IRAN in the Twentieth Century
A Political History

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Table 2.3. Iran's Foreign Trade, 1900-1922 (in millions of rials)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Imports</th>
<th>Exports</th>
<th>Deficit</th>
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<tr>
<td>1900-1901</td>
<td>225.4</td>
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<td>1905-1906</td>
<td>386.5</td>
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<td>1910-1911</td>
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<td>1913-1914</td>
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<td>1916-1917</td>
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<td>1918-1919</td>
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<td>1919-1920</td>
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<td>1921-1922</td>
<td>609.7</td>
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</table>

Export figures from 1918-1919 onwards do not include oil revenues. Data from Sultanzadeh, in Chaqueri, [Historical Documents], vol. 8, pp. 52, 185; and Sultanzadeh, Persia [Iran] (Moscow: Gosizdat, 1924), p. 50.

Data in Table 2.3 graphically depicted. Import vs. Export

![Graph showing import vs. export from 1900 to 1922](image)

Trade Deficit (1900-1922)

![Graph showing trade deficit from 1900 to 1922](image)

After a tour of Europe in the late 1870s, Naser al-Din attempted to introduce Germany as a third power in Iran's political and economic relations. Otto von Bismarck's military achievements and the Prussian style of rule had made a strong impression on the Qajar shah, and Naser al-Din considered asking German firms to develop a railroad and shipping in the south. British opposition put an end to this plan.\(^{33}\)

Naser al-Din became the firmest ruler of the Qajar dynasty. Shaken by Tsar Alexander II's assassination, he severely restricted travel to Europe and prevented liberal political thought from being taught at Dar al-Fonun. His interest in Europe did not extend to the cultural or political spheres. Tsar Alexander III's autocratic style of rule reinforced Naser al-Din's determination not to delegate or share power.\(^{34}\) When the shah established ministerial portfolios along the lines of those of European governments, the powers of the ministers were limited to reporting to the shah and asking him for a final decision. He played off ministries and governors against one another to prevent any one figure from challenging him. In order to strengthen the monarchy, the shah prevented the royal bureaucracy and army from acquiring strength of their own. This deliberate endeavor to preserve the weaknesses of the administration, not surprisingly, ultimately contributed to the monarchy's weakness when confronted by organized opposition in the Constitutional Revolution.\(^{35}\)

After the fall of Taqi Khan, reformism found no administrative outlet. Reformers did emerge, but they had little, if any, impact on the government. The most notable Iranian reformers of the latter half of the nineteenth century were Sayyid Jamal ed-Din al-Afghani and Mirza Malkum Khan. Jamal ed-Din was an extraordinary, if mysterious, reformer who helped shape the emergence of nationalism throughout the Middle East. Born in Asadabad, near Hamadan, Jamal ed-Din was educated in a fatayziyeh, or theological school, in Qazvin. There he was exposed to Shaikhi and Babist heterodoxy.

Shaikhis, members of a Shi'ite splinter group that emerged in the 1810s, believed that God had given each generation a Perfect Shi'i or Bab (door), through whom the faithful could communicate with the Hidden (Twelfth) Imam, and who would lead the Islamic community and establish perfect religious and social justice. The Babists followed Sayyid Ali Mohammad-i Shirazi, a theologian who announced he was the Shaikh Bab.

The Bab advocated social and economic reform (including legalization of money lending and legal protection for merchants), female emancipation, and the elimination of corruption and immorality. Babism promoted an accord between religion and science and formed the ideological basis of the 1848–1850 revolt in northern Iran, including the Azerbaijani cities of Zanjan and Tabriz, where Shaikhis were strong. The revolt acquired substantial mass support in the urban areas, where the antifeudal aspects of Babist doctrine were popular. After the revolt had been bloodily suppressed, a branch of the movement under Baha'ullah, the Bab's chosen successor, disowned violence and advocated the spiritual unity
of humanity, while continuing to advocate social evolution. The followers of this creed became known as the Bahais; another branch—the Azali sect, under Baha'ullah's brother Azal—continued to advocate violence but was forced underground. Shaikhism and Babism both emphasized the role of social and scientific progress in history, and the role of economics in social relationships. This concept of progress seems to have had a great impact on Jamal ed-Din.

After leaving Iran (apparently as a result of a doctrinal dispute with the Shi'ite hierarchy), Jamal ed-Din traveled extensively. He went first to India—where he probably witnessed the Sepoy Rebellion in 1857—then to Afghanistan, Turkey, Egypt, Iraq, and, late in life, to France, Russia, and England. In the course of his travels, he adopted the name "al-Afghani," claiming an Afghan origin so that the clerical establishments in the Sunni countries he visited would not disparage his Shi'ite background. Wherever he went after his trip to India, Jamal ed-Din advocated political reform and the adoption of Western technology. He described as his life's aim "to arouse any one Muslim country to strength and leadership so that the Islamic community might catch up with the civilized nations of the world." Jamal ed-Din was the intellectual father of the pan-Islamist movement; while he recognized the strong appeal of nationalism, he focused primarily on Islam, and the concept of the Islamic umma, or community, as the ideological basis for an anti-imperialist movement. To this end, Jamal ed-Din attempted to persuade the rulers of Iran, Turkey, and Egypt to reform their governments. When they did not heed his advice, he sought to limit the monarchs' absolute powers. The "wisest ulama," he suggested, would oversee the implementation of Islamic law and restrain the power of corrupt secular rulers.

In Iran, before his break with the shah, Jamal ed-Din had joined the Royal Advisory Council and urged reforms on Naser al-Din, including a national legal code. The shah, fearful of the limitations that such rationalization of authority would place on royal power, exiled him. Later, Jamal ed-Din returned to Iran and preached revolutionary ideas in a shrine near Tehran; he particularly criticized the shah's profligacy and even advocated assassinating Naser al-Din.

In London in 1891, Jamal ed-Din stayed with Mirza Malkum Khan, and the two began an effective literary collaboration. Malkum Khan was the son of a wealthy, reformist Armenian merchant in Isfahan who had been influenced by Taqi Khan's programs; Malkum Khan had converted to Islam. He was educated in France, where he became an enthusiastic proponent of Western scientific and political concepts. He taught engineering and geography at Dar al-Fonun and founded the House of Oblivion, patterned after the Masons, in Tehran. As an advisor to the shah, he had promoted the sale of state land to the peasants. The reforms he urged on the shah, his Freemason connections, his proposal of a state lottery, and his Armenian parentage annoyed the ulama, who arranged that he be sent out of the country, as ambassador to England. After 1889, Malkum Khan broke completely with the shah.

While in London, Malkum Khan wrote a book, Politik-i Iran (Iran's Politics), in which he advocated restraints on the shah's power and a constitution that would specify the differentiation of authority. He suggested a civil law code to encourage economic and cultural progress. Together with Jamal ed-Din, Malkum Khan published the newspaper Qanun (Law), a word the shah abhorred. This publication blended Jamal ed-Din's pan-Islamism with Malkum Khan's constitutionalism, and proposed that the mujaheds, or religious scholars, lead the masses from the mosques and create a national parliament, retaining the monarchy:

The ulama should move the masses so that they will remove the corrupted authorities. However, the monarch's position should be kept. . . . The educated, the well-versed, the leaders, and the mujaheds should come from all provinces to establish the great national parliament.

Jamal ed-Din, meanwhile, retained contact with the Shi'ite hierarchy in Iran. Friction between the clergy and the shah had already been created when the shah had appointed his son-in-law as the imam jomeh, or Friday prayer leader, in Tehran. The public had refused to recognize the religious authority of the shah's appointee and continued to acknowledge the clergy appointed by the ayatollahs. Jamal ed-Din skillfully exploited this rift: In 1891, he wrote letters to the ulama, notably the grand ayatollah in Mesopotamia, urging them to denounce the shah's concessions to foreign powers. The recent concession to a British company of exclusive rights to sell and export tobacco became, with Jamal ed-Din's persuasion, the occasion for a fatwa, or religious proclamation, by the grand ayatollah, which aroused mass opposition to the concession. Tobacco was boycotted throughout the country, from the shah's harem to the remotest villages. The ulama clearly had power and communication abilities that the shah lacked. Azerbaijan (notably Tabriz, where many merchants were hurt by the concession) was strongly in favor of this boycott. The shah soon bowed to pressure and cancelled the concession. The power of religion as a force to mobilize anti-foreign sentiment among the masses was clearly evident in this episode. Curzon observed:

[In] Persia, at any time of public disorder, a strong reaction might be set on foot by the retrograde and priestly party. . . . Already there is a widespread feeling of discontent at the policy of concessions to foreigners upon which the Shah has latterly been persuaded to embark, and the recent successful outbreak against the Tobacco Corporation has stimulated a movement which a stronger Government might easily have repressed. Mollahs have publicly preached against the European.

After the tobacco boycott, public discontent with the administration remained high. Even within the shah's own closed political elite, the British
The Struggle of Religious and Secular Forces

The First Majlis attempted to pass legislation to create a strong army, balance the budget, and curb the power of the shah. When Muzaffar al-Din died in January 1907, the last became the paramount issue, as the new shah, Mohammad Ali, was extremely reluctant to relinquish control over the army and the royal purse.

The First Majlis wrote a secular judicial code, which combined French legal concepts with traditional Islamic law. It was passed over the vehement opposition of the clergy in the Majlis and was never truly implemented. The clergy, which drew much of its livelihood and social power from its monopoly over the judiciary, was threatened by this legislation. While liberals in the First Majlis could overcome clerical opposition within the confines of the parliament, they could not overcome it in society at large; the masses and the bazaaris continued to turn to the clergy for legal matters. The clergy in the Majlis particularly criticized the "radical" activities of the Tabriz anjoman. Mohammad Ali Shah used the religious versus secular confrontation in the Majlis to his own advantage. A very religious person, he soon drew many clergymen—the most prominent among them Sheikh Fazlollah Nuri—away from the constitutional program.

The clergy, however, was far from monolithic in its political stance. Behbehani and Tabatabai continued to support the constitution. The intellectual debate on the constitution among the clergy in this period, particularly about the validity of decisions produced by secular assemblies, produced a fascinating literature. Ayatollah Mohammad Hussein Na'ini, a student of the Ayatollah Shirazi who had instigated the tobacco boycott, declared that constitutional government was the best form of rule in the absence of the Hidden (Twelfth) Imam: Na'ini stated that the government should benefit the masses. The secularism increasingly evident among constitutionalists, particularly in the Social Democrat–influenced northern anjomans, threatened the religious establishment: A group of clergymen responded to Na'ini that Shi'ite law precluded government by secular consultation (it conflicted with Shi'ite theological principles) and that constitutional government was a Western-inspired heresy. Many clerics attacked the Azerbaijani delegation. Talebof, who had been elected in absentia by the Tabriz merchant anjoman, was a particular target of the conservative mullahs, who described his writings as heretical and Babist. The strong opposition of the ulama (even preconstitutional ulama) dissuaded Talebof from assuming his seat in the Majlis. The more conservative ulama supported Mohammad Ali Shah in his efforts to control the war ministry, to which he had appointed his uncle (and father-in-law) as head. The shah insisted that the ministers report to him, instead of the parliament, and implement his orders.

The shah replaced liberal Prime Minister Mushir al-Dowleh with Amin al-Soltan Atabak-i Azam, an archconservative. Amin al-Soltan had been prime minister for more than a decade under Naser al-Din Shah, and for a few years under Muzaffar al-Din. He was known for his belief in a strong, autocratic government. Constitutionalists resented him for having arranged many concessions to European powers, including the tobacco concession in 1891 and, more recently, the D'Arcy concession. In a recent visit to Japan, Amin al-Soltan had come to the conclusion that reforms were necessary, and that only an
autocratic government could implement them. Unlike many members of Iran's intelligentsia, Amin al-Soltan understood that Japan's autocratic government, not its constitution, was responsible for its emergence as a power.

Amin al-Soltan's arrival in Enzeli on a tsarist gunboat met with hostility from the port city's ajomans, and a cool reception in Tehran's parliament. The shah had appointed him without consulting the Majlis, and he never succeeded in gaining a vote of confidence.94 He attempted to obtain loans from both Britain and Russia for the monarch's personal use, again without consulting the Majlis. Since the collateral for a loan to Russia would be (as it traditionally was) part of the resources of northern Iran, especially Azerbaijan, the province's state ajoman and the Azerbaijani delegation in the Majlis opposed Amin al-Soltan and his premiership. Amin al-Soltan soon decided to suppress the constitutional movement in Azerbaijan. He ordered the provincial governor (already approved by the local ajoman) to take firmer measures against the constitutionalists. In Tehran, he supported Fazlollah Nuri, and his concept of mashru'e, or religious government, against the secularists.

The Social Democrats were alarmed by Amin al-Soltan's actions. A Tabrizi fedayi of the Social Democrat-dominated Azerbaijani ajoman in Tehran, under Haydar Khan's direction, assassinated him. Amin al-Soltan's elimination denuded the shah of any cloak of constitutional rule, placing him in an open role as a mortal enemy of the constitution. Haydar proclaimed that the shah himself should be eliminated, in order to "awaken the masses." An unsuccessful attempt to assassinate the shah, also engineered by Haydar, did radicalize the liberal intelligentsia against the shah; however, mass support for the Social Democrats or the constitutional movement was not forthcoming.95

The international situation had altered to oppose the constitutionalists, if not necessarily to favor the shah. Germany's emergence as a world power, and the volatility of radical ideas in northern Iran that threatened to spread to India, had combined to persuade Britain that a compromise with Russia on Iran was necessary. Hence Britain proposed the infamous 1907 treaty. This treaty divided Iran into two spheres of influence, with Russia enjoying hegemony in the north and Britain in the south (neutral areas lay in between).

The Russian minister of foreign affairs, A. P. Izvolsky, saw the British-proposed treaty as an attempt to "enlist the support of Russia as a gendarme to help preserve order among Asian peoples," and to prevent the German fleet's appearance "on the shores of the Persian Gulf" as a result of the spread of constitutional ideas.96 British foreign minister, Sir Edward Grey—the treaty's architect—explained that as a result of the agreement, "we are freed from an anxiety that had often preoccupied British governments; a frequent source of friction and a possible cause of war removed."97 The tsar was willing to compromise after the humiliating defeat in the war with Japan and the subsequent tumult of the 1905 Russian Revolution.

The 1907 treaty became a blueprint for British policy: This was not the last time that Britain would attempt to reach an understanding with Russia to maintain its interests in southern Iran. The theme of a rising Germany prompting a closer relationship between Britain and Russia would recur. After the 1907 treaty, British support for the constitution vanished; Russian opposition to the constitutionalists became virulent.98

The shah determined that the new international situation was in his favor. He appealed to the religious authorities who had supported him, notably Ayatollah Nuri, to arouse the urban poor and the rural masses against the revolution. The ayatollah denounced the constitutionalists in his writings, fatwas and sermons; Nuri and his clerical followers condemned the revolutionaries as "Babis" and heretics. The effect of such propaganda among the highly religious lower classes in urban as well as rural areas was immense, even in Azerbaijan.99

The shah tried to stage a counterrevolutionary coup d'état in December 1907; an attempt thwarted by the strong opposition of a network of revolutionary ajomans. After the shah sent an ultimatum to the parliament demanding that certain writers and speakers who had taken asylum in the Majlis—including al-Motakallamin and Jahangir Khan (editor of Sur-i Israfil)—and the entire Azerbaijani delegation be surrendered to him, the ajomans demonstrated their real power. In Tehran, the proconstitutional ajomans created armed guards to defend the Parliament (the Azerbaijani ajoman of Tehran distinguished itself again in this endeavor), and the ajomans in Tabriz and Qazvin mobilized mujaheds and fedayis to march on Tehran.

The shah backed down; the constitutionalists pressed for his removal. Britain and Russia opposed the idea of deposing the shah. The Social Democrats' attempt on his life orchestrated by Haydar Khan in February 1908 helped convince the shah that his survival depended on the suppression of the constitutional movement and destroyed any possibility of compromise between the shah and the Majlis. The constitutionalists were similarly convinced that their own survival depended on the elimination of the shah.100

In June 1908, Mohammad Ali Shah, in concert with Nuri, assembled a large number of peasants, urban poor, and luti (popular knife-wielding thugs) in Tehran to create an unconstitutional atmosphere. The shah had deliberately stirred up racial animosities between Persians and Azeris in Tehran. On his instigation, Nuri had aggravated the traditional hostility of the Moslem community against the Christian Armenians and called the idea of religious equality "un-Islamic." On June 23, the Russian-officered Cossack Brigade bombarded the parliament, and the assembled masses helped the Cossacks round up the constitutionalists and pillage the proconstitutional ajomans, including the Azerbaijani ajoman. The crowd chanted: "We are the people of Mohammad. We are the people of the Qur'an. We don't want a constitution (mashru'teh), we want religious law (mashru'eh). We want the religion of Mohammad; we don't want a constitution." Constitutionalist
attempt to pass the pro-British agreement with the AIOC and by the trade agreement with the Soviets, conservative religious figures viewed his close relations with the Tudeh with hostility. Ayaollah Kashani (who had personal reasons for resenting the general's power, since Razmara had repeatedly imprisoned him) encouraged "sincere Muslims and patriotic citizens to fight against the enemies of Islam and Iran"—the reference to Razmara was clear. On March 7, 1951, a Moslem fedayi assassinated Razmara. Wild rejoicing in the capital ensued.14

Razmara’s assassination and subsequent threats issued by the Moslem fedayis shook the court. In a missive directed to the "Son of Pahlavi," the fedayis demanded that the government free the assassin, praising him as a man who, "on the order of Islamic laws and God, has taken the rotten element from the path of Moslem progress and has inflicted the greatest defeats on the dirty policies of the foreign powers." Death was promised for all members of government, from the shah to members of the Majlis, if the young fedyai was not released with an apology.15 The Islamic nationalist fervor that eventually erupted in the 1979 revolution was already a potent political force.

Mossadegh and the National Front: 1951-1953

In 1949, the National Front had been formed as a coalition of nationalist groups and parties from a broad spectrum of Iranian politics. When Razmara was assassinated, the National Front, under Mossadegh’s leadership, was the clear successor to power. Its main goals, described by its first statutes in 1950, were the establishment of a strong, centralized nationalist government, free elections, and basic freedom of thought and action.16 Its emergence in the summer of 1949 had been sparked by opposition to the supplementary agreement with the AIOC. By a "nationalist government," the front meant one that would control Iran’s oil resources. Mossadegh saw negative equilibrium in foreign policy as a means of ensuring free elections in Iran; conversely, he saw free elections as a means of ensuring that negative equilibrium, once achieved, would continue. The AIOC had become a symbol of Iran’s political and economic subordination to Britain, and the National Front was united primarily by opposition to this company,17 its prevailing ideology was Mossadegh’s doctrine of negative equilibrium in foreign affairs.18 Aside from this common approach to foreign policy, the groups that composed the front had little in common, either in organization or in ideology. They came from both the traditional, religious bazaaris middle class and the modern, secular middle class. This diversity of origins gave the groups in the National Front differences in political socialization that extended through all aspects of life.19 The division between the traditional and modern classes could be observed throughout the political spectrum; right, left, and center.

Kashani’s Society of Moslem Warriors, composed mainly of young, lower-
ehchelon bazaaris, represented the religious right. The charismatic Kashani gave the liberal nationalist Mossadegh a channel through which he could reach the masses. The Moslem Warriors demanded the implementation of the shari’a, the repeal of Reza Shah’s secular laws, and the protection of national industries; the associated Feda’iyan-i Islam, not formally a member organization in the National Front, was more dogmatically fundamentalist.20

The proto-Fascist National Party, founded by law student Dariush Foruhar, represented the secular side of the right of the National Front. The National Party proudly traced its origins to the Fascist movement of the 1930s and pressed irredentist claims encompassing Bahrin, Afghanistan, and the Caucasus. It attributed Iran’s backwardness to religious minorities, especially Jews and Bahais, as well as to foreign powers. Foruhar became the first minister of labor after the Islamic Revolution.21

The center of the National Front included both the Iran Party and the Merchant Association of the Bazaar. British officials described Allahyar Saleh, generally recognized as the leader of the Iran Party, as a "leftist" who had sympathized with the Azerbaijan revolution. He was second only to Mossadegh in popularity in the nationalist movement. Karim Sanjabi, a well-respected dean of the University of Tehran from Kurdistan, who had supported the Iran Party’s alliance with the Tudeh, was another leading figure. He later became a focal point for Iranian liberal nationalism during the 1979 revolution. Many lower- and middle-ranking bazaaris and much of the religious hierarchy were associated with the center of the National Front through the Merchant Association and similar organizations. Hussein Makki, a young political historian from the Yazd bazaar with marital ties to a leading clerical family, belonged to this loose classification; also in this group were Mehdi Bazargan and Mahmoud (later Ayaollah) Taleqani, both later central figures in the Islamic Revolution.22

On the left, there was the numerically weak Hizbeh Zahmatkeshareh Mellat-i Iran, Toilers of the Iranian Nation Party. The ex-Tudeh member Khalil Maleki was the driving intellectual force behind the Toilers’ Party. His influence brought in many students from the university in Tehran and the Toilers—unlike other groups in the National Front—their own coherent ideology and social program.23 Maleki, who controlled the party’s publications, continued criticizing the Tudeh’s international approach to socialism, with its priority on Soviet as opposed to Iranian interests.24 Jalal al-Ahmad, who had joined Maleki in his split with the Tudeh, was part of Maleki’s "modern" wing. The bazaaris were represented in the Toilers’ Party through its leader, the French-educated Muzaffar Baqai, who was a charismatic politician with strong support in his hometown of Kerman; his influence brought in many Kermanis and Kermani shopkeepers in Tehran. The Toilers’ first proclamation stressed support for Kashani and Makki, bazaar favorites, as well as for Mossadegh.25 Thus, the Toilers’ Party, like other segments in the National Front, contained a mixture of elements in both traditional and modern middle classes. These elements split
Ayatollah Khomeini's writings were highly influential in the Islamic Revolution, especially in its earlier stages. The influence of the Islamic Republic and the ISS propaganda efforts on this mixture was great; the ISS distributed these writings extensively.

The ISS had considerable influence among lower-middle-class air force technicians while they were training in the United States. At training centers in Colorado, Texas, and Virginia, the ISS attracted these young Iranians, with their religious background. The confederation and the ISS conducted massive demonstrations: their antishah activities and publications did a great deal to sway Western public opinion. Both groups were also in contact with the Mujahedin in Iran and with Khomeini in Iraq, and during the revolution, many of their members returned to Iran to participate in the street fighting and demonstrations against the shah. The air force technicians who had been exposed to ISS propaganda in the United States, and who retained their loyalty to the religious establishment, brought its radical Islam to the many mosques near Tehran's military stations.

The confederation, like so many other leftist groups during the revolution, split into factions over the question of what its attitude should be toward the Islamic Republic. A faction advocating armed struggle, the Ettehadiyyeyi Kommonishayi Iran—the Communist League of Iran—attempted to stage an uprising in the Caspian city of Amol in January 1982. This attempt, marked by the peasants' traditional hostility to ethnic minorities and the perceived atheism among the revolutionaries, was a fiasco. After Banisadr's ouster in June 1981, the ISS, too, divided into a more secular pro-Mujahedin and a more religious pro-Khomeini faction. Both factions continue to function, the former, of course, in exile or underground.

Ayatollah Khomeini and the Foundations of the Islamic Revolution

Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the central figure in the Islamic Revolution, had begun his career in politics as a reformer, not a revolutionary. The son-in-law and pupil of the well-respected and often apolitical Ayatollah Hossein Borujerdi, the leader of the Shi'ite hierarchy, Khomeini did not become politically active until after Borujerdi's death. A follower of Kashani in the early 1950s, Khomeini followed him in breaking with Mossadeq over the latter's tolerance of the Tudeh, then reverted to inactivity. The 1963 land reform, which seriously injured the clergy's economic power, galvanized Khomeini into active resistance to the government. Declining to join any political organization, he bitterly denounced the shah's contravention of the constitution and his relations with the United States and Israel.

After Khomeini went into exile in 1964, his opposition to the monarchy became increasingly virulent. The shah's continuing encroachments on the clergy's role, and his attempts—reminiscent of Reza Shah—to legitimize his rule by stressing links with Iran's pre-Islamic past, earned Khomeini's anger. In 1971, while Mohammad Reza Shah was celebrating Iran's 2,500-year anniversary, Khomeini delivered a series of lectures, later incorporated into his book, Velayat-i Faqih Hakomati Islami (The Guardianship of the Jurist: The Islamic Government). This book became the ideological foundation for the Islamic Republic. Khomeini emphasized the necessity for creating "political Islamic revolution" throughout the Islamic world. The existing governments in Moslem countries, he claimed, were barriers to the unity of the Moslem world after the Islamic Revolution.

Khomeini appealed to the bazaar, cautioning them: "Our country has become an Israeli base. Our bazaar is also in their hands. If this situation continues, and Moslems stay indifferent, our bazaar would cease to exist." This was a reference to the shah's promotion of several Jewish and Bahai families to positions of commercial preeminence, giving them monopolies which had hitherto been bazaar prerogatives.

In his book, for the first time, Khomeini explicitly condemned the institution of monarchy. The duties of government, he claimed, had been passed by Mohammad to the imams, whose successors were the Islamic jurists who should exercise spiritual and political authority simultaneously as Mohammad and Ali had. Khomeini denounced the idea of the separation of religion and the state as a Western conspiracy to keep Iran politically dependent by preventing Islam from assuming its rightful role in governing the nation. Islam, the book emphasized, was the source of all laws and political governance. All legislation should be Islamic law, and the culture, society, and the legal system should be purged of non-Islamic influences. The ulama were to have the leading role in saving Islam from imperialism by establishing an Islamic government. Jurists were to have ultimate executive, administrative, and planning authority, since they had the highest knowledge of Islam: "Whatever we need to maintain our national freedom and independence, the jurist possesses. The jurist will not fall under the influence of foreigners.... It is the jurist who will defend the rights, freedom, and territorial integrity of the Islamic nation with his life." Khomeini's emphasis on the necessity for an imam or jurist to maintain Islamic unity and implement Islamic law is a reflection of the patrimonial, hierarchical Shi'ite concept of imamat.


5. Abrahamian, Iran, p. 41.


7. Shajii, Representatives, p. 18.


10. Abrahamian, Iran, p. 34; Touhidi-Baghi, "Roots," pp. 48, 54.


15. Ibid., vol. 1, pp. 480–481; also Abrahamian, Iran, p. 55.

16. Abrahamian, Iran, pp. 52–53.


29. Ibid.; and Shajii, Representatives, p. 19. On Taqi Khan, see also Abrahamian, Iran, pp. 53–54.

30. Makki, Taqi Khan, p. 188.


35. Ibid., esp. pp. 3–19.


38. Keddie, Jamal ad-Din, pp. 136–137.


41. Qanun 22 (1891) in Adamiyat, Ideology, p. 22.

42. Ibid., pp. 25–26.


46. Ibid., p. 50.
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48. Abrahamian, Iran, p. 79.
55. Ibid., p. 23.
56. Ibid., p. 59.
61. Abrahamian, Iran, pp. 84–85.
62. For the full translation of the constitution and supplemental laws see Browne, Persian Revolution, pp. 362–384.
64. Abrahamian, Iran, pp. 103–104; Bahar, Brief History, vol. 2, p. 12; and Kambakhsh, Labor and Communist Movement, vol. 1, p. 16.
65. Ghassemi, Syndicalism, pp. 22–23; Abrahamian, Iran, p. 92.
66. Reisi and Nahid, Sattar Khan and Khiabani, p. 29; Hedayat, Memories, pp. 146–147; and Tajizadeh, Background.
68. On the origin of anjomans and their crucial role in the Constitutional Revolution, see Lefteri Stavros Stavrianos, Global Rift: The Third World Comes

71. Adamiyat, Ideology, p. 469.
72. Ibid.
73. Reisi and Nahid, Sattar Khan and Khiabani, p. 28.
74. Ibid., pp. 26–31; Hedayat, Memories, p. 159.
76. On the Bolsheviks and the 1907 treaty, see Yegikian, Soviet Union and Jangal, p. 409.
80. See especially Chapters 8 and 9 in this book.
82. Ra’i, Haydar Khan, pp. 20–37; Kazemzadeh, Struggle, pp. 20–21.
83. Adamiyat, Social Democratic Trends, p. 141.
84. Adamiyat, Social Democratic Trends, p. 136.
93. Adamiyat, Talebof’s Thoughts, pp. 9–10.
94. Hedayat, Memories, p. 159; Abrahamian, Iran, p. 89.
95. On the Atabak and related events, see Adamiyat, Social Democratic
Trends, pp. 19–20; Ra’iin, Haydar Khan, pp. 57–96; Sykes, History of Iran, vol. 2, pp. 629–630.

96. Quoted in Spector, First Russian Revolution, p. 49.


100. See Sykes, History of Iran, vol. 2, pp. 631–632 on the first coup attempt; also Ra’iin, Haydar Khan, pp. 99–100.


111. Kasravi, History of Azerbaijan, pp. 15–22; Ra’iin, Haydar Khan, p. 103.


120. On foreign and domestic opposition to the Missioner, see William Morgan Shuster, The Strangling of Persia (New York: Century, 1912); also Bahar, Brief History, vol. 2, pp. 13–14.


Ch. 3 Notes


3. See Abrahamian, Iran, pp. 45–46; Sepehr, Iran in the Great War, pp. 73–86; and Christopher Sykes, Wassmus: The German Lawrence (London: Longmans, 1936).


5. Lenczowski, Middle East, pp. 54–55.

6. On Iranian politics and alliances in this period, see Sepehr, Iran in the Great War, pp. 237–246; Ramazani, Foreign Policy, pp. 129–130; and Bahar, Brief History, vol. 1, p. 21.


17. Ibid., pp. 126, 151–154.


19. Yegikian, Soviet Union and Jangal, pp. 417–418. See also Jangal 1, no. 7, p. 6; no. 9, pp. 1–3.

Ch. 9 Notes


2. Fatemi, Articles, p. 119.


4. Mehdiniya, Razmara, pp. 60, 81; USNA 891.00/7–1149; 891.00/8–2249; 891.00/8–849; and 711.91/7–148.


For this rumor, see OIR Report no. 4801.1.

12. For this rumor, see OIR Report no. 4801.1.

13. Abrahamic, Iran, p. 265; Razmara and Mohtadi, "General Razmara's Life," p. 58; for purge victims, see Mehdiniya, Razmara, pp. 129–139. Also see Mossadegh's Speeches in Sixteenth Majlis; June 28, 1987, interview with Sanjabi; and a November 23, 1988, letter from Jahan (pseud.), a political associate of Mossadegh.


16. For the bylaws of the National Front, see Bakhtar Emruz [Today's West] 273 (July 7, 1950); also author's June 27, 1987, personal interview with Sanjabi.

17. See OIR Reports nos. 097.37–1092, 5272 (June 9, 1950), "Mossadegh as a Potential Popular Leader of Iran," esp. p. 5; and June 26, 1987, personal interview with Sanjabi


23. On Maleki's popularity with young people, the author is indebted to personal interviews with former members of the Toilers.


25. Jazani, Thirty Years' History, pp. 32, 41, 55, 58, 62; Abrahamic, Iran, p. 256.


27. Quote from ibid., p. 187; see also pp. 161–173 and passim; Jazani, Thirty Years' History, p. 34.


32. Cottam, Nationalism, p. 274; on the AIIC, see Fatemi, Oil Diplomacy; Fateh, Oil, esp. p. 85; and Anthony Sampson, The Seven Sisters: The Great Oil Companies and the World They Make (New York: Viking Press, 1975), pp. 135–166; Zabih, Mossadegh Era, p. 30. Pahlavi, Answer, p. 85, gives a rather different version of events. See also BBC video, July 28, 1986, End of an Empire: Mossadegh; Hassan Sadir, Defaae Dr Mossadegh as naft dar Zendane Zerehi [Dr. Mossadegh's Defense of His Position on Oil from his Jail Cell at the Headquarters of the Second Armoured Division] (Tehran: Sahamie Am Publishing, 1978); Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation: My Years at the State Department (New York: W. W. Norton, 1969), pp. 506–511, 600, 662, 679–685; Acheson expresses the U.S. perception of the Anglo-Iranian conflict. See also the anonymously edited Noiha va Maktabbati Dr. Mossadegh [Dr. Mossadegh's

48. Pouyan, Necessity of Armed Struggle, p. 38; and Jazani, Thirty Years' History.

49. Interviews with PFGO members.

50. Abrahmanian, Iran, p. 487.


53. Farahani, What a Revolutionary Must Know, pp. 10-11.

54. Zabih, Left in Contemporary Iran, p. 131; and Hamid Momeni, Mogadamayi bar Tarikh [An Introduction to History] (Holland: Rastakhiz-i Shakhil, n.d.).


56. Ashraf, Evaluation of Three Years, p. 92.

57. Ahmadzadeh, Armed Struggle, pp. 1-3; on PFGO members' origins, see Zabih, Left in Contemporary Iran, pp. 119-122.

58. Ashraf, Evaluation of Three Years, pp. 48-49.

59. Zabih, Left in Contemporary Iran, p. 130; Abrahmanian, Iran, pp. 487-488.


63. Contemporary Crisis and Projection, p. 41.

64. Anonymous, Chera dar Entekabat i Majlisi Kebrigan Sherkat Kordi? [Why Did We Participate in the Election of the Assembly of Experts?] (n.p., PFGO, the Majority, n.d.); Zabih, Left in Contemporary Iran, pp. 139-146; and interviews with former members of the PFGO majority and minority, and other leftist groups.

65. Abrahmanian, Iran, p. 492.

66. Zabih, Left in Contemporary Iran, p. 78.

67. Interview with Hashem (pseud.), former cell leader of Paykar in Kurdistan; Zabih, Left in Contemporary Iran, p. 87.

68. Zabih, p. 79; Contemporary Crisis and Projection.

69. This information was obtained in interviews with former leading Paykar members.

70. People's Fedayin Guerrilla Organization, untitled leaflet (n.p: PFGO, n.d. [Summer 1979?]).

71. Zabih, Left in Contemporary Iran, pp. 89-96; People's Fedayin Guerrilla Organization, poster entitled "Mujahedin-i Khalq's Warning to the PFGO about the Situation in Turkman Sahra" (n.p.: PFGO, April 9, 1979).

72. Mojaheh Mas'ud Rajavi, Platform of the Provisional Government of the Democratic Islamic Republic of Iran (Long Beach, CA: Moslem Students' Society, 1981); Contemporary Crisis and Projection, p. 41; and Zabih, Left in Contemporary Iran, pp. 89-96.


74. Anti-Iranian Activities, esp. p. 4; and interviews with former confederation members.

75. Anti-Iranian Activities, pp. 42, 49; Abrahmanian, Iran, p. 464.


77. For events in Amul, see Zabih, Left in Contemporary Iran, pp. 160-176, also interviews with Paykar members who were given accounts of the Amul uprising by surviving Communist League members.


81. Ibid., p. 23.

82. Ibid., pp. 189-190.

83. See ibid., p. 42.

Ch. 11 Notes


2. June 28, 1987, interview with Sanjabi; for the first time, Sanjabi revealed to the author that Bazargan was the author of this famous letter, but did not sign it for fear of reprisals.


4. Ibid., pp. 243-246.


8. Ibid.

9. Ibid.


11. Ibrahim Yazdi, Akarin Talasha dar Akarin Ruzha [The Last Efforts in the Last Days] (Tehran: Galam, 1984); Bazargan, Two Opposite Directions, Abrahmanian, Iran, p. 524.