

The Spirit of Allah

Khomeini and the Islamic Revolution

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*In the name of Allah,
the Merciful,
the Compassionate*

seven, was beginning to be considered almost middle-aged. Most men married between the ages of sixteen and twenty and by the time they had reached forty many were grandfathers. Ruhollah may have been tempted by Qanbar-Ali's offer of a marriage that promised both fortune and influence in Arak. After all, Ruhollah's only asset at the time was his title of a sayyed and the Araki family in question was reputed to be extremely rich. But Ruhollah had another option. During the 'year of terror' he had met a *talabeh* some eight years his junior. Sayyed Rahim Saqafi was the son of a wealthy Tehrani family which boasted as its head Ayatollah Mohammad-Hussein Saqafi, a pious and respected religious leader in south Tehran who complemented his income from donations by the faithful with occasional business transactions in the bazaar. The ayatollah had three marriageable daughters and, despite his being already 'too old' for marriage, Ruhollah could count on Rahim's support in seeking the hand of at least one of them. Another mullah, Mohammad Lavasani, was also related to the Saqafis and, as a friend of Ruhollah, was prepared to help make the match.

By the spring of 1930 Reza Shah's anti-mullah campaign had lost some of its ardour and turbaned heads were reappearing in the streets of Qom and Mashhad. Only Tehran itself remained dangerous to visit. Thus, when Lavasani suggested a holy pilgrimage to Mashhad there were many young mullahs to support him. Ruhollah welcomed the idea as a means of ending, more than a year of virtual imprisonment. By April nearly two dozen mullahs had put their names down for the pilgrimage. Shaikh Abdul-Karim strongly supported the plan but made it clear that he himself would not go. The risk of being arrested on the way and having one's beard shaved off still existed and an eminent religious leader could not take it. Eventually a group of twenty mullahs, led by Lavasani, left Qom for Mashhad early in May. The pilgrims were taking the long desert road that bypassed Tehran. This was to prove an eventful journey. The pilgrims travelled over seemingly endless tracts of desert dotted with tiny oases populated by 'wretches, vaguely resembling human beings'.⁸ But everywhere, the poor of the desert, barely squeezing a life out of the saltlands of the Kavir, did everything they could to make the mullahs feel welcome. The presence of so many mullahs convinced them that Islam was still alive and that the local clergy who had either been taken into the army or had fled to Mesopotamia would soon return. The pilgrims were also able to see how the Pahlavi state

was making its presence felt throughout the country. Gendarmerie posts had been established in many villages and government offices already existed in the larger towns. In Semnan, once a sleepy desert town, the presence of an army garrison had created something of an economic boom and the mullahs were treated with less than respect by the local bazaaris who supported the new regime's policy of profitable progress. The Semnani merchants, at first, even refused to sell fodder for the horses drawing the four carriages that transported the pilgrims. The contrast between the treatment received at the hands of Semnan's merchants and the welcome extended by the poor peasants was to affect Ruhollah profoundly. Many years later, he developed his theory of 'the wretched of the earth' as the saviours of Islam.

It was also in Semnan that Ruhollah came face to face with the reality of the Baha'i faith in Iran. The Baha'is are considered a heretical sect by the mullahs, and could thus be automatically punished by death. For a mullah in those days, coming face to face with a Baha'i was far more dramatic than meeting Satan in person. The mullahs generally assumed that the followers of the detested faith kept their identity a secret. In Semnan, however, Ruhollah and his friends were told of Baha'i farmers, sheep breeders, artisans and shopkeepers who lived and worked openly and even preached their faith, protected by the Shah's gendarmes. Against his better judgement, Ruhollah tried to organize an anti-Baha'i gathering in the town's deserted and almost derelict mosque. But he was persuaded by his friends to leave that for later. It was this incident that earned Ruhollah the nickname of Sharur (Troublemaker) from Lavasani. The nickname was to stick for almost half a century and was dropped only after Ruhollah had become Iran's supreme ruler in 1979.

The caravan of pilgrims ran into further trouble in the Gorgan Plain where small bands of armed Turkomans were roaming the countryside, terrorizing peasants and robbing travellers. The main Tehran-Mashhad route, which passed through Turkoman territory, had been made safe by Reza Shah's army in 1923 after a massacre of tribal warriors. But the lesser roads, one of which was taken by Ruhollah and his companions, were still hazardous. Stopped by a group of Turkoman bandits near Quchan, the pilgrims escaped possible death thanks to the sudden arrival of a detachment of Amnieh (security guards). The Turkomans, being Sunni Muslims, would have been delighted to cut the throats of so many Shi'ite mullahs whom they considered to be the falsifiers of

mentaries on all other suras in the Holy Book. That promise was never fulfilled, however, but the lectures and books served to establish Khomeini's scholarly credentials. An increasing number of people now referred to him directly for answers to their religious queries. He would respond to each query in writing, taking care to have two copies made of each response and signing and sealing each copy. One copy would be handed over to the questioner and the other would be kept by Khomeini himself. A collection of these questions and answers was published years later under the title of *Towzih al-Masayel (Explication of Problems)*. Publishing such an oeuvre is essential for those who claim the title of ayatollah (the sign of Allah).

Khomeini's third objective, that of expanding his financial resources, was achieved by a number of deals, including the sale of land to the government for the construction of a sugar refinery near Qom. The refinery was never built but the Khomeini family was none the worse for that. Morteza was by now fully established in Qom as a notary public and engaged in a number of business activities both on his own account and in partnership with his two brothers. Khomeini himself preferred investment in agricultural land and, as food prices rose, largely due to inflation in the late 1950s, he was proved right. By 1960 perhaps as many as 3000 families worked on the land belonging to Khomeini and his brothers. Khomeini was a generous, just landowner, popular with the sharecroppers who worked for him. He continued to live modestly and spent most of his extra income on stipends for more *talabehs*, especially from the villages. To him money remained nothing but a means. Although his parsimony was proverbial he did not wish to amass a fortune. All he was interested in was to have more and more pupils. And in the Shi'ite system of education it is the teacher who must pay the pupils and not the other way round. Thus the wealthier a mullah the better his chances of attracting a larger number of *talabehs*. And when it comes to recognizing a qualified mullah as an ayatollah, the number of students is a key factor. Having more money means that one can take on more students. And having more students means that one is more important as an ayatollah and therefore deserves greater financial support through the system of *khums* and voluntary donations. Even in the Shi'ite theological system, money brings in still more money.

By 1955 Khomeini had his own circle of disciples which, apart from Motahari, included such future prominent leaders of the

Islamic Revolution as Hussein-Ali Montazeri, Mohammad-Javad Bahonar, Shaikh Ali Tehrani and Shaikh Sadeq Khalkhali. Trying to build himself up as a religious leader with nationwide support, Khomeini also had 'representatives' in a number of cities. In Tabriz he had Ghazi Tabataba'i, while Shaikh Mahmoud Saduqi represented him in Yazd. In Tehran he had a special arrangement with the fiery preacher Shaikh Mohammad-Taqi Falsafi for mutual support. One man who was especially close to Khomeini in those days in Qom was Mohammad-Hussein Beheshti who was to emerge as 'strong man' after the Islamic Revolution until his murder by a terrorist group in 1981. Beheshti, although a mullah, was an employee of the Ministry of Education and had been sent to Qom as a teacher of English at a local secondary school. He spent almost all his free time either attending Khomeini's lectures or seeking to benefit from his knowledge at more restricted sessions. Handsome and wilful as he was, the charismatic Beheshti was both admired and feared by Khomeini. At one point Beheshti tried to teach Khomeini English. In those days there was much talk about the need for the mullahs to learn foreign languages so that they could gain first-hand knowledge of a world shaped by 'Cross-Worshippers'. The success of Ayatollah Shahabeddin Husseinimara'ashi-Najafi in learning French and thus being able to quote Descartes and Renan in routine conversations was the envy of more than one mullah. Shaikh Mohammad-Taqi Qomi, himself a notable mullah, had advanced the idea that learning at least one Western language should be mandatory for those seeking a place in the Shi'ite hierarchy. Beheshti offered Khomeini Longman's 'Essential English' series of textbooks but was apparently unsuccessful in organizing a regular course of study.⁸

Early in 1955 Khomeini had an important visitor from Tehran. This was Shaikh Mahmoud Halabi, an enigmatic mullah who had stayed on the sidelines during the stormy years of occupation and oil nationalization. Halabi had a single objective: to seek out and destroy members of the Baha'i faith. The Baha'is, representing less than 1 per cent of the population, had been able, largely thanks to education and hard work but also because of favouritism, to achieve economic power and social influence far beyond their numerical strength. They saw their faith as an independent, autonomous religion. To the mullahs, however, they were *mortad* (heretics) and thus had to be put to death. Halabi's scenario was simple: a national register of Baha'is would be compiled, enabling the mullahs to contact each follower of the faith and try to bring

him back onto the right path; if they failed, the Baha'is in question would be put on a black list and boycotted by the Muslims. In some cases, the adamant Baha'is would be put to death. Halabi had discussed his project with Major General Teymour Bakhtiar, then head of SAVAK, as well as Lieutenant General Batmanqelich, the Army Chief of Staff. Both endorsed his idea in exchange for a promise of support from the mullahs in the continuing campaign against the Left. The two generals charged Halabi with the task of convincing the mullahs of Qom that the Shah was not only far from his father's dreams of reviving aspects of Zoroastrianism but that he was prepared to allow the gradual liquidation of the country's largest religious minority after the Christians.

Halabi was politely received in Qom but was given no promises of support. Borujerdi contented himself with repeating the Qur'anic formula of 'May Allah lead all onto the Right Path'. Other ayatollahs such as Husseini-Mara'ashi-Najafi and Mohammad Ruhani even advised against the witchhunt, arguing that to accept the embrace of Islam was a blessing and should not be forced on anyone. All that was needed was 'better education' and a more forceful propagation of the tenets of the Mohammedan faith. Only Khomeini proved sympathetic to Halabi's enterprise and promised his full support. He could not forgive the Shah for the execution of Nawab and other members of the Fedayeen of Islam, including Emami who had received the royal pardon. But if the Shah now wanted to do something 'proper' by endorsing the destruction of the Baha'is, there was no reason why the clergy should not benefit from the opportunity. Falsafi, Khomeini's ally in Tehran, led the onslaught with an incendiary sermon at a mosque. The sermon, indirectly calling for the murder of thousands of citizens solely on the grounds of their faith, was broadcast by Tehran Radio. The following day a hired mob, armed with picks and shovels as well as more sophisticated demolition equipment, attacked and occupied the Hazirat al-Qods, the Baha'is' cathedral in Tehran. Having partly destroyed the Hazirat, smashing many ikons in the process, the mob then invited the faithful to come into the precinct to celebrate this latest conquest of Islam. A last-minute change of mind by the Shah, and Borujerdi's resolute opposition to the campaign, prevented widespread bloodshed. The two generals and their allies among the mullahs had to beat a retreat. It was during this episode that Khomeini and General Bakhtiar developed something of an affection for each other.

As the 1950s drew to a close Khomeini was already established as an ayatollah. During the turbulent days of 1978-79 the legend was put out by some of the Shah's supporters that Khomeini had been 'declared' an ayatollah by the leading mullahs of Qom only in 1964 and thus saved from the gallows. The truth, however, was that Khomeini was commonly included among the top twelve ayatollahs of the day as early as 1958. He belonged to a group that could be described as the second division of ayatollahs and thus was already in line for promotion to the first division which consisted of three Grand Ayatollahs with Borujerdi presiding over all. Endorsement by the royal court in general and the Shah in particular was an important means of reaching the first division. The fact that the Shah sent cables to Borujerdi on all major religious occasions was important for the Grand Ayatollah's position. By 1960 Borujerdi was already ailing and the succession seemed open. Khomeini knew that he needed the Shah's support in securing for himself the mantle of Grand Ayatollah. He also knew that the Shah did not like him and began to take steps to remedy that. He all but stopped his frequent attacks on the Shah's father and his policies. This did not mean that he genuinely changed his mind about Reza Shah and his record. All he was doing was making use of the dictum 'the end justifies the means', which in Shi'ite theology is more than a mere motto and can at times be taken as a principle of faith. Once convinced of the rightness of your objective, you are allowed to use practically any means, including murder, to obtain it. It was, perhaps, in this vein that Khomeini composed a series of lengthy and often flattering letters to the Shah in which the young monarch was given unsolicited advice on affairs of state, peppered with clever doses of sycophancy bolstering the addressee's ego without unduly compromising the writer. The ayatollah always dispatched his letters to the monarch through carefully chosen emissaries. One such emissary was Sayyed Mehdi Ruhani, then a young mullah. Ruhani was asked by Khomeini in the winter of 1960 to take a 'written message' to the Shah. He asked Shahabeddin Eshraqi, Khomeini's first son-in-law and by then one of his close confidants, what the letter was about.

'Nothing, my friend, nothing much,' Eshraqi replied. 'His holiness wants to attract the Shah's friendship.'

Khomeini was learning that his reputation as a radical could damage his chances of one day succeeding Borujerdi. In 1955 he had endorsed the anti-Baha'is campaign when Borujerdi had

remained aloof. In 1957 Borujerdi had refused to call on the faithful to boycott the newly introduced Pepsi Cola on the grounds that its franchise holder was a Baha'i who sent part of his income to Israel. Khomeini, however, declared Pepsi Cola to be *haram*, warning those who insisted on quenching their thirst with the US-patented beverage that they would all roast in the fires of hell. The only practical result of Khomeini's move was to breach Pepsi Cola's monopoly of the beverages market in Iran. The breach was quickly occupied by Coca-Cola which, benefiting from the tacit approval of Qom, managed to capture part of the market. Pepsi supporters unjustly claimed that the whole issue of seeking religious approval for that type of beverage had been stirred up by the local agents of Coca-Cola who had not spotted the country's potential earlier.

Borujerdi's death in 1962 came at a time when Khomeini had not yet completed his plans for making a bid for the mantle of the Grand Ayatollah. He was still looked upon as something of a lone wolf. Theologically speaking he ranked below a number of others, including Grand Ayatollah Mohsen Hakim Tabataba'i, who lived in Najaf, Grand Ayatollah Ahmad Mussavi-Khonsari, who was resident in Tehran, and Grand Ayatollah Abol-Qassem Mussavi-Kho'i, who also lived in Najaf. As a Shi'ite scholar he belonged to a group that included such eminent teachers as Ayatollah Hadi Milani (in Mashhad) and Ayatollahs Shahabeddin Husseini-Mara'ashi-Najafi, Mohammad-Reza Mussavi-Golpayegani and Mohammad-Kazem Shariatmadari, who all lived and taught in Qom. Compared to them Khomeini had not handled the development of his theological career with adequate care. His flirtations with politics, his association with the Fedayeen of Islam and his love of poetry earned him the reputation of an eccentric. He also suffered from the fact that for years he had mixed mysticism and regular theology in his lectures, which were often delivered in a language deliberately designed to impress by its affected complexity. Was he a Sufi or was he a narrow-minded fundamentalist, people asked themselves without finding a satisfactory answer. Another problem was that Khomeini had earned the reputation of a miser in a society where leaders, whether religious or political, are expected to spend as much money as they can. Khomeini paid his pupils exactly the same stipend that Borujerdi offered. He also gave his sharecroppers a fair part of each year's harvest. But beyond that he loathed spending money as freely as other ayatollahs. He gave almost no receptions at a time when every ayatollah's house was full of all and sundry dropping in for a good

meal or at least a cup of tea. He did not believe in offering gifts and marking special occasions with presents to friends and acquaintances. As campaign manager for Borujerdi only a decade earlier, he had made effective use of money to establish the supremacy of his candidate. But now that his own turn seemed to have come, he adopted a puritanical attitude. No one deserved to receive any money or other material rewards beyond that earned by his work. And that meant ignoring an important fact of life in poverty-stricken societies like Iran where one of the main functions of any leader is to distribute income and favours.

Once Borujerdi's death was announced, the Shah, in his constitutional capacity as Protector of the Shi'ite Faith, sent a number of cables expressing his feelings of bereavement. The longest cable was sent to Grand Ayatollah Moshen Hakim Tabataba'i and was, because of its length, instantly interpreted as the Shah's recognition of the recipient's theological supremacy. Within a few weeks, Hakim's agents in Iran and Iraq, aided by the Iranian court, had created a network of support for him as the undisputed heir of Borujerdi. A rumour was spread quoting Borujerdi as saying, 'Follow anyone you like, anyone except Khomeini. For following Khomeini shall lead you knee-deep in blood' [sic].⁹

Khomeini received no cable from the Shah and instantly interpreted this as a deliberate insult by the monarch. By then the Shah must have forgotten Khomeini's very existence and the fact that he was excluded from the list of those receiving standard condolences from the sovereign could have been due to a bureaucratic oversight. To Khomeini, however, this appeared a declaration of war. He told his confidants that it was a sign from Allah himself that the Shah had not sent him a cable. 'From now on it is we who have to defend the faith,' he boasted. While all other ayatollahs organized special mourning ceremonies to mark the third, the seventh and the fortieth day of Borujerdi's demise, Khomeini stayed at home and warmed himself under the *korsi*, a low table set over a brazier and covered with a thick eiderdown. He was practising the tactic of withdrawal; he wanted to be the only one who was absent from all those ceremonies and, therefore, the only one who retained his 'purity'. To a visitor who called on him and inquired why he was not organizing a memorial service for the Grand Ayatollah, Khomeini said, 'Things that can be done by others better be left to others.' When asked whether this meant that he was withdrawing from the race, he replied, 'Not at all. I am just waiting. Our turn will come when it will come.'¹⁰

ning to be coopted into the regime or who had already surrendered to despair. Islam, he concluded, had to find a new audience in a society that was being rapidly conquered by Western values and ideas. The intellectuals, even when they professed loyalty to Islam, were incapable of ordering their own lives in accordance with the strict rules of the Muhammedan faith. At best, Islam could become their ideology but never their life; at worst, they succumbed to the infectious charm of Western atheism which offered the illusion of boundless liberty. But where could he find his new defenders of Islam? Among the poor and illiterate peasants? Among industrial workers? Finding an answer to these questions was to take him another decade and a half. Of more immediate concern was the need to make a show of force. Having declared war on the regime, he could not simply sit back and watch as nothing happened. He had rejected the advice of those who would have been content with a government inquiry into the violent episode at Faizieh. He had become a general without many troops, engaged in a war in which the adversary did not even acknowledge his existence.

By now convinced that crying wolf over an alleged plot to destroy Islam would not mobilize many people, Khomeini added two new themes to his campaign. The first was xenophobia. In Iran, as in all the other countries of the Islamic East, the foreigner means the European or, more recently, the American and is both secretly admired and intensely hated. The notion that the poverty, backwardness and the generally dismal lot of the Muslim masses is mainly, if not entirely, due to the misdeeds of 'foreigners' (*farangi* in Persian and *agnabi* in Arabic) holds tremendous appeal for all sections of society. The rulers find this idea not only attractive but also profitable as it virtually absolves them of any responsibility for the existing state of affairs. They can claim to be doing their best in the service of the people, blaming their inevitable achievement of adverse results on scheming foreigners. The intellectuals also love the idea because it provides justification for their own laziness, their constant yielding to the temptations of money and power and, above all, their inability to offer a credible explanation for a complex situation. The cry of 'death to the foreigners' is certain to unite a much broader coalition of people in the Islamic East than virtually any other slogan. Even the non-Muslim minorities of the region are prepared to join in the cry because it provides almost the only sentiment they can fully share with their Muhammedan fellow-countrymen. While hatred of the

foreigner offers a promising rallying call for any ambitious politician, it is fully effective only when the additional dimension of hating the Jews is also introduced. Most intellectuals and politicians in the Muslim East are not prepared openly to advocate hatred for the Jews, but this is mainly because they wish to describe themselves in terms borrowed from the West: Liberal, Democrat, Socialist, Social Democrat, Communist, etc. They also know that anti-Semitism is irrevocably associated with Nazism and distasteful to almost every major political movement in the contemporary world.

Khomeini, however, had no such inhibitions. He knew that preaching hate for the Jew and the foreigner would be popular and that was all that mattered to him in those critical days. He could not accept defeat, which would have meant slipping into oblivion. Accordingly, he chose an alleged plot 'by Jews and foreigners who wish to see Islam destroyed' as the main theme of his campaign, which was resumed in May. For stronger effect he also introduced the Baha'is, already considered heretics and thus automatically punishable by death according to him. This time, Khomeini avoided debating the actual reforms. He knew that calling on women to refuse the vote and expecting the peasants not to accept the land offered to them would only isolate him. He now concentrated his attacks on 'the enemies of the Qur'an'. In one speech he claimed that the Israeli Government had printed millions of copies of 'a falsified Qur'an' in a bid to 'destroy our glorious faith'. He also instructed his disciples to ignore the intellectuals and take the message directly to the illiterate masses. His advice was: 'An illiterate [man] can only pervert himself, while an intellectual who lacks moral [faith] can mislead a whole society.'⁸ In a memo to emissaries sent to Tehran and other major cities he wrote: 'Remind the people of the danger posed by Israel and its agents. Recall and explain the catastrophes inflicted upon Islam by the Jews and the Baha'is. Declare your hatred for the traitor government. . . .'⁹ He also asked that his emissaries should make maximum propaganda over the promotion by the government of a number of Jews, Baha'is, Zoroastrians and Christians to positions of responsibility within the civil service and the armed forces. General Assadollah Sani'i, a Baha'i who was to become a Cabinet Minister, was singled out as the first in a line of non-Muslims who would rule Iran in the future.

The new tactic proved far more successful and the Ayatollah's emissaries succeeded in organizing a number of meetings in Qom,

already decided to upstage his own father and become the second Cyrus the Great. Khomeini, for his part, was by then determined to succeed where even the Prophet himself had failed. The clash of two visions became a duel of two men as layer after layer of mutual hatred was deposited in minds extraordinarily bent towards bitterness. The two men and their conflicting visions were to represent two millstones between which any third idea of Iran's place in the world and the destiny of its tragic people would be crushed. From 1963 onwards anyone engaged in political activity in Iran was taking the side either of the Shah or of Khomeini, often without realizing it. People who opposed the Shah as Marxists or liberals were unaware that they were, in effect, strengthening the Khomeini camp. And democrats, atheists and socialists who advocated secularization while rejecting the Shah's dictatorship ended up endorsing him against the Ayatollah. Iran, the birthplace of Manicheanism, had, in closing the parenthesis created by the Constitutional Revolution of 1906, returned to its traditional 'either-or' style of ordering its political life.

The Ayatollah had tested some of his themes in practice, sounding out public opinion. He had discovered that xenophobia and anti-Semitism were powerful themes. The Shah could not use either since he was closely allied to the Americans on the one hand and was making increasing use of Israeli experts in agriculture and military training on the other. Furthermore, the Shah wished Iranians to copy the West as much as possible, provided, of course, that this did not extend to the realm of politics. Large sections of Iranian society, while tempted by the prospect of an improved material life, were scared of social and economic changes they had neither chosen nor helped to shape. It was among them that the Ayatollah would recruit his future volunteers for martyrdom. At the other end of the spectrum, there were many Iranians who, while genuinely attached to Islam, were frightened by visions of government by the mullahs in which life would be austere and dull if not downright cruel. In the 1960s the Shah could mobilize part of that opinion and this, combined with control of the armed forces and the bureaucratic apparatus, proved sufficient to isolate Khomeini and his supporters.

Throughout most of 1964 Ayatollah Khomeini played what amounted to a waiting game. He resumed his discourses at Faizieh and continued to receive a stream of militants from all over the country. Frequently, he spoke against the government and expressed concern about what he termed 'Israeli and Baha'i plots'

to destroy Islam. But he was careful to modulate his attacks so as to avoid fever pitch. He dispatched trusted emissaries to various cities to recruit new supporters and raise additional funds. In Tabriz he had a powerful ally in the person of Ayatollah Ghazi Tabataba'i. In Yazd it was Ayatollah Mahmoud Saduqi, himself a former pupil of Khomeini's master, Shaikh Abdul-Karim, who represented the cause. More importantly, Khomeini ordered two of his closest aides, Morteza Motahari and Mohammad-Hussein Beheshti, to revive the secret cells of the Fedayeen of Islam. The two created the first cell in Tehran in August 1964 but dropped the name Fedayeen in favour of the more complicated *hayat-e-motalefeh-e-eslami* or the Coalescing Islamic Mission. The Mission, soon to be known in the clandestine movement only as the *hayat*, was to emerge as a vital link in the small but growing organization. The *hayat* brought together both propagandist and agitator. Khomeini would set the movement's general goals at any given time and a clandestine council, consisting of twelve trusted disciples, would translate these into concrete policies and communicate them to the *hayat*, which would then take charge of the implementation with the help of devoted militants.

Getting admitted into a *hayat* required passing a number of tests aimed at determining a candidate's loyalty, dedication and readiness to kill and die for the cause. The *hayats* had as members not only mullahs and *talabehs* but also bazaaris, shopkeepers, university students and teachers. Each *hayat* had a maximum of twelve members, the number twelve being considered sacred because of the twelve Imams, and acted autonomously. *Hayat* members did not meet at set intervals but would gather together at short notice. They were sure to meet on religious occasions, which are quite frequent in the Shi'ite calendar. The *hayat*, while an innovation, fitted well into traditional Iranian society. It acted like a traditional *dowreh* or circle, a structure loose enough to cut across class barriers and, at the same time, exclusive enough to foster intense loyalty. Members of the *hayats* were instructed to secure the leadership of as many religious organizations as possible. This proved a long and difficult process but, over the years, ensured the Ayatollah's domination of almost the entire religious apparatus in the country. That control enabled him to divide Iran into two parallel societies: the official one, headed by the Shah and supported by the army, the bureaucracy and parts of the middle and working classes; and the unofficial, the leadership of which passed to Khomeini from 1978 onwards.

Moral Rearmament and advocated a twenty-three-point manifesto which included a number of interesting stipulations such as 'combating narcotic drugs', 'fasting at least one day a week', 'showing kindness to animals', 'refusing to eat tasty meals and juicy fruit' and 'helping human beings under all conditions'. Another point on the group's list of resolutions demanded that every member should be 'submitted to torture one evening each week'. This was justified on the grounds that Abazar activists should prepare themselves for facing SAVAK and its torturers. The group's militants, who proved remarkably successful in escaping detection by SAVAK, carried out a number of 'Islamic operations' between 1970 and 1977, including setting fire to cinemas, restaurants, shops selling alcohol and some bank branches. They also organized an unsuccessful raid on the police headquarters in Kermanshah with the aim of stealing weapons. In addition, members of the group were responsible for a series of assassinations of a variety of people condemned as 'enemies of Islam'. Among the victims were notorious village usurers, gendarmes and schoolteachers found drinking vodka. SAVAK managed to identify and capture six members of the group. All were executed by firing squad in 1973. Among the group's founders and leaders were Bahman Monshat, Valiollah Sayf and Hojatollah Abdoli.

At least two other groups could be counted on by Motahari to provide the coming movement with coercive power when and if necessary. These were the Fajr-e-Enqelaab (Dawn of Revolution) organization and the Mahdavioun Society. The first group, known as Fajr (Dawn), had been founded by a number of students in Mashhad originally as a means of fighting the Baha'i faith, but it had quickly developed into an active paramilitary organization capable of carrying out assassinations and sabotage missions. Soon the group could boast a number of branches in Tabriz, Ahvaz and Qom. During the 1970s it was responsible for a bomb attack on a brewery near Mashhad as well as the burning of Qom's only cinema. This latter incident has entered the history of the Islamic movement as a major event. The opening of a cinema in Qom had been described by Khomeini as 'the greatest insult suffered by Islam in living memory'¹⁴ and years of effort by Grand Ayatollahs had failed to secure its closure. What was more disturbing was that the cinema seemed to be doing excellent business, drawing a large number of believers away from the holy shrine and the mosques. In 1972 the screening of the American extravaganza *The Robe* was interpreted as the first step towards 'spreading the worship of the

Cross to the realm of Islam'.¹⁵ The cinema had to burn, and burn it did, thanks to a commando led by Mohammad-Reza Fatemi who was later to be killed in a gun battle with SAVAK agents. The Fajr group claimed credit for the operation which was hailed in the holy city as 'a sign of divine favour to Islam'.¹⁶ The cinema's frustrated owner, having suffered losses thanks to previous smaller attacks, agreed to sell his land at a giveaway price to Grand Ayatollah Mara'ashi-Najafi, who instantly ordered the construction of a theological school on the site, bearing his own name.

The Mahdavioun Society started as a circle of friends devoted to the study of the Qur'an, but it soon developed into a paramilitary organization offering its members training in the use of light arms, homemade bombs and plastic explosive devices. Led by Ali-Akbar Nabavi-Nuri and an enigmatic character known only as Mahdi (Guide), the group, which began in Tehran, was by 1977 boasting branches in more than a dozen provincial centres. Members of the group were involved in a number of gun battles with SAVAK agents but had nevertheless managed to keep most of their strength intact.

All these and many other smaller groups were directly loyal to Khomeini and could be counted on to fight for him when given the necessary signal. Some, like the Hadafi group in Qohdarijan, near Isfahan, were village terror gangs, while others, like Ghad Islam (Islamic Rendezvous), led by Mir-Hussein Mussavi, who was to become Prime Minister in the Islamic republic, were little more than semi-secret debating societies.

During the fourteen years following Khomeini's exile hundreds of mullahs had been imprisoned for speaking in his support; dozens had died in prison in suspicious circumstances, some under torture, and thousands had been pressganged into the army. Hundreds more were in exile, while scores were forbidden to mount the pulpit and address religious gatherings. Many mullahs were periodically subjected to attacks on their homes and to brief periods of detention during which they had their beards shaved off. Thus, Khomeini, by appearing first and foremost as a defender of the rights of the clergy, could expect much sympathy among the mullahs.

At least one more important religious organization could be counted upon to support the movement in its purported aim of making Shi'ism the basis of Iranian life once again. That organization was the Hojatieh Society. The Hojatieh had been founded in 1954 by the Tehrani mullah, Shaikh Mahmoud Halabi, who

had known Khomeini in the 1920s in Qom. Halabi considered the Baha'is to be the most immediately important enemies of Islam in Iran and dedicated himself to the elimination of what he considered to be 'a lethal heresy'. Promising SAVAK full cooperation in fighting 'other heathen forces, including the Communists', Halabi enjoyed what amounted to *carte blanche* from the authorities to recruit militants for his organization and to raise funds in the bazaar. By 1977 Halabi boasted an organization of more than 12,000 members throughout the country. Most members were part-time volunteers and their task consisted of keeping an up-to-date list of Baha'is in their neighbourhood and trying to reconvert as many of them as possible. Halabi did not like Khomeini personally but could be counted on for support in any fight against a government which allowed the Baha'is ample scope for social advancement and economic profit.¹⁷

SAVAK could not have had any serious appreciation of the strength of the religious opposition. But an assertion that Motahari was even then able to field as many as six hundred highly trained guerrillas and determined would-be assassins would have surprised the secret police. These militants were to provide the hard core of the Tehran crowds which became the hallmark of the Islamic Revolution. They would protect the crowd against police attack and Left-wing infiltration, while using the crowd as a shield behind which to keep their own identities hidden as long as possible.

Motahari, however, decided to begin at the beginning, keeping his trained military cadres in reserve. He began by alerting the open religious network of support that he could command on behalf of the exiled leader. In 1977 Iran was estimated to have around 85,000 mullahs and *talabehs*.¹⁸ Many of them received stipends and indirect financial support from various government agencies. Some 20,000 of them were teachers, employed by the Ministry of Education. Motahari himself was one such ministry employee along with Beheshti and Bahonar, who wrote religious textbooks for the government. Some 1200 mullahs were considered to be of higher rank and used the title either of ayatollah or of Hojat al-Islam. An ayatollah is a Hojat al-Islam distinguished enough to run an independent seminary of his own. Almost all *talabehs* were attached to one or more of the ayatollahs and received stipends from them. Motahari knew that the vast majority of the mullahs consisted of poor, semiliterate rural preachers who were too hungry, too frightened and too ignorant of

the world to play an active political role. All that was needed was to secure the support of a few hundred leading mullahs in Tehran and the provinces to be able to mobilize every turbaned head in the country. The meeting at Motahari's home chose as its first task the preparation of a list of mullahs who would support Khomeini's claim to exercise power in the name of Allah without any reservation. The list as it finally emerged contained no more than seventy-five names. Many of them did not command much public support at the time. A few, however, were already established as major sources of power and influence in their own towns. Among them was Ayatollah Mohammad-Ali Qazi-Tabataba'i, who had secured a following for himself in Tabriz, especially among university students disillusioned with the many different brands of Marxism. Another key figure included in the list was Ayatollah Mahmoud Saduqi, who dominated the religious scene in Yazd. A third major name on the list belonged to Ayatollah Mahmoud Salehi of Kerman. Some of the senior leaders of the movement were in prison at the time, notably Ayatollah Hussein-Ali Montazeri, who was to emerge as Khomeini's heir presumptive after the revolution.

Motahari and his colleagues knew that almost all of traditional Iran had been abandoned by the Shah's regime over the preceding decade of modernization. The bazaars, important commercial and social institutions in every city of any size, had their own organizations in the form of guilds, fraternities, trade associations and informal *dowrehs* or 'circles of friends'. They were connected with a string of associations representing people of the same provincial origin in the capital and other major cities. The Association of Azerbaijanis in Tehran, for example, boasted a membership of over 5000 and could mobilize more than 100,000 on special religious occasions.

There were numerous other traditional organizations which, believing they were either ignored or duplicated by regime-sponsored bodies, felt threatened, and were as a result hostile to the government. These included the Zur-Khaneh (House of Force) where hundreds of men, aged between sixteen and sixty, followed special body-building courses and trained as traditional wrestlers. There were also the so-called 'interest-free' loan funds which provided many banking services and, benefiting from the country's economic boom, mobilized popular savings on a large scale. One such fund, essentially used as a cover for channelling funds to Khomeini's supporters throughout the country, was headed by a

Iran into a Western-style constitutional monarchy in which the Shah would cut ribbons and kiss babies, leaving the real domain of politics to parties, Parliament and the press. The Iranian middle class were badly divided politically; some were liberals, others socialists. But they were all unanimous in wanting the powers of the Shah reduced and a multiparty system installed. For years this middle class had tried a variety of stratagems for imposing the reforms they desired but had failed. To them only the army seemed capable of counterbalancing the monarchy's historical weight in Iranian society.

In some Islamic countries, notably Egypt and Iraq, middle-class intellectuals had succeeded in whetting the appetite of the military for political power by promoting nationalist or socialist ideologies. In both countries the army had toppled the monarchy by staging a coup d'état. In Iran, however, such a scenario would have had little chance of succeeding, as the monarchy itself, in the form it had taken since Reza Shah, symbolized rule by the military. The Shah's opponents had to look for another force with which to topple him, a force large and strong enough to counterbalance that of the army. Some of the middle-class opposition had hoped to provide precisely such a force by organizing a variety of urban and rural guerrilla groups. Between 1970 and 1976 these groups had fought a number of losing battles with the security forces. By the time Khomeini was launching the new phase of his struggle against the Shah it was obvious that the guerrillas, despite their courage and ruthlessness, had slipped into a historical footnote. The question of finding a counterbalancing force against the Shah's army remained unanswered. Right from the start, however, Khomeini thought he had the answer. He was convinced that only huge street crowds could neutralize the Shah's security forces. And the masses, who had to produce the crowds, could not be mobilized in sufficiently large numbers around socialist or nationalist slogans. (The average Iranian would not be prepared to die for the ideals of Lenin or Mao; but he would, given the right circumstances, sacrifice his life in defence of 'the honour of Imam Hussein' and the Muhammedan faith. The language of class struggle, used by almost all the guerrilla groups, frightened the urban bourgeoisie without mobilizing the peasants and the working class. The appeal of the European-style Left did not extend beyond the universities, the secondary schools and certain strata of the lower middle class. None of the major social and economic groupings found their aspirations and interests reflected

in the hotchpotch of proto-Marxian and pseudo-religious ideologies espoused by the guerrilla groups.

Khomeini's instructions to Motahari made this abundantly clear – the movement was to act exclusively in the name of Islam. It also included the basic elements of a coherent strategy. The first step was to destroy the regime's legitimacy. This was to be achieved by a persistent and savage campaign of character assassination, rumours and the exposure of the regime's links with the Zionists, the 'Cross-Worshippers', the Baha'is and other 'enemies of Islam'. There was to be no discussion of the Shah's policies as such and it was to be argued that the Shah, regardless of what he did or said, had been 'excluded' from the Islamic community and should be put to death. Hahsemi-Rafsanjani, in one of his earliest 'guidelines' to militants, put it this way: 'Today, saying "Allah is the Greatest" without immediately adding "Death to the Shah" can only mean that we only half believe in Islam.'²⁰ He added, 'The Shah must die so that Islam can resume life, after centuries of slow death.'²¹ The powerful traditional rumour mills of the mosque and the bazaar were set to work to attribute to the Shah every sin in the book. The monarch was accused of plundering the nation's wealth, being a heroin addict and, at the same time, an indefatigable womanizer. It was rumoured that the Shah had secretly converted to Judaism, Zoroastrianism or Mithraism. The conversion of Princess Shams, the Shah's elder sister, to Catholicism, which was true, was seized upon as an example of the Pahlavi family's disregard for Islam. 'Your Shah is a Jew,' screamed one of the early leaflets, probably written by Ayatollah Beheshti. 'He is a Jew just like his sister has been a Cross-Worshipper for years.' In addition, the Shah was in turn accused of homosexuality, feeble-mindedness, impotence and sadomasochistic habits.

The Shah's close collaborators were not spared either and within a few months were turned into hated caricatures who deserved to be put to death. The regime, content with its hold over the Western-style media, radio, television and the press, totally ignored the tremendous power of traditional media such as the pulpit, the bazaar teahouses and, above all, the nationwide network of rumours. The Islamic East's love of rumour cannot be overemphasized; it is virtually impossible for the community as a whole to accept a straight account of events as such. In almost every case fiction is preferred to fact. Money and sex were the two key elements in almost all the rumours. The message was that the Shah, his family and a tiny group of officials – who were all

Baha'is, Jews or atheists – were spending their time amassing huge fortunes and fornicating, while the mass of deserving believers had to struggle with the problems of everyday life. Within a few months the appellations *Shah-e-Emrika'i* (the American Shah) and *Shah-e-Esraili* (the Israeli Shah) were on many lips throughout the country. The leaders of the movement justified the use of such dirty tactics against their hated enemy by reference to the celebrated maxim that 'the end justifies the means' which, in its Shi'ite version, reads 'All means are justified in the service of Allah.'²²

Motahari believed that destroying the regime's image and persuading a sufficiently large number of people that the Shah was an illegitimate ruler would require 'at least a year or two of hard work'.²³ In the event, however, the objective was achieved much more quickly as the Shah failed to counterattack while also preventing his supporters from reorganizing themselves in his defence. For months on end people were to hear abuse and invective aimed at the Shah, who remained silent or only spoke in apologetic terms that reinforced the claims of his adversaries.)

(Next to establishing the regime's lack of legitimacy on religious as well as moral and political grounds, Khomeini aimed at creating alternative sources of authority.) Reviving his theory of 'opting out', he called on the faithful to reduce their contact with the established order to a minimum. The faithful were to withdraw their money from the 'satanic' banks, refuse to pay taxes or electricity and water bills, refuse conscription and not defer to the courts of justice. Government employees were ordered to create 'Islamic' committees that duplicated the formal managerial structure of each Ministry. The tactic was slow to start but once it had gained momentum it proved lethal to the regime. Ministers, under-secretaries, directors-general and other high-ranking officials were quickly turned into mere actors each playing a part. They lacked all authority, unless, as was increasingly the case from the middle of 1978 onwards, they contacted the 'Islamic' committee and swore loyalty to the Ayatollah.

(The third point put forward by Khomeini in his strategy was to neutralize or, if possible, to win over the regime's coercive forces. As we have already noted, the Ayatollah could field several hundred fighting men and women trained in Lebanon, Libya, South Yemen and, from the middle of 1978, Iran itself. These militants, when using large crowds as shields, became far more effective than their actual numerical strength would allow. But the

Ayatollah knew that his army of street fighters would be no match for the Shah's well-trained and highly disciplined armed forces. (Thus a vast campaign of hearts and minds directed against regular army troops, members of the police force and even SAVAK personnel was launched. The campaign had only limited success so far as the actual number of recruits to the Ayatollah's camp was concerned.) But it nevertheless hurt the regime by casting doubt on the loyalty of the forces at its disposal. And once the revolutionary movement began to gain momentum the remnants of the Leftist guerrilla groups joined forces with it and gave it additional strength in facing the Shah's forces. The most important of these groups was, without a doubt, the Mujahedeen-e-Khalq-e-Iran (the People's Combatants of Iran), which was based on an ideological marriage between Shi'ism and socialism. The group, followers of the writer Ali Shariati, at first advocated Shi'ism without the mullahs. But by the summer of 1978 the Khomeinist movement was so strong that they had to join forces with it, acknowledging the Ayatollah's supreme leadership. The fact that almost all the principal leaders of the Mujahedeen were in prison at the time made it difficult for the badly battered organization to force Khomeini into any concessions as the price of this additional support. The Marxist-Leninist Fedayeen of the People organization also went the same way, being sucked into the ever growing movement of the mullahs. The pro-Moscow Tudeh Party, having just revived its organization inside Iran, was the last to join the Ayatollah's movement. But Tudeh, when it finally acknowledged Khomeini's position as 'supreme leader', was able to provide invaluable service thanks to its expertise in psychological warfare, sabotage and the organization of industrial strikes.

(The fourth and final point in the Ayatollah's strategy was based on the assumption that the Shah's regime would not be overthrown unless a credible and more or less acceptable alternative to it emerged.) Such an alternative, Khomeini realized, had to reassure the middle class, who were sure to be frightened by the prospect of living in a strictly Islamic society, as well as the outside world, which was worried about its vital interests in Iran and the Persian Gulf region as a whole. The Ayatollah was to leave this last point aside until the final stages of his revolution. All he did was order one of his pupils, Jaleddin Farsi, of Afghan origin, to prepare a new edition of *Islamic Government* for publication in Iran. Azra Bani-Sadr, the wife of Abol-Hassan Bani-Sadr, a student of economics in Paris and a long-time supporter of Khomeini, pre-

numbers of conscripts, NCOs and junior officers joined the various guerrilla groups and turned them into an even more formidable force.

On 11 February, the Chief of Staff, General Gharabaghi, tried to convene one final meeting of the high command and, when this failed to materialize, announced the army's 'neutrality'. The announcement served as a signal for an armed insurrection in Tehran. The Immortals, the only unit still loyal to the Shah's regime, was dispatched by its commander, General Ali Neshat, who had failed to make a deal with the mullahs, to 'punish' air force cadets who had dared salute Khomeini instead of the Shah. While the Immortals were fighting the air force cadets, helped by the technical personnel and some NCOs, the Marxist-Leninist Fedayeen guerrillas arrived on the scene, and what was to be the only real battle of the revolution was fought. The Immortals won the battle but lost the empire. Before the sun had set the Shah's last Prime Minister was in hiding and most of his generals were either shot on the spot by guerrillas or arrested. A nationwide search for Bakhtiar proved fruitless as the former Premier remained hidden in a safe house provided for him by his old friend and new rival, Bazargan. Bakhtiar was later able to leave Tehran disguised as a French businessman aboard an Air France jet.⁴

On the morning of 12 February the Imam had only his instinct to guide him; no one knew exactly what was happening in the country, or in the capital for that matter. He had the keys of the empire and did not know what to do with them. Every minute a new van arrived loaded with former officials of the regime who were handed over to the Imam's self-styled bodyguards at the door of the Refah School for Girls. Sometimes those bringing in the captives demanded receipts. But in most cases they were content with simply announcing: Here we bring you a four-star general, five three-star generals, a Prime Minister, seven ministers, etc. The captives were glad to be in the hands of Khomeini's men. Those who had been captured by the guerrillas of the Left had been murdered on the spot. Among them was General Ali Badreh'i, commander of the ground forces. In those early days no one expected the mullahs to order summary executions and few people were aware of the existence of Ayatollah Sadeq Khalkhali, who was to win the title of 'Judge Blood' within a few weeks.

For at least the first week of the new regime Tehran was at the mercy of the Leftist guerrillas who, unaware of their real organizational strength and badly divided, were unable to make a direct

attempt at seizing power. Khomeini hugely radicalized his vocabulary and, for the first time, made use of such typically Leninist terms as 'imperialism'. In almost every speech he bitterly attacked the United States, giving the Left the impression that he was on their side in global terms. The Imam was anxious that no one should appear a more radical or more ardent revolutionary than himself. The prevailing mood favoured the most extremist slogans. The Imam also put the emphasis on 'social justice', 'looking after the dispossessed' and 'making fat cats pay'. Without being conversant with the intricacies of class-war politics, the Imam robbed the Left of its vocabulary and slogans. The middle classes were now frightened and did not pose a threat. In any case, Bazargan's presence was sufficient to allay middle-class suspicions and encourage their almost inbuilt talent for self-deception. What mattered now was the support of the small shopkeepers, students, schoolchildren, workers and the lumpenproletariat which could be seduced by the Left.

The Left's demand for instant social justice, symbolized by wholesale nationalization and an almost immediate distribution of land among the peasants, could be accepted verbally and postponed. But the Left also wanted blood, and clamoured for the execution of former officials. While still at Neauphle-le-Château Khomeini had made it clear that he would put a number of former officials on trial. Motahari had been given to understand that the Imam had had only the SAVAK 'torture masters' and at most thirty high-ranking politicians in mind. The trials, Motahari naively thought, would be principally aimed at fully establishing the legitimacy of the revolution. There was no reason to believe that Khomeini himself had thought of any exact figure for the envisaged executions. Bazargan, in any case, wanted none and was even toying with the idea of announcing the abolition of the death sentence.⁵

By the third week of February Imam committees, known as *komiteh*, had sprung up everywhere in the capital and proceeded with the arrest of former officials and local rich people. Khomeini was deeply disturbed by the class character that his revolution was beginning to assume. For him the revolution had mainly cultural aims. He wanted to eliminate the Shah and his close supporters because they were 'evil' and 'satanic'. He also wanted to end foreign, non-Muslim influence in Iran so as to foil what he considered to be 'a Jewish plot to destroy Islam'. He further wanted to eliminate the Baha'i 'heretics'. He believed that the clergy should

Bazargan and his ministers protested every time an execution was announced, but did little to stem the tide. Ahmad Sadr Haj-Sayyed Javadi, Bazargan's Minister of Justice, expressed regret at Khalkhali's exploits in Kurdistan. He said, 'I was moved when I saw the photo of a twelve-year-old boy who had been executed. I was moved when I saw that even wounded men had been executed by firing squad.'¹⁶ The Minister also related how Khalkhali had refused to commute the death sentence he had passed on a sixteen-year-old boy who continued to plead his innocence. 'Well, my boy,' the Islamic judge told the condemned adolescent, 'if you are truly innocent, as you claim, you shall go to paradise. And if, as I am sure, you are guilty, you will be receiving your just punishment.'¹⁷ Photos of a man who had been executed while receiving treatment in a hospital and with his legs still in plaster, created further revulsion. But the executions consolidated the crucial support given to the Imam by former political prisoners, mullahs seeking to avenge themselves for over half a century of humiliation under the Pahlavis and militants who believed that anyone who had worked under the Shah was, by definition, an enemy and deserved to be put to death. Khomeini had succeeded beyond his most exaggerated expectations in portraying the regime of the Shah as 'satanic' in the eyes of the 'small people' who, having become masters of the land, thirsted for bloody revenge. Domestic servants came out to denounce their former masters and mistresses. Tenants wanted their landlords put to death as SAVAK agents. The Islamic rule under which the testimony of two men, or four women, is sufficient proof of guilt was often used to accuse innocent people of crimes they had never committed. Personal jealousies and rivalries as well as a desire for gain prompted many denunciations. Shopkeepers would drive their competitors out of business by branding them as SAVAK agents, Baha'is, Zionist spies or simply as counter-revolutionaries. Almost any excuse seemed to be good for sending people to the firing squad. Mrs Farrokhru Parsa, a 63-year-old veteran of the women's emancipation movement in Iran and a former Minister of Education, was accused of 'immoral acts' and shot. In Sanandaj a surgeon was shot after he was found 'guilty' of treating wounded anti-Khomeini demonstrators. The former Foreign Minister, Abbas-Ali Khalatbari, a saintly and highly respected man, was executed after being accused of 'having contributed to strengthening the Pahlavi regime'.

In most cases the terms 'corrupter of the earth' and 'warring on

Allah' were deemed sufficient for a death sentence. These terms were not reserved for former officials or ethnic rebels alone. They were also used as justification for the execution of homosexuals, lesbians and people charged with other 'sexual crimes'. Khalkhali organized the execution of half a dozen prostitutes in a south Tehran street where they had practised their profession. A woman accused of adultery was stoned to death in Kerman. Homosexuals were hanged from the trees in Semnan and Najaf-Abad. And in Behshahr an eighteen-year-old pregnant woman was executed by firing squad on a charge of fornication.

The revolution, lacking any serious programme of economic and social reform, tried to maintain its momentum through executions, purges, growing violence against women not wearing the veil, pressure for a total ban on music and dance, and continued attacks on the Shah and his late father. The militants felt they were accomplishing their divine role by raiding people's homes at night in search of musical records and instruments and other 'objects of corruption' such as playing cards, chess sets and backgammon tables. The Imam had no comments on land-ownership, beyond allowing the mullahs to appropriate some 30,000 hectares of land in five provinces. Nor did he have any ideas concerning the control of industry, banks and mineral resources. To him exploitation of man by man was not a result of systems in which small minorities controlled the bulk of the means of production, distribution and exchange. Exploitation was a result of 'satanic' tendencies in certain individuals, who all had to be eliminated. Khomeini's disregard for economic issues contrasted sharply with his strong opinions concerning what he described as 'the essential ethical questions of mankind' in his *Kashf al-Asrar*. He was to propagate his favourite themes in speech after speech made in Qom.

Receiving the directors of Radio Iran in Qom, the Imam urged them to combat music 'with all your might'. 'Music corrupts the minds of our youth,' he declared. 'There is no difference between music and opium. Both create lethargy in different ways. If you want your country to be independent, then ban music. Music is treason to our nation and to our youth.'¹⁸ In a separate meeting with university students the Imam claimed that the introduction of music into Iran had been 'a plot by foreigners' to 'lead our youth astray'.¹⁹ He poured scorn on the Arabian Nights' vision of an Islamic society. His Islam was stern, tough and uncompromising. 'Allah did not create man so that he could have fun,' he told another meeting in Qom. 'The aim of creation was for mankind to

adequate defence. He was dismissed from his position as the sole judge of the anti-narcotics court, a post given to him by Bani-Sadr. Another favourite of the Imam, Hojat al-Islam Ma'adikhah, had to be dismissed as Minister of Islamic Orientation following rumours of scandal linking his name with that of a former TV newscaster. In 1983 the Imam was so angered by the 'loose conduct' of some mullahs in the provinces that he ordered the dismissal of fifty out of 157 prayer leaders throughout the country. He also became bitter about the endless wranglings of the mullahs in the Majlis and the Council of Guardians, which prevented any major piece of legislation from being completed. Addressing the mullahs both in the Majlis and in the Council he warned that he would 'box your ears'. He said: 'Your quarrels [together] are not for Allah. You are quarrelling for your own ends. You cannot fool me by saying that your quarrels are about the interests of Islam. You are fighting for power and I know it. Each of you is saying: more, give me more power. Your quarrels occur because none of you is content to sit on his own carpet and wants to stretch his legs on someone else's carpet as well.'⁵

These remarks reflected only part of the truth and illustrated Khomeini's belief that individuals are motivated to do good or evil not because of their social and economic status and interests or class affiliations but as a result of their success or failure in curbing 'the devil inside' (*Nafs-e-ammara*). The 'quarrels', as the Imam called them, were, however, not over personal ambitions alone. They reflected deep class divisions among the mullahs themselves. Broadly speaking, the mullahs, who had established an almost complete monopoly of political power in Iran from 1982 onwards, were divided in three groups. One group, consisting of well-to-do mullahs, interpreted Islam to mean a set of moral rules that could be observed independently of the society's economic infrastructure. The late Beheshti was a leading figure in that group. His mantle was inherited by Mahdavi-Kani and Hashemi-Rafsanjani who, despite their own differences, support a mixed economy and a gradual improvement in relations with the West. As far as this group is concerned, the revolution has achieved most of its objectives inside Iran and should now devote its attention to the imposition of Islamic rule elsewhere, notably in the Persian Gulf and the Middle East. The veil is back and strict rules of dress are applied for both men and women. Music and most other 'satanic arts' have been suppressed or eliminated. Islam, or at least the version of it presented by Khomeini, has become the dominant

ideology in Iran for the first time in nearly 150 years. Alcohol cannot be obtained legally, while prostitution and pornography have been driven underground. The Baha'is have been forced out of the civil service and are under growing pressure to recant. As far as the economy is concerned, the Qur'anic rule which says 'people have control over their persons and their possessions' is construed to mean respect for private property and free enterprise. To be sure, the government must be on guard against excessive profiteering, usury and other immoral practices. Apart from that, however, *laissez faire* should be the rule. This group, enjoying a majority in the Council of Guardians, has been able to veto a series of proposed bills designed to 'socialize' the economy. These included two separate attempts at legislating for the distribution of agricultural land among the peasants. The mullahs had never promised to give anyone any land, but after the revolution they had to advocate land reform as part of their tactics for divesting the Left of its potentially popular slogans. The peasants, often led by radical mullahs, seized some 850,000 hectares of land – one tenth of the area actually under cultivation. But deeds for only 30,000 hectares had been issued by March 1985 when the High Council of the State, the republic's highest court, ruled that all land seizures during the revolution were illegal. Farmers working 'confiscated' fields were ordered to pay rent to 'legitimate owners' on the basis of 'free consent'. Another important bill that was stopped by the council envisaged the nationalization of all foreign trade. This would have dealt a serious blow to the bazaar, one of the early supporters of the revolution. A third bill designed to replace the labour code which existed under the Shah was also stopped by the group of mullahs in question. The group succeeded in imposing the system of Qissass as the law of the land, declaring all laws passed by Parliament before the revolution to be null and void. The Imam lent his authority to this measure by issuing an edict. In practice, however, the move failed and by 1985 most of the laws passed under the Shah were back in force – including, surprisingly enough, the Family Protection Act which had been denounced by Khomeini himself as 'a law to turn our women into whores'.⁶ The Act makes the taking of a second wife without the consent of the first illegal, in direct contravention of *shari'a* law. A dual legal system was tacitly accepted from 1984 onwards. Thus the same offence could be punished in two entirely different ways. A man found guilty of stealing can have his arm chopped off, by a new electrical machine which was set in operation in January

Notes

Introduction

1. The voice was that of Hojat al-Islam Mahmoud Doa'i who broadcast anti-Shah programmes on Baghdad Radio in the early 1970s.
2. Sadr and his militant sister Bent al-Hoda were shot by Barzan Takriti, the Iraqi security chief. Their murder was followed by the execution of some thousand other mullahs and their relatives, almost all of them related to Khomeini by blood or through marriage.
3. The words of Sa'id Raja'i-Khorassani, the Imam's Permanent Delegate to the United Nations in a debate on Human Rights in January 1985.
4. Meaning former US President Jimmy Carter, the assassinated Egyptian President Anwar Sadat and Israel's former Prime Minister Menachem Begin.

Chapter 1

1. The question was first asked by *Le Monde's* Paul Balta during the trip from Paris to Tehran. The Ayatollah's reply was so surprising that Mansur Taraji, an Iranian journalist also accompanying the Ayatollah on the journey home, asked it again in front of a television camera. Khomeini gave the same reply.

Chapter 2

1. For an exciting account of the Constitutional Revolution, see Ahmad Kasravi's *Tarikh Mashrutiyat (History of the Constitution)*.
2. A series of books on Nuri have appeared since the Islamic Revolution, all of them laudatory. The most balanced one is *Shaiikh Shaheed (The Martyred Shaiikh)* published in Qom in 1984.

Chapter 3

1. In Persian the word does not end in an 'h' and is pronounced 'mol'la'.
2. Khomeini describes the Saudi clergy, for example, as *akhund darbari* (courtesan akhunds) and *wo'as as-salateen* (preachers of the sultans).
3. Morteza Motahari, *Ijtihad*, Qom, 1979.
4. *Shenakht Ijtihad (Knowing Ijtihad)*, a collection of papers, Qom, 1980.
5. This means getting to know the ancestry of the men who relate traditions from the Prophet or the Imams.
6. Khomeini, in *Kashf al-Asrar (Key to the Secrets)*, Qom, 1961.
7. See A. R. Nurizadeh in *Kayhan*, London, 22 February 1985.

8. The term was possibly coined by Imam Shamel in the 1920s and later adopted by anti-Communist Iranian mullahs.
9. *Kashf al-Asrar*, p. 39.

Chapter 4

1. *Kashf al-Asrar*, p. 132.
2. *Tarikh Mobarezat Imam (History of the Imam's Struggles)*, Tehran, 1980, p. 72. (Henceforth, *Tarikh*.)
3. Kuchak Khan was presented as a mullah after the Islamic Revolution and declared to be a 'Hero of Islam'. He was, in fact, a clan leader with a keen taste for vodka and very young women.
4. *Kashf al-Asrar*, p. 69.
5. *Tarikh*, p. 55.
6. *ibid.*, p. 71.
7. *Khianat Pahlavi-ha (The Treason of the Pahlavis)*, Qom, 1980, p. 11.
8. *Gozideh Payam-ha Imam Khomeini (Selection of Imam Khomeini's Messages)*, Tehran, 1979, p. 78. (Henceforth, *Gozideh*.)
9. Khomeini, *Towsih al-Masayel (Explication of Problems)*, Qom, 1962, p. 392. (Henceforth, *Towzih*.)

Chapter 5

1. Mrs Batul Khomeini in an interview with the Beirut magazine *Shater al-Shoara*, April 1980. Also quoted in *Bamdad*, Tehran, 21 November 1979. She also says that her father had already met Ruhollah in Qom.
2. Mrs Farideh Mostafavi, Khomeini's daughter, in an interview with the Tehran magazine *Zan-e-Ruz*, 6 February 1982, vol. 966.
3. Related by Ayatollah Sayyed Mehdi Ruhani in a private interview in Paris in October 1983.
4. *Kashf al-Asra*, p. 71.
5. In a speech in Qom, 4 September 1980.
6. Electricity had come to Qom in the autumn of 1938.
7. Interview with *Iran Post*, London, 8 January 1980.
8. Hamid Ruhani in notes to *Dastami Keh Nagofteh Mand (A Tale That Remained Untold)*, Tehran, 1980.

Chapter 6

1. *Navab va Yaranash (Navab and his Comrades)*, Qom, 1981, p. 24.
2. Mohammad Massoud developed this theme in his editorials in *Mard Emruz (Man of the Day)*. He was assassinated by a Tudeh gunman in 1945.
3. Ayatollah Shaiikh Ali Tehrani quoted in *Erchad*, Paris, November 1984. Tehrani was one of Khomeini's favourite pupils and, later, a close associate. He broke with the Ayatollah and joined the opposition in 1983. Tehrani's wife is a sister of Ali Mussavi-Khameneh'i, the third President of the Islamic Republic. She defected to Iraq in April 1985.
4. Hussein Emami was later executed, together with other members of the Fedayeen of Islam in 1949.
5. *Yadnameh Ayatollah Borujerdi (In Memory of Ayatollah Borujerdi)*, Tehran,

- 1978, p. 14. Ayatollah Ruhani confirms the animosity between Borujerdi and Khomeini. Since the revolution, suggestions for honouring Borujerdi have been vetoed by Khomeini.
6. The theme of the Shah having abandoned Islam became a favourite of Khomeini and was used in countless speeches and leaflets. See *Gozideh*.
 7. Related by Ehsan Naraqi who was, at the time, Kashani's secretary. (In a private interview, Tehran 1978.)
 8. Related by Ali Nayyeri and Abbas Hori who taught in Qom at the same time and knew Beheshti. In separate interviews in Paris (1980) and New York (1982).
 9. Shaikh Ali Tehrani, quoted in *Erchad*, Paris, January 1985.
 10. Ayatollah Ruhani in a private interview.

Chapter 7

1. Fakhreddin Hejazi in a speech in Tehran on 10 February 1983.
2. Nader Naderpour in a private conversation in Paris, January 1982.
3. *ibid.*
4. *Towarikh*, Introduction, p. 19.
5. *Gozideh*, p. 75.
6. Ruhani related the story in a private conversation in Tehran in 1977.
7. *Gozideh*, p. 81.
8. *ibid.*
9. *ibid.*
10. Ali Davani, *Nezhat Ruhaniyat dar Iran (The Clergy's Movement in Iran)*, Tehran, 1980, vol. VI, p. 31. (Henceforth, *Nezhat*.)

Chapter 8

1. The theological term used is *ja'er*, which means 'he who makes people suffer'.
2. *Nezhat*, vol. VI, p. 53.
3. In a speech broadcast by Tehran Radio on 14 February 1979.
4. Tearing the Qur'an is a grave sin, punishable by death in Shi'ite tradition.
5. *Nezhat*, vol. VI, p. 70.
6. *ibid.*, p. 83.
7. *ibid.*, p. 84.
8. The episode was related by Colonel Ali Taqavi, who headed the section of SAVAK at the time, in a private conversation in Los Angeles in April 1981.
9. Private conversation with Shariatmadari in Qom in September 1978. The Grand Ayatollah continued to defend that position at the cost of much suffering to himself and his family.
10. Disagreement between the authorities and the revolutionary mullahs as to the exact number of victims was one of the main features of the psychological war being waged in 1978.
11. Assadollah 'Alam related the episode in a series of interviews in January 1973. These interviews appeared in *Kayhan* in the same month.
12. General Pakravan in private conversation in September 1978.

13. 'Alam in the interviews cited in 11 above.
14. *Nezhat*, vol. VII, p. 57.
15. Pakravan in the conversation cited in 12 above.
16. Pakravan's tragic fate was reported by mutual friends in Tehran.
17. Shariatmadari, quoted in *Nezhat*, vol. VII, p. 92.
18. Grand Ayatollah Tabataba'i-Qomi's declaration in Mashhad in March 1980. Tabataba'i-Qomi continued to oppose all major aspects of Khomeini's policies to 1985.
19. *Zendeqi-Nameh Imam Khomeini*, Tehran, 1980, p. 91.
20. *ibid.*, p. 102.
21. The Shah's speech was delivered on 22 June 1973. But policy aims had been set as early as 1964.
22. *Nezhat*, vol. VII, p. 122.
23. *ibid.*, p. 123.
24. *Gozideh*, p. 70.
25. *ibid.*, p. 71.
26. *ibid.*, p. 72.
27. *ibid.*, p. 74.
28. *Nezhat*, vol. IX, p. 34.
29. Sayyed Ahmad Khomeini in an interview for *Maktab Islam* magazine, Qom, vol. 152. Also briefly quoted in *Bamdad*, 22 November 1979.

Chapter 9

1. *Donyaye Fada'yan Islam (The World of the Fedayeen of Islam)*, Tehran, 1980, pp. 19 and 20.
2. *Ettelaat Hafategi* magazine, Tehran, 22 October 1984.
3. Mrs Mostafavi's interview mentioned in note 2 of chapter 5.
4. See Orion's *U.N. Ambassadeur Extraordinaire*, Paris, 1983.
5. *E'lamieh hay Imam Khomeini (Imam Khomeini's Declarations)*, Tehran, Ministry of Islamic Orientation, 1983, vol. IV, p. 20. (Henceforth, *E'lamieh*.)
6. *ibid.*, p. 22.
7. Amir Abbas Hoveyda related this in private conversation in 1973.
8. Related in private conversation by Shaikh Mohammad Osman Naqshabandi in Paris, October 1983.
9. *E'lamieh*, vol. V, p. 11.
10. Speech by Khomeini broadcast by Tehran Radio on 2 January 1984.
11. The Imam does not know Plato directly and learned about the Greek philosopher's ideas from commentaries by Islamic thinkers of the tenth century.
12. *Hokumat-e-Eslami (Islamic Government)*, Tehran, 1980, p. 11.
13. The Shi'ite theologians are divided on the 'true' meaning of the term. Grand Ayatollah Khonsari, for example, believed that only the mentally or physically handicapped could be described as *mustadh'af*.
14. Details were given in *Bultan Maharamaneh (The Confidential Bulletin)*, January 1970, which was jointly produced by SAVAK and the Ministry of Information and available to about a hundred officials. Copies, however, were often leaked to the press.

15. *ibid.*
16. *ibid.*
17. *E'lamieh*, p. 68. The Ayatollah's 'declaration' was circulated as photocopies in October 1970.
18. *ibid.*
19. Sir Denis related this in a conversation in London in December 1982.
20. Olivier Warin, *Le Lion et le Soleil*, Paris, 1975, p. 60.

Chapter 10

1. Related by Hoveyda in private conversation in October 1978.
2. The new calendar was based on the date of the foundation of the Persian Empire rather than Prophet Muhammed's hegira from Mecca to Medina.

Chapter 11

1. *Tarikh*, p. 145.
2. SAVAK gave several reports on the subject, claiming 'special agents' among the clergy would help the regime. Motahari was considered a 'border-line' case from 1977 onwards.
3. All five quickly disappeared from the scene. Motahari and Beheshti were assassinated. Golzadeh-Ghafouri was forced into house arrest from July 1981 onwards, while Anvari and Mowla'i preferred to retreat into a quiet life of prayer. The last three saw the role of the clergy as one of guidance and supervision and not of exercising political power.
4. Related by Haj Ebrahim Dardashti, who visited Khomeini a few days after Mostafa's death, in conversation in Tehran, 1978.
5. *Nehzat*, vol. X, p. 33.
6. *ibid.*, p. 40.
7. *ibid.*, p. 45.
8. *ibid.*, p. 48.
9. *E'lamieh*, vol. VII, p. 26.
10. Claim made by Attar Pour, a SAVAK functionary, in September 1978 and reported by Mahmoud Ja'afarian in private conversation in the same month.
11. Hezb Melall Eslami (Islamic Nations Party) leaflet published in Qom, October 1980.
12. *ibid.*
13. The insignia consisted of two sickles, one spanner, two machine guns and the sign of Allah in a crescent.
14. *E'lamieh*, vol. VII, p. 57.
15. The declaration was issued on behalf of Mara'ashi-Najafi at about the same time.
16. *Nehzat*, vol. VIII, p. 42.
17. Halabi was later to become a powerful enemy of Khomeini.
18. The estimate was made by the Endowments Office in 1978 and reported by Ali-Naqi Kani, then Minister of State in charge of Religious Affairs, in private conversation in September of the same year.
19. Khoiniha was later to become Emir al-Haj (Prince of the Mecca Pilgrims) on

Khomeini's orders.

20. *Tarikh*, p. 201.
21. *ibid.*, p. 203.
22. *ibid.*, p. 230.
23. *ibid.*, p. 243.
24. A new edition of the book became available in a 'clandestine' edition in August 1978 and sold thousands of copies.
25. A copy of the confidential report was made available to me by Hoveyda to help in an inquiry I was making about the disturbances. The result of the inquiry appeared on 6 March 1978 in the Persian edition of *Kayhan* under the heading 'The Renovation of Iran's Politics Has Become Inevitable'.
26. Both were quickly released.
27. Sharif-Emami in private conversation in September 1978.
28. Foruhar in private conversation in October 1978.
29. I was intimately involved in the abortive attempt at fostering a dialogue.
30. There were also several rude slogans about the Shah's twin sister, Princess Ashraf.
31. Names of members cannot be mentioned since most are still in Iran.
32. I did not allow the letter to be printed in *Kayhan*.
33. Homayun had not even read the letters and passed them on through an aide.
34. The name of the writer cannot be mentioned since he is still in Tehran. Another man, Parviz Nik-khah, was erroneously executed as the author of the insulting letter. Nik-khah had not even read the letter when he faced the firing squad in February 1979 in Tehran.
35. Shariatmadari sent the message through his son-in-law Abbasi.
36. Contrary to subsequent claims by the clergy, there had been no order from Tehran to fire on demonstrators.
37. The Shah made the speech at a meeting of the Iranian Women's Association on 11 January 1978.

Chapter 12

1. The *talabeh* killed was seeking sanctuary (*bast* in Persian) which is a right recognized by tradition. The residence of a Grand Ayatollah who is a *marja-e-taqleed* (source of imitation) is inviolate under the tradition. The Shah's troops had broken this tradition by forcibly entering Khomeini's home in 1964 and were now repeating the act by breaking into Shariatmadari's residence.
2. An exception was made when the Shah granted me two extended interviews in October 1976 and October 1977.
3. In an interview in October 1976.
4. During a private audience in September 1978 in Tehran.
5. Schmidt later became Federal Chancellor and the Shah believed him to have been the only Western leader to have urged strong support for the Iranian Government during the Western summit at Guadeloupe in 1978.
6. Strauss, however, did not join the group in the end.
7. The phrase was that of the Minister of State for Political Affairs, Holaku

Rambod, in a speech in the Majlis in February 1978.

8. The title of the book in Persian is *Akharin Talsh-ha dar Akharin Ruz-ha*, Tehran, November 1984.
9. Yazdi, op. cit., pp. 17 and 19.
10. The title of Bazargan's book in Persian is *Enqelab Iran dar do Harekat*.
11. The meeting with Foruhar was in Isfahan and with Moqadam in Tehran.
12. Foruhar said this in our conversation in Isfahan.
13. SAVAK accused the Tudeh Party and the Soviet Embassy in Tehran.
14. Zahedi said this in a private conversation in Tehran in December 1977.
15. The Shah's comment was reported by Hoveyda. Princess Ashraf also refers to it in her book *Faces in a Mirror*, New York, 1981.
16. Subsequent events showed that Carter had no policy vis-à-vis Iran at the time although members of his entourage may have been opposed to the Shah.
17. Reported by Haj Mohsen Torabi who attended several sessions in Najaf. The speech was also widely published in cassette form.
18. *Gozideh*, p. 193.
19. Reported by several businessmen who attended the meeting.
20. The Shah in a private audience in September 1978.
21. I had weekly meetings with Emami at the house of a mutual friend from August to October 1978. During those meetings he spoke cynically of the mullahs.
22. For a fuller list of the revolution's slogans, see Appendix 3.
23. In the early stages of the movement the mullahs accompanied demonstrators but remained on the pavements.
24. *E'lamieh*, p. 203.
25. *ibid.*
26. *ibid.*, p. 205.
27. *Nehsat*, vol. X, p. 31.
28. *Navid*, Tehran, no. 24.
29. Sharif-Emami in private conversation on 20 September 1978 in Tehran.
30. *E'lamieh*, p. 217.
31. I raised the matter with Shariatmadari during a private conversation in Qom in October 1978. He estimated the number of dead to have been around seven hundred. When asked why he did not say so to correct the much more exaggerated figures, he replied that the Shah had exaggerated everything for years and that he should now have a taste of what that meant.

Chapter 13

1. Published in *Jonbesh*, edited by Ali-Asghar Haj-Sayyed Javadi, in Tehran, January 1979.
2. Related by Mohammad Baheri who was Minister of Justice at the time and prevented the organization of a show trial.
3. Reported by Hoveyda after conversation with the Shah.
4. Hoveyda arranged for the Dino de Laurentis film to be screened for the Shah and the Empress.
5. Yazdi in *Last Efforts in Last Days*, pp. 23 and 74.

6. Bazargan in *Enqelab Iran dar do Harekat*, p. 23.

7. *ibid.*
8. Shah said this at a meeting at Nowshahr on 24 August 1978. Jamshid Amuzegar, then Prime Minister, and Hoveyda were also present, together with Empress Farah.
9. Oveissi related this in Paris in 1980.
10. Emami at a meeting at the residence of Javad Sa'ïd, the Speaker of Parliament in October 1978.
11. Related by Kani himself, in private conversations in Tehran in 1978 and in Paris in 1982.
12. Central Bank of Iran estimate in February 1979.
13. The scheme had the support of Generals Khosrowdad and Amin Afshar and was discussed at meetings at Zahedi's Hessarak residence in October 1978.
14. Related by Oveissi in Paris in November 1982.
15. The Shah's historic speech was not printed anywhere at the time since the press was on strike. Its full text has been published by Bazargan as an appendix to his book (see note 6 above).
16. *ibid.*
17. The massacre at Mashhad claimed more than two hundred victims and only made matters worse as Ayatollah Qomi, until then well disposed towards a compromise with the regime, was forced to interrupt all dialogue.
18. The subsequent claim that the Israelis were the first to realize that the Shah was about to fall cannot be supported by facts but is used by subscribers to the 'conspiracy theory' as a means of 'proving' the involvement of the Jewish state in the overthrow of the Shah.
19. *Navid*, no. 28.
20. Related by Sadeq Qomi, the son of the ayatollah, in a conversation in Mashhad in November 1978.
21. SAVAK mobilized its network to help spread the rumour.
22. At an audience with the Shah on 17 November 1978. Manuchehr Ganji, a former Education Minister, and Reza Ghotbi, the former head of radio and television, were also present.
23. *Gozideh*, p. 245.
24. Quoted in *Zendegi Reza Shah (The Life of Reza Shah)* by Ali Adibi, Tehran, 1976.
25. Motahari related this to a mutual friend in Tehran in February 1979.

Chapter 14

1. Bakhtiar's supporters believe that Huyser, then deputy commander of NATO, was dispatched to Tehran to encourage the generals to stage a coup. Huyser himself, however, says he had the mission of preventing such a move. The debate continues but is largely irrelevant since, with hindsight, we now know that no coup would have been possible or could have stopped the tide of revolution.
2. A. R. Nurizadeh, then a close friend of Ghotbzadeh, was present and relates the unusual intermission in the Ayatollah's hectic schedule at the time.

3. *ibid.*
4. Related by Bakhtiar himself. See, for example, his *Yek-rangi*, Paris, 1983.
5. Related by Hassan Nazih who was close to Bazargan at the time, in conversation in Paris in January 1983.
6. Related by Nurizadeh in private conversation in London, in 1984.
7. Arafat did eventually visit Tehran once but was allowed no publicity. He had to wear European clothes and was whisked to the Shah's palace from the airport for a two-hour audience in January 1971 before being whisked back to catch the first plane out.
8. Hani al-Hassan, interviewed by Tehran Radio on 20 February 1979.
9. Related by a mutual friend who met Qara-nay regularly shortly before the general was gunned down.
10. Forqan, reconstituted as a political group with headquarters in Paris, was responsible in 1985 for the murder of many close Khomeini aides and was accused of cooperation with former SAVAK operatives.
11. Related by Madani in private conversations in Paris in 1983 and 1984. Madani later ran for President but was eventually forced to flee the country.
12. The slogan was that of the Mujahedeen but was often used by Marxist groups as well.
13. Khalkhali in an interview with *Sobh Azadegan*, September 1984.
14. Khomeini in a speech at Qom on 9 April 1979, broadcast by Tehran Radio.
15. Khalkhali in an interview with the magazine *Ferdowsi* in Tehran, 19 April 1978.
16. Haj-Sayyed Javadi in an interview with the daily *Khalq Mossalman*, Tehran, 3 November 1979.
17. *ibid.*
18. Broadcast by Tehran Radio from Qom on 11 July 1979.
19. *ibid.*
20. Broadcast by Radio Iran from Qom on 20 August 1979.
21. Address at Qobad mosque in Tehran on 20 July 1981.
22. Ayatollah 'Alameh Tabataba'i in *Qur'an dar Islam*, Qom, 1980.
23. This was one of the Imam's favourite phrases.

Chapter 15

1. *Asnad Laneh Jassussi (Documents from the Nest of Spies)*, sixty-one volumes of documents seized at the US Embassy in Tehran.
2. The tragic incident in which eight members of a rescue mission died in the collision between two helicopters and a transport aircraft near the Iranian desert town of Tabas, persuaded Khomeini that the USA was still hostile to his regime.
3. For an account of the secret negotiations, see Hamilton Jordan's *Crisis*, New York, 1983. Jordan, however, does not reveal the identity of Beheshti's envoy at the secret talks.
4. In statements broadcast by Tehran Radio on 27 January.

5. Hamid Ruhani in notes to the Persian translation of Muhammad Haykal's *The Return of the Ayatollah* (in Persian, *Dastani keh nagofteh mand*), Tehran, 1982.
6. *Sobh Azadegan*, 28 October 1981.
7. Bazargan relates this in his book, p. 178.
8. On 4 October 1980.
9. *Sobh Azadegan*, 8 July 1981.
10. *ibid.*
11. Hussein Khomeini's speech was reproduced as a leaflet by Bani-Sadr's supporters in June 1981.
12. Bani-Sadr and Rajavi later separated and became political enemies.
13. *Sobh Azadegan*, 20 June 1981. Also the *Guardian*, London, 24 June 1981.
14. Khomeini develops this in his *Kashf al-Asrar*.
15. Related by Haj Nasser Tahami, who was, in part, involved in the mediation (private interview, Paris, September 1984).
16. The magazine *Shaheed (Martyr)*, June 1983.
17. Poem by Mim Atash.
18. Private interview with Shariatmadari in 1968. He was criticizing the Shah at the time.
19. See, for example, Senator Jesse Helms in testimony to the Senate, *Congressional Record*, 7 February 1985.
20. The names often used by the groups include Jihad Islami (Islamic Holy War) and Martyr Hussein's Squad.

Chapter 16

1. Quoted in *Engelab Eslami*, Paris, February 1985.
2. He was unable to visit Mashhad or even the shrine of Abdul-Azim south of Tehran.
3. *Al-Majallah*, London, 26 February 1985.
4. *Sobh Azadegan*, Tehran, 3 March 1983.
5. *Sokahnrani Imam beh monasebat payan Majlis Khebragan (The speech of the Imam on the occasion of the conclusion of the work of the Assembly of Experts)*, published by Pishva, Tehran, 1984.
6. *ibid.*
7. A woman's voice is allowed if she reads from a text in an ordinary way 'not causing lust or stirring sexual desires'. The singing female voice is allowed only if more than two women sing together provided their song is in praise of Allah or supportive of the revolution. The style of singing should not be conducive to 'lust or sexual desires'. Full conditions are listed in the magazine *Pasdar Islam*, Qom, October 1984. In March 1985 two other edicts seemed to 'liberalize' rules concerning women. Public laundries were allowed to accept women's clothing for dry-cleaning, and the development and printing of photos of women by professionals was also declared 'halal' (permitted). Nevertheless ambiguities continued and the daily newspaper *Kayhan* ran into trouble for publishing a crowd photo that showed several Lebanese women without the 'Islamic' headgear.

8. *Neda*, Paris, June 1982.
9. In an interview with the magazine *Saf*, Tehran, August 1984.
10. The religious minorities are the Armenians, the Assyrians, the Jews, the Zoroastrians, the Sabaeans, the Baha'is and the Yazidis. The last three, however, are not considered as religious communities but as 'political enemies'.
11. This group is charged with the task of forcing women to obey the rules of Islam.
12. The oil revenue for 1985 was projected to be at least 15 per cent lower than that of 1984.
13. The shrine of Zaynab, the sister of Imam Hussein, is situated at the Zaynabiah suburb of Damascus.
14. They are known as the *maktabis*, or those who follow the revolution from an ideological point of view rather than for emotional reasons.
15. A term borrowed from the French *nouveaux philosophes*.
16. *Kayhan*, airmail edition, 13 February 1985.
17. *Ibid.*
18. See Appendix 4.
19. Quoted in the *Gahnameh Enqelab (Calendar of the Revolution)*, Tehran, March 1983.
20. Related by Rafsajani in a Tehran Radio interview on 10 February 1983.
21. This handpicked brigade is charged with the task of protecting the capital against a possible military coup d'état.
22. *Kayhan*, airmail edition, 13 February 1985.
23. *Ibid.*
24. *Ahle-Maktab (The People of the School)*, Tehran, June 1984.
25. *Neda*, Paris, July 1983.
26. Report by Budget and Planning Ministry, Tehran, October 1984.
27. *Kayhan*, airmail edition, 13 February 1985.

Appendix 1

Two Poems by Ayatollah Khomeini

The Almond Tree

This *ghazal* or sonnet is taken from Khomeini's *Gozideh Ash'ar (A Selection of Poems)* published in Qom in 1979. The poem itself bears no date but was probably written in the 1930s.


It's spring and there is blossom on the almond tree.
 The bride of the garden is, verily, the almond tree.
 A sight that gives comfort to all tired eyes,
 Filling with joy the hearts of widows and orphans.
 To the sick man, to the dying it gives hope of cure
 A message from the Creator is this almond tree.
 It tells you that: beauty and life are created
 From the ugly earth that wore the death mask of winter.
 Carefree and joyful flock to the garden young and old
 Foolishly taking as eternal the blossoms of the tree.
 And yet suddenly the sky darkens with a thunderous cloud.
 Rain shakes the almond tree, scattering its blossoms.
 The bride of the garden stands naked and trembling
 Like an old beggar woman chased off a street.
 A moment's oblivion, the ingratitude of one moment
 Leads to a terrible lesson for those who forget God.
 'Hindi', knowing all this, remembers at every breath
 Not the beauty of the blossoms but He who made them so.

Tamerlane

The following poem, also taken from *Gozideh Ash'ar*, may have been written in the 1940s.

Appendix 5

Who rules the Islamic Republic? The social structure of political power in the Islamic Republic



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