hasty dinner, put my five-year-old son to bed and sat down to read the newspapers when the phone rang.

The caller was Ed Kreuser, consul general at the U.S. embassy in London and the senior consular officer in the U.K.

"Have you been watching television?" he asked.

"No," I replied.

"I've seen reports that a U.S. carrier 747 has gone down in southern Scotland."

My first response was denial. Jumbo jets out of London didn't fly this far north before heading west. It had to be a mistake.

I am afraid my second reaction was less than admirable. "Why us?" I asked myself in a wave of self-pity. Why now? Up to that moment the major disaster of the year for me had been bureaucratic: a budget cut that eliminated 60 percent of the consulate staff positions only a month before. How were we going to cope with this?

Ed told me that U.S. Ambassador Charles Price would fly up to Scotland that night and would bring a team of consular officers along who would be detailed to us for as long as we needed them. We agreed that I should get our office up and running before heading for the crash site. When I reached the consulate, some of the staff was already there; the rest were called in.

I requested permission from the Scottish authorities to pass through the roadblocks that had been set up for miles in and out of Lockerbie, where, we had by now learned, a Pan Am airliner headed for New York with 259 people on board — mostly Americans — had crashed. After a quick call to let the State Department know we were operational, I departed, along with Foreign Service national John Hastie, for the first of what were to be countless trips to the previously obscure Scottish village 80 miles away.

I had been in Scotland for two-and-a-half years but never visited Lockerbie. It had none of the high-tech commercial importance of the country's central belt, nor the cultural, scientific and historical significance of the great university centers of Edinburgh, Glasgow or Aberdeen. It had no North Sea oil, nor was it a hotbed of Scottish

Douglas Jones, a retired FSO, served as U.S. consul general in Edinburgh from 1986 to 1989.

nationalism. There were no castles or lochs, no seaside golf links. I had passed it a hundred times en route elsewhere, but until that night I had no reason to stop. The bombing of Pan Am 103 not only provided a reason; it made Lockerbie synonymous the world over with the senseless tragedy of terrorism.

A Grisly Arrival

We arrived in Lockerbie about 11 p.m., four hours after the crash. The rain was pelting down and a few houses still burned. Fire and rescue reinforcements from Glasgow, 60 miles away, were directing traffic, getting power restored and trying, despite the darkness, to assess the extent of damage. The townspeople were holed up in their houses, in shock. Except for disaster crews and the rapidly assembling media, few people were to be seen. Those who had survived counted their blessings and wondered about those who had not.

After making some preliminary inquiries, I was told the chief constable of police could see me in an hour, so I explored the town on foot.

The main section of the fuselage of Pan Am 103 had struck near the heart of Lockerbie, atomizing several buildings and their occupants and hurying itself in an enormous crater. The smell of jet fuel pervaded the air. There were no functioning street lights and the darkness made it difficult to get a feel for the shape of the town in normal times. Powerful spotlights sweeping through the town revealed grisly tableaux: a victim sitting on a rooftop still strapped in an airline seat, an overturned automobile, luggage and its contents strewn across the road. The lights moved on and the images receded into darkness. It seemed to me impossible that anyone from the plane could have survived. I went baek to my ear phone and reported what I had seen in my first situation report to the embassy in London.

I had driven by Lockerbie a hundred times, but never had reason to stop.

My first meeting with the chief constable lasted two minutes in the hallway of police headquarters. I felt I was intruding, given the chief's more immediate tasks, but I was not alone. Representatives from Pan Am, investigative authorities, forensic experts, individuals representing religious groups and dozens of other organizations with responsibilities pertaining to the disaster were gathering in Lockerbie. By morning, the local school was headquarters for all of us, and the town hall had become a makeshift morgue. The area's few hotels were soon taken over by these officials and the media. It appeared that the people of Lockerbie had not only lost neighbors in the tragedy, but were about to lose their town for the foreseeable future.

The Search for Victims

I tried to find out how many Americans had been on board the flight, but Pan Am representatives at the scene, who would prove to be enormously helpful in the coming weeks, were initially skittish about showing me a passenger manifest. The reason was woefully obvious. They had only the sketchiest data about the passengers and weren't even sure whether the names they had were those of the passengers on board. Information about the number and nationalities of passengers was next to impossible to come by in Lockerbie that night, but anxious friends and relatives at JFK Airport in New York knew all too well exactly whom they were waiting for, even if we did not.

In the hours that followed, the dimensions of the disaster became clearer. The explosion amid high winds had scattered the plane, its passengers and their belongings for miles in every direction. The recovery effort would require rescue forces supplemented by military units to scour the countryside through fields, fens, bogs and woods. In addition to most of the victims (some were never found), and the generic contents of the airplane, some 16,000 items of personal property would eventually be recovered in the search, examined as possible evidence and, in the case of the personal effects, turned over to the consulate for return to the victims' heirs.

Ambassador and Mrs. Price arrived at three a.m., with the promised team of consular officers. I accompanied the Prices to the sites of major impact.

Shortly before dawn, I learned that the assembled emergency forces were being briefed by the police before heading out in search of the plane's flight recorder and other evidence that might reveal the cause of the tragedy. I slipped in the back door, tried to make myself inconspicuous and listened, along with 200 to 300 grim-faced men and women in uniform. The police and security authorities conducting the briefing told them that whatever they found, some of which would he quite horrifying, must be treated as potential evidence. The world would be watching how they conducted themselves and nothing must be overlooked. Looting or souvenir gathering would be severely punished.

At first light, Ambassador Price and British Secretary of State for Scotland Malcolm Rifkind gave a

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THE POLITICS OF SAVING LIVES

ROBERT ALAN SOULÉ

WHUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION IS A GROWTH INDUSTRY FOR THE U.S. HERE'S A VIEW FROM THE TRENCHES.

BY ANDREW NATSIOS

When I took over as director of the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance in June 1989, I wanted to do some intensive reading and studying to prepare myself. I never had the chance.

During my first week on the job, three crises confronted me simultaneously. First, the Tiananmen Square massacre was in progress, broadcast to the world over CNN. President Bush had promised medical support for the wounded students.

Then, the worst train wreck in Soviet history had just occurred, caused by a natural gas pipeline explosion. More than 800 people had been killed, and many more were dying from burns. The president and secretary of State wanted

to provide humanitarian support, and also wished to send an unspoken message of support for Mikhail Gorbachev and his reform agenda.

At the same time, a famine was raging in southern Sudan which had killed more than a quarter of a million people. Col. John Garang, the commander of the rebel force fighting the Northern government, was in Washington and wanted to see me. Our meeting lasted several hours, during which I heard little about the famine but a great deal about Sudanese politics and the civil war.

Humanitarian intervention had its worst moment on Oct. 3, 1993, when 18 U.S. soldiers were killed in Somalia.

These three disasters were a microcosm of what I was to confront during my nearly four years in office. While every crisis involved the technical disciplines of disaster response — food and nutrition, shelter, emergency medical care, water and sanitation and preventive health interventions — each crisis also involved, to varying degrees, a dose of international relations.

The United Nations, American diplomatic interests, and military tactics all figured into the equation, especially when civil wars were in progress. As State wished in some cases to keep rebel movements in Africa at arms length, our office — part of the Agency for International Development — spent lots of time dealing with rebel commanders, negotiating safe passage for relief commodities.

'Normal' Disasters Are Easy

The United States provides disaster relief in most major disasters for a variety of complex, sometimes contradictory reasons, which sometimes change as the disaster progresses. Disaster policy, like foreign policy, has become more ambiguous with the Western victory in the Cold War, and the disappearance of easily identified threats to the survival of the United States over the past decade.

The U.S. government provides disaster relief in most natural disasters with no media coverage, no pressure from Congress, and no presidential determination of national interest. The existing disaster relief mechanism within OFDA is turned on by the issuance of a disaster declaration by the U.S. ambassador to the country and OFDA's acceptance of the declaration. Under this procedure three tests must be met: U.S. disaster response must be deemed by the ambassador to be in the interests of the U.S. government, the disaster must be beyond the capacity of the local authorities to respond to it, and the national government must have requested assistance. Thus, most disaster work is done automatically under this long-established procedure.

The Official Rules

Even in the case of complex humanitarian emergencies, OFDA and its sister agency, Food for Peace, provide relief assistance under this same regular procedure. It is only when troops and diplomatic capital are required that American intervention becomes more problematic. The simple fact is that when U.S. troops are involved, the U.S. government does not have a consistent policy for when to intervene and when not to.

The cause of humanitarian intervention probably had its most difficult moment in recent years on October 3, 1993, when 18 U.S. soldiers were killed in Somalia. In the wake of that incident, the Clinton administration in May 1994 issued Presidential Decision Directive 25, which contains an onerous set of conditions for determining when the United States will intervene in a crisis using U.S. troops for peacekeeping or peacemaking operations. The conditions include: a) a finding of U.S. national interest for the intervention (whatever this means in the post-Cold War world); b) the presence of a threat to international security (the language from the U.N. charter required for intervention but difficult to demonstrate prospectively); and c) the consent of the parties in the conflict (which is seldom obtainable given that one side is frequently attempting to do away with another side and wants no interference). The policy, not surprisingly, has not been consistently applied.

Because disaster relief enjoys widespread support among the American people (80 percent in one survey done by the University of Maryland) and in both parties in the Congress, its provision is most often not contro-

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Andrew Natsios is a senior fellow at the U.S. Institute of Peace. During the Bush administration, he was the director of the U.S. Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance.

versial. Senators as ideologically divergent as Jesse Helms (R-N.C.) and Senator Ted Kennedy (D-Mass.) have been enthusiastic supporters of disaster relief funding. Conservatives do not object to disaster relief because it does not involve controversial social policies such as family planning or environmental protection. The only two seriously divisive U.S. disaster interventions in the past decade were in Somalia (but only after the killing of American troops), and North Korea, where geostrategic issues predominate.

Larry Eagleburger, when he was a young FSO in Yugoslavia, got the U.S. to organize its disaster assistance.

While media pressure does play a role in affecting U.S. disaster policy in a few cases, the so-called "CNN effect" has been seriously exaggerated as a reason for U.S. government intervention. Scholarly research indicates that even in the case of Somalia, the U.S. response preceded widespread media coverage.

Some security analysts and active duty military (I think a minority) argue that U.S. forces should not be employed anywhere other than where vital national interests are involved. These writers opposed the Gulf War and the Bosnia intervention with the specious argument that no national interest was involved in the Arabian peninsula or the Balkans. Using this line of reasoning, it would be difficult to find any national interest anywhere in the world except a direct attack on the borders of the United States — a throwback to 1930s-style isolationism. Clearly, some old-school military officers are uncomfortable with their new role preserving order in anarchic societies and protecting relief operations designed to keep people alive until the chaos ends. Current world conditions have not presented to American policy makers the kind of clear rationale and tangible threat posed by Nazi Germany, Imperial Japan or the Soviet Union.

The Politics of Disaster Response

Every foreign disaster involves domestic politics. As soon as U.S. involvement looms, the pollsters, members of Congress and the news media express their views. Sometimes ethnic constituencies living in the United States play a significant role, given that virtually every nation on earth has a diaspora in America. Invariably, they regard the disaster in their homeland as of preeminent importance. When I was first offered the job as director of OFDA, I resisted taking it, as I thought my duties would be focused on moving commodities around with no policy or political implications. I was quickly disabused of that illusion.

Though humanitarian interventions have a growing importance in U.S. foreign relations, they are by no means new. President Woodrow Wilson in 1914 asked Herbert Hoover to organize a massive relief effort during World War I. Over the next nine years, 211 private American charities, along with the U.S. and foreign governments, distributed millions of tons of food and clothing to war-torn Europe. When the Russian Revolution and civil war led to famine in the early 1920s, Hoover's relief organization helped to keep millions of Russians alive. After the Second World War, Hoover again led a similar relief campaign in Europe and the Soviet Union. However, in contrast to some recent U.S. interventions, the earlier ones did not require troops to protect the relief missions.

"Complex Humanitarian Emergencies"

More recently, OFDA has generally been a favorite agency of most U.S. ambassadors, particularly in disaster-prone countries. Indeed, former Secretary of State Larry Eagleburger, back when he was a junior Foreign Service officer, is generally regarded as the person who got OFDA started. That occurred in 1963, after the U.S. government's anemic response to an earthquake in Skopje, Yugoslavia. Eagleburger at that time urged the creation of a foreign disaster coordination office. Since then, diplomats have admired the office's ability to move quickly, thanks to a provision granted by Congress many years ago which permits OFDA to suspend much of the Byzantine federal contracting law. Within hours after a disaster, OFDA can dispatch planes with tangible evidence of American support for victims. From its five warehouses around the world, the agency sends out commodities such as blankets, water purification equipment, or shelter material. It also dispatches search and rescue teams to find victims in rubble after an earthquake or bombing.

Since the end of the Cold War, most U.S. emergency assistance has shifted away from natural disasters such as

earthquakes, floods, and storms to countries in conflict — to what are called complex humanitarian emergencies. These crises are characterized by the collapse of public services and political authority, a rise in death rates from starvation and epidemics, mass population movements, widespread violence and atrocities, and macroeconomic collapse.

Complex humanitarian emergencies keep growing in number: this year there have been 25.

The number of these complex emergencies has risen geometrically since the end of the cold war. An OFDA study showed an average of five complex emergencies annually between 1978 and 1985; in 1989, there were 14, while this year there have been perhaps 25. There has been an increase in total U.S. disaster assistance from $300 million in 1989 to $1.3 billion in 1994.

Once a decision has been made to supply emergency aid, the frontline U.S. agencies — OFDA and Food for Peace — try to make sure that aid goes where it is truly needed. Both offices assiduously resist attempts to use these resources without first getting a reliable needs assessment, and for good reason. In the past, excessive resources have sometimes been used where the needs were seriously exaggerated or not directed to where many people were dying invisibly. The assessment may come from OFDA itself, from the U.S. embassy or USAID team, or from the host country. This assessment should enumerate the size of the population suffering, the geographic distribution of the victims, and the nature and quantity of the assistance required. Assessments are done to isolate political considerations, ethnic biases, exaggerated needs described by the media, or otherwise unreported needs so that the humanitarian reality is clear.

Often, visible commodities are not needed; instead, the infusion of small amounts of cash, expertise and managerial skill to sustain indigenous organizations working towards rehabilitation and reconstruction can make a huge difference. This sort of invisible aid sometimes fails to fulfill understandable diplomatic demands for a public display of concern in the form of tangible relief commodities.

The United States has long preferred the Red Cross, NGOs and U.N. humanitarian agencies such as UNICEF as mechanisms to provide relief aid, rather than indigenous governments, which are sometimes not well organized for a major disaster response or which are themselves combatants with biases as to whom should receive aid.

My favorite story of this sort of conflict over means to a common end took place during the Khartoum floods of December 1988. Julia Taft, then director of OFDA, sent the celebrated disaster expert Fred Cuny — since murdered in Chechnya — to design the relief effort. The highest priority was providing decent drinking water for poor people, many of whom were displaced from the war in southern Sudan and lived on the outskirts of the city. Instead of installing an expensive water purification and distribution system, which would likely have collapsed when OFDA withdrew later in the emergency, Fred repaired flood damage to existing wells and dug more, and bought 300 donkeys and 300 metal drums. He then hired 300 entrepreneurial poor people, taught them how to maintain the well pumps, and helped them start a water delivery business from which people would pay pennies a day to get clean water delivered to their homes. The system was a marked improvement over what had existed before the flood. It operated efficiently for four years until the central government bulldozed the housing around the city in an effort to disperse the displaced people into the desert because it doubted their loyalty. While this project was not visible, it cost very little, improved the water distribution among the urban poor, was sustainable over time, and had the support of the public being served.

When Policies Clash

The mission of OFDA and FFP would seem at first glance to be unobjectionable, if not admirable: save lives and reduce human suffering. However, when rigorously applied, the pursuit of these goals has sometimes led to conflicts with Congress, the media and public opinion, and with the diplomatic and security interests of the United States. While competition among diverse U.S. interests is nothing new, the addition of the humanitarian imperative has sometimes strained generally good relations between State and OFDA and FFP. It is not that American foreign policy is intrinsically at odds with the

humanitarian norms of disaster response — it is only that our foreign policy's central purpose usually is the protection of American interests broadly defined. That sometimes means using disaster relief to send a diplomatic message where it is not technically needed to save lives, thus denying it to an emergency with a more urgent humanitarian need but which may not be on the geostrategic map.

Famine relief to North Korea has been an extraordinary headache for the U.S.

This conflict arises most sharply when the disaster is in a country considered hostile to the United States, such as Ethiopia under the Mengistu junta or Cuba under Castro. Would providing disaster relief to an unfriendly state be likely to extend the life of a repugnant regime? If the disaster is visible enough in the news media, the number of lives being lost great enough, and the pressure from Congress and the public intense enough, foreign policy considerations will be set aside and disaster relief will be provided. That happened during the Ethiopian famine of the early 1980s.

Kurds in the Lurch

Quite often, however, humanitarian goals and other U.S. policy goals can be achieved at the same time. That occurred in 1991, in northern Iraq. The problem: what to do about one million Kurds who had sought refuge from Iraqi government attacks in the mountains along the Iraqi-Turkish border after the Gulf War? The military's European Command had an operations plan which sought to keep the Kurds supplied with necessities for an unlimited period of time. OFDA had sent a team to work with U.S. forces. The OFDA team and military field commanders designed a plan to encourage the Kurds to come out of the mountains back to their villages, while the U.S. and allied forces guaranteed safe passage, and the U.S. Air Force provided air cover to avoid another Iraqi assault on the Kurds in the future. Deputy Secretary Eagleburger took me to see the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Admiral David Jeremiah, to get his support for the OFDA team to design this plan which the military would help execute. The Pentagon agreed to the OFDA strategy.

In this case, the diplomatic interests of the United States and the humanitarian imperative were very much consistent with each other. Our Turkish ally would have been unhappy if a million Iraqi Kurds remained in the mountains along their border for a long time, given that Turkey was fighting an internal war with Turkish Kurds who wished to secede. At the same time, if the United States had left the Kurds vulnerable to Saddam Hussein's brutality, it would have strengthened his political position and sent a dangerous message to Iraqi opposition groups: If you are in trouble, the U.S. will abandon you. Hussein had massacred between 100,000 and 150,000 Kurds in the late 1980s because he saw them as sympathetic to Iran during the Iran-Iraq War. The moral imperative played a powerful if muted role in the issue, as many of the Kurds would have died of starvation, exposure, or disease if they had stayed up in the mountains in those refugee camps for very long.

The North Korean Quandary

In other circumstances, politics and diplomacy have sometimes collided with the humanitarian imperative in very visible ways. The North Korean famine relief effort has been perhaps the most politically and diplomatically complex in the post-Cold War era.

The famine began in 1992 when Soviet and Chinese agricultural subsidies were precipitously cut off as the Eastern bloc economic system collapsed. These subsidies had filled the one-million-metric-ton annual deficit between needs and production from North Korea agriculture. The early stages of the famine were almost entirely invisible to the outside world, perhaps even to the leadership in North Korea. Bad news is not easily communicated up the bureaucratic structure in a totalitarian regime. By 1995, the one-million-ton deficit had grown to two million and exacerbated the severity of the crisis.

The North Korean regime has been appealing for food in every way it could since the fall of 1995 after serious flooding, which they blamed for their food shortages. The United Nations harvest reports estimate that the natural disasters which have plagued the country every year since 1995 are responsible for only 15-20 percent of the food deficit, the rest being attributable to the North's Stalinist agricultural policies. The regime apparently believes that if it initiates any economic or agricultural

reforms, its system will collapse like those of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. The North Korean leadership has also refused humanitarian agencies the level of access to beneficiaries and accountability (for donated food aid and medication) required of every other relief effort in the world.

Nation-building is on its face an arrogant presumption.

There have been countless conflicts between competing interests in trying to stop the famine. Bureaucratic wars have been fought within and between NGOs and within U.N. humanitarian agencies. Every group has reluctantly suspended the accepted standards for the monitoring and distribution of aid because the North Korean government will not allow them. While the U.S. executive branch was slow in approving substantial food aid until 1997, that July the president announced a major pledge. This year, the U.S. increased its pledge to 300,000 tons. These pledges have provoked ongoing opposition in Congress because many members fear the food is being diverted to the military. This has meant repeated congressional battles over prohibitions on aid.

Administration policy earlier last year had been to use food aid as an inducement to the North Koreans to negotiate more seriously at the four-party talks designed to get the North and South talking with each other directly (with the U.S. and China). If they cooperated they would get more food; if not, they wouldn't. NGOs and religious groups formed a coalition to change this policy, arguing no political or diplomatic conditions should be attached to food aid in a famine, given the number of lives at risk. While the administration has changed its position on conditionality and separated the negotiations from famine relief, the North Koreans have not. They consistently connect food aid to their willingness to talk: They will only talk if donors pledge food first — a form of reverse conditionality.

Congressional opposition to food aid has grown as North Korea has pursued more and more provocative policies. It has been the Korean-American community, particularly church groups and NGOs working in North Korea, that has led the effort to press the administration to pledge food aid in the first place and then to protect it from congressional prohibitions. While efforts have been thus far remarkably successful, each provocative act by the North Korean government has made opposition in Congress stronger and bolder. The regime's irresponsible behavior can only be explained in one way: Its own central objective of survival always takes precedence over all others, including saving its population from mass starvation.

Now we have reports from Doctors without Borders, a European-based NGO, which has done work in North Korea for several years and recently withdrew, that not only is the famine far worse than they had suspected but that food aid is being diverted to the party elites. Probably, though, some of the food aid targeted to school children under the age of seven is reaching those in need.

Food Aid Held Hostage

I recently visited the Chinese border with North Korea to interview food refugees escaping the famine and reached two unexpected conclusions. First, many of the North Korean people are well aware that the United States, China and South Korea are supplying food aid, yet they are not getting it through the traditional Communist distribution system. They angrily blame their government for this. Second, enough diverted food aid is making its way onto the local farmers' markets — which is the only way people in the cities are eating — to depress prices enough that many more people can afford to buy or barter for it. Thus, the humanitarian imperative is indirectly being served by making food available to the people and the regime's popular support base is eroding because of public anger over the corruption in the distribution system.

Our negotiating position with the North Koreans is properly focused on missile launches, plutonium production and other security issues, not the famine. It is not likely the administration will cancel the 300,000 tons of food it pledged in September even if it is being misused, because it is the food aid that has brought Pyongyang to the negotiating table. And yet Congress may eventually force the negotiating hand of State on the matter.

Without the present food aid as an inducement, the existing negotiating framework might well collapse. The constraints on the North Korean nuclear program

would then be removed, which might increase the risk of conflict on the peninsula. Yet humanitarian agencies would no doubt prefer more diplomatic pressure on the North Koreans to allow them greater access to the needy and greater accountability for food aid. What we have then is a complex of conflicting objectives — working simultaneously to complicate both the broader diplomacy and the humanitarian relief program. Meanwhile, the famine continues.

Somalia has had no national government since 1993, yet Somalis are surviving.

Conflict Without End

All policy disputes over disaster relief issues involve the same fundamental questions: First, will the moral imperative play a large or more peripheral role in the formulation of American foreign policy, compared to more hard-nosed definitions of national interest? Second, should the United States rely on international institutions to carry out disaster responses rather than bilateral relief programs? The realist school of foreign policy rigorously applied would subordinate U.S. government disaster relief to a narrower definition of vital national interests. Military intervention under this policy would only be used as an option if the disaster left unchecked would adversely affect those interests.

A more Wilsonian framework for determining when to intervene insists on internationally sanctioned intervention through the United Nations whenever human rights are abused, lives are at risk, or where there is terrible human suffering as a result of a disaster, regardless of the cause. This same school of robust interventionism has invented the term "nation-building" to describe the post-crisis phase of intervention, when the international community seeks to reconstruct a failed state.

Both schools — hard realism and lofty Wilsonian internationalism — get some things wrong and some things right. International intervention through the United Nations, particularly on the peacekeeping and diplomatic side, has been an abysmal failure. The U.N. lacks the centralized, disciplined military force and diplomatic clout of the great powers, particularly the United States, without which intervention in complex emergencies will fail. While the sanction of the Security Council or some other regional institution, such as the Organization of American States, is an important and useful mechanism for gathering international support, great power leadership is absolutely essential for success. Intervention, no matter how well intentioned, is full of pitfalls and should only occur when the number of lives at risk is so great or the human rights abuses are so egregious that the crisis demands outside intervention.

Nation-building can be an arrogant presumption, especially when based on a triumphalist Western worldview. We do not know how to build or rebuild nations, and should be modest in our objectives after conflicts are over. In cases where the political and security situation is directly responsible for high death rates, as in Bosnia, Kosovo and Rwanda, then a combination of carefully designed but robust military, political and diplomatic interventions may be needed to end the atrocities and create conditions for peace. At the very least, in all post-conflict situations we should provide enough assistance to stop the high death rates from hunger and disease and return the society through rehabilitative programs to a minimum level of self-sufficiency.

We cannot create a stable government unless there is local will to do so. If that will exists, we should support the effort. Surprising as it may be, people can on occasion cope without a government. Somalia has had no national government since 1991, and yet Somalis have been able to survive once the agricultural system was restored and the famine ended in 1993.

Ethical Dilemmas

The politics of disaster response has grown more complex, and the ethical dilemmas more numerous, in our post-Cold War world. At the very least, it requires the diplomatic and security interests of the U.S. government on one hand and the humanitarian imperative of OFDA and its non-governmental allies to understand one another's perspective — and to understand, too, the congressional, media and interest group pressures inherent in a democratic polity. But humanitarian intervention is so complex and difficult to carry out successfully that the United States will only engage in it sparingly, with sometimes contradictory motivations. The best we can hope for is to continue to manage our conflicting policy motivations, aware of the risks and with an understanding of the ethical consequences of our decisions. ■

DECISION TO INTERVENE: HOW THE WAR IN BOSNIA ENDED

ROBERT ALAN SOULÉ

FOR THE U.S., FRUSTRATION OVER THE BOSNIAN IMPASSE CAME TO A HEAD IN 1995 — THE INSIDE STORY

BY IVO H. DAALDER

For over four years following the breakup of Yugoslavia and the onset of war, first in Croatia and then in Bosnia, the United States refused to take the lead in trying to end the violence and conflict. While many have written eloquently and passionately to explain Washington's – and the West's – failure to stop the ethnic cleansing, the concentration camps, and the massacres of hundreds of thousands of civilians, few have examined why, in the summer of 1995, the United States finally did take on a leadership role to end the war in Bosnia.

One notable exception is Richard Holbrooke, who recounts his own crucial contribution to the negotiation of the Dayton Peace Accords in his book *To End a War.* But Holbrooke's account leaves unclear what, in addition to

his own brokering role, accounts for the turnaround in U.S. policy, including the critical decision to take a leadership role in trying to end the war. It was on the basis of that decision that Holbrooke subsequently undertook his negotiating effort.

By 1995, the administration's Bosnia strategy had lost all credibility.

What, then, explains the Clinton administration's decision in August 1995 at long last to intervene decisively in Bosnia? Why, when numerous previous attempts to get involved in Bosnia were half-hearted in execution and ended in failure? The answer is complex, involving explanations at two different levels. First, at the policy level, the day-to-day crisis management approach that had characterized the Clinton administration's Bosnia strategy had lost virtually all credibility. It was clear that events on the ground and decisions in allied capitals as well as on Capitol Hill were forcing the administration to seek an alternative to muddling through.

Second, at the level of the policy-making process, the president encouraged his national security adviser and staff to develop a far-reaching and integrated strategy for Bosnia that abandoned the incremental approach of past efforts. This process produced agreement on a bold new strategy designed to bring the Bosnia issue to a head in 1995, before presidential election politics would have a chance to intervene and instill a tendency to avoid the kind of risk-taking behavior necessary to resolve the Bosnia issue.

The Breaking Point

Although the evolution of America's Bosnia policy, including the predicament of the Clinton administration in the summer of 1995, is relatively well known, the details of the administration's policy-making process during this period are not. Based on new extensive research, including numerous interviews with key participants, it is now possible to begin filling in some of the critical details on how the administration arrived at its decision in August 1995.

Though few realized it at the beginning of the year, 1995 would prove to be the decisive year for Bosnia's future. That shift stemmed from a decision, reached by the Bosnian Serb leadership in early March, that the fourth year of the war would be its last. The Bosnian Serb objective was clear: to conclude the war before the onset of the next winter. The strategy was simple, even if its execution was brazen. First, a large-scale attack on the three eastern Muslim enclaves of Srebrenica, Zepa, and Gorazde — each an international "safe" area lightly protected by a token U.N. presence — would swiftly capture these Muslim outposts in Serb-controlled Bosnian territory. Next, attention would shift to Bihac — a fourth, isolated enclave in northwestern Bosnia — which would be taken over with assistance from Croatian Serb forces. Finally, with the Muslims on the run, Sarajevo would become the grand prize, and its capture by the fall would effectively conclude the war.

Betrayal in Srebrenica

As the Bosnian Serb strategy unfolded through the spring and into summer, the 20,000-strong U.N. Protection Force in Bosnia confronted a fateful dilemma. UNPROFOR could actively oppose the Bosnian Serb effort and side with the Muslim victims of the war. But this would entail sacrificing the evenhandedness that is the hallmark of U.N. peacekeeping. Alternatively, UNPROFOR could preserve its much-vaunted neutrality and limit its role to protecting humanitarian relief supplies and agencies. But this would effectively leave the Muslims to face the Bosnian Serb assault virtually unprotected.

Washington's preference was clear. It repeatedly demanded that the U.N. forces either stop the latest Bosnian Serb assault or, at the very least, agree to NATO air strikes to punish the Serb forces and protect the "safe" areas. Most European allies had a different view. Unlike the United States, many Europeans had placed their troops at risk by participating in the U.N. operation on the understanding that their involvement

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Ivo H. Daalder is a visiting fellow at the Brookings Institution, on leave from the Maryland School of Public Affairs. He was director of European affairs on the National Security Council staff from 1995 to 1997. This article draws on his forthcoming book, Getting to Dayton: The Making of America's Bosnia Policy in 1995 *(Brookings, 1999).*

would be limited to a strictly humanitarian mandate. When limited air strikes in late May 1995 resulted in nearly 400 peacekeepers being taken hostage, a consensus quickly emerged within the U.N. and among the troop-contributing countries that, however limited, NATO air strikes would do more harm than good. The United Nations force would return to "traditional peacekeeping principles." This sent the not-so-subtle message to the Bosnian Serbs that they were now free to pursue their preferred strategy. That strategy, known as "ethnic cleansing," involved using murder, rape, expulsion and imprisonment on a large scale to drive Muslims and Croats from territory the Bosnian Serbs wished to claim.

Western inaction seemed to give a green light to ethnic cleansing.

The Bosnian Serbs implemented their strategy with horrifying results. In July, Serb forces turned their focus to Srebrenica, a small village near the eastern border with Serbia swollen with some 60,000 Muslim refugees. It was there that the then-U.N. commander, French General Philippe Morillon, had two years earlier taken the U.N.'s strongest stand, declaring at the time: "You are now under U.N. protection of the United Nations.... I will never abandon you." Despite the U.N. flag flying over the enclave, the Bosnian Serb assault in July 1995 met no U.N. resistance either on the ground or from the air. Within 10 days, tens of thousands of Muslim refugees streamed into the Muslim-controlled city of Tuzla. Missing from the stream of refugees were more than 7,000 men of all ages, who had been executed in cold blood – mass murder on a scale not witnessed in Europe since the end of World War II.

"No More Pinpricks"

Srebrenica was the West's greatest shame, with each of the 7,079 lives lost underscoring the failure to act in time to avert this single most genocidal act of the Bosnian war. Guilt led senior representatives of the United States and its key allies to agree in London a few days later that NATO would make a strong stand at Gorazde by defending the town's civilian population. (This decision was later extended to the three other remaining "safe" areas of Bihac, Sarajevo, and Tuzla; Zepa had earlier fallen to the Bosnian Serbs). The allies agreed that an attack on, or even a threat to, Gorazde would be met with a "substantial and decisive" air campaign. "There'll be no more 'pinprick' strikes," Secretary of State Warren Christopher declared. A few days later, the North Atlantic Council worked out the final operational details of the air campaign and passed the decision to NATO's military commanders on when to conduct the strikes.

Breaking Out of the Box

By the end of July the United States and its allies confronted a situation that required concerted action. The strategy of muddling through that had characterized U.S. policy since the beginning of the conflict clearly was no longer viable. The president made clear to his senior advisers that he wanted to get out of the box in which U.S. policy found itself. This box had been created by an unworkable diplomatic strategy of offering ever greater concessions to Serb President Slobodan Milosevic just to get the Bosnian Serbs to the table; by the long-standing refusal to put U.S. troops on the ground; by allied resistance to using force as long as their troops could be taken hostage; by a U.N. command that insisted on "traditional peacekeeping principles" even though a war was raging; and by a U.S. Congress bent on taking the moral high ground by unilaterally lifting the arms embargo on the Bosnian government without, however, taking responsibility for the consequences of doing so.

Yet, the Clinton administration had been here before. In early 1993 it rejected the Vance-Owen Peace Plan; in May 1993 it tried to sell a policy to lift the arms embargo and conduct air strikes while the Muslims were being armed; and in 1994 it had sought repeatedly to convince the allies to support strategic air strikes. Each time, the new policy was rejected or shelved, and an incremental, crisis management approach was once again substituted for a viable approach to end the war.

Why was the summer of 1995 any different? Why the emergence of a firm consensus on a concerted strategy now when it had eluded the Clinton administration for over two years? The answer, in part, lies in the horrors

witnessed by Srebrenica — a sense that this time the Bosnian Serbs had gone too far. That certainly proved to be the case in the Pentagon, where Defense Secretary William Perry and JCS Chairman John Shalikashvili took the lead in pushing for the kind of vigorous air campaign that was finally agreed to in London. The real reason, however, was the palpable sense that Bosnia was the cancer eating away at American foreign policy, in the words of Anthony Lake, Clinton's national security adviser. U.S. credibility abroad was being undermined perceptibly by what was happening in Bosnia, and by America's and NATO's failure to end it. With presidential elections a little over a year away, the White House in particular felt the need to find a way out.

Srebrenica, the West's greatest shame, spurred NATO action.

It was a way out that the president demanded from his foreign policy team in June 1995. Spearheaded by the National Security Council staff and strongly supported by Madeleine Albright (then the U.S. ambassador to the United Nations), America's first coherent Bosnia strategy was developed. This strategy for the first time matched force and diplomacy in a way that would break the policy impasse that had strangled Washington for so long. It was debated by the president and his senior advisers over the course of three days in August and, when accepted by Clinton, became the basis for the diplomatic triumph in Dayton three months later.

Lake Pushes the Process

Given the worsening atrocities in Bosnia and the growing discontent with U.S. policy, how did the administration move from its paralysis of 1994 to its constructive role in late 1995? In May '95, Tony Lake first began to consider how U.S. policy toward Bosnia might be changed in a more productive direction. He began to meet informally with key people on his NSC staff (including his deputy, Sandy Berger, and his chief Bosnia aides, Sandy Vershbow and Nelson Drew) to consider how the United States could help to change the tide of war.

It had long been clear that progress toward a negotiated settlement was possible only if the Bosnian Serbs understood that not achieving a diplomatic solution would cost them dearly. For nearly a year, the United States and its Contact Group partners (Britain, France, Germany, and Russia) had sought to pressure the Bosnian Serb leadership headquartered in Pale into agreeing to commence serious negotiations by convincing Milosevic to cut off economic and, especially, military assistance to the Bosnian Serbs. Despite being offered various incentives (including direct negotiations with the United States and the suspension of U.N. economic sanctions), Milosevic never followed through.

This left military pressure — the threat or actual use of force against the Bosnian Serbs — as the only real lever to convince Pale that a diplomatic solution was in its interests. Yet, more than two years of trying to convince the NATO allies of this fact had led nowhere. At each and every turn, London, Paris, and other allies had resisted the kind of forceful measures that were required to make a real impact on the Bosnian Serb leadership. In their informal discussions, Vershbow and Drew suggested that the only way to overcome this resistance was to equalize the risks between the United States on the one hand and those allies with troops on the ground on the other. This could be achieved either by deploying U.S. forces alongside European troops or forcing the withdrawal of the U.N. force. Since the president had consistently ruled out deploying American ground forces to Bosnia except to help enforce a peace agreement, the only way significant military pressure could be brought to bear on the Bosnian Serbs would be after UNPROFOR had been withdrawn. Lake agreed with this assessment and proposed that his staff begin to work on a "post-withdrawal" strategy — the steps that the U.S. should take once UNPROFOR was gone.

UNPROFOR as Obstacle

The NSC's conclusion that the U.N. force was part of the problem in Bosnia rather than part of the solution was shared by Madeleine Albright, long the Clinton administration's chief hawk on Bosnia. In June 1995, she once again made her case, presenting Clinton with a passionately argued memorandum urging a new push for air strikes in order to get the

Bosnian Serbs to the table. Albright's memo noted that if air strikes required the withdrawal of UNPROFOR, then so be it. The president agreed with the thrust of her argument, having himself come to see UNPROFOR as posing an obstacle to a solution for Bosnia. As Clinton well knew, the U.N. force accounted for allied opposition not only to air strikes but also to lifting the arms embargo on Bosnia that had effectively deprived the government of exerting its right to self-defense.

In 1995, Tony Lake broke with the consensus on Bosnia that had led to years of inaction.

However, just as the White House and Albright reached the conclusion that UNPROFOR might have to go sooner rather than later, senior officials in the State and Defense Departments became increasingly worried about the consequences of a U.N. withdrawal from Bosnia. Specifically, they were concerned that UNPROFOR's departure would require the deployment of up to 25,000 American troops to assist in the withdrawal — as the administration had committed in December 1994. Holbrooke recounts that he was "stunned" and that Christopher was "amazed" by the degree to which the U.S. appeared to be committed to this "bold and dangerous" plan. Rather than focusing on how the situation in Bosnia could be resolved, State and Defense urged the United States to do nothing that would force the allies to decide that the time for UNPROFOR's departure had come. Instead, the emphasis should be on keeping the U.N. force in place, even if that meant acceding to allied wishes not to conduct any further air strikes to halt Bosnian Serb military advances or to offer further concessions to Milosevic in a piecemeal effort to get Pale to the negotiating table.

The Endgame Strategy

Given the State and Defense Departments' position on this issue, Anthony Lake faced a critical choice. He could accept that there was no consensus for anything beyond continuing a policy of muddling through, or he could forge a new strategy and get the president to support a concerted effort seriously to tackle the Bosnia issue once and for all. Having for over two years accepted the need for consensus as the basis of policy and, as a consequence, failed to move the ball forward, Lake now decided that the time had come to forge his own policy initiative. He was strengthened in this determination by the president's evident desire for a new direction.

On a Saturday morning in late June, Lake and his chief NSC aides gathered in his West Wing office for an intensive, four-hour-long discussion on what to do in Bosnia. A consensus soon emerged on three key aspects of a workable strategy. First, UNPROFOR would have to go. In its stead would come either a new NATO force deployed to enforce the terms of a peace agreement or the kind of concerted military action by the United States and NATO that the U.N.'s presence had so far prevented. Second, if a deal was to be struck between the parties, it was clear that such an agreement could not fulfill all demands for justice. A diplomatic solution that reversed every Bosnian Serb gain simply was not possible. Third, the success of a last-ditch effort to get a political deal would depend crucially on bringing the threat of significant force to bear on the parties. The last three years had demonstrated that without the prospect of the decisive use of force, the parties would remain intransigent and their demands maximalist.

Lake asked Vershbow to draft a strategy paper on the basis of this discussion. The national security adviser also told the president about the direction of his thinking. He specifically asked Clinton whether he should proceed along this path with the knowledge that in a presidential election year the United States would have to commit significant military force either to enforce an agreement or to bring about a change in the military balance of power on the ground. Clinton told Lake to go ahead, indicating that the status quo was no longer acceptable.

Vershbow's paper set forth an "endgame strategy" for Bosnia – thus emphasizing both its comprehensive nature and its goal of ending the policy impasse in Washington. The strategy proposed a last-ditch effort to reach a political solution acceptable to the parties. The outlines of such a solution, which was based on the Contact Group plan of 1994, included: recognition of Bosnia's sovereignty and territorial integrity within its existing borders; division of Bosnia into two entities -- a Bosnian Serb entity and a Muslim-Croat federation; entity borders drawn in a compact and defensible manner, with the federation territory accounting for at least 51 percent of the total; and acceptance of special parallel relationships between the entities

and neighboring states including the possibility of conducting a future referendum on the possibility of secession.

In order to provide the parties an incentive to accept this deal, the strategy also argued for placing American military power (preferably alongside allied power, but if necessary alone) in the service of the diplomatic effort. In presenting the parties with the outlines of a possible diplomatic deal, the United States would make clear what price each side would have to pay if negotiations failed. If the Pale Serbs rejected an agreement, then the United States would, in the aftermath of UNPROFOR's withdrawal, insist on lifting the arms embargo on the Bosnian government, provide arms and training to federation forces, and conduct air strikes for a transition period in order to enable the federation to take control of and defend the 51 percent of Bosnia's territory that it was allocated under the peace plan. Conversely, if the Muslims rejected an agreement, the United States would adopt a policy of "lift and leave" — lifting the arms embargo but otherwise leaving the federation to its own devices.

The Road to Dayton

Despite considerable opposition to the endgame strategy from the State Department (with Secretary of State Warren Christopher worrying that neither Congress nor the allies would accept the military track) and the Pentagon (where many officials believed that Bosnia's partition would prove the only viable solution), the president decided in early August to support the NSC's position. He sent his national security adviser to persuade key European allies as well as Moscow that the new U.S. strategy was their best bet to resolve the Bosnian imbroglio. The president told Lake to make clear to the allies that he was committed to this course of action — including the military track — even if the United States was forced to implement it on its own.

Lake's message was well received in allied capitals.

For the first time, the United States had demonstrated leadership on this issue, and while many had their doubts about the wisdom of the military track, all supported the strategy in its totality as the last best hope to bring the war in Bosnia to an end.

Lake's successful meetings in Europe laid the foundation for Richard Holbrooke's subsequent efforts to forge a peace agreement. In this, Holbrooke succeeded brilliantly. Aided by a very successful Croatian-Bosnian offensive (which reversed Serb territorial gains from the 70 percent Pale had held since 1992 to less than 50 percent within a matter of weeks) and a prolonged NATO bombing campaign that followed the Serb shelling of the Sarajevo marketplace in late August, the U.S. negotiating team skillfully exploited the changing military balance of power to conclude the Dayton Peace Accords on November 21. By the end of 1995, U.S. leadership had transformed Bosnia into a country at relative peace — a peace enforced by 60,000 U.S. and NATO troops. (Remarkably, the problem that had stymied NATO decision-makers for so long — the vulnerability of UNPROFOR troops — was resolved with relative ease. In December 1995, when implementation of Dayton began, most of the UNPROFOR troops changed helmets, and were instantly transformed into IFOR [Implementation Force] soldiers. Those who didn't departed Bosnia unopposed with NATO's assistance.)

Lessons for Kosovo?

When the crisis in the Serb province of Kosovo erupted in early 1998, senior U.S. officials from Madeleine Albright and Richard Holbrooke on down looked to the success in Bosnia for lessons on how to deal with this new problem. Arguing that the mistakes of Bosnia would not be repeated, they called for an early response by the international community to the latest atrocities in the Balkans, vigorous U.S. leadership from the get-go, and a credible threat to back up diplomatic efforts to resolve

the crisis. Each of these was an important element in finally helping to resolve the Bosnian conundrum in the summer of 1995.

But, as the case of Kosovo demonstrated, they were not sufficient. For apart from concerted U.S. leadership and linking force and diplomacy in mutually supportive ways, success in Bosnia required a clear sense of how the conflict would have to be resolved as well as a willingness to impose this vision on the parties. The endgame strategy provided the vision; Holbrooke's diplomatic efforts produced an agreement based on that strategy.

What's needed in Kosovo is a vision and U.S. determination to make it stick.

Here is where Kosovo differs from Bosnia. While U.S. leadership and the threat of significant force have marked international efforts to resolve this conflict, there has been no clear vision of how the conflict could be ended nor any willingness to impose that vision if necessary. For months, U.S. diplomats have sought to develop an interim agreement for the province's future status, one that would grant substantial autonomy to Kosovo but would postpone a decision on its final status for three years. In essence, this kicks the fundamental issue of Kosovo's possible independence down the road.

Moreover, Washington has given no indication that it is willing to impose its preferred solution nor that it would ensure that any agreement that might emerge from negotiations would be implemented by deploying the necessary NATO firepower on the ground. Without a clear plan for Kosovo's future status and a visible willingness to make it stick, policy toward Kosovo is likely to be little more than the muddling-through approach that characterized America's Bosnia policy in its least effective period. ■

AMERICANS SUPPORT U.N. PEACEKEEPING, WITH CONDITIONS

ROBERT ALAN SOULÉ

POLLS SHOW SUPPORT FOR SENDING U.S. SOLDIERS ON MULTILATERAL HUMANITARIAN MISSIONS

BY STEVEN KULL AND CLAY RAMSAY

Shortly after 18 American soldiers were killed in a Somalia firefight in October 1993, television networks broadcast graphic images of dead GIs being dragged through the streets of Mogadishu. That very evening, public opinion polls taken by ABC and CNN/U.S.A Today showed only 37 and 43 percent of respondents, respectively, said they wanted U.S. troops to withdraw immediately. Three other polls showed similar results. Later that month, NBC found 71 percent support for contributing U.S. troops to U.N. peacekeeping operations.

Those results might surprise many in the U.S. foreign policy community, for whom it has become a truism that the American public wants to disengage from the world. More specifically, the conventional wisdom holds that

Americans have little appetite for contributing troops to multilateral peacekeeping operations, especially if U.S. troops are killed.

In fact, a review of national polling data in recent years shows that this view of the public is largely a myth. No less now than during the Cold War, a solid majority of U.S. citizens believes their country should play an active part in world affairs — including peacekeeping operations.

Americans guessed that the U.S. supplies 40 percent of peacekeeping troops — 10 times the true figure.

Deciding Factors

Polls also show that attitudes toward U.S. participation in multilateral peacekeeping may vary a great deal, according to a number of factors:

- whether the operation is clearly perceived as multilateral;
- whether the U.S. is perceived as contributing more than its fair share;
- whether the operation is perceived as likely to succeed;
- whether the U.S. leadership is acting coherently and decisively;
- whether the operation could mitigate widespread civilian suffering; and
- whether the U.S. soldiers involved want to be part of the operation.

In recent years, polls have consistently found majority support for the general principle of contributing U.S. troops to U.N. peacekeeping operations. Most recently, a March 1997 Roper Starch poll asked respondents whether they would support using U.S. troops "to be part of a United Nations peacekeeping force wherever needed." Seventy-nine percent said they would, with 35 percent saying "definitely," 37 percent saying "probably" and seven percent saying "in some cases."

American support for peacekeeping comes from a sense of national interest as well as humanitarian concerns. An overwhelming 86 percent agreed in 1995 that "The only way for the U.S. to not always be the 'world policeman' is to allow the U.N. the means to perform some policing functions. U.N. peacekeeping is a way we can share the burden with other countries."

Arguments that the U.S. does not have interests in far-flung areas of the world do not sit well with Americans. In the same poll, only 35 percent agreed that "Bosnia is far from the U.S. and we have no real interests there. Therefore it would be wrong to risk the lives of American troops in a NATO peacekeeping operation in Bosnia."

Stopping Genocide

For many Americans, the prospect of genocide creates a particular moral imperative for intervention. Asked in July 1994 how they would feel if a U.N. commission determined that genocide was occurring in Bosnia or Rwanda, 80 percent said they would favor intervention in both cases.

This moral conviction was strong in focus groups. "I think any reason for deciding whether someone lives or dies because of culture or race...or religion is wrong," said a Kalamazoo, Mich., man in spring 1995. "If Bosnia was an issue of...territory, then maybe you should just let them fight it out. But...genocide is wrong and when that is occurring, something needs to be done to stop it."

Even when it does not reach the scale of genocide, the goal of minimizing large-scale civilian suffering is seen as worthwhile by the American public. In PIPA's April 1995 poll, 68 percent agreed: "When innocent civilians are suffering or are being killed, and a U.N. peacekeeping operation is being organized to try to address the problem, in most cases the U.S. should be willing to contribute some troops, whether or not it serves the national interest."

This concern crops up widely in focus groups too. Said one Michigan man, "Suffering is the key thing."

Support for peacekeeping seems at times to be weakened by frustration with the performance of peacekeep-

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Steven Kull and Clay Ramsay, are, respectively, the director and a senior researeh fellow of the Program on International Poliey Attitudes, a joint program of the Center for the Study of Poliey Attitudes and the Center for International Seeurity Studies at the University of Maryland. *Some of the material in this artiele has been adapted from the recently released book* Misreading the Public: The Myth of a New Isolationism, *by Steven Kull and I.M. Destler published by Brookings.*



ing operations. In April 1995, when the U.N. operation in Bosnia was not going well, an overwhelming 79 percent agreed in a PIPA poll that: "Overall, U.N. peacekeeping operations are not very successful because they tend to do just enough to keep the situation from getting totally out of hand, but not enough to really solve the problem."

Despite dissatisfactions, Americans would rather adopt a more muscular approach than give up on peacekeeping. In PIPA's April 1995 poll, 74 percent felt that the U.N. should "strengthen its reputation for following through on its threats to use military force even if this means sometimes going into serious combat." When asked what they would like to see the U.N. peacekeeping forces in Bosnia do, 50 percent said that they would like to see them "get tougher," while only 29 percent said "withdraw" (13 percent said "stay the course they are on").

Unilateral Vs. Multilateral

While most Americans support U.N. peacekeeping in general, their support for a particular operation depends a great deal on how they perceive it. If a number of key variables are pointing in the right direction,

Americans will support U.S. participation.

One good example: whether operations are multilateral. As polls consistently show, questions that clearly spell out that the U.S. would be contributing to a U.N. operation generally elicit a majority support for participation. Questions that simply ask about sending U.S. troops to a troubled area, apparently giving the impression that the U.S. would be or is the sole contributor, usually elicit majority opposition.

Americans want peacekeepers, when faced with opposition, to hit back hard — not to pull out.

Support for peacekeeping drops when the public believes that the U.S. generally contributes more than its fair share to the effort. In PIPA's April 1995 poll, 60 percent said that "the number of troops the U.S. is presently contributing to U.N. peacekeeping is more than its fair share." However, this view was largely based on misperceptions. When respondents were asked to guess what percentage of the troops in U.N. peacekeeping were in fact American, the median response was 40 percent — ten times the actual percentage of four percent at that time (the U.S. share has generally been at this level and has never been above 10 percent). When asked what the U.S. should contribute, the median preferred level was 20 percent.

It appears that such misperceptions have suppressed support for contributing troops to the operation in Bosnia. Americans have consistently overestimated the U.S. contribution. Louis Harris found a mean estimate of 45 percent in October 1997 and PIPA found a median estimate of 50 percent in February-March 1998. In fact, for most of this period the U.S.

contributed 25 percent or less. Interestingly, in a June 1996 PIPA poll, among those who favored contributing some troops, the median preference was 25 percent — close to the actual U.S. contribution.

Chances for Success

Whether or not a peacekeeping operation is believed to have a strong chance of success makes a great difference in how the public responds to it. When respondents are asked to assume that an operation will succeed, support for contributing U.S. troops nearly always becomes a strong majority.

This seems to have affected attitudes toward Bosnian intervention. Support for policing a peace agreement, fairly high in 1993, dropped sharply by spring 1995, when the operation was perceived as going poorly, as being too passive and having low likelihood of success.

Nonetheless, in November 1995, when PIPA asked respondents to consider a scenario in which the U.S. contributes troops and the operation succeeds, a fairly strong majority expressed support even when they were asked to assume that the operation would cost American lives. They were told:

"Imagine that in the course of carrying out this operation over the next year, there is an incident in which 50 American soldiers die fighting in a confrontation with a rogue band that resists the peace agreement. But overall, the operation succeeds in maintaining the peace and stopping ethnic cleansing."

In this case, 60 percent said they would feel that in contributing troops the U.S. "had done the right thing," while 32 percent said they would feel that the U.S. "had made a mistake."

Is U.S. Leadership Decisive?

Americans tend to be more supportive of participating in U.N. operations when the president has made a clear decision to contribute troops and has gotten congressional approval to do so. Often, questions about potential peacekeeping actions have been asked when policy-makers have either not yet made a decision, or when the leadership is divided between a president who has decided to move forward and Congress, which has

AFSA NEWS

American Foreign Service Association

READING THE FINE PRINT: HOW THE FOREIGN SERVICE FARED IN RECENT LEGISLATION

While attention wos understandably fixed on the larger portions of the FY1999 Omnibus Appropriations legislotion (PL 105-277) – such as the reorganization of the foreign affoirs agencies, the funding levels in the oppropriations, ond the omount that would be devoted to anti-terrorism – mony other issues affecting the quality of life and the work environment of the Foreign Service were also passed in this and other legislation. (For coverage of more generol foreign affairs issues, see page 11.)

In the Omnibus Bill

1. **Para-cansular afficers**: To help eose the worklood of consular officers, U.S. citizen employees abrood who are not consulor offi-cers are permitted to perform additional consulor functions including issuance of visos, adjudicotion of possport applications, adjudication of nationolity and the issuonce of citizenship documentotion ofter going through prescribed training.
2. **Presidential Award**: A number of presidentiol awards for meritorious or distinguished service were being withheld because of the lock of accompanying funds. Legislation allows the conferring of such awords without requiring on accompanying cosh payment.
3. **Law Ranking**: Requires the secretory of Stote to develop ond implement a plan to identify Foreign Service personnel who hove been ronked in the bottom five percent of their class for any two of the previous five years, ond recommend such personnel for separation from the Foreign Service.
4. **Retirement benefits for involuntary separatian**: Corrects drafting oversights in previous low so that those involuntarily separated connot receive both immediate retirement benefits ond severonce-type payments.
5. **Separatian af canvicted felans fram the service**: Authorizes the secretary to separate from the Foreign Service those individuols who have been convicted of a crime for which a prison sentence exceeds one year. Those individuals designated for separation are excluded from

continued on poge 2

• AFSA Dateline •

• Through o generous $12,000 donotion, Howord Kovoler estoblished a perpetuol scholorship in his lote wife's nome. The Probhi G. Kovoler Memorial Scholorship will be awarded to a needy Foreign Service child to meet college expenses beginning next September under AFSA's Financial Aid Progrom. Mrs. Kavaler perished in the August 7 bombing of the U.S. embassy in Nairobi, Kenya.

• Two new members have joined the AFSA Board. James R. Dempsey, who is the representative for USAID, hos 20 years of experience in Africo, Asio, ond the Neor Eost. His most recent overseos assignment wos as Deputy USAID Mission Director in Tonzonia. Evons Browne, the representative for FAS, hos had five overseas postings in the lost 14 years. He is currently the Section 108/Local Currency Program Monoger. Welcome aboard.

• AFSA's newest staff member is Jung Wook Lee, a fall intern who is working in Corporate Relations. A groduate of the University of N.C. with o B.A. in English, she is working part-time at Radio Free Asia and hopes to become an FSO.

continued on page 3

RETIREE

V.P. VOICE

• BY ED DILLERY •

Retirees Keeping in Touch

Over the past several months, as AFSA has sought to put itself on a solid footing for the new millennium, I have written about two advantages of AFSA membership for Foreign Service retirees – helping to protect retirement benefits and helping to preserve the effectiveness of the Foreign Service. For the former, AFSA is your voice both on Capitol Hill and with your former agencies. For the latter, you join with us in making our case not only in Washington but in public outreach throughout the country.

"AFSA membership is helping retirees maintain contacts with the FS community."

A third advantage of AFSA membership is helping retirees maintain contacts with the Foreign Service community. Keeping in touch with friends is important in itself, in addition to building solidarity for the above goals. That's why I'm glad to write about a couple of colleagues' accomplishments which arose from their Foreign Service lives but are not part of the AFSA agenda.

First of all, there is the impressive home exchange program which Peter and Luciana Frost have put together. Operating definitely not for profit, the Frosts assembled names and addresses of Foreign Service retirees interested in short-term home exchanges and published a directory with entries from throughout the United States and around the globe. The concept is a good one: by swapping homes or vacation homes with each other, retirees can indulge their love of travel while blending into the community they are visiting. By restricting these exchanges to Foreign Service retirees, the program provides participants the assurance that both parties involved will share certain general values and expectations. In the process, the program offers yet another way of strengthening ties among professional colleagues.

The Frosts are about to issue a new home exchange directory, with information on exchanges, reasonable rentals, home sitting and home visiting. AFSA members who are retired or about to retire and are interested in more information should contact the Frosts at P.O. Box 374, Ligonier, PA 15658.

Second, the *Journal* often reviews books which members have written about foreign affairs. I want to note a remarkable book by Rebecca Latimer, widow of FSO Frederick P. Latimer, Jr., whose obituary appeared in the July-August issue. Titled *You're Not Old Until You're Ninety...Best To Be Prepared, However*, the book was published last year, when Mrs. Latimer was 91. It is not about the Foreign Service but about the author's successful search for spiritual and intellectual fulfillment in the decades after her experiences as a Foreign Service spouse.

This is the same Rebecca Latimer who wrote in the *Journal* as a retiree spouse in 1961(!) about what it was like to be a junior officer's wife in 1929 when Frederick joined the Foreign Service. With her book, which draws from her personal journal beginning in the late sixties, we are allowed to share her impressions spanning nearly 70 years. This is a rare treat in a business where we often do not take time to get to know even our contemporaries that well.

The book, which was favorably reviewed in the *San Francisco Chronicle*, is available from Blue Dolphin Publishing, P.O. Box 8, Nevada City, Calif 95959. (You can access Amazon.com through the AFSA web site at www.afsa.org. Purchases of any books via this link are a way of supporting AFSA – we get a percentage of each sale.)

continued from page 1

Recent Legislation

appealing to the Foreign Service Grievance Board.

6. **Career counseling for those leaving the Foreign Service**: Currently, career counseling consists of one month of counseling plus two months paid job search time. The new law allows one month of counseling plus one month for a paid job search. This provision takes effect six months after enactment.

7. **LEAP for the Diplomatic Security Service**: Provides the Diplomatic Security Service the same pay system for availability beyond a 40 hour work week as that provided to other law enforcement officers.

8. **Non-overtime Differential Pay**: Permits the secretary of State to substitute another day in lieu of Sunday for purposes of Sunday premium pay in countries where the normal workweek includes Sunday.

9. **Reports Regarding Foreign Travel**: Before attending an international conference, any employee of an executive branch agency, with certain exceptions, must report the employee's name, agency, the authorizing official and the purpose and expected duration of the travel to the director of the Office of International Conferences of the Department of State. A final report updating any information from the preliminary report, such as actual cost and duration of the travel, is due within 30 days of the end of the travel.

Other Legislation Passed and Sent to the President

• **H.R. 633** "Regarding the Computation of Annuities of Certain Special Agents and Security Personnel of the Department of State.": Amends the Foreign Service Act so that the annuities of those diplomatic security agents covered under the Foreign Service Retirement and Disability System are adjusted to be identical with other low enforcement officers.

• **H.R. 930** "Travel and Transportation Reform Act of 1998": Requires all federal employees to use the travel charge card to pay for official government travel. Agencies which fail to reimburse expenses within 30 days after the appropriate voucher is filed must pay late charges. The uniformed services are already exempt under the act. The head of a federal agency may establish an exemption if it is in the interest of the agency, and he

continued on page 3

continued from page 2

Recent Legislation

ar she natifies the administratar af the General Services Administration within 30 days. This also autharizes agencies to conduct test programs ta pay employee travel and relacatian expenses.

More Good News for the Foreign Service

• On Nov. 2, the president signed an executive arder which allows FS persannel to switch from one retirement system to another for a six-month interval beginning on Nav.1.

• The Virginia referendum on allawing Virginia residents temporarily residing overseas to vate in state and lacal elections passed with a 73 percent vote. The propasal has to pass the state legislature one more time to finally amend the Virginia constitution.

There are other issues AFSA supparted – such as extending the capital gains exclusion on the sale of a principal residence to FS employees serving abroad, and the legislatian to ensure that people in the wrang retirement system are nat penalized – that did nat pass. AFSA is already hard at wark to push those through the new Congress.

Dateline

continued from page 1

• On September 29, AFSA's International Associates (IA) met at a regular policy luncheon to hear Under Secretary Stuart Eizenstat speak on current internatianal trade and finance issues AFSA President Dan Geisler presided aver the session, which also deolt with the prapased refarm of U.S. ecanamics sanctians practices. The meeting was a timely kick-off for the new seosan of IA activities aimed at building claser ties between the Fareign Service and the U.S. business cammunity. Far infarmatian about upcaming events, check the AFSA website at www.afsa.arg.

AFSA Dues Restructuring Referendum Passes!

Yes 3,335
No 661

Thanks to our members for the excellent voter turnout and support.

Evacuations: Be Prepared

When the arder ta evacuate dependents and nanessential emplayees fram the U.S. embassy in Islamabad came last August, Pat Alter, the CLO, immediately called Virginia Bancy in the State Department and asked,"What do I do?" Boncy, who is the support services officer in the Family Liaison Office, warned her to plan far the long term. The average evacuation period is three ta faur months and can become permanent.

Plan Ahead

Before departing the States: Read the FLO's invaluable pamphlet "Evacuatian Plan: Don't Leave Home Without It!" and heed the suggestions such as making out a will, executing a power af attorney(for each adult), establishing a jaint checking accaunt (for couples) and storing originals of important documents in a safety depasit box. Have the whole family (age six and alder) take the Security Overseas Seminar.

Once at post: Keep important papers (*i.e.*, travel documents, medical records for family and pets, schaal records, accaunt numbers, household inventory, useful addresses and telephone numbers) tagether, so they can be packed in a hurry. Stay abreast of the local security situation thraugh security briefings and avaid rumors.

If an evacuation becomes a possibility: To save time later, make a list of what to pack. (Remember, one bag each is usually the limit.) Plan air freight, if that is an aption. If ane spouse is staying behind, decide how to pay the bills. Secure valuables and arrange for pets. (Officially, they are nat evacuated, but when passible, they are accammodated.)

In the ponic af packing, peaple make some stronge decisians. Boncy remembers two wamen in porticulor: one emptied her lingerie drawer inta her bog and anather arrived with her cacktail dresses. They cancacted same pretty strange autfits for the first cauple af days until they had time ta shap.

When the call to evacuate comes: Use some af thase preciaus haurs shutting down yaur hausehold to plan your arrival. Alice Wells, a political afficer and half af a tandem couple, knew from an earlier evacuation experience that the mare she could arrange from post, the easier the transitian would be, especially with three children under the age of four. She set up her housing before she left. Since she wauld be required as an employee to go to work in the State Department shortly after arrival, she alsa decided to take on the expense of bringing her nanny ta the States. She and the nanny sleep in ane raam ond the three children in the ather raom af her efficiency apartment.

Pick the Right Safe Haven

While employees must return to their headquarters to work, family members can go anywhere in the continental U.S. An employee can also request an alternate safe haven autside the U.S. (with the approval of the under secretary for management). The employee must pay the difference if transportation costs exceed the fare from past ta the U.S. In Bancy's experience, evacuees who make the right choices of safe haven and schoals far themselves and their families also make the best psychalagical adjustment to their plight.

Despite the aptians, family members often stay in the Washington orea. Several families renting apartments in the same camplex and placing kids in the same schools are strategies that can cambat isolation. Boncy finds that "if there's a group together in Washington, they act as a support group far each other and they actually understand the situatian much better than Mom or Dad back home do."

The Money Problem

Once in the States, reality sinks in. Evacuees apply far a subsistence expense allowance (SEA) which is autharized by the under secretary for management in 30-day increments for a maximum of 180 days. "Financial questions loom very large," says Alter, "The SEA payments seem to lag behind the market cost of short-term accomadations. Some people are paying almost all of their allowance for lodging."

In an extended evacuotion, na amaunt af pre-plonning stretches the contents af ane suitcose to caver every need. Mast peaple find themselves in discount stares replacing items thot they knaw they have back at past. Transpartatian is a serious problem. Many overseas insurance palicies do nat cover rental cars. The rental agency's insurance can push the rental price as high as $1000 a manth. Day care is another problem for working parents – both finding it and paying for it. Evacuated family members who had PIT or contract jabs in the embassy suddenly find themselves without that second income.

Living in Limbo

Undaubtedly, the hardest odjustment is ta the uncertainty. In addition to the sense of loss and grief at leaving hame with no

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AFSA ELECTIONS – HEADS UP!

The 1999 AFSA elections will be held early next year. As the Foreign Service faces the challenges of the consolidation of foreign affairs agencies along with reduced budgets, it is important to have strong AFSA leadership. AFSA members are urged to consider running for the Governing Board, or to encourage others to do so.

The formal call for nominations will be carried in the January *Journal* and a cable will be sent to the field. **The deadline for nominations will be March 5,** ballots will be mailed in mid-May, and the new Governing Board will take office July 15.

ONLY AFSA MEMBERS CAN NOMINATE CANDIDATES OR BE CANDIDATES.

FOREIGN SERVICE DAY MAY 7, 1999

Attention Retirees:

You are cordially invited to participate in the thirty-fourth celebration of Foreign Service Day on Friday, May 7, 1999.

This year we will have a special Foreign Service Day program to contribute to the 75th anniversary year of the Foreign Service. An Honorary Committee chaired by Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and including all living former presidents ond secretaries of Stote is leading o series of celebrations in 1999 to commemorate this anniversary, dating from the signature of the Rogers Act in 1924. Events will be designed to enhance understanding of the importance of foreign relations and the contributions of the Foreign Service to the well-being of American citizens.

DACOR will host an evening reception May 6.

If you are interested in attending Foreign Service Day, please send your name, address and telephone number to the following address:

Foreign Service Day
PER/EX Room 3811
Department of State
Washington, DC 20520-2810

A formal invitation with instructions will then be sent to you. Please call PER/EX at (202)-647-8115, if you have any questions.

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Evacuation

chance to say goodbye and no guarantee that they will recover their belongings, evacuees lose a large measure of control over their lives. Since evacuation decisions are reviewed every 30 days, no one can plan more than a month ahead.

Children are especially affected. Boncy relates the story of a small boy peering into a shop window and lamenting, "I used to have that toy." Alter's son began his senior year in high school one day and was evacuated the next. "What we are finding, with all the teenagers especially, is that they aren't interested in becoming involved in [local] school[s]. What they don't have to give is school spirit." Linda Thomas Greenfield, another tandem evacuee from Islamabad, struggles to balance work and the needs of her three children aged 15, 12 and 11 without the accustomed support of her husband. "I'm living as a single parent, but I'm not a single parent!" Boncy says that most evacuees just "want to go back to post as quickly as possible; that's where their home is; that's where their life is."

Staying in Touch

If post agrees to continue funding the CLO position, FLO provides office space and support. Alter spends much of her 20-hour work week on the phone or sending e-mails to the 250 evacuees from Pakistan who are scattered around the country. To sustain a sense of community she sends them a monthly newsletter ond plans potluck sociol events for the 150 who are in the Washington area.

A vital part of maintaining good morale is communication. FLO sets up a monthly briefing at the department. Under Secretary for Political Affairs Thomas Pickering spoke at a recent briefing for the Pakistan group and his candid remarks and obvious concern for their plight went a long way to assuage the frustrations of having the evacuation extended to the 90-day mark with no guarantee of going home soon.

Phyllis Powers, the post management officer in the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs and South Asian Affairs, has worked on three evacuations so far this year and knows the value of good communications. "Explaining all the nit-picky housekeeping rules better [is] the best thing we could do for [the evacuees]."

After an evacuation, each evacuee is asked to give suggestions for improving the process. The department is tracking recurring problems. Changes in allowances and fine-tuning of logistical arrangements, from the arrival process to keeping up with evacuees' mail, are under review.

Seventeen posts have been evacuated so far this year. Personnel from 15 of those posts have still not returned. Meanwhile, there is a rumbling volcano near Quito that Boncy keeps on her radar screen. Evacuations are never easy, but good preparation can soften the impact. If a call comes to evacuate your post in 24 hours, will you be ready?

Support Services for Evacuees

• **Family Liaison Office**: Besides o support services officer, the FLO office hos on employment program coordinator who con help find voluntory, temporary or permonent work, ond on education and youth officer with informotion obout schools and activities.
Room 1212A, Stote Deportment
(202) 647-1076

• **Around the World in a Lifetime**: A teen program for FS kids, AWAL welcomes evacuees. Mony area high schools hove chapters. Contact FLO for information.

• **Employee Consultation Services**: This free, confidential counseling service stoffed by social workers takes appointments, walk-ins or telephone consultations. The ECS has also held smoll group sessions for evacuees.
Columbio Plazo, SA-1, L127
(202) 663-1815

• **The Evacuee Support Network**: The Associotion of American Foreign Service Women runs this network. AAFSW volunteers meet evocuees at the airport and help them get settled.
5125 MacArthur Blvd., NW, Suite 36,
Washington, D.C. 20016
(202) 362-6514

• **Overseas Briefing Center**: The OBC offers a multitude of courses on subjects of interest to Foreign Service families. The coordinotor for youth activities recently focilitated a workshop for a group of evacuated children on dealing with their predicament. Located at the notionol Foreign Arrairs Training Center, the OBC is worth a visit if only to stroll around the tranquil campus.
Nationol Foreign Affairs Training Center,
4000 Arlington Blvd, Room E2114,
Arlington, VA 22204
(703) 302-7269

Inside
THE FOREIGN SERVICE COMMUNITY

• **Kathryn and Gene Schmiel** (a retired FSO) have recently published, *Welcome Home: Who Are You? Tales of a Foreign Service Family*. To order a copy, call (914) 526-2873; fax (914) 526- 2905; or e-mail AlethPub@AOL.com.

• **Rebecca Latimer**, widow of retired FSO Frederick P. Latimer, Jr., published *You're Not Old Until You're Ninety: Best to Be Prepared, However*. See Ed Dillery's column on page 2 for details.

• **Rozanne L. Ridgway** has been selected to receive the Public Diplomacy Award of the Public Members Association of the Foreign Service for her outstanding service in increasing public appreciation of U.S. foreign policy and of international issues facing the country. Ridgway, the first woman to head a geographic bureau in the Department of State, is a retired FSO who served as ambassador to Finland and the German Democratic Republic, assistant secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs and the chief negotiator at the Reagan-Garbachev summit meetings. She is only the fourth person to receive the award.

• **Gabriel Guerra-Mondragón**, former ambassador to Chile, has joined Shepardson Stern and Kaminsky, a public relations, advertising and international consulting firm.

Do you have news about an AFSA member or of an event of interest to the FS community? Fax it to (202) 338-8244.

The Association of American Foreign Service Women (AAFSW)/Secretary of State's Award for Outstanding Volunteerism Overseas

American USG direct-hire employees, spouses and family members over the age of 18 are eligible for this award. Nominations for anyone with outstanding qualifications should be sent to: AAFSW, 5125 MacArthur Blvd, NW, Suite 36, Washington, D.C. 20016; fax (202) 362-6589; e-mail aafsw@erols.com. The deadline for nominations is February 1, 1999.

A fund has been established to support the award. Donations to the fund should be sent to the above address. AAFSW is a non-profit organization.

USAID
V.P. VOICE
• By Frank Miller •

Is the Reagan Building Secure?

As a USAID employee, I am currently assigned to the Ronald Reagan Federal Building, administered by the General Services Administration (GSA), and have serious concerns regarding the building's security. At an AFSA meeting of USAID employees, I discovered that many others share my concern.

The Reagan Building is a mixed-use building to which visitors and government personnel have equal access. However, unlike other mixed buildings (e.g. the Capitol), the Reagan Building lacks basic security measures (scanners, metal detectors at all entrances, closed access to the underground garage).

Clearly, terrorist attacks against America (the embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, the World Trade Center, Oklahoma City, and Atlanta's Olympic Park) have risen in both frequency and aggressiveness. These attacks occurred in areas believed to have ample security, but where security failed to deter terrorists. The Reagan Building could be a prime target in the future. Steps must be taken to ensure the security and safety of the federal employees who work here and the public who visit. (AFSA is addressing overseas security separately.)

Repeated complaints to the GSA and the Federal Protective Service have not been successful. GSA Administrator David Barram has not responded to an August 28, 1998 letter from AFSA requesting a meeting with him to discuss security at the Ronald Reagan Building (RRB). Since our letter, there have been bomb threats and other security incidents at the RRB.

Security for the RRB is supposed to be managed by the Federal Protective Service (FPS) which is part of the Public Building Service. While the head of the Public Building Service, Robert Peck, told the House Subcommittee on Public Buildings on October 2, 1998 that "security needs to be tightly integrated into the location, design and operation of federal buildings," this is not the case in the RRB. The FPS manages the security of the RRB, the second largest U.S. government office building, by remote control. A contract security firm (lowest bidder) provides security for the RRB and reports security incidents to the FPS. The FPS is housed in another building and responds very slowly. This is wholly unsatisfactory.

Recent incidents of indecent exposure in public areas are the latest manifestation of our security problems. These incidents have not been adequately handled by the contract security firm nor the FPS. Follow-up by the FPS is nonexistent or, at best, takes place weeks after incidents are reported. The security cameras that are supposed to record visitors to the building have no film. Moreover, the guards allegedly on duty in the control room are not monitoring the RRB's elaborate video screens.

While other area police and security agencies have already increased security at government buildings, tourist attractions and military installations, GSA has contracted for a security analysis for the RRB. The draft report was completed at the end of September, yet not one of the three federal agencies housed in the RRB had received the report as of October 31.

FPS promised to take immediate steps to improve security but not much has been done. Can it be that our landlord is more interested in saving money than saving lives?

AFSA has written the appropriate oversight committees requesting quick action. Because of Lewinskigate and the rush to complete legislation, AFSA has not been able to schedule a meeting on the Hill until early November. We will continue to press for action. AFSA members and others should write, fax or call their congressional delegation and request immediate action to improve security at the RRB. We need your help, so please contact your representative now!

Dreyfus Fellowship Awards Available for 1999 – 2000

Scholorships ond fellowships sponsored by DACOR Bocon House Foundotion ond o bequest by the lote Ambossodor Louis G. Dreyfus, Jr. for study ot Hotchkiss School ond Yole University ore ovoiloble to children of Foreign Service Officers. The deodline for opplicotions for the 1999-2000 ocodemic yeor is Morch 15, 1999. Contoct Williom C. Homilton of the Foundotion's Educotion Committee ot (202) 682-0500 or (800) 344-9127 or fox (202) 842-3295.

J. Kirby Simon Foreign Service Trust Seeks Grant Applicants

The J. Kirby Simon Foreign Service Trust is seeking opplicotions for gronts for 1999. Estoblished in memory of Kirby Simon, on FSO who died in 1995 while serving in Toiwon, the trust is committed to exponding the opportunities for professionol fulfillment ond community service of octive Foreign Service officers ond their fomilies. (See poge 2 of the *FSJ* for full instructions.)

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largely been opposed. But when asked to suppose that Congress and the president agree on a course of action, about one out of five respondents will change their position.

That "swing vote" often makes the difference between majority support and majority opposition.

One public concern that may come as a surprise to policy analysts is a discomfort with requiring U.S. soldiers to participate in U.N. peacekeeping missions. In focus groups, some respondents — including those supportive of U.N. peacekeeping — expressed the conviction that U.S. soldiers had volunteered to defend the nation and its vital interests, not to carry out humanitarian operations. Consistent with these feelings, a very strong majority would prefer to make U.N. peacekeeping duty voluntary. Given two options, just 36 percent of respondents felt that "U.S. soldiers should be required to participate in U.N. peacekeeping," while 62 percent said individual soldiers should "be able to choose whether or not to participate" (PIPA, June 1996).

Surprisingly, 63 percent of those polled thought U.S. soldiers died in Bosnia. None have.

If such an option were granted, it is likely there would be a dramatic increase in support for U.S. participation. In the June 1996 poll, 57 percent said they favored contributing troops to U.N. peacekeeping. However if the soldiers "had volunteered in advance for this kind of duty," support jumped to an overwhelming 82 percent.

Response to Fatalities

Although many policy-makers fear that Americans will want to withdraw U.S. forces right away if their country's troops are killed during peacekeeping missions, polls show little evidence that this is the case. If anything, Americans are more likely to want to respond assertively.

That's what happened when 18 U.S. soldiers died in Somalia — the only U.N. peacekeeping operation that

involved U.S. combat deaths. Shortly after that firefight, polls by CNN/U.S.A Today, ABC, and NBC, indicated, respectively, that 55 percent, 56 percent, and 61 percent supported sending more U.S. troops.

Furthermore — as noted above — polls taken after the Somalia operation suggest that a strong majority still endorsed it. According to two polls taken by CBS in October 1993 and one the following December, respectively 64 percent, 67 percent and 62 percent said the U.S. "did the right thing" by going into Somalia.

Don't Withdraw, Strike Back

Other evidence challenges the view that Americans will want to withdraw from U.N. operations if fatalities occur. In 1994, 1995 and 1998, PIPA asked respondents to consider a variety of possible scenarios involving American deaths during peacekeeping missions in Rwanda, Haiti, and Bosnia.

Respondents were asked to imagine that 20-100 American troops were killed while carrying out their duties as part of a peacekeeping operation and to imagine that they had seen pictures of the soldiers' dead bodies on television. They were then asked whether under these circumstances they would want to 1) withdraw all American troops, 2) strike back hard at the attackers, 3) bring in reinforcements so that future attacks could be met with overwhelming force, or 4) simply stay the course. In every case less than 25 percent opted for the U.S. to withdraw. The majority favored more assertive responses: bringing in reinforcements or striking back.

For example, in the February-March 1998 PIPA poll, when respondents were asked to consider a scenario in which some NATO troops are killed, 20 of them American, only 15 percent said they would want to withdraw all U.S. troops, while 62 percent favored an active response: 34 percent favored "striking back" while 28 percent wanted to "bring in reinforcements."

In the February-March 1998 Bosnia poll, respondents were asked whether it was their impression that American soldiers had or had not been "killed by hostile fire in Bosnia over the last year." A remarkable 63 percent gave the mistaken answer that U.S. soldiers have been killed. Asked to estimate how many had been killed, the median estimate was 25. It is noteworthy that despite these imagined fatalities, a healthy majority supported continuing U.S. participation in the mission. Perhaps most striking, there was no significant correlation between the perception of fatalities and support for continuing the mission.

In summary, public attitudes on multilateral intervention are much more positive than is often thought in policy circles. In principle, Americans favor contributing troops to such operations. In practice, their support for contributing to specific operations varies: Support tends to be strong when the U.S. is seen as contributing its fair share to a multilateral operation, when the operation is seen as likely to succeed, and when the proposed action seems likely to ameliorate serious human suffering.

In short, Americans are idealistic and want to respond to suffering, but they also want to know that they will not be carrying the burden alone and, most of all, that the operation will work. ■

SHATTUCK'S WORLD

Five years as the Clinton's administration's point person on human rights has meant a ringside seat at the world's unsettling human dramas.

BY MARK A. SAWCHUK

Late in the summer of 1995, when Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights and Labor John Shattuck entered the warehouse in Srebrenica, Bosnia, where, in the weeks before, an estimated 7,000 Muslim men had gone to their deaths, the victims of grenade explosions and gunfire, it took a few moments for his eyes to adjust to the darkness. As his vision cleared, he realized that he had walked into the midst of a gruesome testimony to the human capacity for butchery. Spread before him were walls and floors covered with the brownish-red of dried, spattered blood. When his eyes traveled to the building's twenty-five foot ceiling, he was astonished. Blood had sprayed even the highest point of the cavernous killing ground.

Five years as the Clinton administration's point person on human rights have given Shattuck, who was named ambassador to the Czech Republic in September, a sometimes unsettling but key role in the world's humanitarian dramas, from genocide in Bosnia to the hopeful development of democratic governments in the former Soviet republics. The former Harvard professor came to Washington as a Clinton political appointee, left it as an ambassador, and takes with him new theories about humanitarian intervention, theories born of personal experience. He also carries with him the memory of a sometimes awkward adjustment to the culture of the "up-or-out" Foreign Service.

"Working your way through all the language, and all the acronyms, and trying to figure out what the different colored stripes on the wall mean, and all of those arcane State Department issues, takes some time," he said, "but it's well worth the effort." Intense competition among FSOs for jobs in recent years has been a boon for Democracy, Human Rights and Labor (DRL), he said, resulting in a dramatic rise in staff talent during his tenure.

Red-tape Bureaucracy

Still, even talented staff couldn't prevent Shattuck from coming face-to-face with State's red-tape bureaucracy. "The combination of the clearance process and interagency decision-making process means that decisions are made slowly, and in the worst-case situations, they can be mushy, or not made at all — just kicked down the road," he said. "The most effective way to cut through that is to develop direct relations with all your immediate colleagues and, most importantly, with all the seventh-floor principals, so that there are more channels for discussion."

The ability to go directly to the seventh floor is important for DRL, a bureau that routinely faces world-wide emergencies. In the last five years, the bureau has been heavily involved when the United States intervened in four nations: Haiti, Somalia, Rwanda and, of course, Bosnia.

Shattuck visited Bosnia 22 times during his tenure at State. During his first visit, he interviewed Muslim refugees, survivors who recounted to him the harrowing experience of being rounded up by Serbs, herded

Mark A. Sawchuk was the Foreign Service Journal's *1998 summer intern. A student at Brown University, he is currently spending his junior year in Paris studying at the Institut d'études politiques de Paris (Sciences Po).*

AP PHOTO/RICK BOWMER

Assistant Secretary of State John Shattuck in January 1996, near the Bosnian village of Glogova, some 12 miles northwest of Srebreniea, site of the Serbian massacre of Muslim men.

into warehouses, shot systematically, then dumped for dead in nearby ditches and fields. Upon his return to the United States, Shattuck's report helped galvanize government support for NATO patrols and bombing in Serb-held areas. His Bosnian experiences were also the catalyst for his thinking on world-wide humanitarian intervention, a term that is not always clearly defined.

Writing in last spring's issue of *National Security Studies Quarterly*, Shattuck broke humanitarian intervention into three types of action: early warning and prevention, active intervention and justice. His treatise, entitled "Promoting the Rule of Law in the Post-Cold War World," takes the concept of humanitarian intervention beyond military action and warns that early intervention and prevention, though not generally thought of as humanitarian measures, are crucial.

Shattuck's concept of early warnings systems includes preventive measures such as visa and arms restrictions, refusal to permit access to international finance and economic sanctions on countries where human rights violations are being committed. There is one snag to this proposal, as Shattuck readily admits. Early intervention is rarely available when it is most needed.

Conflict-Resolution Paradox

"The easiest and most cost-effective time to resolve a conflict is, of course, when nobody's paying attention, because it's not a crisis yet. And that's the time when the parties, the people who are facing the crisis, most want help," he said. "As their positions get much more hardened, the international community is more driven to intervene in some fashion, but by then it's often too late in terms of the numbers of lives that have been lost." Shattuck calls this conundrum the "conflict-resolution paradox" and says that it contributed to massive loss of life in Bosnia.

Fortunately, Shattuck also believes that governments have started to pay more attention to early warnings sys-

tems. He estimates that the United States expended some $7 billion in humanitarian aid between 1993 and 1995, during the Haitian, Rwandan, and Bosnian crises. In all three cases, the United States had to resort to sending troops to end the bloodshed. In contrast, the cost of developing organizations effective in conflict resolution — such as the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe — is cheap, only a few million dollars, he said. "OSCE is a very low-budget, but highly effective, conflict-resolution mechanism in Central Europe, and it's had a tremendous impact in the Baltic States and parts of Central Asia."

Shattuck's belief in prevention is so strong that he has proposed an "International Institute of Justice" to bring humanitarian intervention into the 21st century. The Institute of Justice would be a U.N.-based entity with offices in four main regions of the world: the Americas, Africa, Central Europe, and Asia. Its purpose would be to activate already existing organizations to contain conflicts before they lead to genocide.

The Impossible Dream

Though this may appear to be a visionary, intangible goal, Shattuck contends that the elements of such an institution already exist. He considers the strengthening of regional organizations, such as the OSCE and the Organization of American States, to be the most important recent development toward this goal, and says the war crimes tribunals in Rwanda and Bosnia and the Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, created in 1993, also play a role. Similarly, he cites U.S. efforts to strengthen domestic justice systems around the world.

Shattuck wants to strengthen multilateral organizations, but said not all of them should be integrated

into the institute. "As it turns out, the International Criminal Court was much too simplistic and in some ways a dangerous institution." he said. "You can't just say, 'Let's create some vast international structure and let that solve the problem.'"

Even Shattuck's use of the term "institute" is a misnomer. He does not mean a centrally-run organization housed in a modern office building or at the State Department. "Whether the Institute of Justice will ever become a formal international organization with its title on the door and a cute logo, I can't say," he said.

Whether or not the institute becomes a reality, the five years John Shattuck spent in State's color-coded hallways added to the Clinton administration's legacy on human rights intervention. "One of the things I'm very proud of over the last five years is I think we've moved human rights issues into the mainstream of foreign policy," he said. He points out that now human rights concerns are one of seven priorities in the foreign policy budget. "So, bilaterally, intervention is much more connected with our foreign policy than it was just a few years ago."

As a result, says Shattuck, the Clinton administration was the first to commit U.S. troops to multilateral intervention in Haiti and Bosnia. He also points out that Secretary of State Madeleine Albright has instructed American embassies to create human rights and democracy committees, a move that gives human rights more priority.

When asked what he's learned about State, Shattuck chuckles. "Lessons about State?" he asks. "Well, you've got to be willing to accept defeats, and you've got to stick it out, bide your time and stick by your principles. Keep coming back, don't give up on something you think needs to be accomplished. But be realistic; you can't change things overnight." ■

LOCKERBIE

continued from page 14

press briefing about what was known of the disaster to that point, then departed. Telephone lines had been installed in the temporary office assigned to the American consular unit. We set about procuring American victims' passport records and provided our London colleagues with a quick course in Scottish law, which differs significantly from that of England. This relatively technical operation provided the framework from which we would carry out our broader consular responsibilities.

Families in the Spotlight

The following day, our office was deluged with media inquiries, so I contacted Embassy London and asked that a public affairs officer be assigned to help us deal with the press. After considerable deliberation, the request was denied on the grounds that the American consular operation should not be a focal point of media inquiry about the investigation. Instead, the British should have the public relations lead, both out of respect for their sovereignty and to ensure their cooperation in the investigation.

This was not a gag order. I had already given some interviews and was authorized to use my own discretion about dealing with the media. Diplomatically and substantively, it made sense for the American consulate not to brief the press. We were not, after all, a repository of information about the investigation. But this situation created a media vacuum at Lockerbie that was soon filled by an unexpected source. In a move that caught me only slightly less unaware than the crash itself, Pan Am began flying victims' families to the United Kingdom. Many of them arrived shocked, angry, grieving and aggrieved.

Some grieving families pressed for more information and called on the U.S. government to "do more."

By then, the so-called "Helsinki Warning," an FAA bulletin issued before the crash warning government employees of the possibility of heightened terrorist activity during the holidays, had become public. Some relatives were already complaining that they had been treated insensitively by State Department officials in Washington who had notified them of the disaster. These feelings were compounded by the perception that the deaths might have been avoided if the Helsinki warning had been shared with the traveling public. It made the relatives feel that somehow their own government shared accountability with the anonymous terrorists. Lack of information brought the families together in anger and frustration. Some took advantage of the microphones and cameras thrust in their faces to air their grievances, agitate for action and seek to influence decisions made by British and American officials.

Understandably, Scottish authorities were anxious to avoid missteps in what was developing into a criminal investigation on an unprecedented scale. Pan Am 103 was being painstakingly reassembled and the ground surrounding the crash sites was being gone over again and again. The Scots were reluctant to release bodies or property that might become useful evidence. Most family members understood this desire to move cautiously, but some criticized procedures, pressed for more information and called on the U.S. government to "do more."

As a result, American diplomatic officials in London, including Ambassador Price and Ed Kreuser, began meeting relatives upon arrival in London to offer what information and comfort they could before the families continued to Scotland. Once in Lockerbie, the relatives were provided briefings, escorts and grievance counseling by the Scottish government, while our consular team worked with them to gather information that might expedite identification of the victims.

Investigating the Horror

I spent much of this period in meetings with Scottish law enforcement officials and Pan Am representatives covering a host of sensitive subjects. At first, Scottish authorities wanted to wait until all recovered remains had been identified before releasing any bodies. I joined with Pan Am representatives in urging that the process begin as soon as possible, even if only a few bodies could be released. As with most of our requests, the Scots agreed.

Even under optimal circumstances, strict observance of Scottish law usually entailed a week's delay before the remains of deceased foreign citizens could be shipped home. Circumstances at Lockerbie were anything but optimal. Many questions had to be answered. What constituted "final remains?" What about the possibility of misidentification if forensic work was done too quickly? What was to become of unidentified body parts? When would the search stop for victims no trace of whom was ever found? Despite these obstacles, Scottish authorities began releasing bodies about a week after the crash. The process was basically completed

two weeks later, a remarkable achievement given the pressures they were under.

About that time the consulate began to turn a corner in its relations with the victims' families. Once we had determined who the next-of-kin were — not always clear in cases where that designation was disputed among parents, spouses, siblings or adult children — I began to correspond with them regularly, expressing condolences, explaining the consulate general's conservatorship role for the property of deceased Americans, and keeping them apprised of procedural developments. The Lockerbie consular team also kept in touch with the families by telephone and fax. Nevertheless, some relatives saw us initially as, I suppose we sometimes saw ourselves: bureaucratic functionaries filling out consular reports of death and unable to answer many of their immediate questions about the crash and the investigation.

Connecting with Families

The impression began to change when I detailed Vice Consul Elizabeth Leighton from Edinburgh to head the consular unit at Lockerbie and be the primary liaison with the families of all 189 American victims. A second-tour officer, Elizabeth combined a commanding knowledge of the Scottish legal system with the tenacity and empathy required to win the trust of the relatives and turn the consular unit, and thereby the consulate general, into what we wanted it to be: the primary advocate for the families' interests in Scotland.

To accomplish this, Elizabeth and her team had to establish personal relationships with the families. A few rejected our overtures as intrusive, but most did not. They needed help in establishing themselves as the legal heirs to the property we held for them and they needed information. Elizabeth became respected by all agencies at Lockerbie for her aggressive pursuit of the families' interests. So much so that the leading Scottish police official at Lockerbie began referring to her, with admiring chauvinism, as "the wee tiger." For her efforts on behalf of the relatives, Elizabeth received the State Department's highest commendation for consular work the following year, the Consular Service Award. She was not alone in deserving it. The other consular officers detailed to us from London, not to mention our depleted Foreign Service National staff, spared no effort to be of service to the families in the aftermath of the tragedy.

Pan Am and the consulate asked the Scots to begin releasing bodies as soon as possible. They agreed.

That does not imply we exercised infallible judgement. Some things simply couldn't be anticipated. For example, when the Scottish police informed me that certain articles of contaminated clothing would be destroyed because they constituted a health hazard, I accepted this as a fact and passed it on to the families in a letter. Their response was dramatic. By phone, fax and telegram, they asked me not to let this happen. Only the families should decide what to keep and what to destroy, they said. In a telephone conversation I will never forget, one father told me that he had lost both his sons in unrelated bombing incidents and could not bear the thought of not having all that remained of their memory.

The response of the Scottish authorities and the people of Lockerbie was typically open-hearted. Volunteers laundered, ironed and packed away the tattered clothes for eventual return to the families. Through this, and countless other gestures, the townspeople and the American families established bonds in the aftermath of their mutual tragedy that remain strong ten years later. Perhaps it is significant that Lockerbie lies in the heart of "Burns country," the region frequented by Scotland's national hero, the humanist poet Robert Burns. His songs and poems speak to the human condition like no one else's and his compassion is part of the fabric of his countrymen.

Lessons of Lockerbie

What are the "lessons" of Lockerbie? What are its legacies?

There is no doubt that the Pan Am 103 disaster was a watershed event that required the State Department and other U.S. government agencies to reexamine their policies and practices. First, a double standard must never again be created by providing information about possible terrorist danger to government employees that is not also made available to the traveling public. This requirement certainly informed our thinking and planning at my subsequent post in Bonn during the run-up to Operation Desert Storm, as we discussed with U.S. military leaders in Germany the need to provide cautionary assessments of potential danger to both resident and traveling Americans.

Second, it is now a fact of life that unless an airplane crashes in an inaccessible area, officials will have to

deal with victim's relatives on the spot on all aspects of the disaster, no matter how complex, peripheral or gruesome. Officials will constantly have to balance the need for secrecy, or at least discretion, against the need of the bereaved for information and solace. The presence of media digging for information, for whom the relatives' loss and emotional state become stories, complicates this balancing act.

A high-level expression of consolation to victims' families must be part of the U.S. response to disaster.

A Political Interregnum

Further complicating the situation are heightened public expectations regarding official responses to disasters involving the loss of life. Since the Reagan administration in particular, sorrow and grief have become public, political events. A symbolic expression of consolation to victims' families at the highest political level is now the measure of any official response to disasters.

The absence of this symbolism at Lockerbie did not go unnoticed. The bombing of Pan Am 103 was an overt act of political revenge aimed at America as a result of the shooting down of an Iranian airliner by U.S. naval forces in the Persian Gulf. The 270 people who died at Lockerbie, by no means all Americans, were random targets of that revenge, drawn unwittingly into the politics of the Middle East. Their families expected acknowledgement and acceptance of responsibility for that fact, which they did not receive. The "Helsinki Warning" compounded their resentment.

The Lockerbie disaster occurred at the end of 1988, during a political interregnum. George Bush had been elected president, but was not yet in office. Ronald Reagan was about to leave office, his administration distracted and weakened by Iran-Contra. So it was that British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and Prince Charles paid their respects at Lockerbie, but the highest-ranking U.S. official to do so was Ambassador Price. The only other administration official I recall going to Lockerbie was Deputy Secretary of Transportation Elaine Chou, who came several weeks later.

Finally, lessons were learned at Lockerbie about cooperation and resource sharing across traditional lines between agencies, sectors and nations. The presence of the victims' families at Lockerbie made such cooperation essential. Whether this offers a paradigm for dealing with future disasters, I cannot say. However, it certainly confirms the old diplomatic saw that there is no limit to what you can accomplish provided you don't care who gets the credit.

Lockerbie is not just the story of the days and weeks following the disaster. It is also the story of those who persevered for a decade: political and legal authorities, consular officials and, of course, the families of the victims. Ten years later, we share the prospect of seeing some kind of closure to the tragedy in the hope that the two Libyans accused of the bombing will be brought to trial reasonably soon.

This will be an important event, not just from the point of view of seeing justice done. It is an affirmation that anarchy and brutality cannot be allowed to hold sway over civilization, over our respect for life. It also tells us that, long after the lights and cameras are gone, committed people will work for as long as it takes to redress an inexcusable act. Surely that too is a legacy of Lockerbie. ■

Useful Contacts

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web: www.schools.com

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web: www.ecis.org
e-mail: ecis@ecis.org

Family Liaison Office
Department of State
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e-mail: FLO@perms.us-state.gov

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Peterson's Guides
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Schooling the Learning-Disabled Child Abroad

BY SALLY L. SMITH

"The teachers are telling me he's lazy and won't try hard enough. They say we have spoiled him in America."

"There was no way he could exist in any school in Burma so I had to home-school him."

"My hyperactive twins were kicked out of play group in Tanzania at age three for being 'too immature.'"

"My husband couldn't leave his station in Africa so I alone had to take my two children under three years of age to London for a week of testing."

— comments of American parents who have lived abroad with learning-disabled children

For parents of children with severe learning disabilities, dyslexia, problems with their own language and attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), moving abroad causes great difficulties but can, at times, also bring unexpected gifts. Families have to assess what their child's strengths are as well as areas of weakness — usually well ahead of when they would need to acquire that knowledge in the States. Frequently they unite behind this child and find ways for him or her to succeed in some activities, be it in the arts, physical activities or in some area of the new culture. Diversity can be an attribute, not just a nuisance. Still, the tribulations of parents overseas should not be underestimated.

To begin with, 85 percent of the children with learning disabilities and ADHD also have problems in speaking, reading and writing their own language. Therefore language abroad causes problems for them, because the intonations and pronunciations, even in English, can be so different.

Sally Smith is a professor at American University in charge of the Graduate Program in Special Education/Learning Disabilities. She is the author of No Easy Answers: The Learning Disabled Child at Home and at School *(Bantam).*

Coping with ehange is a big problem for children with these diffieulties. They are fragile and respond adversely to different settings, to surprises, to sudden ehanges in plans. They erave familiarity and sameness beeause they suffer from a neurophysiologieal-based disorder, and have a fragile sense of order and organization.

Learning disabilities and ADHD are intrinsic to the individual. Parents and teachers ean't cause them but they can make the eondition worse or better. The problem lies in the neurology of the brain. It's as if the switchboard of the brain interferes and short-circuits some of the information coming in, or as it's getting organized, and interferes with some of the information eoming out. These youngsters are easily eonfused and overwhelmed.

Many of these ehildren are impulsive and hyperaetive. This eauses embarrassing situations overseas if they blurt out what they have heard at home. When a diplomat and his wife were discussing another diplomat who was coming to dinner at their house that night who they felt was a hypocrite, their son asked one of the guests if he were "the hypocrite." On the other hand, this same impulsive hyperaetive ehild was greatly beloved by all the neighbors because he was always talking to them, bringing them flowers he picked from their yards and introducing them to eaeh other.

Yes, there's a naivete and freshness about these youngsters. Frequently they behave younger than their years and do better playing with ehildren younger than themselves. The international eommunity overseas is often more protective of these ehildren than we are here in Ameriea.

For the ehildren who have been diagnosed before the family moves abroad, every record, every letter explaining how this child learns, is golden. The sehool, if it understands or is willing to understand learning disabilities, can help the youngster better with detailed information.

The State Department and the Department of Defense have personnel in Washington prepared to guide

families to proper help. They know the independent international schools in each country and which ones are prepared to help children with special needs. The State Department's Office of Overseas Schools is an important resource. Also, State or DOD personnel can point a family toward new schools being formed, which usually have very small classes — always helpful to special needs children.

The Department of Defense Dependent Schools (DODDS) are found primarily in Europe, Korea, Okinawa and Panama and have some excellent special education programs. They are generally open to children of parents from other U.S. agencies. But there are countries where they have nothing.

There are some youngsters who need to attend special needs boarding schools in the U.S. or U.K., but most parents don't take advantage of these facilities until the children are of high school age.

Some parents have had to resort to home schooling and then they find afternoon recreation activities their child can join. In some cases, the State Department cooperates with a school, like my own Lab School of Washington, where a child may come for a six-week intensive summer program plus occupational therapy, speech language therapy and special social skills training. Then the school writes up a program accompanied by the necessary materials for the tutors and parents to follow.

In most cases, the child thrives abroad by remaining a part of the family rather than being sent away to boarding school (though sometimes this is just what the child needs). Overseas, the child may pick up special interests and expertise in animal life, plants, art, music, photography, or shadow puppets, to name just a few.

One student, whose family moved to Latin America, had miserable school experiences, but returned to this country with incredible knowledge of geography, environmental conditions and the rain forest, and had learned to make primitive musical instruments. Another student returned

with great skills in mountain climbing and kayaking. A severely learning-disabled youngster who had been living in a Francophone African country for several years returned with an art portfolio that was so outstanding it helped him get accepted by a college that had an excellent art program and strong learning-disabled services.

Living abroad, particularly in less developed countries, can be exceedingly difficult, particularly when people there have no knowledge of learning disabilities, language problems and ADHD. Parents receive no help with diagnosis of problems or treatment strategies. However, many Foreign Service people comment on how "child-centered" these cultures are and what wonderful help the care-givers they employ give to their children, especially to those with special needs. However, the major burden of living abroad falls on the parents, most often the mother. Parents must:

- educate themselves to understand fully the nature of learning disabilities, language problems and ADHD in order to become strong advocates for their child;
- must coordinate everything from doctors talking to each other, to educators sharing reports with tutors, to specialists sharing information with baby sitters;
- must attempt to satisfy the special needs of this child while not losing track of the other children;
- must keep their marriage alive, despite the stress and anguish caused by the special-needs child;
- must become to some extent teacher, recreation worker, coach, guide, cheerleader and friend for the child;
- must become an investigator to find appropriate schools and existing programs; and
- must become an extraordinarily gifted problem solver.

But look at the positive side: Children with learning disabilities build character. They train parents so well that after they make progress, parents find they can create and manage large institutions with ease. They can run anything! ■



Schools-At-A-Glance December 1998



Schools	Enrollment	Gender Distribution	Percent Boarding	Percent International	Levels Offered	Common Application	Accepts/Offers Special Programs for ADD and LD	Distance to Nearest Int'l Airport	Counseling/ Orientation for Int'l Students	Dorms Wired for Email/Phones	Holiday Break Coverage*
Appleby College	568	57/43 (M/F)	37	11	7-12	N	N	30 mins.	Y	Y	N
Baylor School	807	52/48	30	5	7-12 #	Y	Y/N	15 mins.	Y	Y	Y
The Brush Ranch School	64	60/40	100	12	6-12	N	Y/Y	2 hrs.	Y	N	N
Calvert School	**Home Schooling Program: For more information go to www.calvertschool.org**										
Cardigan Mountain School	189	All Boys	90	21	6-9	N	Y/Y	2 ½ hrs.	Y	Y	Y+
Dana Hall School	382	All Girls	50	14	6-12 #	N/A	N	½ hr.	Y	Y	N
The Forman School	170	75/25	93	9	9-12	Y	Y/Y	1 hr.	N	N/Y	N
Foxcroft School	157	All Girls	85	18	9-PG	Y	N	30 miles	Y	Y	Y
The Gow School	140	All Boys	100	12	7-PG	N	Y/Y	½ hr.	Y	Y	N
The Grier School	160	All Girls	100	40	7-12	Y	Y/Y	45 mins.	Y	N	N
Hampshire Country School	21	All Boys	100	15	3-12	Y	Y/N	2 ¾ hrs.	N	N	N
The Hockaday School	1009	All Girls	7	3	PK-12	Y	Y/N	30 mins.	Y	Y	Y
Interlochen Arts Academy	447	39/61	93	15	9-PG	N	N	4 ½ hrs.	Y	Y	N
Lakefield College School	335	51/49	64	15	7-13	Y	Y/N	1 ½ hrs.	Y	Y	N
Lawrence Academy	350	56/44	5-	15	9-12	N	N	1 hr.	Y	Y/N	Y
Maxwell International Baha'i	200	50/50	60	45	7-12	Y	N	45 mins.	Y	N	Y
Mercersburg Academy	423	65/35	80	15	9-PG	Y	N	1 ¾ hrs.	N	Y	N
Miss Hall's School	130	All Girls	70	18	9-12	Y	N/A	1 ¼ hrs.	Y	N	N
New Mexico Military Institute	983	80/20	100	6	9-PG	N	ADHD only	3 hrs.	N	Y	Y
Northfield Mount Hermon	1139	55/45	90	25	9-PG	N	N	1 ¼ hrs.	Y	Y	N

Schools-At-A-Glance December 1998



Schools	Enrollment	Gender Distribution	Percent Boarding	Percent International	Levels Offered	Common Application	Accepts/Offers Special Programs for ADD and LD	Distance to Nearest Int'l Airport	Counseling/ Orientation for Int'l Students	Dorms Wired for Email/Phones	Holiday Break Coverage*
New York Military Academy	250	88/12	95	17	5-PG (B) 7-PG (G)	Y	Y/N	20 mins.	N	N/Y	N
Oak Ridge Military Academy	180	82/18	70	10	7-PG	N	Y/N	6 miles	Y	N	Y
Oakwood Friends School	121	50/50	60	10	9-12	Y	Y/Y	25-30 mins.	Y	N	N
Ojai Valley School	337	51/49	46	24	3-12	Y	Y/N	1 ¾ hrs.	Y	N	N
The Oxford Academy	40	All Boys	100	25	9-PG	N	Y	1 hr.	Y	N	N
Perkiomen School	250	58/42	60	20	5-PG	Y	Y	1 hr.	Y	Y	N
The Phelps School	133	All Boys	94	20	7-PG	N	Y	30 mins.	Y	N	Y
Phoenix Special Programs	**Correspondence Program: For more information go to www.phoenixacademies.org**										
Shattuck-St. Mary's School	300	61/39	80	15	6-PG	Y	N	45 mins.	Y	Y	Y
Shawnigan Lake School	380	60/40	91	23	8-12	N	N/N	1 hr.	Y	N/Y	Y
St. John's Preparatory School	250	54/46	36	18	7-PG	Y	N	90 mins.	Y	B-N G-Y	N
St. Michael's University School	845	53/47	22	N/A	K-12	N	N	½ hr.	N	Y	N
St. Timothy's School	120	All Girls	70	13	9-12	Y	N	25 mins.	Y	N	Y
TASIS	280	50/50	90	60	7-PG	N	N	1 hr.	Y	N	N
TASIS England	750	50/50	20	35	PK-12	N	N	35 mins.	Y	N	N
Washington International School	745	45/55	0	33	PK-12	N	N	5 mins.	N	No Dorm	N
Westover School	190	All Girls	63	11	9-12	Y	N	1-1 ½ hrs.	Y	Y	Y
Westtown School	352	46/54	72	11	9-12	N	N	40 mins.	Y	N	N
The White Mountain School	100	N/A	75	10	9-12	Y	Y/Y	2 hrs.	N	N	Y
Williston Northampton School	530	50/50	60	12	7-PG #	Y	Y/N	45 mins.	N	Y	N

* *The schools that offered holiday break coverage either allowed students to remain on campus or arranged for home-stays.*

\+ *Thanksgiving only*

\# *9-12 boarding*

BOOKS

Banning the Bomb in Korea

BY ROBERT M. HATHAWAY

The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History, *Don Oberdorfer; Addison-Wesley; 1997, $30, hardcover; 472 pages.*

North Korea and the Bomb: A Case Study in Nonproliferation, *Michael J. Mazarr; St. Martin's, 1995, $17.95, softcover; 290 pages.*

Disarming Strangers: Nuclear Diplomacy with North Korea, *Leon V. Sigal; Princeton University Press, 1998, $29.95, hardcover; 321 pages.*

During the first half of 1994 the United States drifted perilously close to war with North Korea. Determined to keep one of the last staunchly Stalinist countries in the world from acquiring nuclear weapons, American policymakers faced two equally unpalatable options: move forward with economic sanctions no one believed would work, or launch air strikes against North Korean nuclear stockpiles whose whereabouts were unknown.

War was averted, thanks in large measure to dramatic last-minute intervention by former President Jimmy Carter. How the United States came to face such a distasteful, dangerous set of alternatives is the subject of these three books.

Don Oberdorfer, long-time diplomatic correspondent for the *Washington Post*, bases *The Two Koreas*, in part, on his experiences while posted in Seoul in the 1970s and on many trips to North and South Korea since then. He supplements his own observations with more than 450 interviews in eight countries.

The Two Koreas, writes Oberdorfer, is "a history of the past quarter-century of North-South conflict and conciliation in Korea, with special attention to the roles of the outside powers." One of Oberdorfer's themes is the struggle by Seoul and Pyongyang to remain independent of their Great Power patrons, while at the same time retaining their protection. Frictions between Washington and Seoul figure heavily in this account, as well as in the other two books, as do, to a lesser extent, tensions between Pyongyang and its patrons in Moscow and Beijing. Sometimes Washington got its way, as when it succeeded in blocking South Korea's efforts to develop a nuclear weapons arsenal. Frequently, however, it did not. As William Gleysteen, a former United States ambassador to South Korea, ruefully observes in the book, the United States could not use the powerful security and economic levers at its disposal for fear of undermining the stability of a country it was trying to shore up.

North Korea and the Bomb and *Disarming Strangers*, which deal exclusively with North Korea's nuclear weapons program and international, largely American, efforts between 1990 and 1994 to thwart it, are more narrowly focused. In addition, they are not as easily read as Oberdorfer's well-crafted prose. Oberdorfer's book is contemporary history at its best, as demonstrated by his understanding of the key players, his non-polemical approach and his shrewd judgments.

Oberdorfer approaches his subject like the objective journalist he is. Michael Mazarr, director of the International Security Strategies Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, and Leon Sigal, a consultant for the Social Science Research Council and a former member of the *New York Times* editorial board, are more analytical, even didactic. One-fourth of Mazarr's book, which relies heavily on already-published press accounts, is devoted to laying out his strategy for advancing U.S. non-proliferation objectives around the world. In other portions, he seeks explicit lessons from the Korean experience. Sigal's last three chapters are devoted to asking why the United States found it so difficult to cooperate with North Korea.

Mazarr's bottom line is that the United States has unevenly met the challenge posed by North Korea's nuclear ambitions. He credits Washington with "moderate and nuanced diplomacy," but also criticizes American officials for being insensitive to the diplomatic and economic motives behind North Korea's nuclear program and to that country's security concerns. He chides both the U.S. and South Korean governments for allowing domestic politics to get in the way of promising diplomatic ini-

tiatives in late 1991. He reproaches the U.S. for its narrow, legalistic approach in attempting to keep nuclear weapons out of the hands of the North Koreans. At the same time, he concedes that more skillful diplomacy might not have overcome North Korea's determination to retain a nuclear option.

Mazarr believes that the 1994 agreement on nuclear weapons — the so-called Agreed Framework — was the best that the U.S. could have hoped for from Korea. U.S. diplomats agreed not to demand an accounting of how much plutonium North Korea had produced in the past. In return, North Korea agreed to steps that would prevent it from producing more plutonium. If the United States had pressed North Korea on the issue of past production of plutonium, it might have jeopardized North Korea's agreement to stop producing the deadly material, according to Mazarr. "To insist on immediate inspections aimed at the nuclear program's past, at the expense of an inspection regime to control its future, was to put the cart before the horse," he writes. Critics of the agreement contend that more skillful diplomacy, perhaps combined with greater willingness to employ the stick, could have achieved both, but there is no evidence to support this contention.

Leon Sigal agrees with Mazarr about the 1994 agreement. He's more critical than Mazarr, however, about the methods the United States employed in achieving it. "For too long U.S. policy toward North Korea was muscle-bound and brain-dead," he writes. Instead of offering inducements to North Korea for fulfilling its Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty obligations, Washington insisted that Pyongyang comply fully with the NPT as a precondition for high-level negotiations. Sigal calls this a "crime-and-punishment approach," one that produced diplomatic deadlock and a crisis that might have escalated out of control, if former President Jimmy Carter hadn't stepped in.

Sigal blames Washington's reluctance to negotiate with North Korea on the Clinton Administration's fear of being labeled soft or naive by Republicans. He also blames the American press corps for not reporting conciliatory North Korean statements and the "American foreign policy establishment" for painting Korea as a rogue state.

Sigal downplays Pyongyang's failure to abide by its pledges and ignores North Korea's insistence on inducements before complying with its commitments. Instead, he argues that North Korea has refrained from producing plutonium since 1991, has permitted international inspectors to monitor its nuclear facilities and has consistently met U.S. concessions with concessions of its own. He describes North Korea's large, well-equipped army as "largely a fiction," and ignores how frequently Washington's decisions were driven by bellicose North Korean actions and rhetoric. Challenging the conventional wisdom that Pyongyang is determined to acquire nuclear weapons, Sigal paints North Korea as a country that meets cooperation with cooperation and responds with threats only when confronted.

Both Mazarr and Sigal have harsh judgements about the International Atomic Energy Agency, which was intent upon regaining credibility lost when it was fooled by Iraq about the extent of its nuclear weapons program. The agency often took the "toughest and most confrontational stances," writes Mazarr.

Sigal's judgment is harsher, and perhaps not entirely fair. The IAEA, he writes, "seemed more preoccupied with preserving the sanctity of its own standard operating procedures than with preventing proliferation in North Korea."

Mazarr's account sometimes gets bogged down in the daily twists and turns of diplomacy. In addition, he does not adequately emphasize the degree to which North Korean actions made U.S. concessions politically difficult. Neither Mazarr nor Sigal discusses how Washington could have persuaded its South Korean ally to accept the conciliatory approach toward the North that both advocate.

Sigal's book is the most sweeping in its criticism of a U.S. policy that he sees as resulting from systemic flaws, not simply poor leaders. He is likely to give readers heartburn with his central contention that the U.S. should have been prepared to offer inducements so that North Korea would abide by its NPT commitments and with his assertion that the near disaster in 1994 was due to Washington's intransigence. Still, this is a serious book which merits study.

Today the Agreed Framework is under attack in both the United States and North Korea. These books provide useful information about the complexity of the North Korea issue.

Government officials and military commanders might also profit from the words of Gen. Gary Luck, commander of U.S. forces in South Korea in the mid-1990s, whom Sigal quotes: "If you fight, you win. But you spend a billion dollars, you lose a million lives, and you bring great trauma and hardship," said Luck. "So, I'm not sure winning is a win."

Robert M. Hathaway is a senior staffer on the House International Relations Committee. ■

In Memory

H. Stuart Blow, 82, a retired FSO, died of pneumonia July 26 at the Sleepy Hollow Nursing home in Annandale, Va.

A native of Edenton, N.C., Mr. Blow graduated Phi Beta Kappa from the University of N.C. Before World War II he was an insurance agent and served in the army in Europe during the war.

In 1946 he joined the Foreign Service. His overseas posts included Calcutta and Bangkok. In the 1960s and 1970s he aided in the negotiations with Russia and Japan on fishing and whaling treaties. He retired in 1974 after an assignment in Washington, D.C. as special assistant to the secretary for fisheries and wildlife.

Survivors include two daughters, Deborah E. Blow and Lucinda B. Brown, both of Springfield, Va.; and two grandchildren.

Louis C. Boochever, 78, died of heart failure at his home in Bethesda, Md. on October 31.

Born in Madison, Ga., Mr. Boochever grew up in Ithaca, N.Y., where he graduated first in his class from Cornell University. He interrupted his graduate studies at the Harvard University Littauer Center to serve in the Army Signal Corps and Office of Strategic Services in Washington during the war years. He returned to Harvard to complete master's degrees in public administration and in economics and government.

Mr. Boochever first joined the Department of State in 1945 in the Office of Research and Analysis, USSR Division, later serving as an economist with the Marshall Plan and with the Office of European Regional Affairs. He entered the Foreign Service in 1956 and held overseas posts in Luxembourg, Paris, Belgrade, Rome and Brussels, which included duties as deputy U.S. representative to the European Coal and Steel Community; deputy to the U.S. representative to the OECD; and chargé d'affaires of the American Embassy, Brussels, for over a year. Mr. Boochever retired in 1974.

In retirement, Mr. Boochever served as chief economist for the National Restaurant Association until 1979 and remained active in educational, civic and athletic pursuits.

Survivors include his wife of 53 years, Virginia Outwin Boochever of Maplewood, N.J.; four children, David R., Emily L., Mary V. and John O.; and seven grandchildren.

William Dietz, a retired FSO, died of cardiac arrest at his home in Fort Myers, Fla. on August 24.

Mr. Dietz was born in Philadelphia in 1917. After serving in the U.S. Navy in World War II, he went to work for the government and eventually transferred to the U.S. Information Agency. Among his overseas posts were Stuttgart, Surabaya, Tokyo and Nagoya.

Survivors include his wife, Dorothy; his daughter, Carol; and his son, William, Jr.

Arden Edward du Bois, 91, a retired FSO, died August 17 in Naples, Fla.

Mr. du Bois was born in North Mankato, Minn. Before his career in the Foreign Service, he worked with the International Health Division of the Rockefeller Foundation in Brazil, Panama, New York and Cuba.

He joined the Foreign Service in 1940. During his more than 30-year career he served in Brazil, Honduras, the Dominican Republic, Mexico and Germany. In Washington, D.C. he was in charge of the Translation Branch of the Division of Languages until his retirement in 1973.

Survivors include his wife, Nally du Bois; his son and daughter-in-law, Marc and Pat du Bois; his daughter and son-in-law, Félice and Patrick McIntyre; four grandchildren; four great-grandchildren; a sister and brother-in-law, a nephew and nieces and cousins.

In Memory

Honora Rankine-Galloway, 51, an FSO, died of cancer at Georgetown University Hospital on July 18.

A native of Albany, N.Y., Ms. Rankine-Galloway received her bachelor's degree from the College of New Rochelle, earned a doctorate in American literature from the University of Pennsylvania and had been a Fulbright fellow. She taught at several universities: Aix-en-Provence and Caen in France, Rutgers, and the C.W. Post Center of Long Island University.

In 1984 Ms. Rankine-Galloway joined the Foreign Service as an officer with USIA. Her overseas assignments included Tokyo and Copenhagen. She was serving in Washington, D.C. as a country affairs officer in the Office of West European and Canadian Affairs at the time of her death.

Survivors include her husband, Gerald Rankine-Galloway, and her son, Adrian, both of Washington, D.C.

Edmund Sehechter, 90, a retired FSO, died September 11 in Washington, D.C.

A native of Austria, Mr. Schechter received his doctoral degree from the University of Vienna and was fluent in six languages. He left Vienna in 1938 a few days after the German occupation. From France he organized clandestine immigration to Palestine before he was captured by the Germans. He escaped from a POW camp in Brittany and credited the U.S. consul-general in Casablanca who gave him a U.S. visa with saving his life and engendering his dedication to and appreciation of the U.S. Foreign Service.

Mr. Schechter's government career began at the Office of War Information and he later made the transition to USIA. He served in London, Luxembourg, Berlin, Munich, Bonn, Rome, La Paz and Caracas. During his career he founded RIAS (Radio in the American Sector) in Berlin. In Bonn and Munich he oversaw the de-nazification efforts and the return to civilian control of Germany's communications infrastructure.

After his retirement, Mr. Schechter continued his activities as a writer, lecturer and consultant on international affairs. He was a lifelong Zionist leader and published two books — *Kampf Um Zion (Fight for Zion)* shortly before he emigrated from Austria, and *Viennese Vignettes* in 1984, dedicated to the Viennese Jewish community prior to World War II.

Survivors include his wife, Gerda; his son, Peter; his daughter-in-law, Rosa; and his granddaughter, Alia.

John Milton Steeves, 93, retired FSO, died of a coronary thrombosis October 1 at the Renovah Center in Mechanicsburg, Pa.

Mr. Steeves was born in 1905 in Brinsmade, N.D. and graduated from Walla Walla College in 1927. He also earned a master's degree in education from the University of Washington in Seattle in 1935 and attended the National War College in 1950. He spent 15 years in India as a secondary school principal, and in the last two years of World War II, he became the executive officer of the Office of War Information for the China-Burma-India theater of operations.

After he joined the Foreign Service in 1945, Mr. Steeves specialized in Asian affairs. He served overseas at the embassy in Tokyo, as chargé d'affaires in Djakarta, as consul general in both Okinawa and Hong Kong, and as ambassador to Afghanistan from 1962 to 1966. Returning to Washington, he became Director General of the Foreign Service in 1966 and retired in 1969.

After retirement, he was the chairman at the Center for Strategic and International Studies at Georgetown University. He moved to Pennsylvania and in 1970 he organized the Carroll Valley, Pa., Citizen's Association and was instrumental in the formation of the Borough of Carroll Valley, Pa., where he served as mayor.

He is survived by four grandsons; fifteen great-grandchildren; and a sister, Cynthia Homann of St. Helena, Calif.

Kenneth P. T. Sullivan, 80, a retired FSO, died of cancer September 18 in Chambersburg, Pa.

Born in Boston in 1918, Mr. Sullivan attended the Boston Latin School and Bowdoin College, where he earned an A.B. degree in German. Later he studied at Harvard and American Universities as well as Universitaet Bonn and the Université de Marseille à Nice. During World War II, he served in both Europe and the Pacific and attained the rank of major. His last military assignment was with the U.S. Group Control Council in Berlin, to which he

returned as a War Department civilian in 1946.

In 1947 Mr. Sullivan joined the Foreign Service and was assigned to USPOLAD in Berlin in what was to be the first of several assignments as a Central European specialist. Later tours abroad were in Tuebingen (in the then state of Wuerttemberg-Hohenzollern), Bonn, Duesseldorf, Belgrade, Khartoum, Vienna and finally in Bremen as eonsul general. He retired in 1976 after a tour in the State Department as a Foreign Service inspector.

Survivors include two daughters, Dale A. and Karen Lee; a son, Kirk Bruce; and four grandchildren, all of Germany. In the U.S. he is survived by three nephews and four nieces.

Sarah A. Taylor, 83, a retired Foreign Service employee, died of heart failure Sept. 2 at her summer home in North Carolina.

Born in Westminster, S.C., in 1915, Ms. Taylor attended Winthrop College and graduated eum laude from the University of South Carolina with a degree in foreign languages, and later earned a master's degree there. She taught school until she joined the WACs during World War II. After the war she worked in a Charleston, S.C. law firm.

In 1950 she joined the Foreign Service; her foreign assignments included Frankfurt, Karaehi, Paris, San Salvador, Rabat, Quebec, and Izmir. She retired in 1975 from Malta.

She continued her world travels in retirement. She was a member of the Audubon Society and many of her trips were to identify birds.

Survivors include a brother, Walter Carroll Taylor, Jr. of Martinsville, Ind.; two nephews, Walter Carroll Taylor III of Illinois and Christopher Earle Taylor of Charlotte; a niece, Susan Aliee Taylor of Illinois; and many cousins in the Greer/Greenville, S.C., area.

Charles H. Thomas, 64, a retired FSO, died of leukemia Sept. 13 in New York.

Mr. Thomas was born in Buffalo and graduated from Harvard University. From 1956 to 1959 he was a Navy helicopter pilot and he continued to serve in the Navy Reserve until retiring in 1972 with the rank of lieutenant commander.

After joining the Foreign Service in 1959, Mr. Thomas served in Ciudad Juarez and La Paz. He received the Department of State Award for Heroism in 1965 for his role in the release of four Americans taken hostage in Bolivia. After a tour in Washington, first at the Foreign Serviee Institute and then as director of the Operations Center, he was posted to Lisbon as politieal counselor. He also served as Peaee Corps director in Uruguay and Honduras and deputy ehief of mission in Brussels before returning to Washington as principal deputy assistant secretary for European and Canadian affairs. Mr. Thomas served as ambassador to Hungary from 1990 to 1994 during that country's transition to democracy. Tapped to be special U.S. envoy to the former Yugoslavia, Mr. Thomas was part of the team working on the Bosnia peace negotiations in 1995. He retired to Annapolis, Md., in 1995.

Survivors include his wife of 41 years, Lourana Swift Thomas of Annapolis; three sons, John Charles Thomas of New York, Stuart Granville Thomas of West Palm Beach, Fla., and Andrew Lowry Thomas of MeHenry, Md.; a daughter, Jennifer Thomas McGrath of Pittsburgh; his mother, Helen Cogswell of Pittsburgh; a brother; and six grandchildren.

Mary Vance Trent, a retired FSO, died of cardiae arrest October 13 in Alexandria, Va.

Born in Indianapolis, Ms. Trent graduated from Butler University. Before joining the Foreign Service, she worked on the implementation of the United Nations Treaty in London.

In 1946 she beeame a Foreign Service offieer and was sent to Paris where she continued to work on U.N. issues. Her other foreign posts ineluded Norway, Czeeho-slovakia, Indonesia (twice), and New Zealand. In her last posting, she lived in Samoa, where she served as politieal adviser to the Interior Department on the status of the Trust Territories in the South Paeifie. One of her assignments in the State Department involved establishing an in-depth orientation program for wives of Foreign Service offieers in preparation for serving abroad.

After retirement, Ms. Trent continued to travel and served as the international president of the Society of Woman Geographers from 1984 to 1987.

Ms. Trent had no surviving family. ■

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Washington, DC 20016
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REAL ESTATE

Real Estate

Postcard From Abroad

Trans-Siberian Lunch

By James F. Prosser

The photograph in the tourist brochure promised an elegant dining experience: 12 tables for four covered with white tablecloths and vases filled with flowers sitting on each. The real restaurant on board the Trans-Siberian Express didn't live up to the propaganda, however.

There were only six tables available for customers. Cardboard boxes covered with tarpaulins were stacked on and under the others, making the dining room look like a freight warehouse. Nevertheless, our group of six Americans, joined by two Finns, laid claim to the car for eating, drinking and socializing while chugging from Moscow to Irkutsk, four days away. Since most Russians carried enough food to last the entire trip, we were alone in the diner.

Valentina, the sole waitress, informed us that the car was open from 0900 to 2100 *Moscow time* each day. Since the train crosses seven time zones traveling eastward across Russia, I knew just scheduling breakfast would be a problem. Like the dining car pictures, the menu also promised more than it delivered. Printed in Russian, German and English, it listed succulent, varied items. We quickly discovered that ordering whatever the cook had decided to prepare for the day, whether it was on the menu or not, was the only option. Still, we were never disappointed with these tasty meals, which cost from three to five dollars and included, at times, excellent borscht and delicious sauteed beef.

It had taken me more than 50 years to finally take a ride on the 9,271-kilometer-long Trans-Siberian railroad.

It had taken me more than 50 years to finally take a ride on the 9,271-kilometer-long Trans-Siberian railroad. As a boy, a history of the world's railroads in my grandparents' library first piqued my curiosity about the train. When I was an FSO posted to Moscow from 1972 to 1974, I twice asked — and was twice refused — permission to ride it from Moscow, in the heartland, to Vladivostok, on the Pacific Ocean.

So, in 1996, after the Soviet Union disintegrated, and again in this year, I jumped at the opportunity to fulfill a rail fan's dream. Traveling in neat, clean "soft class" (first class) sleeping cars, with permanently locked windows, but surprisingly decent air conditioning, I watched from a train window as we passed Zagorsk's ancient, onion-domed cathedral, traversed the Ural mountains to Yekaterinburg, where Czar Nicholas II and his family were executed, crossed the Volga River and headed into summertime Siberia, which reminded me of farms and forests I had viewed as a boy on the train from Green Bay, Wisc., to Duluth, Minn.

At regular station stops, which seemed to come at two hour intervals, we purchased food from vendors in kiosks along the platform. In Irkutsk, we left the train to explore Lake Baikal. When we re-boarded a different train four days later, our accommodations were identical to those we had left. Heading for the dining car, we noticed that even more space was occupied by the mystery boxes. Soon, we found out why. At each stop in the 2,240 kilometers between the cities of Chita and Birobidzhan, just north of the Chinese border where there aren't any roads, we watched our waitress, Svetlana, and cook, Vladimir, sell vodka to waiting customers during five-minute station stops. They explained to us that the boxes of vodka help the dining car employees, who work for a concessionaire and not the railroad, make extra money.

By the time we reached the Pacific and the end of the line, all the boxes were gone. ■

James Prosser, a retired FSO, served in Rome, Nairobi, Brussels, Geneva, Moscow, Leopoldville, Munich, Phnom Penh, and Saigon.



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

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